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OF

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121

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VOL. XXXI JANUARY 1991 NUMBER 1

DEDICATION

This 121st issue of the **Darshana International**
is most respectfully **dedicated** *to*
DR. C. T K. CHARI

Retd. Professor of Philosophy, Madras Christian College Tambran. He was an eminent Professor of Philosophy, Psychology and Parapsychology and devoted his whole life for the cause of philosophy. His services will always be admired in the philosophical literature of India.

ANURAG ATREYA
Managing Editor

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DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

Darshana International has completed Thirty years of its existence with this number. *Darshana Internationol* served the cause of Philosophy and its allied disciplines for a long period of 30 years. It is all due to sincere and untiring efforts of the distinguished scholars on the Editorial Board, Contributors, Subscribers who are taking keen interest in bringing *Darshana International* to the lime light, who deserve our appreciation. This Journal has achieved rare distinction in the realm of the philosophical journals of the world.

The General Editor Dr. J. P. Atreya deserves much more appreciation for his efforts to continue this Journal which is run by him single handedly for the last 30 years.

Mr. B. V. S. S. Mani, the Hony. Managing Director of the Swadharma Swaarajya Sangha, Madras in enabling us to send *Darshana International* to several institutions. Mr. Mani has been a great source and solace of inspiration and motivation for us to promote philosophical undertaking to continue this venture of ours. His continuance finanicial assistance to promote the publication of the *Darshana Internatioual* for so many years has been very much helpful.

We are really sorry on account of financial difficulties the Journal is behind schedule. We are trying our best to bring it upto date.

Darshana Printers and its staff under the able leadership of Mr. S. K. Agarwal is doing work with sincerity and devotion. **They** deserve our heartfelt thanks for bringing out this Journal. Without their active interest and efforts it was not possible to continue this journal so long.

We are conscious of the shortcomings of our journal. It is all due to financial difficulties. The cost has gone enormously high and the regular publication is being delayed. We have published large number of articles of high standard to attract more and more scholarly readers.

We wish our Readers to introduce this Journal and recommend *Darshana Internatianal* to their friends and libraries in their vicinity to subscribe. We shall welcome article from you for the Darshana International.

We wish all our Readers, Subscribers, Members of the Editorial Board, and Contributors *A VERY HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR.*

ANURAG ATREYA
Managing Editor

I

Violence and Non-Violence. Some Sociocultural Aspects in History of Russia and India

Anikeeva E. N.

This paper is intended only to set some problems concerning one of the most anxious topics for all times : what is the source of violence, how to avoid it, is there a real progress of non-violence through human history, may non-violent resistence be effective against bloody violence and so on. Methodologically we speak about violence in that sense which Leo Tolstoy and Mahatma Gandhi meant : violence against nature, against nations, against mankind and against personality. We shall speak about non-violence also as the two mentioned thinkers : Russian and Indian,—have spoken. It may be posed two main problems : [1]) the capacity and the framework of non-violent resistence under the austere totalitarian rule,[2]) the possibility of prognosticating the supposed escalation of violence for avoiding it. These two problems may become clearer by having attention to some sociocultural aspects in history of Russia and India.

Preliminary we should say that though M. Gandhi believed in progress of non-violence in the whole history of mankind from barbarism to higher stages of civilization nevertheless the XXth century showed the "progress" of violence. That appeared in nuclear weapons, world wars, global crisis, destructive revolutions, totalitarianism, 'Red Terror', degradation of personality. What is the source of this Evil—escalation of violence in XXth century ? This question is not only philosophical—it has theological, moral and other aspects. As for philosophical attitude if it may be even admitted to speak about any progress in human history one should recognize only the paradoxical progress of non-violence. Paradoxical because the imperative of non-nuclear and non-violent world was at last achieved in XXth century by too expensive cost—by the escalation of violence.

Both Russia and India suffered much from violence. Especially Russia has undergone by the burst of violence in the first half of XXth century : World and Civil wars, Red Terror in the revolution 19 7, totalitarianism. Not to speak about Stalin's repressions Russia lost about 13 million lives only within the period from 1914 to 1923 mainly because of Red genocide and after that because of wars. The history of Red Terror has not yet written properly. It is known that one of its organizers N. I. Lenin even on the eve of revolution 1917 could not prognosticate the quantity of its victims. At that time he wrote that coming proletarian revolution would be non-violent or it would require only 2-3 hundred lives out of counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. The reality of revolution refuted Lenin's prognosis-Russia became the ocean of tears and blood : "Russia Washed by Blood", as one poet put it.

And what about Lenin ? May be he confessed in his criminal mistakes, may be he forbided the terror ? — Nothing of it. He welcomed the 'new proletarian law', the' new revolutionary violence' which was exactly directed not only against the bourgeoisie but against all the classes, against the whole nation. Besides Lenin made secret many facts of violence from the side of revolutionary regime. So he was conscious in his crime but could not foresaw it. Lenin looked at using of violence as the question of tactics and did not take it seriously. For Lenin the avoiding of violence was not the main point of politics. That is why the gap between the prognosis and the reality of violence in revolution 1917 in Russia was so vast. In contrast to this now-a-days the avoiding of violence is one of the main points of both inner and external policy. Nobody out of modern politicians can use Lenin's example prognosticating the scale of violent actions.

About the first of our problems, concerning the capacity of non-violent resistence to austere totalitarian regime. After first years of revolution the system of Red Terror became so rigid and complicated in its anti-human actions that it can be called Mega-Machine of Violence. According to Prof. K.S. Murty from India the 'socialisation of fear' was achieved in the whole society under totalitarian dictatorship due to secret repressions made by secret services like Nazi SS or we should add Soviet KGB. Tactics of non-violent struggle can be effective only when the act of self-sacrifice of one or many persons is done and this act is public. Without publicity, as Prof. K.S. Murty considers, non-violent resistence has no sense.1) At the same time working methods of such secret services are directed straight to the

---

1 See : Murty K. S. The Quest for Peace. N. Delhi, 1986, p. 101.

exception of the very opportunity of public self-sacrifice and the opportunity of corresponding reaction of other people. Stalin's totalitarian regime in Russia not only oppressed the possible opposition but accidentally chose its victims and made mass-killings secret wiping off the very memory of tortured fathers for new generations. That does not mean the absence of personal feat of victims. Only a few years ago we became able to have an information about the awful facts of totalitarian authority in our country. And these facts are to be demonstrated before the justice of history.

So the capacity of non-violent resistence under the austere totalitarian rule is almost non-realizable. We agree with Prof. K. S. Murty in this. Perhaps non-violent struggle needs the preconditions of democratic and civil society which is antipode of totalitarianism. But in case of erosion of totalitarian system, e.g. during Gorbachev's period when the society achieved the level of publicity the non-violent methods become more and more effective. Events in Moscow in August 1991 showed that non-violent resistence of thousands of the civilians against communist politician who have dared to move the troops along the peaceful capital. Non-violent resistence was one of the main factors of crash of totalitarian regime in USSR.[2] Notwith-standing only three victims in this struggle between military and civilians this did not mean an easy victory of non-violence over violence. And these three apparent victims were the symbols of millions who by secret have been tortured by Communist Terror. Cannot be non-violence defined as moral power ?

India did not know such form of concentration of violence in XXth century like Russia. But during millenia India suffered from a terrible form of violence (according to M. Gandhi) which is cast-system and oppression of down-trodden and 'untouchables'. We need to mention that not caste-system itself but ostracism of down-trodden and 'untouchables' is the most odious featcher of this system. It may be remembered that Nietzsche's idea of racial superiority of Aryans meant first of all humiliation of chandala, and this humiliation was called by Nietzsche "Aryan humanism".

Indeed millions of people in India were deprived of culture during millenia, and their status was very disastrous. The energy of fear and despair generated through centuries and did not have an exit.[3])

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[2] This does not mean that modern democratic leaders in Russia who was in opposition to communist violence do not themselves use violence against peaceful civilians.

[3] The situation was expressively shown by Om Poory in brilliant movies "Akrosh".

Can anybody says that this energy will not in any case transform to the energy of riot and destruction under certain circumstances ? Now we observe the enforcement of political struggle of 'untouchables' and down-trodden in modern India. The collisions in this struggle mark that the problems have not yet properly solved and the tension is growing. The danger of social explosion is real. Indian historian Hiren Mukherjee considers its supposed power as more destructive than all known revolutions.[4]) The fundamental question of prognostication of probable escalation of violence stands again. To find the way for an answer we shall see some historical parallel between Russia and India.

The revolution 1917 in Russia won mainly due to inner process of spontaneous democratization of down-trodden peasant population. A famous Russian philosopher S. L. Franc who during 1920-1930's in emigration analized the causes and the factors of this revolution came to such a conclusion. He wrote that alienation between upper and low classes in Russia was so great that revolutionary ideology became an adequate expression of hostile feeling of common illiterate people to cultural gentle folks. The Bolshevics were lucky to govern this process of spontaneous democratization which in other words S. Franc called "invasion of inner barbar" and that is why they since 1917 could catch and hold the power.[5]) The forces of counteraction to a cultural nihilism in Russian society were very weak at that time. The culture of upper classes was almost quitely wiped off by the revolution and the cult of brutal force and "revolutionary violence" was erected.

The struggle of 'untouchables' in modern India may be considered as the same process of spontaneous democratization of down-trodden population. The less cultural level of fighting people—the more danger of extension of violence. But unlike the situation in Russia 1917 there are more factors of counteraction to the process in India. The striking facts of self-burning of Hindus from upper castes as a protest against the increase of reservation for 'untouchables' tell that cultural classes in India worry much by the probable "invasion of inner barbar". Nevertheless self-burning is not the solution of problems of 'untouchables', and the tension in Indian society may grow.

Continuing a historical parallel between Russian revolution 1917 and the struggle of Indian 'untouchables' we shall consider ideologi-

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4 See : Mukherjee H. Gandhi, Ambedkar and the Extirpation of Untouchability. N. Delhi, 1982, p. 29.

5 See : Eranc S. L. Beyond "right" and "left", New World, 1990. No. 4, p. 215 (in Russian).

cal aspects. No doubt, the more radical is ideology of fighters the more violence they can use in their struggle. An atheism which is one of the most if not the most radical ideology became a banner of cultural destruction in Russia in 1920-1930's because of extirpation of religion and church. And the latters are the heart of any culture. Do modern Indian 'untouchables' confess an atheism ? — No. (Or not yet ?). But their protest bears apparent anti-Hindu direction which is radical too. If many thinkers say that Hinduism is the core of Indian culture has any anti-Hindu ideology the potentialities destructive for this culture ?— A complicated question.

First of all better to pay attention to anti-Hindu character of ideology of 'untouchables'. It is known that a spiritual leader of Indian 'untouchables' B. R. Ambedkar was a passionate exposer of Hinduism. Not all of his works concerning criticism of Hinduism were published during his life. especially "Riddles in Hinduism". In 1988 this work came out through severe censorship under the pressure of "pure castes". As a protest to this half million of 'untouchables' took parts in political demonstration in Bombay, the great political action in our times.[6] It shows that ideological questions concerning the attitude to Hinduism stand not in the last place in political struggle of untouchables. It may be supposed that if anti-Hindu direction of their ideology strengthen there will be more potentialities of violence in their struggle and vice versa.

And yet the question about anti-Hindu direction of 'untouchables' ideology is perhaps the most controversial. Untouchable castes are Hindus or not ? And if even to admit they are Hindus the problem of their alienation from Hindu culture remains. In this connection we can pay more attention to some aspects of Hindu and (non-anti) Hindu tendencies in ancient Indian ideology. We are interested in problem of genesis and spreading of original form of Indian atheism—the ideology of Lokayatas and Haitukas (atheistic logicians). Some well-known indologists believe that Lokayata coming from outside did not belong to Indian ground, and atheism itself is accidental and absolutely alien to Indian culture. Is it alien in the same degree and in the same sense as at first shudras and then untouchables are alien to Hinduism ? The question is not abstract. There are many evidences and data in ancient Indian manuscripts that show almost the equal status of both down-trodden and atheists. But everything concerning varnas and castes in India should be taken seriously so we cannot consider Indian atheism as accidental.

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[6] See : Yurlova E. S. Untouchables in India. Moscow, 1989, p. 90 (in Russian).

Before regarding these evidencies we should say that just Indian atheism (Charvaka—Lokayata) was perhaps the most radical ideology among atheistic doctrines in other countries. Lokayata's conception of "deceptive" origin of religion is known in India already in the beginning of A. D.)[7]. Such radical atheistic ideas came to Arab culture in late medieval period not to speak about Europe where they appeared only in XVIIIth century. And the more radical was Lokayata's ideology the more potentialities of violence could it bring. But what was the reaction of Hindu orthodoxy ? It was not non-violent at all as ancient data show.

By writings of Marxist Indian philosopher Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya[8] we understand that ancient evidencies tell about the equal oppression of materialists, atheists and logicians from one side (Lokayatas and Haitukas) and of shudras from the other side. In "Manuimrti" it is said that the insulting of Vedas in the same crime as killing of brahmin (XI. 55-57); and you must not even speak with breakers of caste-discipline, nastikas and logicians (IV. 30). Maitri Upanisad blames criminals among whom are insulters of Vedas and learned shudras. (VII. 8). Who were these learned shudras ? May be they constituated a serious political opposition to brahmin-kshatrtiya establishment ? Not without reason Manu warned not to live in such a state whose authorities were shudras and low-caste people and where they subdued to nastikas; such a state must perish (IV. 61). Was not this a predecessor of atheistic state which completely realized in two thousand years in Russia ?

No doubt, the reaction of Hindu orthodoxy to both atheistic and low-caste danger was violent. Shudras underwent cruel tortures even if they heard the Vedas. Ostracism of down-trodden castes and we should add of atheists was one of the most violent treatment. The works of Lokayatas were purposely extirpated by brahmins as J. Nehru believed. Our hypothesis is that atheistic ideology circulating among shudras and down-trodden was one of the main factors of enforecement of violent oppression of low castes. This hypothesis should be examined.

Cannot be the inference from all that was said that violent revolution of modern Indian 'untouchables' would be just ? —Yes, some neo-Bolshevic would definitely agree with this and surely would spread original Indian Lokayata's ideology among 'untouchables'. But we should say— No; violence borns violence, and it is not the wisdom. Violence can be conquered not by violence, but by non-violence. The solution of problems of 'untouchables' by Bolshevic methods would be the tragedy for India. The bloody history of Bolshevism in Russia warns from it.

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[7] According to Madhavacharya, Charvakas say : "The authors of three Vedas are just cheats and cunning thieves".

[8] Chattopadhyaya D. "What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy". N. Delhi, 1976; "Science and Society in Ancient India". Calcutta, 1977, et alt.

2

Doctrine of Rebirth

J. P. Garg

The theory of rebirth takes for granted that life is eternal and that it is subject to retribution. The belief in the eternality of human life ensues from the conviction that besides having a body-form, man possess soul which inhabits inside it, imparts life to it and moves it to act. Soul is termed emobodied self in the Gita. It is assumed that the soul is an infinitesimal part of God and is ever-lasting, enduring and eternal as God is considered to be. It is a long held conviction that the existence of human life is due to infusion of soul in the body-form, and so human life assumes the eternal character of soul. However it is a mute question as to how and at what stage the infusion of soul in the body-form took place. Theologians however, advance the theory that the pre-existing human soul enters the body by divine infusion at conception or birth. It is but a religious belief. There appears to be no rational and logical basis for this belief. So far no logical and rational explanation has been provided for this belief. Since the input of soul in man has been a long established belief, we are accustomed to this doctrine without demanding proof or harbouring any doubt about it. The belief in the existence of the soul in the body-form of man has to be assumed to give credibility to the theory of rebirth.

All activities of man are considered to be due to the extstence of soul in him which is his embodied self. The nature of soul is to remain always is incessant motional action and so it keeps man ever engaged in activity. Activity in fact is life. Krishna in Gita (chapter 3 verse 5) teaches that "Nor can anyone even for an instant, remain really actionless, for helplessly is everyone driven to action by the qualities born of nature" of the soul. Even the Great Soul God is always active as Krishan in Gita (chapter 3, verse 22) points out that "There is nothing in three worlds, O Partha, that should be done by me, nor anything unattained that might be attained; Yet I mingle in action." However, the action of soul is limited to providing energy to a physical and chemical vehith. For soul or The Great Soul has only incessant motional attributes. In themselves both the soul and the Great Soul do not and can not directly perform observable actions, as both the soul and the Great Soul (Parmatma) are not objective realities. Their actions are, however, visualized to be expressed through an observable object. It is due to the nature of soul to be uninterruptedly and unceasingly always in active motion that it keeps matter with which it mingles in motional activity. Hence man passess on from birth to birth, and thus maintains the continuity of action and motion since soul admits of no break as it is eternal and always in motion. It is neither static nor can ever be static. Soul in fact is all motion and a continuous and uninterrupted motion. At the end of one life when the body is destroyed, soul departs from it and passes on to another body and in this way maintains the continuity of motion and this is what is meant by rebirth. It is this inherent motional character of the soul that enable the phenomenal appearances to remain ever in motion and engaged in activity. It is due to the uninterrupted continual motional character of the soul that rebirth is a must.

The view expressed in Old Testament is that God created man in his own image. "And God said, "Let us make men in our image, after our likeness :" "So God created man in his own image in the image of God created he him, male and female created he them" Genesis chapter 1 para 26 and 27. While creating man after His image, God gave his body. God himself does not possess any body. For he is not an objective reality. The body of a man being liable to dissolution and ultimate destruction can-not be the image of God. For God is undestructible and all spirit. He is of spiritual character. God is the Reality Himself, Great Soul and all existences. God is everlasting and eternal. It is, therefore, the soul of man and not the body that is the image of God in him, and like God is eternal. This image of God in man is the infinitesmical part of Great Soul what is God Himself : This infinitesimal soul of Great Soul in man, however, is not separated from God at any stage, similar to the moment of time which ever remains linked to time, and forms part of a continuous process of time. Soul of man never becomes static as to moment of time never becomes stationary. It is always moving It is always in action. Accordingly soul possess on from body to body and this is known as rebirth.

In the Vedantic philosophy, God is named as Brahma, The Great Soul Man is also designated as Brahma as is clear from the Vedantic declaration 'I am Brahma', that man is Brahma. In harmony with this proclamation Swami Ram Tirath Called Himself Brahma. Th.s has the same meaning as to say that Brahma is Great Soul and man in an infinitesimal soul. Thus man is essentially a soul which is eternal and not subjected to death. Soul, the ambodied self is infinite while the bodies of embodied self are finite. That the soul or the embodied self is eternal, indestructible and immeasurable, is the declaration of Gita. The embodied self is soul but not distinct from the Great Soul, God. Its inherent character is neither diminished nor upgraded at any time.

The infinitesimal soul in man has the same relation to the Great Soul, God as an infinitesimal drop of water has to the water of which it is the drop. The embodied self is related to the Great Soul as a sample of grain is related to the mass of grain, of which it is a sample.

The body of the embodied self has no existence without the presence of soul in it. On the soul leaving the body at death, the body starts disintegrating and becomes a corpse to be disposed of by burial, or by putting it to flames or in any other way, but embodied self continues to exist even after the extinction of its body as it is eternal. In only changes bodies. It abondons old and worn-out bodies and adopts to new ones. This transfer of soul from one body to another is what is treated as rebirth in the Hindu scriptures. The soul is described as indestructible, parpetual, unborn and undiminishing. Regarding rebirth of the soul, Krishna examplifies that as a man, casting off worn-out garments takes new ones, so the dweller in the body (soul) casting off worn out bodies, enters into others that are new. The soul in itself is neither born nor subjected to death. It only changes bodies. The body is unreal, but the soul is real. It is the soul that counts and not the body as Long Fellow has brought out in his couplet "From dust thou springs. To dust thou returnest was not spoken of the Soul." Rebirth is of the soul in the sense that it enters a new body after throwing off the old one, and not of the body. The body is the product of matter in motion and its existence is due to favourable environmental conditions. The bodies of all the living beings are in essence matter in motion. The bodies are formed because of favourable environmental conditions. The bodies of the living beings in the world are conditional. If those conditions cease to exist, all bodies of the living beings will be extinguished and soul in bodies will cease to operate. Life will come to end. All individual souls will automatically become one with the Great Soul, God, and the appearent individuality of souls will vanish.

There is a theory that continues to gain support that life was the inevitable result of chemical evolution, following the emergence of the solar system. If the conditions responsible for chemical evolution become non-existent, life will evaporate and vanish. This theory applies to bodies only but does not speak of the soul that inhabits the body and counts for the so-called rebirth. It only points out that bodies are destined to destruction. Soul, however, is a permanent entity. On the total extinction of life on earth, soul will have no role to play and the question of rebirth will not arise. Indirectly the theory supports the view that soul is permanent and non-destructable, while the bodies are temporary and bound to annihilation. Bodies have, therefore, no roll to play in the matter of rebirth, in the sense that the same particular identifiable body will emerge after its dissolution. The identity of the body is effaced on death.

In a general way, however, bodies can be said to be reborn, signifying that a body of a particular specie ceases to exist on its destruction but new bodies of the same specis in the same form comes into existence. So perpetual existence of bodies of different species is a permanent feature unless there is complete annh'ilation of life or of that particular specie on earth. Different condition are, however, required for the existence of different kinds of species. If any of the conditions necessary for the existence of a particular species becomes extinct, only that particular specie is annihilated and not all the species. Changes in conditions take place but occasionally and after a long period of time. It depends upon the speed of the emotion effecting those condition. Due to this fact, it is conjectured that some species of olden days have become non-existent, while others have surfaced. The study of some planets of our solar system have indicated that there might have existate life in them but due to the scarcity of conditions necessary for the existence of life, life has become extinct in them. The structure of bodies of diffe ent species does not change but it remains the same so long as there is no complete annihilation. At death, only the particularization of bodies ceases to exist, for which Arjun was lamenting. Lord Krishna consoles him with the lesson that 'The wise grieve neithere for the living nor for the dead' For "Not any time was I not, nor thou, nor these princes of man, nor verilly shall we ever cease to be hereafter." Gita capter 2 verse 12: Here 'I' and 'thou' refer to the mental set up and out look of an individual and his status and position in the society which gives him particularity and which differ from man to man. Persons like Arjun, Krishna and others, such as princes will ever exist. Mental set up, behaviour and mode of action of human beings in general with slight variations is a permanent feature but which, of course, differ from individual to individual to maintain separate identity of each.

Strictly speaking the principle of rebirth states that the soul enters in another body-from after death or destruction of the previous body-from in which it has so long inhabited. This process is a permanent feature. Soul is accordingly the pivot of the principle of rebirth. The soul, however, in itself, is incapable of performing overt or inward actions, being not an objective reality, and so remains unattached to the actions of the body-forms; it only stimulates the phenominal appearences to act by providing motion to them. The activity of the soul is limited to its emotional character, being always in continual notion. According to chapter 13 verse 30 of Gita, "He who seath that matter verily performs all actions, and the self is actionless, he seeth, "Being beginning-less and without qualities, imperishable supreme Self, though seated in the body......worketh not, nor is affected,"—chapter 13, verse 32 of Gita. Thus the soul is like the electric current which on passing into the body of an electric motor, provides motion to it. It is the matrer of electric motor that acts. It is the activated material structure of the electric motor that acts. Similarly it is the activated bodies of different living species which acts. But bodies in themselves are also actionless, but have the potency to act being constituted out of matter in motion, and came into existence because of chemical evolution and the infusion of soul in them. The action and mental set up of the body of each specie depends upon its own identifiable physical constitution, shaped out of different elements of matter and distinct chemical componen*is*.

Neither the bodies in themselves nor the soul in itself can be subjected to retribution as both are actionless in themseles. Besides the soul has no directional potentiality for human actions. It is the union of soul with matter that provides life to the body and moves it to perform actions as is done by the electric motor on the passing of electric current into it. But the actions of living bodies are quite different from man-made or artificial bodies. The actions of living bodies are voluntary, while the actions of artificial bodies are involuntary. Actions of living bodies are willed and discretionary. Will, intention and purpose are attributed to all human actions. The mind which evolves out of the union of soul wtth matter of the brain, is the source of this will, intention and purpose· Accordingly it is the mind or mental set up that directs the body to perform actions. Mind being responsible for to actions of man can, therefore, be sub jected to retribution. Sufference and pleasure depends on mental attitude, which is formed out of experiences gained by coming into contact with the outside social world in accordance with the intensity of attachment to the concerned social situation and mental level of the society of the time. Mental set up of each man, in general, is formed in accordance with the prevailing social atmosphere with which the individual has contact and intercourse. There are, however, a very few people who are treated as genius and are a numbered let in the entre history of man. They revolt against the prevailing system and give a new direction to the thought; feeling and behaviour of man and transforms all existing views, feelings and behaviour of man to new ones.

These considerations are a pointer to the fact that mind is the driving impulse of all human actions. It is the mental set up that signifies the existence of man. Man without mind is only a senseless thing and dumb matter. The soul in itself has no material attibutes. God, the Great Soul is attributeless. Mind, in fact, is the man-a man is what he thinks" I think therefore, I am", Thought generates the view which a man holds. No doubt, the views are formed by mind on coming into contact with the level of thinking of the time and existing behaviour and mode of living of men in the prevalent society in which one is born and lives. Mental set up of an individual thus constituted, differ from mental set up of other individual depending on differences of time, social situations, angles of mental vision and capacity of mental reception. In addition, man has some inherent mental capacities the origin of which is still not known. Every man looks at the social structure of his time from his own angle which is his inherent characteristic, which may have been formed out of his heredity. However it is difficult to trace the source of heridity despite unlimited regression. It might have developed by coming into contact with prevaling social environmental conditions which went on changing from time to time. Individual differ from one another on the ground of what and how one thinks and how one acts influenced by different religious feelings, political conditions and social behaviour of the time. In case of rebirth link between the previous birth and the new birth is essential, and this link could only be maintained by mind for the purpose of retribution. Link of the soul between the previous birth and new birth is of the continual motion with-out regard and attachment to retribution.

So far we have brought out in our above study in respect of the doctrine of rebirth that life is sustained by soul. It is believed that since soul is, so life is. Soul is treated to be the necessary condition of life, and also the necessary condition of rebirth. But the materialists consider matter, in motion under certain circumstantial conditions and due to favourable chemical evolutionary composition, to be the basis for the existence of life which is in material form only. They reject soul as necessary adjunct to generate life. It is held by then that the existence and centinuation of life in material shape is due to two accidents, the accident of birth and the accident of death. Had these accidents not occured, there would have not existed life in the material form and the question of rebirth would never have arisen. Hence the doctrine of rebirth is a dependable theory. It is not a theory that can stand of itself, as there are other scientific theories such as the theory which has now been turned into a certain principle that steem has power, that motion is a continuous process act. Hence according to them the doctrine of rebirth is only a presumption and not a faet.

There are may assumptions in the accepted theory of rebirth such as the existence of soul, the infusion of soul in the body form, the creation of life because of the existence of a Creater and His interfearance in human actions possessing discretionery powers to use them in awarding happy or miserable life to living beings as the case be. It is also depended on the fear generated by the view of God that He look on the doings of man and reward them with the happy or miserable life as the case be. The doctrine of rebirth is however mainly dependent on retribute. Without consideration of retribution, the doctrine of rebirth is meaningless. Thus the theory of rebirth is a dependent theory and cannot stand by itself. It envisages the continuation of life. But this continuation takes place under the condition stated about. It is not based on the materialistic theory of the accident of birth and death. On the other hand the theory of rebirth is purposive and occurs specially for the purpose of retribution. But rebirth is possible because of the reality being inherent uninterupted motion.

Discression :

Motion is an ultimate truth. The universe would never have been possible without its base being motion. That motion is an ultimate truth will be dealth with separately under the head "Ultimate Reality".

There is also a different theory of rebirth, where the soul casting off a body on death remains dormant till the Day of Judgement, when it rises to face God to give account of his doings when living in the body who which it abondoned on its destruction. Doing are attached and unattached interested and uninterested. It is the attached and interested actions which are taken as polluting the otherwise pure soul, for which man has to give account as he is responsible only for such actions. The soul which performs only uninterested and unattached actions stands freed and has already becomes one with God which is called Moksha. In this connection the Gita points out that "the disciplined self, moving among sense-objects with senses free from attraction and repulsion, mastered by the Self, goeth to peace." (moksha)-Gita chapter 2, verse 64. But we have already brought out that soul is itself in unattached. More over the soul is the image of God and is, therefore not responsible for actions performed by an individual. What, then wakes up on the last day of judgement. The soul is considered to be the image of God according to the old Testament. But this image is not the representative of God but an undetached element of God. Soul and God are one and unlimited. Soul embodied self-becomes limited on its infusion in the body just as water becomes limited in a bucket but it remains water in essence. In these circumstences the question arises as to who gives account of doings to God and who receives the award or punishment. The recepient of this reward or punishment is the mind, or mental set up of man which we may call mental soul.

The theory of the Day of judgement is that God gives hearing to each dead mental soul and pessess His judgement granting punishment or award as it deserves. Having then under-gone the punishment or received the award in the shape of praise as the case be, it stands purified. This is what is ment by retribution on the day of judgement. This rising of the soul after destructions of the body in which it has live in the past is what is meant by rebirth of souls on the day of judgement, Thus purified God takes the soul into Himself and becomes One with it. Here rebirth takes places only once on the Last Day of Judgement. Thus retribution in this theory takes place only once at the final stage. In the other theory of rebirth where the soul traveles from onebody to another the object of rebirth is to reap the fruits of doings in the previous birth or suffer condemnation, pain, distress, sorrow and misery of his doings in the previous birth. Here Retribution takes place from birth to birth.

Thus the theory of rebirth has two view points, In both these aspects, however the existence of a permanent entity known as soul recognised, which is not subject to destrucsion at any stage and lasts forever. According to one view the soul remains dormant till it awakes on the end of the world on the last day of the judgement. After being purified by the judgement of God it becomes one with God. In the other view the soul remains awake forever and travels from body to body. On the destruction of one body it adopts another new body. It does not speak of the end of world as rebirth is taken as a continuous process.

In the above discussion on the doctrine of rebirth it has been made clear that to consider soul as the vehical of rebirth falls short of the consideration of retribution, a necessary constituent of the theory of rebirth. Moreover, the individuality and particularity of soul in a body of man is also disputed. Soul, in fact is only a life principle and to consider soul as maintaining identifiable particularity of man is a myth. More transmigration of soul even if it occurs can not be strictly treated as rebirth. For soul can not be the vehical of rebirth of a particular identifiable men. The other composing constituent of man is his body. But it has been made clear that particular identifiable body of man is destined to destruction and complete annihilation at his death. In these circumstances body ca also not become the subject of rebirth. At best, it has been suggested in the above discussion that mental soul yielding mental set up can be taken as a vehical of rebirth. For it has individuality of its own. Each man has his own psychological build-up which differs from individual to individual and therefore each man has his own psychological identifiable individuality. Rebirth envisages that a particular identifiable living being is born again after his death. This individuality can be identified by his own individual mental set up. But it requires further examination of this claim to find out the truth.

Mental soul is taken as a combination of mental capacity and soul. For mental capacity becomes operative only when energiased by soul. On the departure of soul from the body mental set up also departs, deserting the dead body. Mind is the source of mental capacity which is formed out of the working of the individualived structure of the brain, which develops progressively from childhood to full manhood. Mind has no pre-existence of its own like soul. It is a product of the brain. It is a material reality. It is not an innate faculty. But rather an acquaired ability of living beings. Thinking is the resultent of mental capacity of mind, which goes on developing side by side with the development of brain from childhood to manhood. At birth the baby performs only instinctive actions as its mental capacity is almost nil. Mind is thus the product of unique physical structure of brain not only of human beings but also of all other beings; However, there are certain living beings such as plants and trees where a structure akin to brain can not be located at any place in the body of the plants or the trees. If an action is imputed to be performed by them, it is instinctive only. In the performance of instinctive actions mind is not involved, and hence existence of brain is not necessary.

Two kinds of actions are performed by living beings. Instinctive actions and throught out or purposive actions. Instinctive actions are involuntary and independent of reason or experience. Instinctive actions result from inborn tendency to behave in a way characteristic of a specie. Only the purposive and voluntary actions are indicators of the existence of the minds. Instinctive actions are carried but by all living beings of the world, including plants and trees. If we consider sound made by a living being as an action the sound made by trees and plants is an action, but this action is an instinctive one. There are touch plants which immediately reach on the touch of a finger of another living being such as man. This reaction is instinctive. Rebirth is possible in respect of the voluntry and purposive actions only for such actions can be subjected to retribution. It is them mental soul or mental whole that performs such actions, and as such could form the vehicle of rebirth.

But rebirth is meaningful only if all actions performed by mind, are out of his free will. It now needs examination whether actions performed by individuals come out of their free will. The possibility of free will has to be enquired. Man is a social animal and the excution of all his actions are in relation to the society, in which he moves and lives. Along with the growth of the body, his social circle also grows. He has his playmates, school mates, fellow workers and other companies in the circle of which he acts and communicates. He influences his social contacts and is influenced of them. His actions are not performed in solitariness as those of Robinson Crusoe, who was ship-wrecked on a tropical island.

On the birth of a child, the baby is surrounded by the doctor and nurses concerned, effecting his birth and then by his parents, relations and other acquaintances. The baby is immediately imprisoned within this sociel circle. Their behaviour, actions and talk are imprinted on the clean slate of the mind of the child. Even before birth the would be child in the womb is influenced by the talk and behaviour of his parents and other accessive relations and friends. The case of Abhimanyu who learnt to break chakraview in womb of his mother is relevent here. With the physical growth of the child to manhood, mind develops accordingly on the basis already determined. In addition there/are inborn tendencies of actions, which are predetermind and may be due to heredity or the social environments of the past. In such circumstances free will is not a possibility. Moreover astrological prophesies, which come out to be true in some cases points to the fact that life is predetermined, and depends on the movement of stars and planets. Probably on these considerations Arther Schopenhouer opined that, "you can do what you will, but you will, but you can not will what you will." In view of these considerations, which question the free will of man, the theory of rebirth as stated above falls to the ground.

There is, however, another view in relation to the theory of rebirth. The mind developes with the growth of the physical structure of man, and keeps its own individuality distinct from the physical structure as is indicated during dreams in the sub-conscious state. At death, the physical structure is completly destroyed, but the menal set up of the dead man which has its own individuality after deserting the dead body moves about to seek avenues for its disposal. Some mental wholes enter into the bodies of newly born babies, and this is strictly speaking a rebirth. But there are very few cases of this type. It happen in only a very few cases. This type of rebirth, therefore is negligible. Some mental setsup are disintegrated into philosophy elements and mix up with the mental atmosphere and form a universal mental environment, which prevades the human world.

A very few mental wholes seeking their disposal locate themselves into the bodies of trees or station themselves in some solitary phenomenal things or places. They are called ghosts. They roam about near their places of locations as disembodies spirits of dead persons. They have no bodies and hence they are incisible.

There is another way of enunciating the theory of rebirth. The father being reborn in the form of his son. The son generally inherits the traits of his father and becomes his copy in many aspects. This point was made clear by the child Chaitenya while arguing with his mother on the matter of the execution of his father by the king Anand and his subsequent death. He told his mother that his father is not dead but lives in him and pervades in his blood and veins. He is his father, being reborn. But the conventional doctrine of rebirth do not take into cognizance this type of rebirth. But on the basis of what has been enumerated above indicate that this type of rebirth is a possibility and should be treated as such. There is a continuation of life from father to son. There is retribution in this view of rebirth. The son inherits the fruits of the doings of his father. If the father leaves wealth, the son enjoys it. If he dies a pauper the son suffers and leads a miserable life. Besides good and bad deeds of the father effect the life of his son.

On the basis of above discussions where various aspects of the doctrine of rebirth have been dealt with, it can be stated that in reality there is no rebirth. The conception of rebirth is merely a delusion. It was profounded with a view to keeping man within moral limits in regard to his actions in the society; It is to generate fear of retribution that man could be dissuaded from spreading evil in the human world and that man could lead a pious, morally happy and right life and maintain the spirit of brother -hood and universal love.

In any case the stated doctrine of rebirth is a general theory and not related to any particular religion. It finds acceptance by all human beings-some believe in immediate reabirth after death while other believe in one birth only after death on Dooms Day when imagined soul of all dead persons appear before God to here his verdict in respect of their doings, when acted in human forms. There is also a cogant and reasonable view in regard is the doctrine of rebirth. Reaction to action is a scientific and logical doctrine of cause and effect. Every action has a reaction. Every cause has an effect, Each out-ward action is guided by inner incitement of mind. Each physical action depends on the constitution of the mind. Evil mind performs evil actions white good, pious and moral minds perform good, pious and moral actions. Immediately an action is performed its reaction is immediately determined. Rebirth goes on every moment and not after death. Similarly judgement on an action, whether good or bad has not to wait till the dooms day. Every moment is a day of judgement and rebirth take place at every moment. In this view of momentary rebirth, instinctive action, are not taken cognisance of.

As a result of all the above discussion in regard to this doctrine of rebirth, a question is posed-rebirth of what? Both the soul and the body in their individual capacitiies falls short of being a vehical of rebirth. Mental whole of man after his death does not always find an occasion to enter a new body at its formative stage, and hence rebirth in all cases is not possihle. Such a rebirth is an exception Hence it can be concluded that the conventional theory of rebirth is not a sound doctrine to rely.

3

A Defense of Masculinism Versus Feminism Or, A Reply to Alison Jaggar and Feminists in General

John O. Nelson

A Prefatory Explanation

Although, as its title indicates, Alison Jaggar's recently published paper, "Feminist Ethics : Projects, Problems, Prospects,"[1] is intended primarily to describe various contending schools of thought within the feminist camp and to make practical recommendations thereon, in the process of doing so Jaggar repeats with approval some of the more common canards of feminism and also, and more importantly, sets forth a plausible minimal criterion of anything's being properly called "feminism."

For the last two reasons, and because Jaggar is a recognized authority and proponent of feminism and hence may be quoted without its being imputed that one is unfairly representing that philosophy or dogma, I shall carry out my defense of masculinism versus feminism within the framework of Jaggar's "Feminist Ethics : Projects, Problems, Prospects". This intention will explain the subheading of our defense of masculinism versus feminism, "A Reply to Alison Jaggar and Feminists in General".

A Defense of Masculinism versus Feminism

To go by "Feminist Ethics: Projects, Problems, Prospects" (henceforth, FEPPP), or almost any other contemporary promulgation of feminism. the combatants in the immemorial battle between the sexes and the nature of thr battle itself have in recent years suffered or undergone a dramatic sea-change.

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[1] Alison Jaggar, "Feminists Ethics, Projects, Problems, Prospects", *Denken der Geschlechterdifferenz, Neue Fragen und Perspektiven der Feministichen Philosophie*, edd Herta Nagl-Docekal, Herlinde Pauser-Studer; Reihe Frauenforschung Band 14, Wien, Wiener Frauenverlag, 1999, 143-159.

It used to be that the combat, insofar as anyone's conscious understanding of it went, was a contest either between individuals as such, this particular wife, this particular husband, or in the case of some very acute observers, like Chaucer, a contest motivated by the secret ambition of women to rule men.[3] The particular morality, legal system, religious doctrines of the time and place were not in contention. Aboue all, it was not claimed, by one party or the other, that these social and religious frameworks were designed by males for their own advantage, or by females for theirs. They were like the squares on a chessboard upon which the contest takes place but are themselves not in contention.

Today, at least in feminist circles as described by Jaggar, the combat of the sexes is taken to be a combat between not only the above social, legal, and moral frameworks, the analogical squares of our chessboard, but even between those most abstract and hence seemingly sexless frameworks of all, philosophic systems of ethics.

In what follows, namely, my defense of masculinism, I shall accept this contention of the feminists. It may therefore appear that our argumentation has to be flawed from the commencement, for if even philosophical thought is sexually biased, then, it would seem, neither Jaggar nor I can escape in our philosophizing a relativism that precludes an objective determination of questions. It will be one of may main projects to show why this is not in fact the case and to show how masculinism in philosophy, as well as elsewhere, escapes the present charge, though feminism does not.

Before I proceed to this validation of masculinist philosophy, though,-in the way of clearing the ground of possible obstructions to a clear view of our topic—I want to take issue with Jaggar and other feminists on some adjacent claims and suppositions of theirs which help fuel the fires and smoke of their more particular animadversions upon our western society's male-biased"[3] conventional morality, legal systems, and even its systems of philosophy.

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2 See Geoffrey Chaucer, "The Wife of Bath's Tale", *The Canterbury Tales*, The Penquin Classics, Baltimore, Maryland, 1952, trans. Coghill, pp. 305-316 The question is posed (p. 309), "What do women most desire?" and the answer given (obviously Chaucer's) is, "My liege and Lady, in general, women desire the self-same sovereignty/ On husbands as the have on those that love them, /And would be set in mastery above them; that is your [a woman's] greatest wish".

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For one thing, Jaggar often refers to the present time and its morality or moralities as "prefeminist."[4] The implication of Jaggar's use of this term is that, up to the present, there has existed only male-made (as it were) moralities, expressive of male self-interest and male moral experience. One can point out, however, that there stands in opposition to this implication of Jaggar's use of the term, "prefeminist," a considerable body of theory and research holding that prior to the existence of patriarchies and their male moralities, male religious systems, and so on, there existed matriarchies and their female moralities, female religious systems, and so on.[5]

Let me propose however, a slightly more complex theory than these two standard ones. I would suggest that ancestral men, *homines erecti*, dominated their woman in the way that, say, the male gorilla dominates the females of his group : in the final analysis, by brute, physical strength. Against the pronounced superiority in brute, physical strength of the *homo erectus* male neither the greater guile nor the greater ferocity of the female could prevail. I am supposing in this that *homo erectus* possessed no true speech; simply animal cries, signals, and so on. Hence, neither guile nor ferocity could be formed through speech into such things as duties, obligations, gods or goddesses, and so on. To the extent that there was anything like a moral order it was like the pecking order of brute animals. Dominance relations were determined by mere force or the bluff of force and incorporated in behavior but not in concepts. Thus, in this speechless society, there existed a natural and unarguable dominance of males over females. Nor could there be, on the part of an outside observer, any doubt about who dominated who and why.

I would next want to suggest that sometime during the subsequent development of Neanderthal or at least Cromagnon man-perhaps

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[3] Jaggar repeatedly refers to the "male bias" of our social and philosophical frameworks; see, Jaggar, *op.cit.*, 146, 154, 158, 159, 165, 167. As already indicated, I shall not want to deny but to defend the "male bias" in question.

[4] Jagar, *op. cit.*, 163: "Feminist ethics recognizes that we inhabit a painfully prefeminist world". See also 166.

[5] See Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths*, vol. one, Penquin Books, Baltimore, 1960, pp. 12, 13, 28, 35; e.g., p. 13, "Anceint Europe had no gods;" p. 28, "In this archaic religious system [the Pelasgian] there were as yet, neither gods nor priests, but only a universal goddess and her priestesses..." Graves finds the same state of affairs having taken place in the Near East (*loc. cit.*); see also p. 35, where Graves describes the transition from matriarchy to patriarchy as having taken place "in Mesopotamia, as elsewhere". Our assumption is that Graves' "elsewhere" was "everywhere".

as a matter of remarkable invention on the part of some individual, probably a female-our ancestors developed true speech. Because of a variety of factors, some of which still mainfest themselves as in, for example, the generally earlier speech-making abilities of female infants compared to male infants, the women of these Neanderthal or Cromagnon societies acquired an adeptness in true speech or even true speech itself before the man. They were thus able to carry the physical force of the male with deceptive talk of various kinds. I imagine these cave women, for example, now backing np their already effective arsenal of tears with prudential threats spun out of imaginative uses of language. Thus, with a command of language that man could understand but not themselves employ (just as brute animals can understand human verbal commands but not themselves initiate them) I imagine these women conjuring up the images of horrifying powers of retribution and death, like the Furies of later times, all under their monopolistic control, or, since naive male-kind still had no idea of the role played by men in procreation, claiming as belonging to themselves alone the power to replenish or not replenish the the tribal population. In these and other similar ways I imagine these cave-woman exacting obedience from the tongue-tied, comparatively guileless male (as women still do) and so instituting a full-bodies matriarchy in place of the preceding partiarchy of speechless males (thus proving once again that the sword is mightier than the sword).[6] Thus, with speech came matriachy, along with matriarchy's grim goddesses of the earth and underworld, its grotesque Cromagnon Venuses, its Furies, hag-like Fates, and so on: these all having shapes, in their pre-patriarchal days, that were intended to intimidate just the male population and not, as later, the population at large.[7]

Meaning by "matriarchy" not just the institution of maternal lineage, but an Amazon-like dominance of women over men in all social institutions, I am proposing, then, that matriarchy both followed and preceded patriarchy, and hence women at certain times in the past ruled men. Their rule, accordingly, has already been tried and found wanting, as shown by the final, general replacement of matriarchies by patriarchies. But just why, except in the case of a few remote and backward communities, did matriarchy finally give way to patriarchy ?

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[6] Graves' own explanation for the dominance of women over men in early societies is that women played upon men's ignorance of human generation; see, Graves, *op. cit.*; p. 28: "Women [were] the dominant sex and men her friehtened victim. Fatheihood was not honored, conception being attributed to the wind, the eating of beans, or the accidental swallowing of an insect". Graves' theory is not, however, inconsistent with our own regarding language, and may even be argued to presuppose it.

[7] See, Graves, *op cit.*, p. 38 . "The vengeful Erinnyes are understood by the mythographer as warning Zeus not to emasculate Cronus with a square sickle; but it was their original func ion to avenge injuries inflicted only on a mother or a suppliant who claimed the protection of the Hearth—Goddess, not a father."

Part of a possible explanation is that males finally acquired an equal ability with women to speak and so, by employing their own lies and inventions of divinities and other unseen powers, were able to take back their lost dominance. or at least here and there they succeeded in going so. But why should these isolated patriarchies in the end replace, if our theory is correct, the much more numerous and long-established matriarchies ?

The most likely explanation is suggested by the fact that with the emergence of patriarchy there emerged the sky-gods or, vice-versa, with the emergence of sky-gods there emerged patriarchy, and that among these sky-gods was a dispenser of justice, Zeus. As a tribal memory embodied in myth, for instance, we are told by Hesiod that "Zeus, after overcoming the last dangerous threat to his power by conquering Typhoeus, marries Themis and becomes the father of Dike together with Eirene, peace".[8] That is, it is only with the advent of the sky-god Zeus and patriarchy or vice-versa that justice begins to be a fact of perception and to prevail in human societies. What is thus suggested is that, divinities being in the image of their creators and the matriarchal goddesses being all whimsical and vindictive types with no care for justice or impartiality, matriarchs were like their goddesses, unpleasant and whimsical rulers to be under, productive of more discord and disorder than concord or order.[9] In short, matriarchies, in their competition with patriarchies, waned and disappeared in the same way that inefficiently or even insanely run businesses wane and disappear.

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[8] The claim that Zeus......early Zeus, anyway, the Zeus, for instance, of the *Iliad*,......was a dispenser of justice is, one must grant, moot; see, for instance, Lloyd—Jones, *Justice of Zeus*, Sather Classical Lectures, volume forty–one, Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 1971, chapter one, "The Iliad." Lloyed—Jones argues, convincingly, however, that the Zeus of the *Iliad was* dispenser of justice (loc. cit.). In Hesiod the association of justice with Zeus and hence with kingship is unequivocally stated (see Hesiod's citation of the myth that Zeus was the father of Dike or justice); and later on in Aeschylus, "In a remarkable fragment of a lost play...Justice herself explains the origin of her connection with Zeus" (Lloyd–Jones, *op cit.*, p. 35).

[9] Thus, Graves *op. cit.*. p. 35 ; "The principle theme [of the Gilgamesh tablets] is a revolt against the matriarchal order, described as one of utter confusion..." See also, Graves, *op. cit.*, p. 36 : "Though the myth of the Golden Age derives eventually from a tradition of tribal subservience to the Bee-goddess, the savagery

According to this view of things, which, I should parenthetically say, possesses quite as much if not more evidential support than Jaggar's view of the human past as having always been dominated by males, not only is it false that the present times are prefeminist but the further implication of Jaggar's use of this term, that we shall in the future witness the rule of feminism, conjures up, not a future of peace, order, and prosperity, but a future of whimsy, vindictiveness, and discord, all descriptive of an unnatural condition of things. One might say: God (and I mean here some sky-god), God pity both the men and women of the societies thereof ! But I shall have more to say later concerning the predictable consequences of a return of feminist rule, along with the possible claim of some feminists and seemingly, sometimes anyway, Jaggar, that feminism does not subscribe to the rule of women over men but merely to an equal rule of both.[10]

Right now I want to critically pursue to further adjacent claims of Jaggar's: the claim that the present, so-called "male-biased" social frameworks of religion, law, and other institutions have necessarily resulted and must necessarily result in the subordination of women to men and that with the abolition of those institutional opressions and the consequent so-called emancipation of the female women will necessarily enjoy happier and fuller lives.[11]

With respect to the first claim—the necessary and therefore inevitable domination of women by men given the past and present male-biased social institutions—, one might cite any number of historical and literary sources depicting the very opposite. For example, no kings were presumably more absolute rulers than the French monarchs of the 17th and 18th centuries. Yet, anyone residing in their courts knew that if a favor were wanted, — for example, some royal grant or emolument, — it was not to the king that one went but to his wife or mistress: to Marie Antoinette or Madame de Pompadour.

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of her reign in pre-agricultural times had been forgotten by Hesiod's day... "An instance of matriarchal savagery was the sacrifice of the queen's consort at the end of a year: *ibid.*, p. 14 : "his [the consort's] flesh was torn and eaten raw by the Queen's fellow nymphs–priestesses wearing the masks of bitches, mares, or sows."

[10] See Jaggar, *op. cit.*, 161 : "While feminist ethics may begin with feminine ethics, it cannot end with it." It is only, Jaggar argues, *op. cit.*, 166, as a matter of passing tactics, ensuring victory, that feminists should abjure "gender-blind" theorizing.

[11] Both these claims are rather to be inferred from everything that Jaggar says rather than straightforwardly presented.

Why should this have been so? Certainly, only because certain women exerted immense power over certain men, the religious and legal system of the time and place to the contrary notwithstanding.

Was this the case only in the artifical and effete mileau of royal courts? Or in an effeminitized France? Let me cite in rebuttal a popular Indian poem that very long ago was included in the Jainist canons. In perusing this poem, it might be observed, one could almost think that one were reading something printed, say. in an older, Non-feminist-intimidated *The New Yorker*. That is to say, and this accounts for our recognizing the humor in it, the poem describes a condition with which we are all familiar. With a few stanzas omitted, here the poem is:

If a monk breaks his vows,
And falls for a woman,
She upraids him and raises her foot to him,
And kicks him on the head.

"Monk, if you won't live with me
"As husband and wife,
"I' ll pull out my hair and become a nun,
"For you shall not live without me."

But when she has him in her clutches,
It's all housework and errands !
"Fetch me a knife to cut this gourd !
"Get me some fresh fruit !

"We want wood to boil the greens
"And for a fire in the evening !
"Now paint my feet !
"Come and massage my back !

....

"Bring me the chair with the twine seat,
"And my wooden-soled slippers to go out walking."
So pregnant women boss their husbands
Just as though they were household slaves.

When a chid is born, the reward of thir labours,
She makes the father hold the baby,
And sometimes the fathers of sons
Stagger under their burden like comels.

They get up at night, as though they were nurses,
To lull the howling child to sleep,
An though they are shamefaced about it,
Scrub dirty garments just like washerwomen.[12]

So much for the inevitable domination of women by men in a male-dominated world... As for the joys of woman's liberation, let me quote from a very shrewd observer of this century's mis-en-scene, Agatha Christie, in her *An Autobiography*. Comparing the woman's lot of today with that of her Victorian predecessors, Christie has this to say :

"The position of women, over the years, has definitely changed for the worse. We women have behaved like mugs. We have clamoured to be allowed to work as men work. Men, not being fools, have taken kindly to the idea. Why support a wife ? What's wrong with a wife supporing *herself* ? She *wants* to do it. By golly, she can go on doing it !

It seems sad that having established ourselves so cleverly as the 'weaker sex', we should now be broadly on a par with the women of primitive tribes who toil in the fields all day, walk miles to gather camel-thorn for fuel, and on trek carry all the pots, pans and household equipment on their heads, while the gorgeous, ornamental male sweeps on ahead, unburdened save for one lethal weapon with which to defend his women.

You've got to hand it to Victorian women, they got their menfolk where they wanted them. They established their frailty, delicacy, sensibility—their constant need of being protected and cherished. Did they lead miserable, servile lives, downtrodden and oppressed ? Such is not *my* recollection of them. All my grandmother's friends seem to me in retrospect singularly resilient and almost invariably successful in getting their own way. They were tough, self-willed, and remarkably well read and well informed.

Mind you, they admired their men enormously. They genuinely thought men were splendid fellows—dashing, inclined to be wicked, easily led astray. In daily life a woman got her own way while paying due lip service to male superiority, so that her husband should not lose face.

"Your father knows best, dear", was the public formula. The real approach came privately. "I'm sure you are *quite* right in what you said, John but I wonder if you have considered..."[13]

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[12] A. L. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India*, Grove Press, N. Y. First Evergreen edition, 2nd printing, 1959, pp. 459–460 (trans. Basham).

[13] Agatha Christie, *An Autobiography*, Dodd Mead and Company, New York, 1977, pp. 121–122.

I have so far been dealing with and attempting to demolish some of the out-works, one might say, of the feminist position. Or, in any case, Jaggar's more moderate feminist position in FEPPP.[14] But while showing that these adjacent claims of Jaggar's and other feminists, as I have been calling them, are more based on partisan fancy than objective fact, feminism and in particular the philosophy of feminism still remain to be heard from and refuted and the opposed position of male-biased conventional morality and masculinist perspective and philosophy vindicated. In what follows I shall take Jaggar's descriptive account, though not, of course, her normative account, of all the social institutions, moralities, and philosophies that I have been referring to, to be essentially correct. Thus, I shall take feminism and feminist philosophy to maintain, as its two universal principles, that (1) it is immoral to subordinate women to men (2) that moralities need to take into account women's moral experiences.[15] For our argumentative purposes I shall conflate the essence of feminism and feminist philosophy into these two principles

Paralleling this conflation, and taking Jaggar's own descriptions of prevailing western conventional morality and philosophy as accurately representing the faets, I shall suppose that the essence of male-inspired moralities and philosophy or what Jaggar would call "male-biased" morality and philosophy is the denial of the above two principles. That is to say, I shall suppose that the essence of masculinism or male morality and philosophy consists in the two principles 1a) that it is moral to subordinate women to men—meaning by this, first of all, that it is moral to subordinate feminist morality and philosophy to male morality and philosophy—and 2a) that women's moral experiences, at least, where diverging from men's, not only need not but should not be taken into moral account : meaning by this, they should not be allowed to alter. where it is masculinist, conventional morality. In short, in what follows I shall be directly opposing the most basic claims that Jaggar makes for feminism and feminist philosophy. Sinde, though, Jaggar's basic claims in FEPPP are, compared to the claims of other feminists—to judge from her own account of the latter[16]—minimal claims, I shall suppose that in refuting Jaggar on feminism and feminist philosophy I shall hav refuted feminism and feminist philosophy themselves.

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[14] In other writings of hers Jaggar is not quite the moderate feminist that she appears to be in FEPPP, where she has assumed the role of elder statesman. Indeed, some of her proposals have gained nation-wide notoriety, witness the following holding-up-of-hands-in-horror in the business journal, *Forbes*, April I, 1991, 86, under the title, "Visigoths" : "Alison Jaggar...denounces the traditional nuclear family as a 'cornerstone of women's oppression' and anticipates scientific advances enabling men to carry fetuses in their bodies so that child-bearing responsibilities can be shared between sexes."

[15] Jaggar, *op. cit.*, 164; also, 1[illegible]7.

Now it may be that, as Jaggar presumably would like to pretend, feminism, both as a cult and a philosophy, intends, not the dominance of women's moral experiences over man's or of women over men, but a cessation of the immemorial war of the sexes and thus the domination of neither over the other. Let us, anyway, suppose that this were so (though even Jaggar's title to her paper and many of her asides suggest rather the carrying out of war tactics most conducive to a female victory over the male).[17]

If, though, Jaggar has been accurate, and I think she has been, in her depiction of male morality and philosophy as treating the subordination of women and their moral experiences to men and their experiences as right and moral, and if that may be treated as the essence of masculinism as the essence of feminism consists in the opposite principles, then there obviously can be no such thing as the moral equality of the sexes: certainly neither as a prescription of feminism nor masculinism. If feminism, for instance, is to triumph, as Jaggar advocates its doing, then there must take place a suppression of masculinism and its male-biased principles and hence a condition where, in actual fact, the male is being dominated, as in the matriarchies of old, by the female.

It is also arguable—indeed, more than merely arguable: conclusively arguable—that moral and legal equality between the sexes is practically impossible, short of the abolition of the family. For as long as there exists the family unit there will come about occasions when the desires of husband and wife conflict. If the family is not to explode into fragments, one or the other of the spouses has to have the last word. Moreover, it is almost a truism that ultimate power cannot be divided. There has to be, in other words, a head and not two heads of a household. If that is the wife, the husband is dominated; if the husband, the wife.

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[16] Some of the more radical feminists cited by Jaggar are (*op. cit., 11*), Cixous, Irigan, Marilyn Freye. Freye, for instance (*loc. cit.*) "... questions whether feminists really need ethics at all (Freye forthcoming)..."

[17] The title of Jaggar's paper, "Feminist Ethics, Projects, problems, Prospects, ' as interpreted by Jaggar, proposes how, tactically and strategically, feminists can most effectively secure victory in their program to see to it that the view that it is "morally wrong to subordinate women to men is universally accepted" (Jaggar, *op. cit.*, p. 91) and (*ibid.*, 23) "to promote woman's emancipation..."

On behalf of feminism Jaggar might want to contend, should it prove impossible for men to bear fetuses,[18] that with the advent of the rule of feminism the family must or will be abolished, as, for instance, it is for the guardians and kings in Plato's hypothetically ideal Republic, and as it actually was, to some extent, in ancient Sparta. But even given the abolition of the family, there cannot, practically speaking, exist a moral and legal equality between the sexes. Women may be more fierce than men, as acknowledged in the piece of conventional wisdom that tells us, "Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned", and they may be more guileful than men (as is noted throughout literature and even that composed by women, witness our quotation from Agatha Christie's *Autobiography*), but men are physically more powerful. Duties involving the use of an individual's own physical power cannot then be allotted on an equal basis to women. Moreover, and most importantly, it has to be supposed that the possession of greater physical power, and the way that power is physiologically embodied, must have its psychological effects; so that in the long run men will naturally resent and even find it morally degrading to submit to women rather than have women submit to them. For actually—and Jaggar herself argues that what is actually the case rather than the hypothetically ideal case should be the basis of our present reasonings concerning feminism and its tactics[19]—Might, as Thrasymachus in Plato's *The Republic* contends, makes Right.

As exclusive disjuncts, then, masculinism or feminism must prevail; both cannot, nor can one be abandoned without either the moral subordination of women to men or of men to women, and in morality's train, either the legal subordination of one sex to the other. and in the latter's train, either the actual subordination of one sex to the other. And this must be the case whether there exists the institution of family or not.

The question, therefore, comes down to this as a question concerning actualities: what grounds are there for holding that masculinism should prevail over feminism, as it historically has in the replacement of matriarchies by patriarchies, or feminism over masculinism ?

As we originally noted, it may seem that in trying to reach an answer here we must end up locked in a stale-mate. Women, to judge by the duration and virulence of the battle between the sexes, can be counted on to join the feminists and claim that the arguments of masculinists cannot be believed, being male-biased, and should be dismissed, while men or those who have not been intimidated by the egalitarian, self-righteous cries of the feminists, can be counted on to dismiss the arguments of the latter as being "female-biased". Since every participant in the argument is either a man or woman, how can there possibly be a standing point that lies outside mere, dogmotic partianship ?

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[18] See, again, *Forbes*, "Visigoths," April I, 1991, 86.

[19] See Jaggar, *op. cit.*, 168-169.

Now I first want to introduce a fact concerning the uniquely male sex chromosome, the Y chromosome, that bears directly upon the present question. This is the fact that, unlike the X sex chromosome, or, indeed, any other chromosome, the Y chromosome is a "fluorescent" body; at least, it is in the case of man and the gorilla. In this connection, let me quote Ursula Mittwoch in "Sex Chromatin Bodies",[20]: "Another interesting difference between X and Y bodies is that a second X chromosome is visible in interphase nuclei in the large majority of female mammals, whereas a fluroescent Y body is absent from the cells of most male mammals; it has been seen only in the cells of man and the gorilla". That is, the Y chromosome of the male human being is a body that, under certain conditions, produces light.

One might therefore argue as follows: according to many theologies and many religions themselves—for example, Manichaeism, Neo-Platonic Christianity, and so on—divinity, or at least beneficient divinity, is likenable to pure light or is, indeed, pure light. Combining this religious insight with the discoveries of chromosome science, one has to suppose that only the male part of mankind possess true souls or, in any case, souls that actually reflect and duplicate beneficient divinity. Thus men, as opposed to the female part of mankind, are alone qualified to found genuine moral systems. Hence, the very fact that a morality or philosophy is male biased and morally subordinates women to men testifies to its truth and rightness. But for the same reason already given, men but not women are alone able to perceive this truth. For, not being fluorescent or luminous, but dark, the X chromosome can confer upon women only at most the powers of darkness: the desire, for instance, for an illicit power over men, as noted by Chaucer: and so on. But not actual moral vision.

If it be objected that, according to the same discoveries, the male gorilla also possesses a flurorescent Y chromosome but it does not seem that the male gorilla has founded any genuine morality or has any such moral comprehension, it is answerable, I think, that for all we know he may. We just do not know gorillas that intimately. Or, if we are, say, Manichaeans, we might want to retort that gorillas are perhaps a failed creation of beneficient divinity; an experimental creation that for various reasons did not work out.

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[20] Ursula Mittwock. "Sex Cromatin Bodies," *Human Chromosome Methodology*, 2nd. edition, Ynis, 1974, pp. 73-4, also, p. 84; p.90.

It may be wondered, perhaps, why I should introduce into a serious philosophical discussion such superstitions as I have immediately above. I will not agree, however, that what I have referred to... the identification of beneficient divinity with light and divinity itself--are necessarily superstitions and even if they were they might still express, in symbolic form, truths of nature, in the way that folk-cures of some diseases have been found to constitute real cures. But I am, nonetheless, willing to forgo the advantage of these admitted speculations on light and divinity, and limit my arguments to what we know as fact. For on this basis too, I shall now show, the male-bias of conventional morality and traditional philosophy, both, can be vindicated.

To begin with, it must surely appear to any impartial thinker that if one party in a dispute has access, say, to moral perceptions A and B while a second party has only access to moral perceptions A, and if these perceptions are the only ones at stake, the first party has an edge over the second insofar as being a judge of whether A should take precedence over B or B over A. Indeed, the second party cannot reasonably be considered a possible judge at all.

But just this, I want to contend, is the actual position in which men and women are situated when it comes to judging what moral values should be given our assent and to what extent. My more particular contention will be that in the case at issue, where an absolute incompatibility exists between masculinist and feminist moralities—namely, where the one maintains that it is moral to subordinate female morality to male morality and hence, via the legal implications of this moral subordination, women to men, and the other in effect holding that male morality be subordinated to female morality and hence, by the same implications, men to women, it is men who are in a position to judge between the two moralities, where they conflict, whereas women are not in such a position. Thus, the historical fact that moralities. legal systems, and the other frameworks of advanced societies, like their religions and dominant philosophical systems, have been, in Jaggar's judgment, "male-biased," is perfectly right and proper and as things should be.

How is this itself "male-biased" contention to be impartially vindicated ? Quite simply.

Insofar as the battle between the sexes is looked at from moral perspectives it has to be a battle between that moral value or those moral values which, because women are what they sexually are, are basically womanly moral values and not manly moral values and vice-versa, those that are basically manly values and not womanly values because men are sexually what they are. What precisely these values in fact are is a matter that, I grant, needs a great deal more scientifically controlled investigation than has so far been given it. It may be, as ordinary untutored impressions would seem to dictate, that the male values in question consist in some form or forms of aggressiveness, and the female in some form or forms of caring. But what seems clear, in any case, is that the presence of the Y chromosome produces such enormous glandular, hormonal, and other physical and physiological differences in the initially female body and brain it must *a fortiori* simultaneously produce comparable psychological differences and these, where moral experiences come into play, moral differences. That is to say, it is only common scientific sense to suppose that since a male, because of the presence of the Y chromosome, differs physically and physiologically so drastically from the female he must, in some crucial area of his moral experiences and values, differ from the female. As I have already indicated, what these differences actually consist in--I refer here to differences in moral experience and valuation -may still need to be scientifically determined. But our argument doos not rest on that determination; only on the postulation of a crucial difference (or differences). And that postulation would seem to be also a postulation of the feminists themselves, where, like Jagger, they demand that (see Jaggar's second universal feminist principle) "moralities need to take into account women's moral experiences". For if the latter were not supposed to be essentially different from men's moral experiences then it could hardly be supposed that actual, conventional morality, however "male biased" it might be, would not be taking into account these very experiences and not be open to the feminist complaint that they were not.

We have, then, as our minimally necessary premise that in certain areas at least what we shall call "Y moral experiences and valuations' (or "Y morality", for short) differ from what we shall call "X moral experiences and valuations" (or "X morality for short)—whatever these differences may specifically be. What follows, therefore, is that in these same areas—presumably areas where male and female interests conflict—man's Y and woman's X morality will deliver different verdicts and different perceptions. But since men also possess the X chromosome and hence share in woman's X morality, but women do not possess a Y chromosome and hence do not share in an experience of its male morality, men but not women will be able to apply to conflicts of male and female interest a balancing judgment and that means, a deliverance of justice. To be sure, in certain actual cases, where emotion overwhelms all attempts to objectively balance the claims involved, they may not, but it is possible for them to. The point is: men are in a position to deliver just verdicts, where the moral and other claims of men and women conflict, whereas women are not. And this fact; which would seem to account for the almost maniacal character of matriarchal rule—for instance, the literal tearing apart alive of the queen's consort by the Bee goddess's maneads —would also seem to confirm the Gilgamesh tablet's complaints of matriarchal disorder and confusion. The upshot is: for the sake of justice itself, men have to replace women as the rulers of a society and see to it that women do not, above all, exercise the powers of legislators or judges.

So far, however, our argument and the evidence we have adduced above seem to show only that where there are conflicts of interest or moral perceptions between men and women is it impossible for women to deliver just verdicts. In other areas it would seem that they might and that hence, justice to a-limited extent existed in pre-patriarchal societies or, in other words, in their antecedent matriarchies. It might seem, therefore, that the lack of justice that is imputed in Hesiod and in various Greek myths to have prevailed before the advent of Zeus was a lack of justice in certain particular areas only: those where the interests of men and women were in conflict. Here men, as the saying goes, got from their matriarchal masters, as a mere matter of course, the short end of a stick. It was not that their matriarchal masters meant to be unjust: it was merely that in these particular areas (where X and Y moralities were in competition) these matriarchs could have seen only what their X moral experiences dictated. They necessarily had to fail to arrive at a balanced judgment of their own, even had they tried.

Since the distribution of X and Y chromosomes has not changed in the interval, this would currently have to be the case as well. Women might imitate the balanced judgements of men in these areas, as parrots imitate the talk around them, but without any more genuine understanding of what was involved than a completely color blind person would have of colors. Hence, the call for a matriarchal society is really the call for a basically unjust society. This conclusion, as itself expressing a balanced judgement and thus resting ultimately on the possession of not only an X but a Y chromosome and hence upon the experience of both X and Y moralities and not just X morality, must, unfortunately, be comprehensible only to men, involving as it does a comparison of the claims and titles of both X and Y moral experiences and hence as lying outside the bounds of a woman's actual moral experience. Thus, as I indicated at the beginning, a stale mate between men and women on the question of whether a matriarchy or a patriarchy ought to be embraced by our society is not mandated. Since men, for the reasons already given, can exercise balanced judgement covering both sides in the areas concerned, their male-biased verdict can be an informed and just one, while the female-biased judgment of women *a fortiort* cannot be. For the same reasons given above, women will have to take this conclusion itself, as far as their immediate moral perceptions go, on blind faith. But insofar as women can exercise an impartial reason, they ought to be able, abstractly anyway, to follow out the evidence and arguments we have adduced to that same conclusion and so be willing to give at least an abstract assent to it. Or so it might be hoped.

It is not likely, however, that they will. Suppose, for instance, that the physiology and hence psychology of women is such that they cannot reason impartially, but by their very natures must always mix reason with the emotions pertaining to their X moral experiences? For example, suppose that when confronted with a conflict of interests of no matter what sort, a certain person finds it impossible to separate, elliptically speaking, justice from mercy. The verdicts he delivers will then always appear, as far as the claims of justice go, skewed and emotional, rather than balanced and rational. Those who could separate justice from mercy might want, therefore, to claim that the person in question lacked "a reason." They would not mean, in saying this, that the person in question lacked a reason in the way that a beetle might be said to lack a reason, but in the way that someone who reasons, and even reasons cleverly but paranoidly, might be said to lack a reason. In short, what would be meant would be that the person in question's reasoning powers were vitiated by outside elements and so always delivered impure reasonings.

Now it is surely in some such sense that it has been maintained, at all times and places, by various societies and their most able and trusted thinkers, that women lacked a reason. Where there is so much smoke one has to assume that there is fire. In addition, this hypothesis can explain not only the deranged nature of life and religion in the matriarchies that preceded the rise of patriarchy—the "utter confusion" of the matriachal order complained of in the Gilgamesh tablets; the savage, almost insane, rites of the matriarchal Bee goddess, described by Robert Graves-but the fact, to believe the early Greek mythologists, that prior to the advent of Zeus and hence patriarchy, there did not exist justice. If Plato is right when he claims that the ethics of a State mirrors the ethics of its rulers and if the ethics of a matriarchal society mirrors the moral judgments of its matriarchal rulers and these rulers all lack reasons, in the sense noted above, then we should have as a consequence a society in which there actually did not exist justice anywhere. Everyone would be, according to Plato's principle, mixing their reasonings with, say, mercy or some other emotion or passion, and hence, except perhaps in the fancy of some of the male members of this society, there would not occur in actual practice the objectively balancing judgments constituting justice. As myths often are the disguised presentations of time-buried truths, the myths relating Zeus to the very existence of justice would then be vindicated.

We have supported our contention that women *per se*, lack the ability to render justice by referring to the widely separated and diverse cultures in which it has been maintained, by thinker and ordinary member alike, that women lack a reason and by referring to the symbolic credibility of myths. But does this outrageous contention of ours—or certainly, a contention that will generally be taken, in view of today's obsession with egalitarianism, as outrageous—possess any more reliable support ? Does it, for example, possess scientific support ? It would seem that it does. One gathers that humoral and other studies of the brain now suggest that the activities of male brains are separated from each other and compartmentalized whereas those of female brains are not, but tend to be diffuse. Reading these neuro-anatomical suggestions into macroscopic behavior, as seems justified on the basis of scientific studies themselves,[21]e seem to confirm the myth that says that Zeus or, in short, patriarchy, was the father of justice. But if that is so, then, as we have already said, the feminists' call for a matriarchy or even a shared rule of men and women, is a call for injustice. For take even the case of shared rule. What one is confronted with by shared rule is, genetically looked at, three x-chromosomes for every y-chromosome (what one gets where for each male ruler there is a female ruler). Where men alone are the rulers, what one is presented with genetically is the balance of one x-chromosome for every y-chromosome. Now clearly, being their balance, the latter, but not the former, which is an imbalance, constitutes a just agency or an agency productive of justice.

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[21] For experimentally demonstrated connections between neuroanatomical and physiological structures and behaviorial and psychological structures see, for instance, Paul D. Maclean, *The Triune Brain in Evolution/Role in Paleocerebral Function*, Plenum Press, N. Y., London, 1990.

4

The Ethical Philosophy of Jaisi

Swami Makhan Lal

The mystic poet, Jaisi was one of the most illustrous personalities in the medieval Indian mysticism. Jaisi was initiated in the Chishti Sufi order (Silsilah), the main spiritual line of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya, which was developed and flourished statewise after the death of Nasiruddin Chirague-i-Delhi. Jaisi was initiated by Shaikh Mohidi, it was admitted by Jaisi in his famous treatise (Akharawat' written in oudhidialect in Hindi language, in the form of beautiful verses, dohas, chanpais and sorathas. He is the author of twenty six books in which six are available in the published form.

In the last days of his life Jaisi was living in the Jungle as a hermit, in a hut built by the prince of Amethi. Pt. Ram Chandra Shukla wrote in his 'Jaisi Granthawali', "The shrine of Jaisi is built in the Jungle of Mongra (Ram Nagar) near Amethi 1/8 miles far from the town in the North, in the present Sultan Pur District of U. P. The boundary of the Shrine is still there as remainings. The practice of reading Quaran by a priest appointed by Raja Ram Singh, was continued up to 1915 A.D."

Jaisi's Ethics :

The Place of knowledge in ethics : Knowledge plays an important role in Jaisi's ethics in his writing named 'Akharawat' particularly and in other place generally. He expressed the views regarding knowledge, discipline and means and end, without using any metapher and allegory. Though there is no systematic presentation of the role of knowledge available in Jaisi's ethical views but a flood of light on knowledge is thrown an effort has been made to collect the scattered points spread over the entire 'Akharawat' and to present it in a systematic way.

All human activities are directed toward some end. The process by which an end can be achieved is called discipline. Manifold means and methods are taken to be practicised by manifold beliefs in order to achieve the charished end of life beyond which nothing can be desired. This cherished end of man's, is the love of God which is called as the Summum Bonum of human life in the ethical system of Jaisi which is the core of sufism, for which a man has been created.

The means to achieve the end can be categorised into three groups; the discipline of action, the discipline of knowledge and the discipline of love. Though they are summarily divided into three kinds but they are inter-dependent to each other; for instance, Shariat and tariqat mainly emphasised on the discipline of action, but marifat and Haqiqat are based on the disciple of knowledge and love.

In the opinion of Al-Ghazzali, the famous sufi of 11th century, knowledge has two aspects, formal and existential. Formal is the knowledge of form in which the various objects of the experience and intuition are apprehended. Existential knowledge is the knowledge of the objects and events attained through experience and intuition. Existential knowledge again is of two kinds, viz., phenomenal and spiritual. The former is the knowledge of the material world while the latter is of the spiritual realities is the highest form of the knowledge.

Like Al-Ghazzali Jaisi also says that knowledge serves in two ways-as means to achieve the end and as well as end. Discipline of knowledge is essential for the perfection of the soul to attain the end by mortification which leads to a seeker of God from finite to infinite. In the ethical system of Jaisi, knowledge of the phenomenal world is the first step to attain the knowledge of self which begets the love of God which is conditioned by the knowledge of God. This knowledge leads to man from imperfection to the perfection from mortal to immortal. The perfection of knowledge makes a man perfect. In the system of Jaisi, this phenomenal world is not regarded as unreal but he admits this world as changeable and mortal. That is why, the knowledge of this world may be essential for the knowledge of God. Jaisi says in 'Padamawat' that there is no reliability and estability of this-world because the experience converts itself into non-existence. Nothing is permanent. The existence of all the things are pleasures are short lived; therefore, nothing is beneficial to have and enjoy it. Jaisi says that man's pleasure is ceased with his birth, so again he is searching after this pleasure. He sometimes seek it is one thing and the other time in the other worldly things, but he is not able to find out the pleasure in the worldly objects, while there is no pleasure in these objects so how can be attain in them, But a seeker of God seeks the pleasure in the knowledge of God which is the highest kinds of the pleasure. Jaisi asserts to attain this type of knowledge which gives the pleasure of highest type, that the spiritual pleasure. In 'Akharawat' he emphasised to aquire the knowledge of self which leads to the knowledge of creator (God) who has created the man. This knowledge is the means to the knowledge of God and it also serving as the end because knowledge of God is the essential condition for the love of God.

The acquisition of the knowledge of God and love of God cannot be attained easily by giving through the books or otherwise, therefore, Jaisi emphasised on the mortification which is essential to the pleasure and knowledge. A seeker of God reaches the stage of divinity, by surrendering one's self to God, He says God is Omnipresent but no one is able to seek Him anywhere unless he knows his self. He expressed the views in 'Akharawat' that one who has sought in his own self, the knowledge everything as well as God. The same spirit is expressed in the famous tradition of Prophet and the classical tenet of Sufism, "Man Arafa Nafsahu Faqad Arafa Rabbahu" (one who cognises his own self, certainly cognises God).

Very few persons are able to cognise their selves. Cognition of the soul is conditioned by self knowledge which can be acquired by mortification, which is beyond the reach of the common people. Only some gifted souls can do this, yet they cannot be able to attain it by their own efforts but only with the grace of God. Jaisi says in 'Padmavat' that we are the people like a fish who always remains in the water but it never sees the water in which it lives which is its life. On the same way, God is our life but we are not able to see Him.

According to the Islamic belief, the object of man's creation is the acquisition of the knowledge of God. Man's love for God is the supreme end in this world which is the direct consequence of the knowledge of God. It can be achieved through the purification of the heart, which breeds love of God.

Jaisi hold the view that the man is the supreme in the entire creation of God. He is bestowed with the senses and reason unlike the animals, as a gems. But man being in the clutch of his Nafs never realizes the importance of these gifts to him, on the other hand, he misuses these senses like animal nature. He again says that man utilizes his senses otherwise to its purpose owing to be in the cluch of his Nafs. He expressed in 'Padmavat' that due to the excessive attachment with the world man remains in the clutch of his

Nafs and seek pleasure in the worldly things especially in wealth and never think of his ultimate goal, undergo in immense troubles. Jaisi says that it is very difficult to overcome these Nafs. When a man becomes an old his Nafs remains still young. which never become weak with the human body. Jaisi very excellently gives advice to the seekers of truth, to be alerted towards the Nafs, because it is like the snake always to be dangerous he says in 'Padamavat' to the aspirants to control his Nafs by the goad of reason.

The bodily pleasure is the enemy of the spiritual life. Jaisi says that our body can be compared to this universe, in which both heavens and earth are hidden. In the body our brain is like Mecca and the heart is like Madina. Ears, eyes, nostrils and mouth are like as four faithful servants, which can also be recognised as four angels e.g., Jibrail, Israil, Israfeel and Mackail, and like four Murshids (directors; Pir) as Hazrat Murtaza Ali, Khwaja Hasan Basari, Khwaja Habib Azami and Abdul Wahid Bin Zaid Kufi) or four books (Torait, Zubure, Injeel and Furgan or the Quran).

Jaisi emphasised on the Gnosis (Marifat) to cognise the self. He opines, Gnosis is attained by the purification of the heart from all human infirmities. A mystic perceives the grandeur, magnificance and the beauty of God in his own heart. The perfection of the Gnosis is based on the purification of the heart. Jaisi hold the share of this opinion in his 'Akharawat' that the heart of the individual is like a mirror which can be purified through the mortification and Gnosis can be attained to cognise the attributes of God by a mystic.

The Means to Achieve the end :

Almost all the Indian Sufis laid the great emphasis on Gnosis (Marifat) to cognise God. They were of the opinion that the intellect is helpless in cognising God. The Gnosis is possible only through self knowledge. For the acquisition of the knowledge of God they prescribe the path of sincerity and mortification. For the love of God, which is the supreme end of a man in this world, they say that the love of God and love of things other than God cannot go side by side.

Therefore, Sufis emphasised on the self purification through Mujahida (Penitence), Muraqaba (absorption in God, dhiker (Rememberance of God's name) and fana (self annihilation). Like other suf Jaisi also emphasises on these means in order to achieve the end tha love of God in this mortal world.

Muraqaba (Absorption in God) ; is one of the well known metho for the purification of one's heart, which has been prescribed by sufis. Jaisi also emphasised on this method to purify one's own self which breeds the love of God. Muraqaba is an essential aspect of discipline in the ethical system of Jaisi. He opines that Muraqaba is a device to purify the heart of seeker of God from human infirmities. He wrote in his famous 'Akharawat' that Muraqaba serves two fold purposes. First it is a method to purify the heart, secondly, a seeker can perceive the attributes of God iu his own heart (Qulb), in which 'Reality' is reflected. It is possible only when one purify his inner self. There must be unanimity between his outer and inner self. Jaisi said in 'Akharawat' that the manifested form of God in the outer world is not easily apprehensible. A seeker of God is able to cognise eternal granderur of God, Therefore, Jaisi advised to cognise Him (God) in his own self. In 'Akharawat' Jaisi, further points out the revelation and method of Muraqaba in order to realize the truth. After attainment of Muraqaba a seeker feels nearness to God and all the mysteries of the attributes of God are revealed to him. This pleasure and stage of Muraqaba is inexplicable. This is a valuable achievement of realization which gives the highest type of pleasure in this world. Jaisi says again is 'Akharawat' that one who practicises this Muraqaba becomes aloof from the indulgence in sensual pleasures. He takes meal only for maintaining his body and life, to seek nearness of God which is not in terms of time and space but in the attributes or virtues of God.

Dhikr (Remmberance of God) : Dhikr is one of the most imp rtant means to achieve the end by repeating the God's name through its practice. The discipline of the seeker is dhikr which ordinarily means rememberance of God and repeating His name but which includes all the devotional practicious which induce ecstasy and trance. There are two kinds of dhikr. First, dlukr-i-Jali or reciting loudly the names of God and second, is dhikr-i-khafi or reciting silently. They are very similar to the meditation and the breathing exercise (pranayam) of the Indian yoga. Dhikr-i-Khafi (reciting silently, is also termed as (gupta Jap) (hidden reciting) by Jaisi. He expressed this spirit in 'Akharawat' the importance of the dhikr-i-khafi, for a short duration is sufficient rather than a life long reciting.

There are numberless of the kinds of the deikr-i-khafi, among which three types of dhikrs are principal; e.. g., Sultanul Azkar, Habs-l-Dam. and Pase-l-Anafas. Jaisi elaborately treated with these three kinds of dhikr in his 'Akharawat' in the following ways: Sultanul Azkar-In this practice of dhikr a seeker recites the God's name silently in order to awake his latayuf (coiled up nerve centre). In 'Akharawat' he said in detail. Hase-l-Dam. In this method of dhikr a seeker of God controls his breathing and concentrate on the Qulb (heart) and recites the word (La illaha illallaha) again and again. This process of reciting God's name is also expressed in 'Akharawat' by Jaisi in the following way, that in this process of dhikr a seeker draws his breathes upward in order to seek the light (Jyoti). Here light means the Husn-l-Basirat (divine light). Pase-l-Anfas-This kind of dhikr is elaborately treated by Jaisi and mentions its name in his 'Akharawat'. He very much emphasised on this Pase-l-Anfas in the following lines, In this kind of dhikr seeker keeping the conception of God in his mind and has an idea of His place on the left side of the chest, where the word 'Allah' is supposed to be written in the bright letters of Arabic, he inhales, reciting 'Allah' and exhales reciting 'Huwa'.

This process of dhikr makes the heart of a seeker purified. Jaisi says divine light is like the fire in the wood, smiling of lotus in the pound, which leads the purification of the heart of a seeker, who ultimately perceives the grandeur of God in his own heart. In his 'Akharawat' he said that this practice of dhikr removes all the human infirmities from the heart of seeker and he seeks intimacy to God and practically unite with Reality where the idea of right and wrong is banished and he always closely associated with his and (the love of God). Fana (Self-annihilation)—Fana is most important means to attain the end. The mystic who sets out up on the path of union (wasal), with God absorbs himself in the rememberance and Fana always needs a spiritual guide, for if a man has no teacher, his iman is Satan.

In order to attain the Reality of the Gnosis a man annihilates himself under the command of God and subsist in the expansion of God without his self, then he becomes dead to be alive and alive to be dead and veiled to be revealing and revealing to be veiled. Jaisi expressed this spirit of annihilation in 'Akharawat' in the following way; (The act of annihilation is too difficult to achieve, it can be realized by rarely gifted persons. But who realised the fact of this annihilation examplify his self like a moth who runs against the candle to be dead in the light of a candle. To elaborate the spirit of annihilation Jaisi puts the example of a bee who catches an insect and keeps it in the fissuse of a wall and goes out side in search of food. Between the bee's departure and return, the poor insect is practically lost in the thought of the bee. It expects the bee to come and back at it every moment. As a result of this expectant concentration generated throug fear a wonderful transformation takes place a moment comes when in the crowling insect the insect itself transform into a flying bee leaves the wall and flies in the open air.

The thorny path of the practice of annihilation is very difficult to traverse. One can achieve the end only by making himself like a subtle entity because path way is as subtle as the eye of needle and tedious to reach it like the climbing of a mountain,though it seems to easy to attain but practically it is very difficult, and can be fully realized by a mystic who sets out on the path of reality. Jaisi says this is in his 'Akharawat'. In other place in 'Padamavat' sense other example of Fana also available as one who dies before his death becomes divine and overcomes the death, and he never dies by death. Jaisi says that one who annihilates, transforms his self into immortality.

The means which have been discussed above, pointed out Jaisi is not any new means. These means have already been discussed by the Sufis in different Sufi orders. Some prefer the dhikr-l-jali but some other laid emphasis on the dhikr-l-khafi.

The ethical end :

Love of God is the core of sufism. Jaisi makes it the supreme end of man, in this mortal world. "No one is truly faithful till God is dearer to him than all else".

Knowledge of God is related to love of God. Love is a natural inclination towards objects that give pleasure. And the love of God is conditioned with the knowledge of God. Real knowledge of God is the source of love of God. The higher aspect of love are Sabr (patience), Rida (submission to God) and Tawakkul (trust in God).

Subr (Patience) : In the opinion of Jaisi the discipline of Sabr and contentment are essential for a seeker of truth, one who has not attained stage of sabr, remains unpleasant and complains against happenings by the will of God, cannot attain the love of God, because the lover of God always provides peace in his mind and he is never desirous of worldly pleasures. He always seek the pleasure in obeying the command of God. Jaisi says that in the thorny path of the discipline of love, a seeker faces the unimaginable troubles loses his patience and truth, but those courageous seekers do not become perturbed by these obstacles lead his life on the edge of as word, and ultimately attain divinity with the association of the Sabr (patience). They are able to remove the darkness of their path.

For them troubles vanish and they are able to search the light of knowledge by which they attain the end.

Rida (submission to God)—Rida is a state of love in which a lover of God, does not feel any pain or trouble sustained by him, on the other hand,be bears all these sufferings cheerfully by thinking that this is the command of his beloved (God). When a lover of God bears complete reliance on God he surrender every thing to Him. He even becomes detached from his life. There is a famous traditions, "The love of God and love of things other than God cannot go side by side". Jaisi sketched the picture of submission to God in his 'Padamavat' expressing by the king Ratan Sena (a seeker of truth) in the following. He says; "I am the begger of Padamavati (adumberation of God) I am not seeing any sea or the river Ganga. I have submitted all my belongs to Padamavati (God) I have no fear of flowing in the river on this path or of killing by any body.

Jaisi holds the share regarding Rida (submission) with Al-Ghazzali, in which Raja Ratansena (love of Padamavati the adunberation of God), being punished of crucification, he uttered these words like a true lover of God. He says; 'Every breath of mine is remembering her (Padamavati or God) to whom I submitted. Every drop of the blood in my body is also reciting her name. Every hair of my body is reciting her name. I become simply a skeleton of bones. Padamavati entered in my body assuming a form of mine". I completely submitted to her, now the life and death depend on her Rida. Whether she gives me crucification or any other trouble, I have completely surrender my will to her Rida."

Tawakkul (Trust on God)—Tawakkul is the highest stage of love. It is the absolute dependence on God. A lover having reached this stage does not rely on any thing except God. No faith in God would be completed without Tawakkul.

According to Jaisi no complete love of God and nearness to Him can be experienced. In his Padamavat this view in the following way, (The eyes of the lover of God (Ratansna) are fixed on his beloved (Padamavati) like a Chatak bird in the forest and as a shell in the sea. He had a trust on God. Having seen the complete reliance of a lover (Ratansena) Parvati being fully satisfied after a careful examination of his trust, she said Mahadeo, "He is definitely devoted to attain his beloved (Padamavati). Love and perfume cannot be hidden by con cealing. He bears in his heart the spark of her love. He is only her lover and desirious to none."

In the ethical system of Jaisi, the love of God reached its highest stage in the case of Ratansena lover to Padamavati, when he was ready to be crucified and was said to avail whatever he desires. But Ratansena (seeker of truth) as a true lover in the complete reliance on Padamavati; says, "Every breath of mine is remembering her. I become united with here. There is no thought in my heart except of her (Padamavati as God). Every drop of my blood is filled with her and I have complete reliance on her."

There are several problems involved in Rida, for example, the possibility of Rida in the most acute or prolonged suffering. There are innumerable cases of men and women who have suffered death and the most severe tortures and pain cheerfully because they were convinced that it is the will and pleasure of their beloved. These are grades of Chearful submission to the will of God. First is the hope of reward in the next world. In the ethical system of Jaisi, we have this example in the case of Ratansena (seeker of truth) as a true lover of God (in Padamavati's form) suffered death for the love of his beloved cheerfully.

Virtues :

The discussion of the virtues brings us to the practical aspect of Jaisi's ethics. The virtuous life is characterised by the supremacy of the rational soul. One who has completely surrendered his will to the will of God and acts according to His desire to please Him in order to achieve the nearness to Him, can be called a virtuous man.

Virtues are of two kinds : (1) Those which are means, e.g. repentence, patience, fear, piety, Meditation, sincerity, truthfulness and (2) Those which are both means and ends; e.g. Trust on God (Tawakkul) and thankful praise (Shuker) to God. In order to seek the truth and love of God, Jaisi emphasised on moral values. He prescribes the seekers of truth to adorn himself with the virtues of God, such as truth, sincerity, love, mercy and Justice, etc. etc.

Jaisi says that the path of sincerity and mortification for the love of God, is an essential step to seek the end of life. The virtues of sincerity plays a very important role in the ethical system of Jaisi. Therefore, he firstly asserts on cleansing body and heart in order to cultivate outer and inner virtues and to eradicate outer and inner vices of the body. He imparts some instructions to avoid the sumptions food and diets in his 'Akharawat' in the following passage, that one who wants to attain the virtues, should not take the delicious food which exites his Nafs (Lower self). He prescribes not to take milk, butter, meat and fish, but take a nofat diet, like fruits etc., which would be helpful in controlling his lust, anger, pride and greed. And this would cultivate good ideas and contemplation. (Contemplation is necessary to realise the truth and love of God).

The same control of diet and fasting have been prescribe by Al-Ghazzali where he says that fasting brings modesty and concentration which strengthen the mind and soul resulting in spiritual pleasure. Love is the most important virtue in the human life in this world. This world has been made by God for the love of Prophet Muhammad. And this love is also an end of human life. It is very difficult to define love. Jaisi says that the game of love is very difficult to play; but those who realise this love certainly achieve his summum Bonum. He says that one has reached this path of love, never sustains loss. Again he says that whose heart is full of love, the fire becomes cool for him like sandal. And a seeker of truth burns himself in the fire of love to attain divinity. Therefore, Jaisi says in Padamavat that one should win both the worlds with the love. The love of God leads to the vision of God in the world here after.

Jaisi further says; "One who suffers troubles for the love of God in this world, certainly faces the vision of God in the next, which is possible only with acquisition of knowledge and love of God.

In the ethical system of Jaisi, righteousness is the virtue of justice. A seeker should be virtuous in order to be justice with his own self as well as in relation to attain the perfection. Jaisi writes in his 'Padamavat' that if the heart of a seeker, is full of love of God, certainly attain divinity and with the help of truth a mystic would be able to have truth. The truthfulness is like the wings, by which a seeker attains his destination one who leads his life in a truthful way, certainly attains his goal.

Service to humanity was taken as apart of mystic discipline.

Like other, Indian sufis, Jaisi also emphasised the service to God as well as to humanity. Service to humanity is ultimately the service of God. Jaisi asserts his views for this service which is expressed by the mouth of Nagmati a queen of Raja Ratansena (a seeker) in the following :

(A little insincerity in the service results in immense trouble in the life of a mystic which causes a disgrace from God. But if a seeker of truth is not constantly helped by God in the form of grace, the seeker's love and service is of no use. A seeker should remain very cautions from pride. One who has the fear (Khauf) of God and never neglect sincerity and service, is quite dearer to God). Jaisi is of the opinion that for the mystic discipline both fear (of God) and hope (from God) are necessary. One should obey the command of God, otherwise he would be punished by God. The 'Quran' is full of such punishment though in symbolic form, on the other hand, one must be hopeful of God's grace and mercy because without His grace and mercy one cannot traverse this thorny path of moral and mystic discipline.

Vices :

Vices are unethical forms of the natural propensities of man. Propensities became harmful when they engender love for the world at the cost of spiritual development. The love of this world is the root of all vices. In order to attain perfection, these propensities must obey the dictates of reason, vices, then, are the misuse of human propensities which become curtains between man and his oal.

Vices are of various kinds : (I) Those which are gross in nature and are connected with the physical body, e.g. stomach, sex and tongue; (II) Those which are gross but not connected with the body; e.g. anger, malice, enry; (III) Those which are distinctly human and are practicised by man deliberately, e. g. pride, vanity, love of wealth and love of position, hypocrisy, wilful deception, etc.

Pride is the habit of the self and is also a action resulting from this habit. By considering one self superior to other, one feels gratified, even learned men, worshippers and devotes are seldom free from it. In the opinion of Jaisi, it is greatest Vice. The purpose of Jaisi, in writing the 'Padamavat' is to keep one self aware of the vices.

Love of wealth generates the pride and greed, which caused the man's untruthfulness and become miser by which he becomes greedy and commits sin. Therefore, Jaisi, warns against the wealth in 'Padamavat' that welath is the source of both the pleasure and pain as the fire is the source of both the gain and loss. Just enough wealth is a source of pleasure because man satisfies his basic need through it and does not become a needy person or a beggar, but the excess of wealth is often a source of pain because it begets arrogance and pride which are the root of evils.

Vices connected with the physical organs of body, e.g. stomach, sex, anger and attachment. The propensity of the hunger is of paramount importance to the living organism. One self is endowed with it in order to provide it with food. It is good as such. But when it exceeds its limits and becomes gluttony, it became the source of vices. In 'Padamavat' Jaisi says that hunger is the root cause of all vices.

Lust, anger, greed, pride and attachment are called as thieves by Jaisi. He says that these Thieves are looking the treasure of human body and they are the classical vices in the Indian ethical philosophy. In order to attain perfection or the goal of life, Jaisi prescribes that one must be always cautious of above mentioned theives.

Miserliness and lack of reasoning—possession of wealth utilizing for the benefit of others is a charity. Miserliness is a contrary to it. A miser neither use his wealth for his own sake nor for the benefit of others. Jaisi says that charity brings virtues. Wealth spent in charity, removes the misfortunes of a giver. But on the other hand, one who creates his habit as a miser creates for himself innumerable troubles. Jaisi suggests to the benevelent to give charity without any rested interest as soon as possible. If it is given for the sake of return or in return of a service, it is not a charity as such. If any one does not spend wealth in charity, ultimately is ruined.

Freedom of will :

In dealing with the problem of 'Freedom of Will' Jaisi, neither favours the Mutazilities nor the Asharites. He has his own views which are based on the 'Quran' and very much similar to those of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auhiya and Rumi.

Jaisi, on the one hand preached the absolute sovereignity of God and on the other hand, he gave to man his due place. He says that God has provided every soul with potentialities according to its capacity. These potentialities are limited in their nature. Now, it is the business of each man to actualise these potentialities. Jaisi, asserts this views regarding human will for how far he is free to do, by giving the example of Adam in his 'Akharawat' in the following way; (what God wanted, he did. But He put this responsibility on others. Adam took the wheat to be unmindful and in consequence he come to this world to repent).

Here Jaisi, asserts the absolute sovereignity of God on the one hand and limited freedom of man on the other, to actualize the inherent potentialities by using reason. Jaisi says that once who have lost your paradise therefore, donot fear and try to seek the will of God, so that you will have not to repent. Text runs in 'Akharawat' as follows (once you have lost the paradise by doing wrong. Now do right to actualize your inherent potentialities in order to gain the favour of God. If you do not perform good for which God has equipped you to do so, you would not be pardon).

The above quotation from Jaisi's 'Akharawat' clearly shows that like other sufis Jaisi places a great importance to the freedom and responsibility of man. He is quite categorical that a man has to perform the good actions according to his capacity. He further says that a man has to reap the fruits of his actions either good or bad, when he would go back to the heavenly abode after his death. Thus Jaisi, declared the moral discipline as the Basic need to attain the Summum Bonum, e.g. the ultimate Good. And here Jaisi is quite in agreement with teachings of the 'Quran' and the other sufis of Chishti and Suhrawardi orders in India.

Thus after the analysis of 'Ethical system of Jaisi we may conclude that Jaisi's system may be called 'Theologica-Ethica,' His moral system is a means to achieve the end and that end is love and vision of God which is rooted in religion. He does not present any independent system of Ethics as we find the current western trend.

5

PEACE

Michael Allen Fox

What is peace ? Would we recognize it if we met it face to face? Is it the sort of thing we could, even in principle, meet face to face ? We all talk about peace as that which we want and strive for, and our leaders claim to be seeking it on our behalf; yet do we know what it is we want? And whatever peace is, would disarmament lead us there? It is an article of faith on both sides of the East-West power struggle that this is so, but do we know this to be so? In what follows I shall be concerned with an initial attempt to understand peace, and relatively little with how we might get there. Some will say that these two issues can't be separated, but since peace is an ideal condition, and one whose pursuit allegedly directs many of our efforts, it seems to me legitimate to analyze the concept in its own right. I shall also pay little attention to considering whether efforts supposedly directed toward securing peace, such as nuclear deterrence, arms control agreements, detente, peaceful coexistence, and the like. really move us toward this coveted goal, but will leave others to draw their own conclusions in this regard.

As in most areas of philosophy there are more questions than answers in the quest for an understanding of the concept of peace. A Socratic approach would celebrate this fact; it would assume that we already know what peace is, since we seem to know how to use the concept meaningfully. We know peace when we see it, this view would hold, just as we know beauty, truth or goodness. All we need is to complete the classic task of teasing out the essence of peace from examples and successive and gradually improving attempts to define it. Unfortunately when we follow this method the precise essencc of what we seek to grasp always seem to elude us.

Third International IPPNO Conference, Moscow, May/June 1990.

Is peace really like this anyway ? Do we already know what it is ? Does it have an "essence", or is it merely a mistake to think so ? Can we define it ? Is it merely an illusion ? Schopenhauer argued that pleasure is merely the temporary absence of suffering.[1] Could it be that peace similarly is just the temporary or permanent absence of war ? This account does have the merit—the sole merit, I should say—of suggesting why we are so voiceless when it comes to defining peace, namely, because we have, in the history of our species, been so seldom without war. But I think we know at least one thing for certain from experience, and this may serve as a useful starting-point : whatever peace is, it is not non-war.[2] Non-war is what we have at present and what the proponents of nuclear deterrence in its various forms hail as having prevailed for over forty years, since the end of World War II, allegedly owing to the system of mutual assured destruction of mutual terror. Non-war is escalating weapons development, the Strategic Defense Initiative, the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities, and the devastating consequences for our psychological and physical well-being of the production, testing, stockpiling, deployment, and brandishing of nuclear weapons. Non-war is what is costing the world 1.8 million U.S. dollars a minute in armaments.[3]

It has been argued that peace is likewise unhelpfully characterized as a state of nonviolence; for in thinking of it in this way we also conceptualize in negatively and fetter the imagination.[4] (In saying this, I don't of course mean that we regard peace as undesirable, only that we think of it in opposition to something else that is more familiar rather than in its own right.) One author who develops this critical perspective suggests that peace research has been shaped to a large degree by a "medical model" that pictures war as a disease we need to prevent; what is required instead is a "public health model" that seeks to understand the conditions of political and social well-being.[5] In the same spirit it has also been observed that "Peace is more than an absence of conflict, just as health is more than an absence of illness... Even a difficult illness may be easier to diagnose than the complex synergy of healthy, peacefull living".[6]

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[1] Arthur Schopenhauer, "Additional Remarks on the Doctrine of the Suffering of the World", in *Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays*, Vol. 2, trans. E.F.J. Payne (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 290-305.

[2] Beverly Woodward, "The Abolition of War", in *Nuclear War : Philosophical Perspectives*, 2nd ed., ed. Michael Allen Fox and Leo Groarke (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), pp. 245-256; Herbert Kelman, "Reflections on the History and Status of Peace Research", *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 5/2 (Spring 1981), 108; Steven Lee, "A positive Concept of Peace", in *The Causes of Quarrel*· ed. Peter Caws (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), pp. 183-192. As Duane L. Cady has pointed out, in an important recent book, "It is ironic that, culturally, we have lost sight of the positive meaning of peace—that is, concord, harmony—and think of peace as merely the absence of war. Yet it is war—that is, discord, dissonance, hostile contention between groups—that is the negative idea, a breach of agreement, a lack of cooperation, an absence of unity of harmony". (*From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum* [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989], p. 13).

[3] Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88*, 12th ed. (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1987), p. 5.

It is difficult enough to visualize a world without nuclear weapons, more difficult still a world without war. But to say a task is difficult is not to imply that it is impossible, and imaginative exercises of this sort are crucial for our survival. Is it so much more difficult a task to imagine peace in positive terms ? In my view it is not. Sometimes it seems as if we, as a species, dwell on the negative, the bad news and the pessimistic outlook. As Schopenhauer suggested, we seem to know a great deal more about unhappiness and what makes us unhappy than about happiness and what makes us happy. We need to break out of this psychologically crippling habit when thinking about peace.

Some thoughtful individuals who have written on nuclear war, nuclear deterrence and related issues have urged that it is essential to reflect upon, and to whatever extent possible mentally image, the omnicidal consequences of a general nuclear exchange between the superpowers[7]. What they have in mind is not "thinking about the unthinkable" as Herman Kahn proposed we do, namely, consider the use of nuclear weapons as an option and as demanding that we ponder alternative survival stratagems we might employ after the fact[8]. Quite the opposite; those who believe we should confront the possibility of omnicide, or universal destruction, affirm that we cannot even begin to get beyond our willingness to contemplate an all-out nuclear exchange unless we acquire a clear conception and a deepened psychological understanding of what this would mean. Omnicide-consciousness, if we may call it that, is a useful perspective to develop, and those who have clarified the meaning of omnicide deserve credit for their contribution to the pursuit of peace. However, contemplating omnicide has its negative and limiting side as well. For too much thinking about and imaging of universal destruction psychologically incapacitates us. Articulating a vision of omnicide is vital, but it is only part of the picture, if our goal is to prevent omnicide from occurring. We must in addition move forward on other levels of analysis and activity in order to defeat depression, denial, distancing, alienation, and self-fulfilling prophecies about nuclear war, to clear a space for hope to flourish and to empower ourselves. As Mark Sommer writes,

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[4] Mark Sommer, *Beyond the Bomb*: *Living Without Nuclear Weapons—A Field Guide to Alternative Strategies for Building a Stable Peace* (Chestnut Hill, MA: Expro Press, 1985), p. 90.

[5] Kelman, "Reflections", 107.

[6] Penney Kome and Patrick Crean, "Foreword", in *Peace*: *A Dream Unfolding*, ed. Penney Kome and Patrick Crean (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1986), p. 10.

[7] E.g. John Somerville, "Nuclear 'War' is Omnicide ', in *Nuclear War*, ed. Fox and Groarke, pp. 3-9; Robert Jay Lifton and Richard Falk, *Indefensible Weapons*: *The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism* (Toronto: CBC Enterprises, 1982); Jonathan Schell, *The Fate of the Earth* (New York: Knopf, 1982).

> The only means by which we can overcome the debilitating despair brought on by a sober appraisal of the odds against us is to engage in a deliberate overleaping of the obstacles between "here" and "there", to place ourselves in the territory of peace itself. We can then begin to survey the terrain into which we have ventured, noting what it looks like, feeling how it feels. Having premised the possibility of peace in a given circumstance, we find our minds and hearts liberated to engage in the practical consideration of how to find our way back to the present from that promised future.
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> This approach is not to be mistaken for wishful thinking. On the contrary, once the radical assumption has been made that peace is indeed possible, we must demonstrate an exceptional rigor in evaluating the most plausible means of reaching that state.[9]

For this reason thinking about and imagining peace, both individually and when we are together, is arguably essential to preventing omnicide. Let us see if we can make a contribution to this project.

Peace is something that individuals of a militaristic bent or who value violence as an expedient will never comprehend. Peace will not begin to be visible nor viable for the majority until people learn to abandon the nuclear mindset[10] and ideas that peace can be brought about by force or the threat of force. Lyndon Johnson, when he was President of the United States, asserted that his country was not waging war in Vietnam, it was "waging peace". But this Orwellian absurdity shows how impoverished our vision of peace really is, just as "wars" on poverty, crime, drug addiction, etc. reveal the paltriness of our metaphors and in fact of our plans for treating social ills.

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[8] Herman Kahn, *Thinking About the Unthinkable* (New York: Horizon Press, 1982).

[9] Sommer, *Beyond the Bomb*, pp. 120-121.

[10] See Michael Allen Fox, "The Nuclear Mindset: Motivational Obstacles to Peace", in *Nuclear War*, ed. Fox and Groarke, pp. 113-129.

A related sort of myopia is found in a recent volume of Richard Nixon's self-aggrandizing memoirs, in which it is urged that "Perfect peace assumes the end of conflict. Real peace is a means of living with unending conflict".[11] Here it is evidently presupposed that aggressive impulses inevitably seek direct expression and that conflict is much more fundamental to human nature than cooperation (and hence "unending"). We need not be so naive as to believe that conflict will vanish from the human sphere, that it is less a part of human nature than cooperation. But to imagine peace we have to be able to move beyond stale and hackneyed generalizations about our capacities continually recycled by so-called political "realists". Our permanent possibilities as a species are not circumscribed by the present and the past. As one writer observes, "If one tries to work toward the future from the present, the known realities cling like tendrils to every new idea, somthering it with awareness of what won't work because of the way things are".[12] Besides, it is worth reminding ourselves that we needn't think of conflict as necessarily or potentially destructive unless it is held in check; it can also become a source of creative energy and healthy competition.

At this point it should perhaps be conceded that there are two major and evidently very different conceptions of peace that we must avoid confusing. One has to do with bringing armed hostilities among nations to a halt. Here, peace is a state of non-war or, more constructively (or perhaps subsequently), of nonviolent internationl cooperation. We might say that this criterion describes an external relation or set of relations. What is being alluded to is the situation existing between the nations concerned. Peace, conceived in this way, may lead to internal changes within the nations, such as improvements in the quality of life, freedom from fear, security of the person, and so on, but it is not identified with these benefits.

The other approach to peace sees it in terms of personal security and well-being. Here, it is not the body politic that is the focus of attention but the body—and even more so the mind—of each individul. Viewed from this perspective peace is a state of mind as much as anything, one of security, contentment and inner harmony. Hence it is an internal relation or set of relations to which our attention is directed when we speak this way, namely, that between the different components of our psyche; if I may speak in this Platonic fashion. I am not saying that we are merely minds, nor that the body doesn't count for much; quite the contrary. But it is inner peace that manifests itself in physical health and robustness.

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[11] Richard M. Nixon, *1988*: *Victory Without War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), p. 27.

[12] Elise Boulding, "The Social Imagination and the Crisis of Human Futures: A North American Perspective", *Forum for Correspondence and Contact*, 13/2 (February 1983), 7.

According to the first view just outlined, one might say, "Inner Peace would be great, but I'll settle for peace among nations," while according to the second one might say, "Peace among nations would be great, but I'll settle for inner peace." Which is the correct view? There really isn't a "correct view" so this quetsion cannot be answered and is therefore inappropriate. Yet it might be asked which is more ultimate, in some sense. My answer is the second. An end to hostilities among nations is crucially important and even a necessary condition of inner peace. But it is not the only or the final goal we seek to realize when we speak of peace[13]. The quality of life of the people of many nations is impoverished significantly, even severely, from time to time, when they go to war. But it is arguable that the quality of life has more or less permanently deteriorated for a great many human beings, a large number of them children, around the globe, and that the cause of this is, directly or indirectly, the cost of preparing for war. Within a discouraging number of nations an additional great sum is expended on the institutions and machinery of oppression. An end to war or a general reduction of tensions leading to war would of course not automatically reduce domestic oppression. Nor would it automatically lead to other needed improvements in people's quality of life, even though it could open the way toward such changes. This shows again that the nonviolent coexistence of nations is at most a necessary but not a sufficient condition of peace as I am trying to understand it.

To begin with peace for each of us means security of the person. Th does not merely entail the freedom to come and go, assemble with others and express ourselves without putting ourselves at risk of harassment, incarceration and physical abuse of one form or another. It entails all aspects of self-determination, not only higher order aspects such as philosophers speak of in characterizing "autonomy". It entails things like having enough food to eat for ourselves and those we care about and care for. It entails being cared for at various stages of life in ways that make life worth living, if not by those near and dear then by agencies acting on behalf of society. Old people facing death in loneliness, precarious health, poverty, and despair are not at peace any more than young people who are unwanted, uneducated, unemployed, and without hope for the future. The world is full of people who are not on the fast track, who are sidetracked, derailed or left behind by the peace of progress in the competitive struggle with others for sheer survival. Nor, for the most part, does peace belong to those who are materially successful, as countless prophets and philosophers from all traditions have observed.

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[13] According to David W. Felder, "Peace concerns the non-violent settling of conflicts between nations. It centers on international relations. It is not concerned directly with domestic relations or with peace with oneself". ("Problems in Defining 'peace'," *Philosophy and Culture : Proceedigns of the XVIIth World Congress of Philosophy*, Montreal 1983 [1988] II, 689). Unfortunately Felder merely asserts and never tells us why he thinks this is so.

Perhaps, however, we err in trying to think of peace as an end state, as something to be strived for and once and for all attained. Perhaps peace is to be identified with the striving rather than the attainment. One writer on peace holds that "Peace... should be seen mainly as a *process* rather than as an ultimate goal with static content. Peace is not some wonderful object that we can possess once certain prescribed steps have been accomplished..."[14] In a similar vein, another peace theorist states that "peace is an activity which aims at, and struggles for, a just world".[15] It is no doubt helpful to think of peace as a process, namely, the process of endeavouring to bring about the conditions that make peace possible. And it may well be the case that peace is, in the final analysis, unattainable and only to be continuously strived for, much like equality, social justice, wisdom, and truth. It may be that peace is the light at the end of a tunnel, toward which we move yet never reach. To leave the matter here, however, is to confuse peace with the strategy for finding it. But for what reason do we have a strategy at all; what is our purpose in seeking peace? And, more crucially; *what* are we seeking and what is the nature of the peace—seeking process? To answer *these* sorts of questions, surely we need to conceptualize peace as an end state, not only as a process, for a process is amorphous and our understanding of it is nebulous if it has no product.

One reason for conceptualizing peace as an end state is that self-transformation may be seen as both the source and the result of the

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14 Woodward, "The Abolition of War," p. 252 (author's emphasis).

15 David Weinberger, *Nuclear Dialogues* (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), p. 211.

quest for nonviolence and political security on any scale one chooses to consider. In this spirit Jiddu Krishnamurti said, "To put an end to outward war, you must begin to put an end to war in Yourself."[6] By this he seems to have meant both that we must cease being divided against ourselves in our private emotional and intellectual lives, and that we should cease being contributing causes of war by harbouring ill will and aggressive impulses toward others. Inner peace or harmony of some degree, then, may be understood as the wellspring of actions designed to end hostilities among individuals, social groups and nations, but also as the end state to which we aspire, which is true personal security. This is a return to where we started, but to a reinforced state of inner harmony. Thus peace, so far as it is a process, represents a cyclical movement from self-knowledge to self-realization, or one could say from one stage of self-mastery to the next. Peace begets and reinforces peace; as Spinoza wrote, "Peace is not an absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice."[17]

Certainly those in both Western and Eastern traditions who have found inner peace, harmony, enlightenment, or full self-realization have been the most exemplary and inspiring apostles of peace' they have pointed the way for the rest of us to follow. I do not mean to suggest that one must be completely at peace in oneself in order to seek peace in the world. But I think one must have made at least a start in the direction of seeking inner peace in order really to understand what is needed to make peace in the world possible, and to be committed to the cause of peace, as it is usually understood.

I would like to suggest here that those who think of peace exclusively or primarily as a process have begged the question with which we began: assuming that peace is a matter of resolving and ending international hostilities, they see it as an ongoing activity of seeking detente. From this vantage point, the conception of peace as an ultimate goal is bound to appear as something with "static content", a "wonderful object that we can possess", and by the some token as a vacuous ideal. But there is a second level at which the question is being begged here. For every goal could, in a sense, he said to have "static content" and to be an "object" of our intention or desire—otherwise it would not be a goal but something else instead. Yet for

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16 J. Krishnamurti,*First and Last Freedom*: *A Quest Book* (New York: Harper & Row, 1954); cited in Kome and Crean, eds., *Peace*, p. 61.

17 Benedict de Spinoza, *Theologico-Political Treatise* (1670), cited by Cady, *From Warism to Pacifism*, p. 109.

something to be a goal for us, or an ultimate goal, does not have to imply that its attainment is equivalent to or leads to a condition of stasis. Perhaps peace is that which we all need in order truly to flourish.

Some misgivings may yet remain. For when we talk about peace in the way I have chosen to—as an end state of individual self-realization—are we not left merely with what one author describes (in a different context) as "a goal without any road map for getting there; a moral imperative without strategic directions"?[18] Perhaps we are; but recall that I earlier disclaimed any intention of trying to define the precise path to peace. Does this mean that we have not advanced our understanding of peace ? I trust not. It may be of some importance to have considered and possibly accepted that there can be no "strategic direction" without a destination, and that a road map has shape and meaning only if it can help us find the place we already know we went to go.

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[18] Cynthia Secor, "Androgyny : An Early Reappraisal," *Women's Studies*, 2 (1974), 164.

6

Religiosity and the Attitudes towards Death in Old Age

(A case study of Retired Govt. Employees Living in Urban Areas)

Saraswati Mishra

(In this research paper an effort has been made to examine the relationship that exists between the retirees' degree of religious-mindedness (RM) and religious-activeness (RA) on one hand and the degree of positiveness of their attitudes towards the event of death (PAD)* on the other. The findings of the investigation among 800 retirees, demonstrate statistically signficant positive association among these variables. *Prelude :* A particular system of faith and worship is called religion (Oxford English Dictionary). It originates from the recognition of the existence of some higher unseen power, controlling the universe, i.e., almighty God, with the emotion and morality connected there with. The two most generally accepted derivations or interpretations of religion by Cicero and 'Christian Cicero' of 4th century, suggest the twofold aspect of religion. On the subjective side, it is part of the hidden experience of the psychic life; on the objective side, it involves the recurring performance of certain human activities and thus belongs to the realm of external phenomena. As a matter of fact, both the aspects of religion are interrelated, as, the external manifestations of religion are organically rooted in the inner experience of psychic life (Bertholet, 1969 : 228).

The superior power, having full control of man's destiny, intrenches upon his life and hence must be compounded with, if he has to ward of the dangers emanating from it and receive the assistance it

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This paper is prepared on the basis of information collected by the author during the field work for her D. Litt. thesis on 'Social Adjustment in old Age' which was submitted in July, 1985, in Jabalpur Univetsity of Madhya Pradesh, India.

* These abbreviations will be used subsequently to express the variables under consideration

can bestow. Thus, from the sociological point of view, the religion can be understood as the complex of man's interrelations with the super human power, based on a particular system of faith and worship. In this way, religion is the belief in one or the other super-human, super–natural or supra–social power, directing and controlling the course of nature and the human life which has for its basis, the fear, the reverence,the devotion and the idea of sacredness and which is expressed through prayer, worship and submission (Mukherjee, 1985 : 49).

The religion defines and explains various aspects of life, death and life after death as well as transmits the message of God in the from of recommendations for ideal life style, generating positive effects during life, death and after death period (Marshall, 1986 : 125-146).

Nothing is more certain than the 'State of being dead', of every living being. But at the same time it is also true that every living being wants to continue its living process. Therefore while facing the death of others, we reflect upon our own mortal state and become conscious of this inevitable event (Moore, 1969). But as cited by Marshall (1986 : 125), Georg Simmel (1908), by recognising the inevitability of death as a fact of life, has distinguished its definition in the consciousness of individuals. According to him, the manner in which we conceive this fact of ours and its final effect, and in which we react to this conception, varies greatly. So does the way in which this element of our existence is interwoven with other elements.'

Recognition of mortality by the culture is the universal phenomenon but it varies dramatically in form and content in different cultures. Every religion provides an answer to the question 'why human die?' The written and orally transmitted myths of diverse religions provide a wide variety of 'explanations' for death, conceptions of after life and the recommendations as to how the death should be faced with greater equanimity (Marshall, 1985 : 126). Thus under a particular cultural and religious environment we learn to accept our own impending deaths and keep on living.

In any Society, a set of few religious beliefs, written or orally transmitted, gets widely spread and shared by the people. And as an expression of the religious feelings, they adopt particular activity pattern in different stages of life, prescribed by their religion in the form of the wish of God.

According to the philosophy and most popular religious beliefs of Indian Society,* the human spirit (substance of inner self) is immortal. It emanates from the Supreme spirit of God, takes different physical forms in different lives in the world and ultimately gets absorbed with the supreme spirit. The Salvation (Moksha) is the greatest achievement and a state of extreme happiness for human spirit as it gets liberated from the trouble-some cycle of birth and death forever. Connected with this spiritual aspect of life is the belief of human deed's outcome (result) which one has to go through during the life, death and life after death. While for the good deeds the person earns graces and gets rewarded, for evil deeds one earns sins and gets punished even after death while staying in the heaven and hell between the two births respectively. Therefore the deeds approved by the religion have been declared as the greater one and they should be performed without thinking about their outcome. Thus, a sense of continuity or on goingness of life even after death, has been created by these beliefs among Indians.

In the Indian Society, the life of human being has been planned and organized under the traditional 'Ashram System' which provides equal and balanced opportunities for intellectual, behavioural and spiritual advancement in one's life. Under this system, the life span of 100 years has been divided into four equal parts of 25 years. In the first part, the person belongs to 'Brahmcharyashram' where one is expected to get oneself educated and attain knowledge for intellectual advancement. During the second phase of life, that is, 'Grahasthashram', a person is supposed to earn livelihood, get married and raise family and perform 'Yagna' (institution of sacrifice and offerings) and lead a household life. In the third stage of 'Vanprasthashram', the person should try to get rid of the worldly ties and attachments by renunciating the homely environment and living in the forest. And in the last phase of life, that is 'Sanyasashram', a person should become monk (saint) totally renounce the world, plan his life in order to reach to the God and attain salvation through very hard

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* According to 1981 census report, there are 85% Hindus, 9.9% Muslims, 2.3% Christians, 1.7% Sikhs, 5% Jains, 5% Bauddhs, .03% Parasies, .477% tribal religious groups and .03% other non-tribal groups in the Indian population (Census of India, 1981).

Although the religious belief, being mentioned here are mainly from the Hindu religion but they are prevalent in the whole Indian Society. In other religious groups also they are found in some or the other form and their negative or positive impact can easily be seen on the lives of individuals other than Hindus.

By considering the fact, that over whelming majority of the followers of other religions in India, especially Muslim, Christian and Sikh, have the Hindu ancestors; all the retirees of different religions were grouped together for the purpose of finding out the degree of their religiosity and attitudes towards death.

and difficult penance (Tapasya), resulting into the graceful and willing acceptance of death, as it is considered as the opportunity of meeting the God (Mukherjee, 1985 : 26–48).

In the present Indian Society, we may not find the above mentioned life pattern in general but while living in the same house hold, increasing religiosity with the advancing age, can easily be observed in India. The religion plays a very important role specially in the later life of Indians. According to Indian religious preachings as we have seen earlier, the old people are recommended to detach themselves from the present materialistic world and to attach with the other spiritual world. Gradual withdrawal or disengagement, in other words minimization of the needs, on the part of the aged people, may release them from the worries and tensions of worldly affairs and provide mental peace and satisfaction. Religiosity in terms of belief in life after death which gives a sense of 'ongoingness' may make the old people less afraid of impending death. Moreover, it provides various activities to pass their leisure time which is a biggest problem in old age specially in the case of retirees. Since present society does not provide them important roles and opportunities of social participation, they can divert their attention towards the spiritual matters. It can also avoid the conflicting situation created by the unnecessary interference by the elders in the personal affairs of grown-up children. The disengagement theory of successful aging (Cumming et. al., 1961) also suggests the 'rocking chair' pattern of life in old age.

But the situation today is, that with the modernization of the Indian Society, the religion's control over the people's life is decreasing gradually. Probably quite a few problems of old age in the present society emerge from the fact that the aged people wish to remain engaged in the worldly affairs till their last breath. Due to this tendency while on one hand, modern attitudes and activities of the younger generation make them unhappy and frustrated, on the other, they get worried and frightened due to the impending death, fast approaching to them.

Objective : In the present paper an effort has been made to find out the relationship that exists between the religiosity and the attitudes towards death in oldage. It was thought quite proper and interesting to know whether religiosity helps them to get mentally prepared to face death gracefully or creates fears and tension in their minds about the terrific experiences at the time of death or during the imagined life after death.

Concepts : For the purpose of the study the term 'religiosity' has been divided into two parts, i.e., religious-mindedness (RM) and religious-activeness (RA). They are considered to be the two facets of religiosity, very closely connected yet possibly different from each other, atleast at the comparative grounds. Positiveness of attitudes towards death (PAD) conveys a healthy outlook regarding the event of death

Hypotheses : Due to lack of literature available in India in this field, mainly on this basis of observation and logic, few hypotheses were constructed to be tested. They are—

1. Religious-mindedness will be positively associated with the positiveness of the attitudes towards death.
2. Religious-activeness will be positively associated with the positiveness of the attitudes towards death.
3. Religious-mindedness and religious-activeness are positively associated with each other.

Research Design : Explainatory types of research design has been adopted for the purpose of understanding the PAD in the context of RM and RA.

Importance : Apart from adding knowledge to the literature on the subject, its practical importance lies in the guidance to the aged people for getting better prepared to face the inevitable event of death. It may also help the welfare agencies, active in the field of aged people to decide whether to divert their attention towards religion or not.

Universe and Sample : The universe of the study is the entire number of male retired Government employees living in the cities of Chandigarh and Jabalpur (2400). By adopting the simple random sampling method, one-third proportion of the universe, that is, 800 retirees, were selected out of which only 720 could be interviewed. Death, change of address and migration were the main reasons behind sample mortality.

Procedure of Data Collection : Interview method was selected for collecting the information about the retirees, attitudes, beliefs and activities.

Index and Religious-mindedness : With a view to judging the levels of RM of the aged people, an index, measuring the strength of their faith in the popular religious beliefs, has been prepared. The religious beliefs, taken into account are about the existence of almighty God; pre-determined fate of a person; concepts of 'Punya' (grace) and 'pap' (sins); 'Karmaphal' (out come or the result of deeds) and rebirth; hell and heaven; relationship between the common spirit and the supreme spirit, and the state of salvation.

Index of positiveness of attitudes towards death: With the intention of deciding the level of PAD also, an index measuring their mental preparedness to embrance the death at any time, has been constructed. For this purpose, six statements indicating the meaning of death to the individual, such as vision or thought of death as a source of anxiety and depression; imagination of the experience of death as quite painful and frightening; death as the source of bereavement and problems to others; death as a quiet, natural and inevitable event of life, death as the opportunity of unification with God and getting better life afterwards, and the death as the freedom or emancipation from the false worldly illusions and attachments (Maya and Moh), have been used.

Scaling technique : While preparing the indexes, Likert type of scaling method has been used. Both the indexes contain three positive and three negative statements which have been mixed up and arranged in the index to get reliable information. Each statement has five point response categories, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The score of each statement ranges from one to five in negative statement and five to one in positive statement. In this way the total scores of all the six statements of each index adds to 30.

Item analysis : After completing the data collection 100 interview schedules have been selected randomly and the upper and lower quartiles (25 schedules) for each item score have been worked out. It is assumed that these two groups provide the criteria groups interms of which each statement of an index can be evaluated by deriving its 't' ratio. As Edwards (1969 : 19-53) has written, the value of 't' measures the extent to which a given statement differentiates between the high and low groups. As a crude and approximate rule of thumb, 't' value, equal to or greater than 1.75 may be regarded as indicating that the average response of the high and low groups to a statement differs significantly' provided 25 or more subjects have been kept in both the groups.

For the purpose of our study also, with the help of t' ratio, the difierence between the mean response of each statement in the upper and lower quartiles has been tested for significance. Any statement having 't' ratio less than 1. 75 is required to be removed from the index. The 't' ratio of each statement of the two indexes of our study has been shown in the appendix No. 1. It is a matter o^ chance that all the Six Statements of each index were found to differ significantly, hence the removal of any statement was not required.

The total score of a respondent on any one of the two indexes has been taken as the indicator of his level of the concerned variable i.e. religious mindedness (RM) or positiveness of attitudes towards death (PAD). Based on the five point response categories of the Six statements, the possible total score, an individual can obtain in any index, ranges from 6 to 30 This range of score has been equally divided into five categories as 6 to 10, 11 to 15, 16 to 20, 21 to 25 and 26 to 30. Higher score on any index shows the better level regarding that variable. All the respondents have been appropriated in these categories indicating the level of either RM or PAD as very low, low, average, high and very high.

In order to measure the degree of retirees religious activeness, the total time spent by them daily on religious activities, such as worshiping, praying, reading religious books, telling religious stories, visting religious institutions, singing religious songs, meditating, listening religious preachings etc. has been considered as the indicator of the level of their religious-activeness (RA). The retirees spending less then 1 hr, 1 to 2 hrs, 2 to 3 hrs, 3 to 4 hrs. and above 4 hrs. on religious activities daily, have been categorised as having very low, average, high and very high level of religious-activeness.

Test of Association : In the present investigation an attempt has been made to examine the relationship that exists between the religious-mindedness and the religious-activeness on one hand and the positiveness of attitudes towards death on the other. Therefore any two variables under consideration have been crosstabulated to find out their relationship. Since we have the ordinal level of data, Goodman's and Kruskal's Gamma(r) test of association has been applied for examining the association between any two variables. Since 'r' measures the degree of agreement between any two ordinal level variables, the value of 'r' shows the percentage of error which gets reduced in the mutual predictability of those two variables (Champion, 1968 : 219-224). Further, the value of 'r' has been converted into the value of 'z' to findout its statistical significance by applying the conservative asymptotic test suggested by Goodman and kruskal (1963 : 310-364).

The value of 'r' ranging between 1 to .3, between .3 to .4 and above .4 is considered as indicating the weak moderate and high association between any two variables respectively. The 'z' values ranging between 1.92 to 2.33 and above 2.33 are considered statistically significant at .50 and .01 level respectively. Owing to the qualitative nature of the data, .05 level has been set to test the statistical significance of association between any two variables. Since the nature of the variables concerned is largely qualitative, a multiple correlational analysis could not be adopted and the researcher has to be contented with only a single factor association between any two variables.

FINDINGS

In the sample of the study, 79.59, 12.36, 3.75, 1.74 and 2.36 per-cent of the retirees are Hindus, Sikhs, Muslim, Christians and other religious groups respectively.

Table No. 1 Shows the distribution of the respondents regarding the three variables under consideration.

TABLE NO. 1

Distribution of the Respondents according to their levels of RM, RA and PAD.

Degree or the level of the variable	Religious-mindedness.	Religious-activeness	Positiveness of attitudes towards death.
Very Low	45 (6.25)	107 (14.86)	96 (13.33)
Low	52 (7.22)	179 (24.86)	142 (19.72)
Average	101 (14.02)	165 (22.92)	143 (19.86)
High	12 (17.22)	139 (19.31)	151 (20.98)
Very High	398 (55.29)	130 (18.05)	188 26.11)
TOTAL :	720 (100.00)	720 (100.00)	720 (100.00)

(Percentage are given in the parentheses)

Table No. 1 demonstrates a great concentration of the aged people in the category of very high level of strength of faith in religious beliefs. Regarding religious-activeness and positiveness of attitudes towards death we do not find the heavy contentration in any category. More or less same proportion of the retirees fall in the all levels of these two variables.

Now we are in position to find out the relationship among these variables.

RM and PAD : RM plays an important role in old age. It goes with the traditionalism and helps the people to divert their attention from the worldly matters to the spiritual matters. It is very significant in view of the fact that present society does not provide the aged people, the opportunities of achieving higher status. In the situation they can withdraw themselves mentally from the known world of their near and dear ones and draw some satisfaction or peace by connecting themselves with the God.

Like any other society, in Indian society also the religion defines, explains and gives meaning to the life, death and life after death. According to it, human spirit is immortal as it is the part of the supreme spirit of God. It only changes the physical forms in different births (Like one changes the clothes). Origin and the end of the soul is God, as salvation is the ultimate aim of it. The religious belief in the life after death may give a sense of on goingness to the aged people and make them less afraid of their impending death. This realization may release them from the tensions and worries and they may generate in themselves the positive attitudes towards death.

Considering it was hypothesized that significant positive association exists between RM and PAD in old age. The two indexes, measuring the level of RM and PAD have already been discussed in detail. For RM, the strength of faith in religious beliefs and for PAD, mental preparedness for death, are the criteria for measurement. For examining the relationship between above mentioned two variables, all the retirees are divided into five categories, i.e. having very low, low, average high and very high level of both the variables separately and the frequencies are cross tabulated in the table No. 2. After that the Gamma 'r' test of association has been applied to findout the relionship. Further, the value of 'r' has been converted into the value of 'z' to findout its statistical significance.

TABLE NO. 2

Distribution of the Respondents according to their levels of RM and PAD

Level of RM	Level of PAD					
	Very low	Low	Average	High	Very high	Total
Very low	25	12	5	3	0	45
Low	10	29	8	4	1	52
Average	17	16	37	18	13	101
High	16	15	21	35	37	124
Very High	28	70	72	91	127	398

(r = .40, Z = 2.73)

Table No. 2 demonstrates, firstly, that majority of the retirees are having very strong faith in the religious beliefs prevalent in the Indian Society, Secondly, that a considerable numer of them have quite positive attitudes towards death also, and vice-versa. The point worth noticing here is, that we find quite a few retirees having very high level of RM, falling in the category of low level of PAD When we applied the test of association between these two variables, it has been found that a moderate degree of positive association, which is statistically significant at. 01 level, exists between the (r = . 40, Z = 2. 73). This finding Supports our hypothesis regarding these variables to a great extent. Moderate association between them shows that the religious beliefs are not very much effective in creating the higher degree of positiveness of attitudes towards death among the retirees.

Now let us examine the relationship that exists between RA and PAD among our respondents.

RA and PAD : RA plays a very significant role in old age specially in the case of retiress. In the present society, which does not provide opportunities of social participation to its senior members, they have to face the problem of leisure time. While younger generation does not approve their interference in every matter, they themselves want to remain in the dominating position. This creates conflicting situation at home and generates intolerance and irritation on the part of both the generations. Moreover, the aged people remain tense and worried due to the fast approaching death to them. The idea of imaginary after-death, life also frightens them and they really do not know what is there in store for them in near future. Under these circumstances, involvement in religious activities can be proved as a boon to them. They on one hand, can withdraw themselves from the worldly affairs by detaching from the near and dear ones and remain busy in religious activities to pass the time; on the other, they can earn graces through the performance of religious deeds and consequently be assured about the lack of sufferings or punishment by God during the present life, death and life after death. This can release them from mental tension and depression and bring them some satisfaction and happiness.

Considering these possibilities it was hypothesized that the positive association exists between RA and PAD in old age.

In order to indicate the level of religious involvement of the respondents, the time spent by them. On religious activities evey day, has been taken into account. The retired people spending upto 1 hr, 1 to 2 hrs, 2 to 3 hrs, 3 to 4 hrs. and above 4 hrs. on religious activities, have been considered as having very low, low, average, high and very high level of religious activeness. The frequencies regarding this variable were cross tabulated with the frequences of PAD in the table NO. 3 and then the tests for association and its statistical significance were applied.

TABLE NO. 3

Distribution of the Respondents According to their levels of RA and PAD

Level of RA	Level of PAD					
	Very low	Low	Average	High	Very high	Total
Very low	68	21	17	1	0	107
Low	12	97	49	21	0	179
Average	9	11	56	55	34	165
High	5	11	11	64	48	139
Very High	2	2	10	10	106	130
Total :	96	142	143	151	188	720

(r=77, Z=4.85)

Table No. 3 demonstrates firstly, that more or less same proportion of the retirees have come in the all level categories of RA but the largest group of retired people is spending 1 to 2 hrs daily on religious activities; and Secondly, that a considerable number of people is havhoving quite positive attitudes towards death. Cross tabulation of both the variables shows quite clearly that most of the aged people having lower or higher levels of religious involvement are also having the lower or higher levels of PAD respectively. And this is the case over whelming majority of retirees. Both the variables have the tendency to proceed or recede together in the same direction. On the application of the test of association between these two variables, it has been found that a very high degree of positive association, which is statistically significant at .01 level, exists between them (r = .77, Z = 4.85). This finding strongly proves our hypothesis regarding the relationship of these variables i.e. higher the RA higher the PAD. It certainly shows that religious involvement may lead to positive attitudes towards death in old age. It seems, as it was expected, that more involvement in religious activities assures them that they will certainly be placed in heaven after death. They may also attain salvation, and if not, they will definitely get comfortable and respectful life in the next birth. In the rest of the present life and during the event of death also, they will not have to suffer, as they are earning lot of graces through religious deeds. This decreases the fear of death in their minds and makes them free from tension and anxiety. It seems quite possible that highly religiously active old people may prepare themselves to die any time and quite a few of them may even look forward to die as it relieves them from false illusions and attachments of the present world.

R.M. and R.A. : Initially it was hypothesized that RM and RA must be significantly associated in positive direction specially among retirees. But moderate positive relationship between the RM and PAD (r = .40 Z = 2.73) on one hand and the high level of positive association between RA and PAD (r=.77, z=4.85) on the other, demonstrates firstly, that RA is affecting PAD more than RM and secondly, that it is not necessary that a highly religious minded person should also be highly involved in the religious activities and vice versa.

In order to confirm the above mentioned fact, it was thought proper to examine the relationship that exists between RM and RA in old age. For the purpose, frequencies in the five categories of RM were cross tabulated with the frequencies in the five categories of RA in table No. 4.

TABLE NO. 4

Distribution of the respondents according to the RM and RA

	Degree of Religious Activeness					
Degree of Religious Mindedness	Very low	Low	Average	High	Very high	Total
Very Low	26	10	6	3	0	45
Low	9	31	7	4	1	52
Average	18	19	34	17	13	101
High	13	25	28	39	19	124
Very High	41	94	90	76	97	398
Total	107	179	165	139	130	720

(r=.31, Z=1.64)

Table No. 4 demonstrates that while majority of the respondents have achieved very high level of RM, we do not find such heavy concentration in any category regarding RA. More or less same proportion of the retirees have fallen in all the categories of RA. It also shows that although in lower levels of both the variables we find some association between the two facets of religion, i.e. RM and RA but in the higher categories it is not so. It is quite clearly visible that almost same proporation of those having very high level of RM have low, average and very high level of RA. When we applied the test of association between the two variables, we found the moderate positive association exists between them which is not statistically significant even at .05 level (r=.31, Z=1.64).

The findings demonstrate the fact that quite a few aged people are not involving themselves much in religious activities inspite of their very strong faith in religious beliefs. Consequently, they are not certain about the treatment they will get by the almighty God during the event of death and life after death, which creates fear of death in their minds. The phenomena is quite understandable and there can be several reasons due to which they may not be able to devote much time to religious activities. For example, money earning activities due to liablilities even at this age may be the biggest obstacle in this respect. Bad health condition, house hold jobs, other interests and hobbies or the mere laziness may be the other reasons in this regard. In this way, our hypothesis regarding the close association between RM and RA was approved by the data only partially.

Now we can summarize our findings as below :

(a) RM is positively associated with PAD. This relationship although exists at the moderate level, is statistically significant at .01 level ($r = .40$, $Z = 2\ 73$)

(b) RA and PAD are positively associated at a much higher degree and obviously this association too is statisticaily significant at .01 level ($r = .77$, $Z = 4\ 85$)

(c) The value of relationship betwen RA and RM is not statistically significant, although they are positively associated with each other ($r = .31$, $Z = 1.64$)

In this way, while our two main hypotheses about the significant positive association between the RM and RA on one hand and PAD on the other, have been approved by the facts, the side hypothesis regarding the close association between the RM and RA has been partly rejected by the findings of the investigation.

Conclusion : On the basis of above mentioned facts we can conclude that RM alone is not sufficient to produce positive attitudes towards death. On the contrary, it may create anxiety, fear and depression in the human mind. Most important is the RA, of course based on the RM, through which one gets assured to have good experience of death in the present as well as in the spiritul world, when RM gets coupled with the RA, it becomes very effective on the issue under consideration. [illegible] indicates towards the fact that due to the imagined positive consequences of religious deeds, the self assurance about the comfortable experiences in future i.e., during and after death; decreases the seriousness of threat posed by the fast approaching death to them. On th [illegible] trary, they look forward to embrace the death any time to get e [illegible] release from the worldly worries of present life. They think it [illegible] joyful and peaceful event, liberating them from the [illegible] s and giving opportunity to meet the God and achieve the state of salvation to get rid of the life and death cycle again and again in different briths.

Suggestions : Since the practical purpose of knowledge in the field of thanatology is to provide death education to the people on the basis of our conclusions, some suggestions can be forwarded to the aged people and to the agencies working for their walfare. For the happy ending of life, the aged people should try to minimize their needs and detach them selves from the worldly ties. They should look at the death as the inevitable natural phenomena which should be accepted willingly in the later years of life. For the aged, having strong religious beliefs, best course of action is to devote more time in religious activities if their basic needs along with the dependents' requirements are being fulfilled. The agencies working for them may provide opportunities of religious group activities. Consultation services can be provided and lectures, discussions, film shows etc. can be arranged to educate them on death and remove its fear from their minds. This will help them to plan rest of their life and the end of their life properly.

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* Quite often we come to know about such events where the highly religious people such as Saints, Sages etc. minimize their needs, involve themselves more and more with advancing age in meditation and prayers etc.. get mentally prepared for death and ultimately die quietly and peacefully.

APPENDIX—A

(a) Item Analysis ('t' ratio) of the Statements of the Index of Religious Mindedness :

Sr. No.	Statement and the Degree of Agreement	Mean of lower quartile	Mean of upper quartile	Value of 't'
1	I believe in the existence of almighty God Every where. Strongly agree 5 Agree 4 Undecided 3 Dis-agree 2 Strongly dis-agree 1	1.32	4.48	7.9
2	I do not believe that the fate of a person is pre-determined by God. S.A 1 A. 2 U. 3 D. 4 S.D. 5	1.2	3.8	9.6

3	I believe in the concept of 'Pap' & 'Punya' S.A. 5 A. 4 U. 3 D. 2 S.D. 1	1.36	3.88	8.7
4	I do not believe in the concept of 'Karmaphal' and the rebirth. S.A. 1 A. 2 U. 3 D. 4 S.D. 5	2.1	4.3	7.8
5	I believe in the concept of hell and heaven. S.A. 5 A. 4 U. 3. D. 2 S.D. 1	1 60	4.40	11.1
6	I do not believe in the inter-relationship between the human and supreme spirit and the state of salvation. S.A. 1 A. 2 U. 3 D. 4 S.D. 5	1.45	4.00	9.1

(b) **Item Analysis of the Statements of the Index of positiveness of Attitudes towards Death**

Sr. No.	Statement and the Degree of Agreement	Mean of lower quartile	Mean of upper quartile	Value of 't'
1	Quite often thoughts about death worry me a lot and I get depressed. Strongly Agree 1 Agree 2 Undecided 3 Dis-agree 4 Strongly disagree 5	1.96	4.4	9.5
2	We should accept the death not as the source of bereavement but as an inevitable natural event of life. S.A. 5 A. 4 U. 3 D. 2 S.D. 1	2.36	4.48	8 8
3	Death must be a quite painful and tough experience for a dying person S.A. 1 A. 2 U. 3 D. 4 S.D. 5	1.40	3.60	6.9
4	Death provides an opportunity of meeting and unifying with the God. S.A. 5 A. 4 U. 3 D. 2 S.D. 1	1.00	3.72	12.00
5	The after death life of spiritual world seems quite frightening to me. S.A. 1 A. 2 U. 3 D. 4 S.D. 5	2.56	4.5	7.4
6	Death provides an occasion to get freedom from the worldly illusions and bindings. S.A. 5 A. 4 U. 3 D. 2 S.D. 1	1.4	4.4.	11.8

APPENDIX –B

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7

Program Evaluation

Stefan C. Christopher

What is program evaluation ?

Program evaluation puts research methods to use in measuring the effects of social programs-programs in schools, social work, jails, hospitals, job training, technical assistance, community development, law and so on. Such research gives us hard facts upon which the usefulness of a social program aimed to change what people know, how they feel, what they want, what they do, the institutions with which they deal, or the communities in which they live. It gathers data in an orderly way from a representative sample of the units to be looked at. As a rule it puts the evidence into quantitative terms (32% of the clients, adoption rates of 85 per thousand or better, etc.), and compares it with the criteria that were set. It then draws conclusions about the effectiveness, the worth, or the success of what is being looked at.

What good can come from a program evaluation ?

No program should be conceived, implemented, continued or terminated without concomittant professional evaluation. The hard data needed for informed decision making is otherwise absent, and one has no basis of comparison for judging relative quality. Program evaluation provides the groundwork for trend analysis and supplies the data needed for cost/benefit analysis. Apart from some form of program evaluation, the rational resolution of controversy becomes virtually impossible.

What are the kinds of program evaluation ?

In the area of needs assessment, we can be of help in the process of goal determination in the initial phase of program development. We can help a client in translating global goals into specific operationally defined target objectives; and in prioritizing these. The relevant question here is: *What should the program(s) try to accomplish ?* Given a legislative mandate, say, to improve the health care of an administrative unit where there are a multiplicity of health problems but a limited set of resources, should one concentrate on sanitation ? infant mortality ? health education ? improved delivery systems ? One has to sort out long-range vs. short-range objectives, direct vs. indirect effects. economic vs. humanitarian considerations, etc., to develop the most advantageous calculus of immediate goals for a program, given budgetary limitations, policy restraints, and the other contextual realities of the situation.

What do people experience in the programe ? You may want a description of who is doing what in Program X, or of how a requirement that such-and-such take place has been interpreted by program planners and developed across sites. You may want to compare programs or alternative versions of the same program over sites to collect evidence about the manner in which the theory or philosophy behind a program is being put into practice by program personnel. How many participants and staff are taking part ? When ? How often ? Where ? What activities do participants in the program become involved in ? Answering such questions requires expertise in how to measure *program implementation.*

Clients are also often interested in *how much a program varies fram site to site.* The operation of some programs is like the man with one foot in the fire and the other on ice--he was, on the average, comfortable ! Are overall evaluations giving a realistic picture or a statisiical artifact ? (Remember : there are lies, damn lies, and statistics !) Facts never speak for themselves; they must be interpreted. How consistent is the implementation of the program? Is it failing to work in some areas because of witting or unwitting sabotage ? Is it working in others only because of the unusual enthusiasm, personalities, or local conditions involved ? A few "mistakes" on site in program implementation can create a counter-productive public relations problem that most policy-makers and managers would prefer to see avoided. This is the *evaluation of program processes.*

We have particularly wide-ranging experience in *formative evaluation*, or collecting and sharing information for program improvement. This is done through periodic program monitoring, in-depth scrutiny of particular program components, and pilot and feasibility studies. The program evaluator provides information on how to help to adjust the program to the setting and to improve it. A question clients often ask in this regard is : *How can the program be improved ?* This question is of the essence of formative evaluation. Answering it may include conducting a needs assessment in some cases; certainly it will also involve some attention to monitoring program implementation and achievement of goals. In order to improve a program, it is necessary to understand how well a program is moving toward the objectives set for it so that changes can be made in the program's components. Before launching into formative evaluation, make sure that there actually is a chance of *making changes* for improvement--if no such possibility exists, formative evaluation is not called for.

How can the program become more efficient or effective? As a result of the answer to this question, revisions are made in materials, activities and organization of the program. Such adjustments require answers to questions such as: What adjustments in the program might lead to the attainment of the objectives ? Are some better suited to certain participants ? What problems are there and how can they be solved ? Or, and this one is especially important :

What in the program needs attention ? Often, it is not enough to have a global sense of the efficacy of a program. If a program is not meeting its objectives fully and efficiently, precisely which components are at fault ? Or even if the program as a whole is reaching its goals it may be that this is in spite of, not because of, certain features, and that modifications in the program would improve the cost efficiency of obtaining the result. A cost/benefit analysis of various alternative components sometimes pays far the cost of an evaluation several times over in a relatively short period of time.

In summative evaluation, we look at the total impact of a program and assess its overall value. Such evaluation ascertains the extent to which a program has succeeded in meeting the goals it was set up to achieve. Such research basically addresses three questions:

How will is the program meeting its goals ? In this kind of evaluation, we measure the extent to which the program's highest priority goals are and are not being achieved. Some of these goals may be affective, such as satisfaction with the program, others may be cognitive, such as in programs of information diffusion, while still others may be behavioral, as for example an anti-smoking campaign. An evaluation that involves only measures of goal achievement does not provide a basis for comparative evaluation, but it is cheaper than a full-scale formative evaluation and does give a basis for at least tentative conclusions about the program's quality. Usually, however, what research of this kind ultimately aims at is the answer to the question :

Is the program worth continuing or extending ? Preparing an answer to this question is ultimately what summative evaluation is all about. We try to provide a basis against which to compare the program's effects and costs with those produced by an alternative program that aims toward the same goals. Of course, there will be situations where the program cannot be evaluated by contrasting its results with those produced by competitors. In these cases we try if possible to compare program results with a group receiving no such program at all or with that of similar groups in previous years. All this boils down to :

How effective is the program ? Do program activities lead to goal achievement ? How effective is Program X in comparison with alternative programs ? Unless a program has clear and measurable goals, and consistent replicable means of achieving them, such questions cannot of course meaningfully be answered. This is why we cannot help but advise clients to think about evaluation early, even in the program planning stage if possible.

You can expect and get from a program evalautor advice on and help in problems connected with the application of research methods in the environment of an action program, such as new programs in education, vocational education, rehabilitation, crime and delinquency, mental health, family planning, health, community planning, addiction services, refugee resttlement, and so on. You may also benefit if you are a practitioner or administrator in those fields where you are expected (and often legally required) to cooperate with evaluation efforts and to put to use the findings that emerge from study. A professional evaluation firm can be of great value to you if you are a professional charged with evaluation research in addition to or are involved in policy-making, administration, and conduct of programs that are evaluated. A professional evaluator can help you in the process of conceptualizing and understanding evaluation research, as well as doing it or offering advice to you on how to do it.

Specifically, you may get expert help from a professional program evaluator in the following : how to design a program evaluation, how to measure achievement, how to measure attitudes, how to measure porgram implementation, how to calculate statistics, how to deal with goals and objectives, and how to report.

The professional approach to evalution

When we do evaluation research, we emphasize, if possible, the use of controlled or at least quasi-experiments. Where this is impossible or impractical, it is best to substitute multi-variate and path analyses. In such cases our methodological and statistical competance is critical in addressing questions of the choice and computation of appropriate measures of association, partial relationships, and statistical significance, given the level of measurement and other features of the data.

The professianal evaluator has at his fingertips a wide battery of attitude tests, and full competance in the construction of special tests to measure attitudes, knowledge acquisition, and behavioral change.

In many large programs, considerable economy can be achieved by the drawing of an appropriate sample and generalizing from it to the population from which it was drawn. A representative sample will provide you with sufficient information to be able to develop an accurate portrayal of the program, including random, random stratified, cluster, matrix, or whatever, as appropriate to the research task at hand.

However expertly executes, the evaluation of a program is only as useful as the clarity and conciseness of its reporting permits it to be. We should pride ourselves on communicative face-to-face discussions and written reports, both interim and final. The evaluator must make sure that the results of any program evaluation will be transferred to the proper persons in a lucid, comprehensive but concise form, with concrete suggestions for program modification where desirable. He must also be willing to assist in the implementation and testing of any proposed modifications.

8

Dr. Radhakrishnan. The Man and His Message

P. Nagaraja Rao

Dr. Radhakrishnan is the finest product of the powerful movements of the contemporary Indian Renaissance. His popularity is second only to Gandhiji and Tagore among our great savants. He is the most renowned representative philosopher of India. He combines in himself different roles all of them integrated and grounded in his philosophy of life. His undying title to fame rests on his diligent and enormous work in two fields of the interpretation of Religion and Philosophy, Educational reconstruction, and the quest for peace and world unity. He has grown old with grace and success, in the service of his country's cultural interpretation.

Radhakrishnan, the man is the greatest element to reckon with in the assessment of his complex and rich personality. He is essentially shy, and a man of few words, specially in the company of persons not familiar to him. He is the least donnish of dons. His unremitting diligence is only equalled by his great tolerance. The twin passions that animated his life and underlined his mission are education and spiritual religion. As an orator, who weilds the English language with perfect ease, and astounding selectivity, he is the hero of a thousand platforms and can speak on the most intricate subjects abstruse concepts, in limpid prose without reference to notes. His memory is phenomenal and is the despair of many and the wonder of all. He has been an active University Professor, for over four decades. It will be difficult for him to recount without errors list of academic distinctions, conferred on him. There is hardly a university in India and abroad, which has not conferred an honourary doctorate upon him. He has been the Vice-Chancellor of two universities and Professor of a half a dozen, which includes the World Platform of Culture, Oxford. His was the first unprecedented appointment of an

Asiatic to the Chair of Eastern Religions and Western Thought. He has served as a member of Intellectual Co-operation Committee, the Chairman of the UNESCO, the Chairman of the University of Education Commission etc.

He occupied an eminent position of the President, of the Indian Union, after serving two years as India's Vice-President. In all, he has some 40 volumes to his credit. His genious is partly interpretative and partly constructive. His two volumes on Indian Philosophy have come to stay as permanent books in our universities. The massive erudition the brilliant style, the cogen array of quotations, the authentic documentation, the insightful asides, the instructive comparisons with Western thought, have all made the book a permanent classic and it will continue for long to be the standard work on the subject.

Radhakrishnan, like the traditional acaryas of India, set his hand to translating and commenting upon the triple texts of Vedanta, i.e., the Upanisads, the Gita and the Brahma sutras. His catholicity of outlook has made him translate the Dhamma Pada also. In all these translations and commentaries his stand has been refreshingly original. He is of the opinion that the religious classics of the contemplative seers were the result of their spiritual experience. Being the expression of experience, they cannot be entombed in the frame work of neat philosophical systems for ever. He claims that he has a right to interpret them and disclose the flexibility of eternal ideas. What is wrong with the traditional systems is that they have given an undue fixity to the eternal truths and ignored their flexibility.

Religion is essentially a tranforming experience; it is the reaction of the entire man of his total personality, it is scientific, humanistic, based on self-styling experience : it is the most perfect instrument of social regeneration : it fosters world unity and outlasts war, satisfies the demands of reason and the needs of humanity True religion stands for the fellowship of all faiths : religion helps man to integrate himself, religion is morality lived; a man may subscribe to all the tenets of his theology, he can perform scrupulously the elabbrate rituals ordained, he can also experience the modt edifying emotions—with all this, if he is consistently dishonest, completely selfish and wholly unrepentent, his religion is a sham. It is education of an integrated type that can foster such a religion.

Dr. Radhakrishnan's views on religion are developed in different ways in a series of books. His conception of Spiritual Religion and its wide spread presence of the core of all religions is brought in his Oxford Lectures : *Eastern Retigions and Western Thoughts.* This book is the harvest of his invaluable study of comprative religions. With-massive erudition, he throws light on the tenets of Spiritual Religion by tracing the history of mysticism in Greece, Christendom, Palestine and India. He elaborates "the meetings of religion" in a memorable chapter.

The case for the need for Spiritual Religion of the non-dogmabic type is convincingly argued by him in his "*Recovery of Faith*". *Recovery of Fatih* is the popular version of the technical work,*Eastern Religions and Western Thought*". The application of the tenets of Spiritual Religion for the reconstruction of society in the economic, political and social spheres is described by Radhakrishnan in the Kamala Lectures "*Religion and Society*", and in a similar and eminent readable book three decades ago, in his "*Hindu View of Life*" Radhakrishnan does not make a fetich of the past; the past is only an inspiring ideal and not a prison house. "We look backwards and live forwards". From the past alters, we should carry not the ashes and the smoke; but the fire. His reflections on religion are once again expressed in their historical settings in his Belly Memorial Lectures. "East and West--Some Reflections". He is our modern prophet of Spiritual Religion.

The personality of Dr. Radhakrishnan is inspired by its immense humanity. He has impressed the great men of our age, who are thorough contrasts in their temperaments and outlook. At a leave-taking ceremony, from his ambassadorial job in Russia, on 5th April 1952, Radhakrishnan met Stalin. After talk, as interpreted by Pavlov, Radhakrishnan writes about it : I met Stalin. I told him we had an emperor who after a bloody victory, renounced war and became a monk. You have waded your way to power through force Who knows that might happen to you also". Stalin said : "Yes, miracles do happen sometimes. I was in a theological seminary for five years". Radhakrishnan continues, "I patted him on the cheek and on the back I passed my hand over his head. Stalin said : "You are leaving us and I am sad. I want you to live long 1 have not long to live". Six months afterwards, he died.

Here again, is the effect produced by Radhakrishnan on another type of greatness. In 1957, Radhakrishnan a few weeks before Gandhiji's Bhagavad Gita to him, Sri Pyarelal records Gandhiji's remarks : I know Radhakrishnan will not write anything unworthy". Gandhiji called in Radhakrishnan and said : "I am your Arjuna. You are my Krishna. I am like Arjuna confused". Radhakrishnan made a terrible impact on all who met him. His affability and kindly love have endeared him to all, irrespective of political parties and ideological differences. All go to him alike and he meets each according to their measure of needs.

He lived in honour and died in honour on the 26th March. He was awarded the Templer award for being the best exponent of Huministic religion. He represented the best and the noblest in Indian thought.

9

S. M. Campbell : "Religion and Science : The Immanence of the Transcendent"

Makoto Ozaki

My interesting point is the possibility of religious significance in scientific discovery which Carl Sagan presents in respect of communicating with an advanced race on another planet and sharing in its wisdom. From the Buddhist viewpoint it would be even highly possible to search for the other intelligent species, for the real existences of other intelligent beings in other worlds than the earth are vividly described in many Mahayana sutras, especially in the Lotus Sutra. Even though these Buddhist descriptions sound mythologically, we might not be able to rule out the metaphysical meaningfullness of the other possible beings in the universe, or more correctly, in the multiverse. In connection with the possible beings on other planets, it would be even more probable to speculate on the survival of one being in another state of being, the possibility of resurrection of the body in another form and a series of lives in many worlds after death. But, the issue is : how to explain the immortality of humanity or the soul in relation to the scientific knowledge ?

The scheme of the immanence of the transcendent God seems to me just a scheme, a formal logical structure without content, in itself. It might be a task for theologian or philosophers of religion to specify the way in which the transcendent principle or God acts in the world through the particular scientific facts and theories. I entirely agree with that the metaphysical truth actualizes itself in physical nature. However, what kind of metaphysical truth is working out in nature, or, to which degree is the presence of God constantly immanent in the interplay of natural forces ? What is the boundary between scientific knowledge and the presence of God ?

The assertion that biology tells us about the organic aspect of human beings; the Organism as the material structure and function of matter, an immaterial material fact that an organization is simply a manner of existence of that matter, is very acute and profoundly suggestive of the necessary entailment of metaphysical or religious insights into the scientific discoveries and facts beyond the simple dichotomy between spirit and matter, the soul and the body, God and the world. In this regard, the assertion that the visible world is neither matter nor spirit is corresponding to the Buddhist principle of non-duality between matter and spirit, while the expression of which is the visible dual world of matter and spirit.

With regard to the cosmic code, in what sense in the physical structure of reality as a message written in nature a revelation capable of making converts as in religion ? In this context, does "the birth of humanity into the universe" mean the rebirth of humanity, who comes to an end, into another place of the universe ? Further, what kind of faith other than the traditional Christian belief is necessary for fulfillment in an ongoing dialectic between faith and reason ? The assertion that the visible world is the invisible organization of energy is corresponding to the Buddhist famous assertion that form or matter is no different from voidness and voidness is identical with the matter which constitutes our world. The Buddhist term 'voidness', or 'emptiness', or 'negativity', means in no way nothingness but the source-power capable of making convertion from the negative to the positive, and vice versa, thus organizing the visible world.

In reference to the creator, Trefil's effort to avoid the idea of a creator, God, and instead rather to settle for an infinite regression, moving back in time even to before creation is also leading to the Buddhist idea of the eternal origin of the universe. The figurative idea of a creator, seems to me, has a symbolic or mythological connotation in its origin. The personality of the ultimate is very essential for the relationship with man, however, I think, it is one aspect of the ultimate.

Other problems raised here such as the historical direction, human freedom to decide between good and evil, death and pain as the biological functions and contributions to the harmony of the universe, the moral implications of the psycho-biological nature of man, and so on, are to be deeply examined in terms of a complementary relation between the ascending reflection of the synthesis of the sciences and the descending reflection of theology reflecting on the world, which is inclusive of the world religions as well as Christianity. In addition, reflecting into the scientific theories themselves in a perspective of historical development would entail a new perspective for a synthesis of religion and science.

Book-Reviews :

Girish Baruah : *Indian Philosophy*, pp. 232, Bhagwati Prakashan, Golaghat, Assam (1991), price Rs. 80.00 (Hard-bound edition), Rs. 48.00 (Paper-back edition).

Indian philosophy written by Dr. Girish Baruah, a well-known thinker in the realm of philosophy and a progressive intellectual, is actually an exceptional product. It is an exceptional product because it appears not only to be a Critical analysis of Indian philosophical tradition but also a bold attempt to nullify those elements which have become irrelevant and to emphasise those elements which are having relevance to this age of science. As a matter of fact Dr. Baruah has made a sincere attempt to analyse Indian philosophical tradition from the standpoint of our present philosophical requirements. Present philosophical requirements are science-orientation, logic, concrete humanism etc. Accordingly, the author has tried to differentiate what is living and what is dead, what is relevant and what is irrelevant, what is gold and what is bronze, what is logical and what is mythnical, what is progressive and what is reactionary in Indian philosophy.

In regard to the relation or philosophy with society he says that philosophy cannot exist in isolation from society, because it is generated in society itself. If must, therefore, discuss the contradictions between the working class and the privileged class too. Philosophy, in his mind, should educate the down-trodden people and show them the real path to liberation.

The author has observed a nationalist zeal and a revivalist spirit in the contemporary Indian philosophers excepting a few like D.P. Chattopadhyaya. It is a fact that D.P. Chattopadhyaya has been trying to interpret Indian tradition from a modern scientific standpoint. But it is to be noted here that although Dr. Baruah's approach is in many respects akin to that of Chattopaddyaya still Baruah appears to be more courageous, more simple and more straight-forward.

Very boldly the author has expressed his view that a philosophy which cannot serve the interest of common people is useless and irrelevant. So we need such an Indian philosophy which can show a correct path for the uplift of the down-trodden.

By quoting some passages Dr. Baruah has very convincingly established his view that the germ of materialist philosophy lies in the Vedic literature itself; the idea of immortality of the soul, the idea of God, the idea of moksa in the trans-empirical import was unknown to the Vedic poets.

The Upanisads, for the author, are the store-house of idealistic, materialistic, metaphysical and all types of thought. Following Walter Ruben and D. P. Chattopadhyaya he has delineated Uddalaka as the beginner of rational thinking in India and Yajnavalkyan tradition as an unscientific approach.

The author has observed an opportunistic role played by upper classes in the Bhagavadgita, which was composed at a time when class contradictions in India became very sharp. Behind the concept of non-possession also he has smelt a good strategy of exploiting the working class by the upper classes. He has maintained that ahimsa and himsa both these concepts are there in the Gita and that ahimsa is for the exploited and himsa for the exploiting class.

As a matter fact "the necessity of a foreign principle like the adrsta may very well be negated considering the atomistic theory of the Nyaya-Vaisesika". (p 92).

The most significant contribution of Samkhya philosophy, as pointed out by the author, is that it has laid down the foundation of scientific thought in India. With a very realistic outlook he has declared: "Samkhya gives us the true picture of the world, not the Vedanta". (p. 119)

With the recognition to Sankara as a creative genius, the author has boldly stated that we must judge Sankara's philosophy on the basis of 'scientific testing'. His view is that Vedanta is generally regarded as 'the supreme philosophy in India', but our duty is to examine how far it has contributed to the welfare of mankind. He maintains that Sankara tries to make real (empirical) world unreal and unreal (transcendental) Brahman real.

Since our duty in the present age of science is to improve our practical life so unlike Radhakrishnan the author has rightly remarked that Vedanta philosophy by denying the reality of the practical life contributes nothing for the solution of the practical problems of mankind.

Dr. Baruah has maintained that we Indians are proud of Indian philosophy to be practical not due to the idealist system like Advaita Vedanta but due to the materialist system like Carvaka.

In Jainism the author has observed much more materialist elements than any other systems except Carvaka and therefore placed this system in materialist tradition. In his view the account given by Jains as to dravys and soul is more realistic than that of orthodox systems. The Jaina theory of syadvada in logic and anekantavada in ontology reminds us, as the author has opined, of Einsteins theory of relativity.

Buddha has been highly praised by the author because of his attempt to bring philosophy down to earth and make it a way of life for common people. But Buddha has been criticised for his failure to find out the true cause of suffering. The author has very rightly declared that individual ignorance is not the true cause of suffering; suffering is not simply a psychological phenomenon but it is a real one, the true cause of which lies in socio-economic conditions of a society.

On this historical perspective Buddhism as a transitional philosophy has possessed all the elements—materialistic and idealistic.

Conclusively it may be mentioned that some significant ideas which the author is trying to put forward in his book are as follows :

Our general notion that Indian philosophy is essentially spiritual is not correct. Such a notion is based on a biased analysis of our philosophical tradition.

Our general feeling that philosophical system like the Vedanta is beyond question and there by a perfect one, may be considered as the main obstacle in our attempt to make Indian philosophy dynamic as well as scientific.

In order to make our philosophy a true philosophy of life, a proper guide to better life and better world it must be founded on logic and made free from all prejudices and all illusions.

Our approach to the study of Indian philosophy is to be guided by the ideal of humanity. Accepting the development of humanity as the objective of philosophy it should be our duty to reject what is irrelevant and reinterpret what is relevant in our philosophical tradition.

One may or may not accept the interpretations as given by the author but every serious reader will certainly notice some novelty in his writing which may undoubtedly claim to be original and the demand of the age.

Punyeswar Bora

G. Sreenivasan : *The existentialist concepts and the Hindu Philosophical systems*, pp. 274, Udayana Publications, Allahabad, 1967.

Towards the Philosophy of integration—The convergence of classical Indian and Modern Western Philosophizing.

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan wrote in 1952 "The Prayer of the Upanisads—lead me from the unreal to the real—lead me from death to immortality—assumes that we live in a world of fear, of care, of abandonment, of death, of nothingness and we seek a world of being, of fearlessness, of freedom of spirit, of eternity".

This prayer of the Brihadaranyak upanisad 1, 3, 28 gives a clue to the chapter headings in Dr. G. Srinivasan's book "The existenatialist concepts and Hindu philosophical systems"—The contents of this book expound (1) Being in the world (2) dread (3) Death (4) Nothingness (5) Freedom (6) Being, clearly and distinctly.

Radhakrishnan's book "Introduction to the Dhammapada. 1950, rightly stated "The teaching of the Buddha has been misinterpreted as a nihilism for getting that the Buddha's emphasis is on man's power to overcome the void and attain nirvana". Professor Radhakrishnan was Professor of Philosophy in 1916 in the University of Mysore. His mantle fell on Dr. G. Srinivasan who in the true tradition of his great predecessor compares the Hindu Philosophical systems with the existenz philosophesies. We Indians use the term existentialism but the correct phraseology is existenz philosophy. Heidegger invoked the ancient mystical principle that Being as avachya or ineffable. For him Being is not there for the talkative man to catch with his talk.

So a Japanese mystic well versed in Zen Buddhism is better able to understand Heidegger than the ordinary professors. Jaspers in the heritage of phenomenology tried to analyse the subjective consciousness in all its finitude and strife, disharmony and uncertainty, guilt, anxiety and dread by time and changed groundless and tossed about, Existenz for Jaspers seems to be the equivalent for soul and if you define Existenz you objectify it and destroy it.

I regard Dr. Sreenivavan's best contribution is suggesting the convergence of classival Indian and modern Western Philosophizing in the philosophy of integratiem as advocated by the most original of all Indian Philosophers viz: Aurobindo Ghosh. On aesthetics (A-Ghosh was poet himself) and politics History (Spiritual interpretation of history and stress on the antomy of psychology as against the anatomy of Sociology as in Karl Marx) religion, morality and philosophy Aurobindo gave the world unique transcendental insights and empirical outsights. Regarding the philosophy of man, Dr. Srinivasan finds correctly a prallelism between the Darsanas of Aurobindo and Heidegger.

Dr. Sreenivasan's grasp of Aurodindo's drasana is good but he should have, in addition to picking out the similarities and dissimilarities between Existonz Philosophies and Aurobindo's weltanschauung noticed the uniquely original points advanced by Aurobind : (1) The four intermeidary stages from mind to supermind are higher mind, illumined mind, intuitive mind and overmind. (2) Evolution is a process of self absorption of the spirit, culminating in God, involution originates from God and is a process of self manifestation of the Spirit (3) The order of involution is pure Truth (Sat) Consciousness-Force (Cit) Pure Bliss (Anana) Super mind, mind psyche. life, matter. The Order of evolution is matter, life, psyche, mind, supermind, bliss, consciousness force and truth. (4) Maya is God's play with division and darkness, ignorance, desire, strifes and subjects himself to the force whih has come out of himself (5) The liberated sould extends its perception of unity horizontally and veritically i.e. with the Transcendent one ond with the cosmic Many (6) Sri. Aurobindo tries his best to avoid the difficulty confronted by Sankara. How does the supermind follow from the Absolute ? Neither-does Aurobindo say that supermind is inferior to Sat Sit Anada.

Therefore the Philosophy of Integralism must swear by the proposition that existence expires in essence. G. Sukumaran Nair

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Principle for All People to have Peace

M. B. S CHAR
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INDIA

People all over the world are in need of peace against antagonising factors such as tension, threat of war, uncertainty for lack of support for living, pollution, pain and conflicting discrimination etc. They must adopt befitting principle as a means to have peace when awards, rewards, marches, and godmen have failed to get them.

Peace is the basic requisite for all people to experience happiness. It is neither a myth nor a miracle but a condition in reality to be achieved. To be specific, it is the condition of harmony of mind, body and environment and not even just the absence of war. Therefore, all people to have peace must achieve harmony of their mind, body and environment. To achieve harmony, they have to adopt the well established techniques from religion as well as science, such as meditation for mind, WHO (World Health Organisation) standards of nutrition and health for body, and environment. Moreover, they must evolve and establish an effective system in their respective nations to maintain peace by eliminating antagonistic factors of peace such as war,, pain and conflicting discrimination etc. All people have to make use of their peaceful condition to work for their collective welfare and in turn to maintain Peace. They must bear the principle that peace results from the harmony of mind, body and environment and operation of an effective system for maintaining conditions of peace by eliminating antagonistic forces such as tension, war, pollution, pain and conflicting discrimination etc.

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Editorial

Reflection on the Real Foundation of Democracy

R. N. Vyas

After the dissolution of the U. S. S. R., the concept of democracy has become still more relevant and important to the modern world. India too has chosen the path of parliamentary democracy. But most of us are unaware of the real foundation of democratic system.

Most of people wear a badge of democracy without understanding real import of the term. Just as most of people like to put on ready-made clothes or ready-made shoes, in the same way most of people like to be called adherents of democracy, without knowing the very connotation of the term.

I recall a funny incident. One person, who happens to be a lawyer by profession, visited a picture house to see a file in English. His friend was also sitting by his side. Now, it is not posisible even for an English-knowing man to understand film English unless he has become very conversant with it. On one occasion, the lawyer and a large number of audience began to laugh at some dialogue of the film. Lawyer's friend unfortunately could not understand anything. Therefore he turned to his friend and asked 'Why are you laughing ? What is it that makes you laugh' ?. The lawyer replied' Well, if you really want to know the truth, I could not understand anything bacause of the pronunciations. But as other persons were laughing, I too started laughing. I do not want that anybody should think that I cannot understand this film, while others have understood it. What will they think, if I do not join their laughter' ? We, I mean most of us. are democrates in the lawyer's way. The greatest enemy of democracy is the ignorance of people about its very foundation. Hence, democracy is not yielding proper results even in the U. S. A.

How true sounds the poet when he says
'We are the hollow men,
We are the stuffed men
Leaning together'.

The result is that despite democratic regimes, the world is moving towards the doom. The money that is to be spent on the removal of poverty is being invested in the production of deadly war-weapons, religion which aught to work for peace and amity is working for increasing social distance.

Writes W. B. Yeats

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and every where
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passiontre intensity.

Things can be improved, if attention is paid to the real foundation of democracy.

Lincoln had described democracy very broadly as the government of the people, by the people and for the people. But this type of democracy is neither possible nor feasible. It is clear that largely populated nations can have democracy only through representatives of people duely elected by them. Lincoln's words, therefore can provide only inspiration. Hence democracy has been described by other writers in their own ways. Thus P. Basset describes it as' a method of government by which every citizen has the opportunity of participating through discussion in an attempt to reach voluntary agreement as to what shall be done for the good of the community as a whole. It resolves itself, in practice, into a continuous search for agreement through discussion and compromise, and action on the basis of maximum measure of agreement obtainable.'

C.F Merriam in his work 'What is democracy' ? has expressed an opinion that democracy is 'a form of political association in which the general control and direction of the commonwealth are habitually determined by the bulk of the community in accordance with appropriate understandings and procedures providing for popular participation and the consent of the governed.'

The ultimate aim of democracy is to secure social welfare. Social welfare is possible only when feelings of liberty, equality and fraternity prevail in society.

Franklin Roosevelt, the famous President of America, had stated that his aim was to have 'A world founded upon four essential freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression-everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way-everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want. everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear. any where in the world'.

Liberty is an essential feature of democracy. But liberty should not be considered in the sense of license. It has a constructive meaning. No freedom to harm anybody else or the social structure directly is worth accepting. An unbridled freedom destroys the very society which gives its sanction.

The foundation of democracy lies in the constructive out-look of the people who accepts it as a way of their government.

Democracy is essentially a western concept. In ancient India we had 'gana-tantras' which were based on the spiritual outlook of Indian society. Democracy has no spiritual basis, as per the popular opinion, which makes it very vulnerable and unstable at times. Napoleans and Hitlers are born from such democracies.

Rousseau was right when he stated that man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains. Unprincipled people make democracy a mockery. They are the enemies of democracy. Every sensible democracy must take due care that it does not provide any opportunity to any undeserving person to gain power that can prove to be destructive. This can be possible only when due emphasis is given to ethical conduct. Kant in the west has given us a scheme of ethical principles which can be considered to be the foundation of the democratic system.

Good will is the basic thing. Kant states 'It is impossible to conceive anything in the world, or even out of it, that can be called good without qualification except a good will. A good will is a categorical imperative i.e. every person should accept as a will that is good in itself. If anybody accepts good will as an instrument for attaining anything one is likely to provide other persons excuses for doing anything that suits their individual selfish interests.

The forms of this categorical imperative are the following :

(i) So act as to treat humanity, both in your own person and in the person of everyother, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means.

This means everybody should be given equal importance.

(ii) Act as a member of a kingdom of ends.

This means that worth of everybody is equal. Nobody should be subjected to any exploitation of any kind.

(iii) A principle of moral conduct is morally binding on me only if I can regard it as a law which I impose on my self. This means that everybody is free to think, write and act in a way he likes. Nothing should be imposed on any person. The Western mind can understand all this on the basis of utility of a conduct swayed by these principles. But everybody may not accept the concept of utillity. The fact is that the concept of utility may not be acceptable to many persons. But human mind is a lover of reason. It cannot be satisfied till an adequate rationale is provided. This rationale for a conduct aiming it social welfare is provided by Indian philosophy of the Advaita.

The Upanishads are the store-house of the philosophic thought of India.

The Upahishads contain the insight of thinkers who tried to go beyond the domain of the perceptible domain. They declared that 'All this is Brahman.' Man is really speaking, the Brahman or the Atman. Multiplicity is only apparent. The whole world is replete with unity and not diversity. The entire universe has sprung from this Brahman alone, and there is nothing which is not Brahman from the standpoint of ultimate Truth. The implication of this thought is very clear. If every.thing is Brahman, and I am too Brahman. why should I consider anybody to be different from me and try to exploit him in any way ? I have to behave in such a manner that would show that the welfare of every person is actually my own welfare and the agony of every person is actually my own agony. It is clear that this type of thinking is not materialistic. It is spiritualistic. Democracy can function properly only when this spiritual attitude is accepted. In the absence of this spiritual attitude, it is impossible for everydody to fulfil the expectations of a democratic ideal.

Though it may sound rather strange, but we shall have to accept the fact that the West is generally swayed by faith. Christianity and Islam are the religions of faith. Both are ruled by faith, faith in the words of a Prophet or faith in the words of their scriptures. Democracy is more strong in the west because of this element of faith present in an average citizen of the West. But faith may be destructive at times. That is why even Nazism can come into power there. Atrocities too may be committed in the name of a system based on faith-tendency of people.

In India faith never ruled in that way. India has been ruled either by materialistic attitude or spiritualistic attitude. Most of

Indians are ruled by materialistic attitude alone, even when they utter the name of any system or creed. That is why the order of society is disturbed many times. But there are always some stalwarts who swayed by spiritual attitude like Gokhale, Tilak, Gandhi, Aurobindo, Vivekanand, Tagore who do not allow materialistic tendencies to get a complete victory. If we are keen to preserve democracy in India, we shall have to increase the number of the people accepting spiritual attitude. Only such persons shall be able to preserve the right of speech, liberty of behaviour, and sanctity of individual freedom that does not degenerate in its irrational forms. It should be our endeavour to inculcate a spirit of this spiritual attitude in all our members of legislative assemblies, state assemblies, parliament and other key organizations.

Not only in the domain of political activity, even in the domains of business, industry, social conduct and family we shall have to spread the spirit of spiritual attitude. Only then, we shall be able to create an ideal India. Otherwise parties shall be in power and shall go out of power, the things shall never change. They may even worsen, because when the environment becomes more and more vitiated, the condition of our society is bound to worsen day by day.

Let everybody give his consideration to this thought.

I

On the Necessarily Existent

A. D. Naik

1. I give three arguments for the necessary existence of one self-caused substance (2, 6 and 9); 3-5, 7 and 8 and 10 and 11 consist of answers to objections and elucidation of the arguments. The arguments do not imply any particular variety of one substance monism.

2. Consider the first argument. If everything were only possible and nothing were ever actual even possibillities would remain only possible. There would be the possibility of possibilities but not the actuality of possibilities. But if possibilities forever remained only possible they would be identical to impossibilities since they would never be actual. But possibilities and impossibilities are contradictories and cannot be identical. Now what makes possibilities actual cannot be possibilities themselves for these are precisely what require actualization. Thus what makes possibilities actual is something other than possibilities. If what makes possibilities actual were itself not actual there would be no possibilities.

But what makes possibilities actual is one. For each possibilitiy is not made actual by a different actuality since it is the realm of possibilities containing the totality of possibilities that is made actual and this can be made actual only once.

Possibilities not are only actual, they are limitless. For if they ceased to be they would not be necessarily different from impossibilities. They would be contingently different from impossibilities. But this is self-contradictory. Further if only impossibilities exist then there would be the impossibility of impossibilities rather than the possibilities. But then the impossibility of only impossibilities implies the limitless existence of possibilities. Thus the one actuality necessarily exists, it can never not be since possibilities can never cease to be.

Since possibilities are sustained by the actuality and sustaining is a causal relation the actuality is a substance.

3. This argument is not a version of the ontological argument. The argument is not that the possibility of the actual or necessarily actual implies its actuality or necessary actuality. The argument is that the actuality of possibilities as a whole implies the necessary actuality of something other than possibilities. Leibniz suggests that the existence of possibilities implies a source. But he does not argue for it. He identifies the source with God.

4. It may be objected to the argumenl in 2 that new possibilities are created with the coming into being of substances and events which did not and could not have existed before. Consequently the idea of the necessarily actual as something which makes everything possible at one go is not possible. But the sense in which the necessarily actual makes all things possible is at a higher level of logical ordering. Consider the illuminating analogy of capacities. One has the various first order capacities such as that of logical reasoning or artistic ability. But one also has the second order capacity for acquiring some of the first order capacities. Parallel to this one may have the idea of second order possibility. One may then think of the necessarily actual analogically as that which makes all possibilities possible as possibilities. Just as without the capacity to acquire capacities no first order capacities could be acquired at all, so too without making the realm of possibilities itself possible all particular possibilities themselves would not be possible.

5. On the other hand it can also be argued that all possibilities are sustained by the necessarily actual. For everything actual and possible must at least be different from each other and this can only be if each thing is to some degree either a determinate possibility or actuality. Consequently all possibilities are to some degree already actual. What the emergence of new objects and events does is to turn a possibility from a remote one into a real one. What it does is alter its modal status. My existence was more of a real possibility after my parents meeting each other than before it when they did not know each other. Before their meeting my existence was a somewhat remoter possibility. Yet it was a Possibility nonetheless. For it was never an impossibility, it was a possibility yet the conditions were not yet ripe enough for its realization.

6. Consider now the second argument. If possibilities are actual but only possibilities exist nothing could ever exist for possibilities cannot realize themselves. Therefore something other than possibilities which realizes possibilities exists. For otherwise all possibilities would remain unactualizable and so identical to impossibilities.

But possibilities are limitless and actual forever. For if possibilities ceased to be they would be contingently different from impossibilities and so possibly identical to impossibilities which is self-contadictory. But then if possibilities are limitless the something other than possibilities that exists must exist forever or eternally. The something that exists is therefore of limitless power (energy). It is necessarily self-existent.

7. Note that the first argument is that the actuality of possibilities implies the existence of an actuality other than possibilities since otherwise possibilities would be identical to impossibilities. The second argument is that the actuality of possibilities implies the existence of an actuality other than possibilities since possibilities even if actual cannot realize themselves. Whereas the first argument is concerned with the actualization of possibilities the second is concerned with their realization or materialization into concrete entities and events.

8. It might still be objected that once a possibility is realized it is no longer a possibility. The more possibilities are realized the greater is the number which are no longer possibilities. There is a gradual decrease in the number of possibilities. The argument does not establish that there are infinite possibilities. Gradually the limit may be reached, possibilities may be exhausted. But we might here resort to the idea of possible worlds. A possible world may be defined in the following way. A possibility left unrealized in the world we find ourselves in may be imagined to be realized in a world very similar to our own. Perhaps all or most of the events upto the realization of the possibility in question may occur in that imagined world. In this way inumerable possible worlds could be imagined. But a possibility realized in one world say the actual world may be left unrealized in other possible world. So even if a possibility is realized relative to one world the same possibility remains unrealized relative to another. Possibilities forever or eternally remain possibilities without contradiction even when actualized. So possibilities never cease to be.

9. Consider now the third argument. This argument is inspired by that of Bergson's and Nozick's but is different from both. Neither Bergson nor Nozick argues that the concept of Nothing, conceived as the non-existence of all things actual and possible, is self-referentially inconsistent.

Nothing itself must either be or not be, it must itself exist or not exist. Something neither existent nor non-existent is nothing at all. For no attributes can be predicated to it. If no attributes can be predicated of it then it is logically inconceivable. But only the self-contradictory is logically inconceivable. Thus there can be nothing beyond existence and non-existence. If Nothing itself does not exist it negates itself. Nothing itself is not. There is then something which exists. For there is the not-being of Nothing.

On the other hand if Nothing exists or has being because it is rather than not, then there is existence of Nothing. There is the being of Nothing. But being and not-being are contradictories and so the being of Nothing or Not-being is self-contradictory. For Nothing is the absence of all being, of all existence. How can Nothing which is the absence of all existence itself have existence in its very being? Nothing in its very being cannot be. The idea is self-contradictory.

Nothing conceived as the absence of all things actual and possible, is logically impossible. But then if Nothing necessarily can never be, being or existence must necessarily be forever or eternally. But if existence or being is necessarily forever or eternally it is of limitless power and so self-existent.

10. It may be objected that while these arguments might show that necessarily something always exists it does not show that this necessarily existing thing is some one thing. It may be that the series of finite existents is necessarily self-existent rather than some one existent. Thus while there are finite substances which come into being and perish there as an infinite number of them and so necessarily there is never a time when there are no finite substances. Only the infinite series of finite substances is self-existent not its members.

But if each finite substance is a contingent existent and so need not have been the series of finite substances could cease to be at any time. The series than cannot be self-existent. It is a contingent series.

Either the totality of dependent substances is itself Independent or not. If it is independent then it forms one self-caused substance. If it is not then since every substance is dependent it is possible for all to cease to be. But this implies the possibility that the totality of objects actual and possible may cease to exist. But the concept of Nothing is self-contradictory. Since the denial of the totality of dependent substances forming a self-caused substance is self-contradictory the totality of dependent substances forms a self-caused **substance**.

Still it may be objected that while the being of any finite substance is contingent it is necessary that some existent or other is followed by any one. But if substances thus necessarily generate one another they do so according to a law which determines this and inheres in each as a disposition and so binds them into a unity. But then the totality of substances do not merely from a series but one comprehensive substance. Since it would be all-inclusive and retain its identity through all changes it would be the self-existent substance.

11. It might be objected that there could be self-existent atomic events. These are things which come into being on their own and perish on their own. If so the self-existent is not necessarily everlasting nor one thing.

But if it can be something which comes into being on its own once and perishes on its own once, it can generate itself again and again endlessly and so would be everlasting.

Further the idea of atomic events is unintelligible. Something comes into being from something else from itself or from Nothing. If an atomic event comes into being from something else it is not self-existent. If it comes into being from a form of itself it must already be in which case it is everlasting. It cannot come into being from Nothing if we mean by Nothing the absence of all things actual and possible. For this idea is self-contradictory. Moreover if there are atomic events then Nothing is not there from which anything could come into being. To say that what it means is that it does not come into being at all from anything is to say that it has no origin. But then it is everlasting and will continue to be so. To say that what its coming into being from nothing means is that it is causeless is to say that anything can come into being anytime anywhere anyhow which is causal anarchy and turns reality into unreality which is self-contradictory.

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1 G.W.F. Leibniz, *Monadology and other Philosophical Essays*, Translated by Paul Schrecker and Anne Martin Schrecker, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), 154-155, nos. 43-45.

2 H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*: *translated by A. Mitchell*, (Ne York; Henry Holt, 1944), 303-314. R. Nozibk. *Philosophical Expl nations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 122-124.

2

Futurology And Values

V. Rajeev Karan Reddy

Futurology as a trend has crept into every department of knowledge. Futuristic ideas were always there in one form or the other in almost all the scriptures of the world. Every great thinker either a scientist or technologist in their higher realms of speculative processes indicated their own futuristic ideas and beliefs in one form or another. Instead of our assertion that Past flows into the Present we started reaffirming our faith in the current saying that the Present is fast flowing into the Future. The Values and value-systems which are dominant in Present societies are bound to contribute to the quality of life. The present world weich cannot afford to remain in flux any more is trying to find its way in terms of movement, growth and fulfilment towards the known and unknow futures. It is in this context that values are bound to change and transfrom into positive moulds of becoming. Then only we can introduce the Idea of Progress into societies and civilisations of the world. Otherwise, all claims and goals of man will be reduced to 'a painted ship on a painted ocean'.[2]

Not only individuals but also some civilisations take birth, grow and later decay without any permanent contribution to posterity; they live like an organism, the satisfaction of life instincts is their sole concern. Their values are rooted in their instincts; they become slaves of Time which leads them towards blind ends. An increasing use of 'Will' at all levels is the sign of a conscious man who refuses to be lead mechanically by Time. Will reduces the gap between thought and action as much as between being and becoming.

Futurology highlights our values and sets guidelines for achieving our goals. Several alternatives are proposed scientifically for reaching the desired targets. The task of futurology is not limited to Science and Technology alone, though this is the first impression one gathers. It holds the responsibility of guiding and coordinating all disciplines of knowledge which have become water-tight systems. It

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[1] Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock*, Bantam Books, New York, 1981, p. 439.

[2] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book II and W.D. Ross, Aristotle Selections, 1928.

also determines the ideals and values or goals to be achieved depending upon the 'ethos' based upon the collective aspiration of the people.[3] But how is Futurology going to select values. These have been changing down the ages, and no two persons seem to agree on the problems of values, everyone has his own goal in life. The implementation of values also poses a problem depending upon the time-factor, territory, method, etc. Values are changing at a very fast pace in the modern context. The mutual trust the people had in each other in the 60's is almost totally absent today; this makes things more difficult for futuristic thinking; the selfish instinct have come to the surface.

Apart from these fleeting values, there are some of them which have withstood the test of time. These are eternal truths like 'Satyam', 'Shivam', 'Sundaram.[4] Truth, Consciousness, Beauty, Such truths often recede into the background and other superficial values are projected. During the centuries the methods to achieve these truths change gradually because man's environment and consciousness are not the same throughout. For instance, 'Vanaprasth ashrama'[5] or seeking of spiritual perfection in forest-life is no more relevant today. Today, the schism between spiritual life and ordinary life does not exist though it may be necessary at a certain stage of evolution. Similarly, saffron clothes, fasting or ascetic practices are not indispensable to attain moral or spiritual life.

We can look back to the Vedas or the Gita for solutions to our modern problems since our scriptures are an ocean of light. However, this is not normally true in the case of Science and Technology. We do not look back to the bullock-cart or the steam engine to solve our technological problems.[6] It is needless to state that virtues are psychological powers, they serve as cutting tools to realise the values. Virtues belong to the psychical domain where as money being instrumental in its nature belongs to the material world and hence it cannot generate virtues which can only be achieved through serious effort and dedication.[7] A value which is attained is different from a value

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3 Reddy V.N.K., *Problems of Futurology*, Sterling Publlshers, New Delhi, 1985, p. 140.

4 Swami Chinmayananda, *Tha Holy Gita*, Chinmaya Mission Trust, Bombay, and K.C. Pandey, *Comparative Aesthetics*, Vol. II, Chowkhamba series, Banaras, 1956, p. 148.

5 Paul Arthur Schilpp, New York, *The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan*, 1952, p. 743.

6 *Synthesis af Science and Religion*, Edited, Bhaktivedanta Institute, San Francisco, 1987, p. 134.

7 Sri Aurabindo, *Centenary Vol. 18*, 1976, p. 609.

which is to be attained and remains always an ideal. With the ever-growing consciousness of man as you proceed towards the ideals they every recede from us. This is because of evolution and growth inherent in Man.

That which is valuable is not necessarily that which is useful. 'Value-in-itself' is different from 'value-for-itself'. Instrinsic values are different from extrinsic values. Instrinsic values are therefore called essential values. They serve as sources of energy for all extrinsic values. The relation between being and becoming can be explained in this context as a befitting parallel. Man, by nature, prefers time-bound values because they are relatively easier to achieve than long-lived or permanent values which are invariably intrinsic in their nature and difficult to achieve. A state of 'anarchy of values' sets in when a set of people belonging to one tradition and generation assert that what they interpret is alone real value. The other groups belonging to different ages and heritage similarly assert their own particular view points and value-system. In view of the diverse environments it is not possible ordinarily even for an axiologist to determine as to which is the true interpretation. Nevertheless this is a kind of pluralism which sets in values and value-systems which is commonly explained as 'Anekanta-Vada' in Indian Philosophy particularly in Sankhya.

All scientific and technological values must be oriented towards the welfare of man. All inventors and discovers must realise that their discoveries and inventions are mainly meant for the welfare of man, his awareness and transcendence.[8] No doubt Science and Technology deserve the importance given by the futurists all over the world in view of the immediate problem of survival; But in the guise of 'bare necessities' Science and Technology are indulging in unncessary consumerism. Secondly, in the name of 'defence' they are producing destructive weapons instead of concentrating on developmental activities. Thus, in spite of so much pre-occupation with Science and Technology, we have been unable to give it a proper direction. This exclusive preoccupation at the expense of a deeper psychological study of man is uncalled for. The main resources are human resources and considerable time and energy must go into the study of man himself, his different levels of being. Futurists in general around the world, in fact are beating around the bush with their prime exercise of 'taming technology'. A proper study of man has to be undertaken which cannot be avoided if a lasting solution is to be found, otherwise we will have to remain satisfied with the patch-work solutions. The panel of futurists and future researchers must include prominent educationists other than exclusive inclusion of scientists and technologists. It is true education which makes man cultured; Science and Technology will ever remain as aids in the long process of interiorisation of man and humanisation of his race. For this reason civilisation is no more a de-raciation mechanism but it is always the collective aspiration of the people which works wonders in the wider context of integral ideas and beliefs which constitute the universal world order.[9]

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[8] Mikhail Gorbachev. *Perestroika*, New Thinking for our country and the world, Fontana 1988, London, p. 164.

FINDINGS

The problem of 'Futurology and Values' is a never ending problem for any researcher to probe. However, the sages and saints who proclaim its true significance in their prophecies and visions could give us correct clues. For this reason, experience is always held superior to formal acquisition of knowledge.

The present paper has attempted to establish the exact relationship between the futuristic ideas and qualitative life of values.

The divergent claims about the validity o' the values are analysed in terms of 'anarchy of values'. The essential values serve as an edifice to all our present and future structures in one form or another. But the outward or extrinsic values are bound to change and transform themselves with the growth of individual consciousness and transcending levels of awareness in societies and civilisations throughout the world.

The significance of the nature of man and his importance has earmarked. If there is any being next to god, it is man. All scientific and technological activity must harness around him to make his living nobler and richer. For this end-goal of civilised man a collective aspiration on the part of both common and uncommon people becomes necessary and inevitable from the standpoint of futuristic thinking.

Futuristic thinking helps us to respond creatively to great challenges and transform them into endless advantages. If this is realised dexterously by individuals in appropriate context several day-to-day difficulties are bound to be solved or dispelled.

If we learn to view human values as isolated from divine sanctions, then alone essence of new confidence and optimism is bound to cover ovr lives. Trans-empirical and divine revelations belong altogether to a different domain from which nobody can escape. Not only for the purposes of preservation of man and his civilisation higher values are needed but every enhancement and transcendence of his state of being becomes all the more essential for his evolution and growth. 'Revaluation of values'[10] has been considered in the context of progress of society but today it has proved to be an insufficient medium before the more effective and invigorating process of transvaluation of values.

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[9] Reddy V N.K., *East-West Understanding of Man*, B.R. Publishers, Delhi, 1985, p. 232 and *Man, Education and Values*, 1979, p. 81.

[10] O. Levy, *Nietzche's Writings* in Collected Works, 1909.

3

An Action Plan for Survival

Patricia T. Birnie

The Chinese have a symbol that has dual meaning : "Crisis" and "Opportunity". Today we have a *global crisis* and an *urgent opportunity.* The crisis is the increasing damage to our gene pool by environmental pollution. Our opportunity is to work cooperatively against this common enemy. It affects our whole future. It is not a political issue. It is a moral and ethical issue.

According to a New York Times article, July 18, 1983, physical and mental disabilities in newborns have doubled in 25 years. Recent studies on animal life also show increasing deformities. Toxic chemicals, radiation, viruses, and diet (food chain) are given as the primary causes. Most of these pollutants know no national boundaries.

The object of our international philosophers organization is to prevent nuclear omnicide. At the time IPPNO was formed, there were reasons to believe that the superpowers were on the brink of precipitating omnicide by the detonation of nuclear weapons. We hope that possibility is no longer likely, though we need to continue to work hard to prevent the use of nuclear weapons.

However, some scientists claim that the artificial radiation already released into our environment is presently causing an incremental omnicide...infant mortality, birth defects and damage to our gene pool...Now...Every Day. Not only from fallout from weapons testing and radiation releases from weapons production, but also from normal operation of nuclear power plants and certainly the tragic accidents from nuclear power plants.

According to Dr. Zenon Matkiwskyj of the world Federation of Ukranian Medical Associations, the Chernoby' accident has been and continues to be devastating to hundreds of thousands of children and adults in the Ukrain, Russia and Byelorussia. Leukemia, sarcoma, and thyroid cancers are prevalent. Toxemia of pregnancy, premature and still births occur at disproportionately high rates. An alarming increase in birth defects is being reported. Genetic mutations have also been observed in plants and animals. The food supply in some regions of the plume fallout still remains contaminated today. A travelling exhibit of photographs of the tragedy of Chernoby[2], taken by Igor Kostin of Kiev, is presently touring the United States.

But the U.S. has its own proof of its own radiation tragedies. I have seen photographs of plant and animal abnormalities from farms near the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, some taken *before* the 1979 accident. Epidemiologists report that there were many human health victims in the TMI area.

Radiation pollution had its beginning at the end of World war II. The inhabitants of the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands learned early that the Earth has limits to the amount of damage which can be absorbed in the name of national security. U.S. bomb tests there caused "jelly fish" babies and poisoned the islanders' food supply for generations.

Varying estimates are given for the casualties among uranium miners, workers in the nuclear industry and members of the public who have been exposed to low level radiation.

U. S. government information released within the last few years admits to off-site contamination at U.S, nuclear weapons sites. Low levels of ionizing radiation are routinely emitted at all nuclear power plants, both gaseous and liquid.

Both military personnel and civilians who were "downwinders" of U.S. weapons tests or other nuclears facilities have been trying for years to convince the government and the courts that their impaired health was caused by radiation.

Now new information has been released by our government, the BEIR V report, which confirms that there is no level so low that no health effects could result, and that the lower levels of radiation do indeed cause leukemia, other cancers, birth defects, and lower the immune resistance.

Two new books just published further confirm that there are measurable health effects from low level ionizing radiation. One entitled *Deadly Deceit : Low Level Radiation, High Level Cover-up*, by Jay Gould and Benjamin A. Goldman, examines official U. S. Vital Statistics and claims that thousands of Americans have suffered premature deaths from radiation exposure from nuclear weapons fallout and nuclear reactor accidents. It also claims that there were as many as 40,000 excess deaths in the U.S. from the Chernoby[1] plume that crossed the U.S.

Dr. John W. Gofman, in *Radtation-Induced Cancer from Low-Dose Exposure : An Independent Analysis*, has provided careful analysis of known data, and concludes that the cancer-risk is *more* severe per dose-unit at low doses than at moderate and high doses. He postulates that ionizing radiation may be the most important single carcinogen to which large numbers of humans are actually exposed. The authors of both books accuse the government of retroactively altering key data, and distorting truth in the service of policy.

The technologies that have been touted to provides "National Security" and "Energy Too Cheap To Meter" are actually undermining the quality of life for our children and all future generations !

Those of us living today will die some day...a natural part of the life cycle. Many of us may die pre-maturely and painfully due to radiation damage, or other environmental pollutants. But the most tragic situation is gene pool damage that causes a dimunition of capability in future generations. This includes not only physical and mental disorders that cause a drain on society for maintenance, but raduce the level of competence for leadership for future generations. This tragic condition is in part due to public policy of our governments, and the vested interests of the corporations.

We must shut down all nuclear power plants *and* nuclear weapons facilities, and concentrate our scientific efforts to isolate the radiation already released to the environment. We must permit no more uranium mining, no more refining, processing and fabrication of fuel rods, no more generation of plutonium, no more generation of *more* radioactive waste.

Public protests resulted in the halt of atmospheric bomb testing in the 1960's when the harmful effcts on babies became publicized. We need to rally the mothers of the world to demand *NO MORE RADIATION RELEASES TO THE ENVIRONMENT !*

In 1986 40 Finnish women gave a Father's Day gift to the fathers of Finland. They danced into the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, brandishing brooms, symbolic of sweeping away the hazard of nuclear power. We need constant creative ways of demonstrating our opposition to this unforgiving technology.

Dr. Rosalie Bertell, director of the International Institute of Concern for Public Health, Toronto, presented a paper "Health as a human Right" to the World Health Organization in 1988. She said, "The study of generalized, random abuse and murder for the sake of collective greed and political or economic power has become more focused in recent years...During and since World War II there has been an escalation of random injury and killing of the general population through wanton pollution of air, water and food, and destruction of the life-supporting environment. This includes testing of nuclear weapons, herbicides, pesticides and other 'deathogenic' activities of governments.

"In the past...(the battlegrounds were) able to recover fertility and become life-supportive again as wartime moved to peacetime...... Now there are 'national sacrifice areas' which will be uninhabitable for the sake of some national objective, for example the Nevada nuclear test site and the nuclear test sites in Siberia and China."

Dr. Bertell asks, "What are the limits of government action to 'sacrifice' deliberately or place at risk parts of the nation's territory? What are the human rights of the people to a non-poisoned air, land and water system? What about corporations based in one nation and jeopardizing life in other nations, or governments which destroy colonial 'possessions' or 'trust territories'?

"These questions, which call for a new ethic of governmental behavior, are themselves imbedded in an even more pofound truth. Because the Earth is a recycling system, no pollution remains at its point of entry into the biosphere......Most of the cost of dumping poisons into air, land and water will be paid by future generations... first because the Earth's recycling system moves slowly; second, because the future generation now present in the sperm and ovum of living people is being damaged as the interior of the human body gradually assumes the polluted state of the external environment."

There are many things that we *can do* and *must do* to help make our environment safer. After informing ourselves of the extreme danger of our environmental pollution, we must act at the local, state, national and international levels to stop the dangerous practices. There are opportunities to work cooperatively with other individuals, groups, and private and public agencies. We need to :

* Halt *ALL* nuclear bomb tests...above *AND* below ground.

* Halt all nuclear weapons production.

* Promote mutual security and nonviolent civilian-based-defense.

* Demand an end of nuclear power worldwide. (Its proponents are wrong about its potential to combat Global Warming. Energy efficiency and renewable energy *ARE* "answers".)

* Reduce the use of fossil fuel power generating plants, and require cleaner technology of those left to operate.

* Demand the shut-down of Sellafield reprocessing plant and a halt of its irresponsible dumping of radioactivity into the sea and environment.

* Actively work to support Nuclear Free Zones worldwide.
* Actively promote energy efficiency and renewable energy.
* Boycott nuclear businesses; work from within corporations to increase corporate social responsibility.
* Lobby businesses to implement the Valdez Principles.
* Halt space weapons.

Most governments are so bureaucratic at the top that changes in public policy are slow. Therefore we must work at the local level. One current cooperative working arrangement between the U. S. and the Soviet Union sets a fine example for other cooperative ventures. The U.S.'s Natural Resources Defense Council and Soviet Academy of Sciences have embarked on a cooperative program of demonstrations of the value of energy efficiency, least cost energy planning and promoting more stringent model building codes to curb the emissions of "greenhouse" gases.

Implementing these concepts would be not only better environmentally, but also economically, and additionally would strengthen the country's national security. According to Hal Harvey of the Rocky Mountain Institute, investments in energy efficiency would reduce U.S. dependence on oil, gas, coal and naclear power, thus decreasing exposure to foreign wars, domestic sabotage, nuclear accidents and nuclear proliferation. They would also result in substantial economic saving. Harvey says, "Full use of electricity-saving technologies now on the market, such as super-efficient appliances, building elements, lights, motors, could save about five times the electricity produced by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The cost of implementing such technologies would be less than the current cost of operating those plants, with the future net savings approaching $ 100 billion per year. Systematic least-cost energy investments could save several trillions of today's dollars by the year 2000, enough, in principle, to pay off the present national debt."

People to People International is another non-governmental program that teams up citizen ambassadors with their counterparts abroad. One such delegation from the U.S. farm belt has recruited industrial development experts and economists and is presently meeting with top Soviet economists and engineers. It is also visiting Soviet military installations that are being converted to private industry.

The ethical "bottom line" is that is if the human race is to survive, we should live in such a way that those who follow us may inherit the Earth. Translating what we *know* into *action* is the key to survival.

As educators we have an obligation to rssearch and publicize the truth. As caring people, we have a moral obligation and responsibility to actively protect our gene pool.

IPPNO Conference, Moscow, USSR May 28-June 1, 1990

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Aurobindo's Critique of the Doctrine of Double Negation of Matter and Spirit

D. R. Bhandari

The various systems of Indian Philosophy were primarily concerned with the salvation of the individual. Jainism, Samkhya, and Nyaya-Vaisesika clearly maintained an ultimate distinction between the spiritual and the non-spiritual phenomena, which had wholly different characteristics, and nothing in common. Matter does not become spirit, so there is no salvation for matter according to these systems, therefore a satisfactory relation is not established between the physical and the non-physical phenomena. This bifurcation of nature has prevented, for quite a long time, the construction of a well-integrated philosophy of cosmic evolution. Many Vedantic systems declared that the Brahman includes matter, but even in such cases, the doctrine of the Brahman undergoing actual modification was expounded in a half-hearted manner.

Aurobindo declares that the Brahman is not only the cause and supporting power and indwelling principle of the uuiverse, it is also its material and its sole material. Matter also is Brahman and it is nothing other than or different from Brahman[1]. "Matter is Sachchidananda represented to His own mental experience as a formal basis of objective knowledge, action and delight of existence".[2]

The ultimate Reality, from which the origin and evolution of the world proceed, has been called by Aurobindo as Sachchidananda, Brahman, spirit, the triune principle of Existence-Consciousness-Bliss, Absolute, Delight, Truth-Consciousness-Force, Shiva, Shakti, Kali, the Mother, and so on.[3] This original creative power is neither material, nor vital, nor merely mental; it is, however, the source of all these. "Mind-Energy, Life-Energy, Material-Energy are different dynamisms of one World-Force".[4] This univeral force is identified with universal consciousness; "Cosmic force is the operation of cosmic consciousness".[5]

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[1] Sri Aurobindo : *The Lifc Divine*, p. 289. One volume edition, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1955.

[2] Ibid, 286.

[3] Ibid, pp. 120, 157, 169, 215, 280, 381, 785, 1103-4.

This supreme consciousness is a creative or a self-expressive force capable of infinite variation in its manifestations. Aurobindo rejects the claim of materialists that ultimate reality is purely material. Although matter is the first substance, the original pewer is not an inconscient material energy. Similarly, he discards the claim of those why deny matter as an illusion. His whole philosophy revolts against what he calls the two great denials, viz., the denial of the spirit and the denial of matter. Matter cannot be cut off from the spirit, since it is the spirit itself in an involved condition. He says :

"If indeed matter were cut-off from spirit, this would not be so, but it is, as we have seen, only a final form and objective aspect of the divine Existence with all of God ever present in it and behind it". "......all matter as well as all life, mind and supermind are only modes of the Brahman, the Eternal, the spirit, Sachchidananda, who not only dwells in them all but in all these things though no one of them is His absolute being "[6]

Though Aurobindo holds that the Absolute is undifferentiated and indeterminable, he deprecates negative approach to describe its nature. He says :

"The Absolute is indeterminable in the sense that it cannot be limited by any determination or any sum of possible determinations, but not in the sense that it is incapable of self-determination". "The Absolute is not a mystery of infinite blankness nor a supreme sum of negations, nothing can manifest that is not justified by some self-power of the original and omnipresent reality".[7]

The one attribute, at least, which cannot be denied of the Absolute, is that of self-expression. Here we find, as in the philosophies of Ramanuja, Pasupata, Pancaratra and Sakta, that self-expression is not only quite compatible with perfection, but that it is also the nature of the ultimate Reality. He maintains that Shiva and Kali, Brahman and Shakti are one and not two who are separable.[8] Force is inherent in existence which may be at rest or in motion. When it is not in motion, it exists in a potential condition. Aurobindo applies the doctrine of 'The conservation of force' to demonstrate the futility of all enquiries concerning the "how" of the origin of the world-process. It is said :

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[4] Sri Aurobindo : *The Life Divine*, p. 215. "Mind and Matter are rather different grades of the same energy, different organisations of one conscious force of existence". Ibid. p. 105.

[5] Ibid p. 163.

[6] Ibid. pp. 289-90.

[7] Ibid. pp. 381, 371.

[8] Ibid. pp. 98-99.

"Since Force is thus inherent in existence and it is the nature of Force to have this double or alternative potentiality of rest and movement, that is to say, of self-concentration in Force and self-diffusion in Force, the question of the how of the movement, its possibility, initiating impulsion or impelling cause does not arise".[9]

Nature of Evolutionary Process :

In the philosophy of Aurobindo, evolutionary process is real, and not illusory. Evolution is the manifestation of the supreme consciousness into different forms. During its descent, the spirit becomes involved and appears to us in different forms. Evolutionary process consists in the ascent of the spirit which is now already in the involved condition.

"Evolution of Life in matter supposes a previous involution of it there, unless we suppose it to be a new creation magically and unaccountably introduced into Nature. If it is that, it must either be a creation out of nothing or a result of material operations which is not accounted for by anything in the operations themselves or by any element in them which is of a kindred nature; ......".[10]

"All creation or becoming is nothing but this self-manifestation. Out of the seed there evolves that which is already in the seed, pre-existent in being, pre-destined in its will to become; prearranged in the delight of becoming. The original plasm held in itself in force of being the resultant organism. For it is always that secret, burdened, self-knowing force which labours under its own irresistible impulse to manifest the form of itself with which it is charged".[11]

Evolutionary process is governed by laws, there are no miracles. "This Existence, Conscious-Force, Delight does not work directly or with a sovereign irresponsibility like a magician—building up worlds and universes by the mere fiat of its world. We perceive a process, we are aware of a Law...... This power was known to the vedic seers by the name of Maya...... It is by Maya that static truth of essential being becomes ordered truth of active being".[12]

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[9] Ibid. p. 1017.

[10] Ibid. p. 221.

[11] Ibid. pp. 133-134.

[12] Ibid. pp. 136-137.

This Maya or Shakti is part and parcel of the Brahman Itself. Aurobindo does not accept the claim of the materialists that the universal Force is unconscious and unintelligent and that its operations are non-purposive. For him, "material force is, in fact, the subconscious operation of will".[13] Shakti is the expression of the free will of the Brahman.

The Ladder of Evolution : Descent and Ascent : Ascent and Integration

Aurobindo's scheme of evolution involves to processes : Descent and Ascent. His ladder of evolution consists of many rungs. Reality at the top is the triune principle of Existence-Consciousness-Bliss which is the Life Divine. The Divine descends from pure existence through the play of Consciousness-Force-and Bliss and the creative medium of supermind into cosmic being. Matter is the last rung of the ladder of descent. The Divine Existence is involved in the apparent inconscience of matter. Evolutionary movement is the progressive self-manifestation of the spirit which got involved during the process of descent. We ascend from matter through a developing life, soul and mind and the illuminating medium of supermind towards the divine being. The knot of the two, the higher and the lower hemispheres, is where mind and supermind meet with a veil between them :

Descent	Existence	Ascent
	Consciousness-Force	
↓	Bliss	↑
	Supermind	
↓	——— — (The knot)	↑
	Mind	
	Psyche	
↓	Life	↑
	Matter	

The whole process is thus a movement between two involutions :

Spirit, in which all is involved and out of which all evolves downward to the other pole of Matter, and Matter, in which also all is involved and out of which all evolves upwards to the other pole of spirit. The planes in the lower hemisphere are in themselves powers of the superior principles; but wherever they manifest in a separation from their spirituai sources, they undergo as a result a phenomenal lapse into a divided in place of the true undivided existence : this lapse, this separation creates a state of limited knowledge exclusively concentrated on its own limited world-order and oblivious of all that is behind it and of the underlying unity, a state therefore of cosmic and individual Ignorance. Each ascent will bring with it a partial change and modification of the old nature taken up and subjected to a new fundamental principle leading to a gradual diminution of inconscience and ignorance.

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[13] Ibid. p. 207.

In the evolutionary process there is not only a nisus or urge impelling the lower levels to realise the higher levels, there is also descent from the avove. The higher precipitate their influences on the lower, the lower react to the higher and develop or manifest in themselves within their own formula something that corresponds to the superior power and its action. The material world has evolved life in obedience to a pressure from the vital plane, mind in obedience to a pressure from the mental plane. It is now trying to evolve supermind in obedience to a pressure from the supramental plane.

This process of evolution is a triple one, which we may call a widening, a heightening and an integration. First of all, it means a widening of the field, providing greater room for the operation of each principle as it emerges, secondly it means an ascent from grade to grade, from the lower to the higher, and thirdly, it means taking up within itself, as soon as it reaches a higher grade, all the previous lower grades and transforming them, so that at each step of the ascent, there is not merely an ascent to a higher principle but a lifting up and transformation of all the lower grades.[14] Aurobindo describes[15] the process of transformation of the lower levels as "integration" which means "a spiritualising or supramentalising of the mental, vital and physical nature".[16] When the higher descends into the lower consciousness, it alters the lower but is also modified and diminished by it; when the lower ascends, it is sublimated but at the same time qualifies the sublimating substance and power. Mind and life are evolved in matter, but they are limited and modified in their action by the obligation to use its substance for their instrumentation and by their subjection to the law of material nature even while they modify what they undergo and use. Each new advance or formation takes up what was before. The animal takes up into himself living and inanimate matter, man takes up both along with the animal existence. The evolution of life and mind leads to the transformation of the material nature—first into living substance and then into conscious substance—but this is not a total transformation : 'Life nature evolving is bound to death; mind evolving is materialised as well as vitalised; it finds itself rooted in inconscience, limited by ignorance; mechanised by the physical forces on which it has to depend for its own self-expression". Aurobindo accepts life and mind as creative principles, but these are not original or primary. "Life, though not the original Reality, is yet a form, a power of it which is missioned here as a creative urge in Matter".

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[14] S.K. Maitra : *Introductlon to the Philosophy of Aurobindo*, pp. 65-66, Banaras Hindu University, 1945.

[15] *The Life Divine*, pp. 808, 1137, 840-43, 867-68.

[16] Ibid. p. 808.

Aurobindo and Modern Theory of Emergent Evolution :

Here we find a marked difference between Aurobindo's conception of the evolutionary process, and that of the western philosophers of modern evolutionism. For Alexander, Morgan and Smuts, evolution exhibits a nisus from lower to higher levels; there is a straight-line evolution. The higher levels are not existent at the level of events or Space-Time. Though there is progress in evolution, the higher is explained in terms of the lower. But Aurobindo does not find in such schemes an adequate explanation of evolution. He cannot accept the absence of the Divine at any stage of evolution. For him, the Brahman is eternally present at each level of evolution in a more or less involved state. It is because of the previous involution or what he calls 'descent' that the present evolution or 'ascent' is possible. Mere evolution is not a sufficient explanation; it must be supplemented by the doctrine of previous involution. "Ascent without descent, evolution without involution is unthinkable".[17] The spirit descends and during its descent it gets involved into various levels; evolutionary process or ascent is the nisus towards the realisation of its original state. In the philosophy of Aurobindo, the evolutionary process is circular rather than rectilinear.

The Supramental Manifestation :

Aurobindo refers to a series of gradations between the mental and supramental levels according to the sublimations of the consciousness, viz., Higher Mind, Illumined Mind, Overmind. In due course of time, there will be a race of supramental beings on the earth just as now there is a race of mental beings.[18] "The gnostic consciousness in which all contradictions are cancelled or fused into each other in a higher light of seeing and being, in a unified self-knowledge and world-knowledge".[19]

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[17] S.K. Maitra : *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Aurobindo*, p. 5.

[18] *Letters of Sri Aurobindo*, First series, p. 15 Sri Aurobindo circle, Bombay, 1947. Also see the chapter on '*The Gnostic Being*' in '*The Life Divine*', p. 1151.

"It is not to be supposed that all humanity would rise in a block into the supermind; at first those only might attain to the highest or some intermediate heights of the ascent whose inner evolution has fitted them for so great a change or who are raised by the direct touch of the Divine into its perfect light and power and bliss. The large mass of human beings might still remain for long content with a normal or only a partially illumined and uplifted human nature. But this would be itself a sufficiently radical change and initial transformation of earth life. ...... "it would be a new orientation of the earthly life but not the consummation of its change".[20]

According to many modern biologists and philosophers, evolutionary process is epigenetic. Life and mind have emerged as a result of peculiar combining factors under definite conditions in the history of the earth. For them emergence is a fact which has to be noted and accepted in a spirit of "natural piety", and no explanation can be given for it. "What emerges is something new, which was not previously present in any of the constituting factors analysed or considered separately. It is something more than a mere sum of the entities entering into any organisation. This has led them to distinguish between the resultant and emergent phenomena.

Aurobindo rejects the doctrine of materialistic emergence and advances his psychical interpretation of the world-process. It there is unity and continuity in the world-process and "if we suppose the unity to be unbroken, we then arrive at the existence of consciousness in all forms of the Force which is at work in the world". .... "Mind and Matter are rather different grades of the same energy, different organisations of one conscious Force of Existence". He thinks that life, mind and supermind are present in the atom, are at work even there, but invisible, occult, latent in a subconscious or apparently unconscious action of the Energy. "The electron and atom are in this view eternal somnambulists".[21] He says :

"It is quite true that to a surface view life seems only an operation of Matter, mind an activity of life."......But this is a superficial view of things......"One might as well on the same lines have concluded that electricity is only a product or operation of water and cloud matter, because it is in such a field that lighthing emerges; but a deeper inquiry has shown that both cloud and matter have, on the contrary, the energy of electricity as their foundation, their constituent power or energy-substance; that which seems to be a result is-in its reality, though not in its form-the origin; the effect is in the essence pre-existent to the apparent cause, the principle of the emergent activity precedent to its present field of action. So it is throughout evolutionary Nature. Matter could not have become animate if the principle of life had not been there constituting Matter and emerging as a phenomenon of life-in-matter; life-in-matter could not have begun to feel, perceive, think, reason, if the principle of mind had not been there behind life and substance".[22]

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[19] *The Life Divine*, p. 1265.

[20] *The Supramental Manifestation*, pp. 39-40, Pondicherry, 1952.

[21] *The Life Divine*, p. 848.

Aurobindo agrees with the evolutionists that higher levels have successively emerged on this earth, but he does not believe that their emergence is a production of something new which was not already involved there. "The progress of Nature from Matter to Life, from Life to Mind, may be conceded but there is no proof yet that Matter developed into Life or Life-energy into Mind-energy; all that can be conceded is that Life has manifested in Matter, Mind in living Matter". ......"Even if it be discovered here after that under certain chemical or other conditions life makes its appearance, all that will be established by this coincidence is that in certain chemical conditions are constituents of life.".[23]

Aurobindo rejects the doctrine of "The Physlcal Basis of Life", made so popular by T.H. Huxley and many others. He says :

Materialism indeed insists that, whatever the extension of consciousness, it is a material phenomenon inseparable from our physical organs and not their utiliser but their result". But "it is becoming always clearer that not only does the capacity of our total consciousness far exceed that of our organs, the senses, the nerves, the brain, but that even for our ordinary thought and consciousness these organs are only their habitual instruments and not their generators. Consciousness uses the brain which its upward strivings have produced, brain has not produced nor does it use the consciousness. There are even abnormal instances which go to prove that our organs are not entirely indispensable instruments,—that the heart-beats are not absolutely essential to life, any more than is breathing, nor the organised brain-cells to thought. Our physical organism no more causes or explains thought and consciousness than the construction of an engine causes or explains the motive-power of steam or electricity. The force is anterior, not the physical instrument".[24]

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[22] Ibid. p, 1016.

[23] Ibid. p. 988.

[24] Ibid. pp. 101-102.

Or, again. "So long as Matter was Alpha and Omega to the scientific mind, the reluctance to admit intelligence as the mother of intelligence was an honest scruple. But now it is no more than an outworn paradox to affirm the emergence of human consciousness, intelligence and mastery out of an unintelligent, blindly driving unconsciousness in which no form or substance of them previously existed. Man's consciousness can be nothing else than a form of Nature's consciousness".[25] It is not the function of nervous matter as Huxley used to maintain.

S. Alexander's metaphysics of evolution resembles in some respects with Aurobindo's doctrine of evolution. Alexander talks of the emergence of higher and higher levels of consciousness and believes in the emergence of a consciousness higher than the mental that has so far emerged, and calls it 'Deity'. Though both talk of the 'nisus' towards something supramental, Alexander frankly admits his inability to explain the nisus, and enjoins upon us to accept it with 'natural piety'. Aurobindo, on the contrary, holds that the nisus is due to the higher levels which have already been existing in an involved state in the inconscient matter. Aurobindo gives spiritual explananation in justification of the evolutionary process, whereas Alexander has non such to offer. The ascending evolutionary process would not have occurred if Brahman had not already descended by a process of involution. Alexander stops at Space-Time, and does not feel any need to extend his enquiries concerning the how and why of his original substance.

Aurobindo, strictly adhering to the logic of *satkaryavada*, thus affirms that the entire material nature, of this earth and all that is beyond *it*, *is* the manifestation of the spirit or Brahman; "a self-energy put forth by the Brahman, a form and substance of Brahman".[26]

Concluding Remarks :

Aurobindo has tried to improve Indian metaphysical thought by the incorporation of the doctrine of evolution. The Samkhya also believed in evolutions and involutions, but its eternal dualism of Purusa and Prakrti did not make it a thorough-going philosophy of evolution. There was no question of the emancipation of Prakrti in the Samkhya system. So also, the physical world of the Jaina as well as the Vaisesika was an eternally separate segment of reality, whose relation with the souls was of a temporary nature; i.e., till their emancipation. But there was no question of the emancipation of the phy-

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[25] Ibid. pp. 106-107.

[26] Ibid. p. 1174.

sical nature as such. Indian philosophy upto this time was primarily concerned with the nature and purpose of the individual and was some what indifferent to the question of the nature and purpose of the world. But Aurobindo seems to have as much concern for the deliverance of Nature as for the souls. The physical world is not a separate segment of reality, but is an essential part of the whole circle. From Aurobindo's point of view, remarks Prof. S.K. Maitra[27], matter, which is the usual philosophical *pariah*, is spiritual, and has, therefore, been treated with due respect, Evolution is a spiritual movement from bottom upwards, the raising of the lower to the higher level.

Aurobindo thus thinks of the gradual transformation of the whole Nature that got involved in the previous process of descent. His scheme of evolution exhibits a higher unity and integration than was ever achieved in Indian Philosophy.

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[27] S.K. Maitra : *Meetiug of the East and the West in Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy*', p. 238. Also his book 'An Introduction to the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo'. pp. 8-9.

5

Freedom, Causality and the Law of Karma

Archana Barua

The term 'freedom' is multidimensional. In the tradition of European liberalism, which was advocated by J.S. Mill and later supported by B. Russell and others, the term refers to a condition characterized by the absence of force or constraint imposed by others or by any external condition. In the positive sense 'freedom' is 'freedom to', either to act or to choose. In this article an attempt will be made to examine those two aspects of freedom in the light of some philosophical reflections on this issue. An attempt would be made to throw some light on the concept of 'karma' in the light of the above discussion.

If one enters into the philosophical discussions of freedom and determinism, one would be surprised to fine some common traits. On the one hand, there is a strong assumption that science will one day be able to provide a complete picture of human nature. It is believed that to give an ultimate explanation of human action is to bring human action under general causal laws. In this sense, it would be a denial of science, one feels to make man an exception to the universal laws of nature. Although a systematic account of human nature in scientific terms may or may not be possible, there is a vigorous attempt on the part of some philosophers to resist the intrusion of scientific ways of thinking into the description of human thought and action. A scientific account of human nature would replace concepts like desire, intention, etc., with some such notions as stimulus/response, etc. The inevitable result of such attempts would be to take away the human element from human nature as such, replacing the idea of human nature with something else. This certainly poses a threat to human freedom. Man likes to feel that they matter, that it makes a difference what they do, that they are not automatons. We still condemn the Nazis for regarding non-Aryans mere animals and for treating them scientifically as mere objects of scientific research.

In this background, one can have a sympathetic understanding of the negative interpretation of freedom as 'freedom from constraint'. There is an attempt on the part of some philosophers to make man an exception to the causal laws of nature. To deny predictability of human actions or a refusal to have a causal explanation of our actions would be to categorise human actions as random actions. If there will be no dependable relationship between the cause and the effect, there will be no consistency in human actionsand our actions will have no rational justification. Rather, everything will be explained in terms of magic.

The attempt to explain 'free actions' as 'a temporal' and 'contracausal' was made because of the wrong identification of the two different concepts. The law of universal causation and the thesis of determinism is often identified and there is a tendency among the philosophers to interpret causality in terms of necessity. The close association between these two concepts is very old and can be traced back to Aristotle who regarded the agent and the patient to act on one another necessarily. David Hume himself considered that necessary connexion is an essential part of the idea of the relationship of cause and effect, although for Hume, the necessity was of subjective type. The negative definition of freedom as 'freedom from constraint' would then be interpreted as "freedom from scientific prediction", or "freedom from causality". This claim is rejected by many. As observation goes : "To say that an action is free is to say that it is uncaused, that it can not be explained with reference to any prior state of affairs : to say that an individual is free is to say that his actions are not subject to determination of a certain kind, not that his actions are uncaused or fortuitous."[1] "That freedom, 'an intrinsic characteristic of the agent' should not be based on unpredictability (which is extrinsic to the agent) is forcefully argued by A.R. Lacey."[2]

Although scientific prediction is not the same as prophecy or prevision, it is the preparedness to say what will be on the basis of what has been. This is purely an epistemological claim, it is an ability to predict; nothing is made to come about merely because science predicts. Causation does not compell us. Whatever may be known about me or about x on some grounds, that does not constrain me or x to act in one particular way. All this is the result of accepting a particular view of knowledge, that knowledge is what must be'. An eminent schglar observes : "Few would now deny that to think of science as consisting, ideally of necessary truths, in the model of pure mathematics is misguided. But still the feeling that a well proved scientific proposition must express necessity in some way has outlived the critical destruction of the rationalist necessitarian view. In some minds causal necessity (a revenant from 1738) has satisfied the feeling, in others the force of nature (again understood very vaguely, but in the biological sciences to day such terms as natural selection, the elan vital and even economic determinism). The idea has persisted anywhere that anything which science proves to exist or to act in such ways must exist or in these ways act."[3] The strict rationality model of pure mathematics is questioned even in the field of mathematics itself. "Godel, as it is well known has established the incompleteness of mathematics. What this means, is that mathematics, as long as they remain creative, will always be exposed to the possibility of unpredictable surprises".[4] Unless one reduces science to scientism, one must acknowledge the human element in any scientific inquiry. As Jacob Brownski puts it, "Science is fact and thought giving strength to one another".[5] "It is the business of the scientist to be wrong".[6]

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[1] Fredric Vivian, *Human Freedom and Responsibility*, p. 113.

[2] A R. Lacey, 'Free Will and Responsibility' : 'Proceedings of Aristotelian Society', (October, 1957) p. 32.

In the light of the above discussions it can be stated that if we abandon the narrow view of knowledge that regularity in the strong sense is not sufficient to explain everything, we should differentiate the two, the ability to predict, which is what science purports to do, (to tell us how we act, and how we are motivated, etc) and the ability to act. In fact, causation in the sense of pure regularity explanation may explain the behaviour of two billiard balls or of a sphex as the billiard ball and the sphex are incapable of having any consciousness (no reflection on their actions) of their behaviour. But human beings are capable of rational behaviour which is different from mechanical causation. It is impossible to have a proper explanation of the actions of sensitive human agents, who are capable of growth and who are sensitive to the changes in the surroundings, in terms of mechanical cansation (in the strict regularity model). Rational explanations, unlike regularity explanations, are dialectical in forms and it requires universality only in a weak sense. Now, if the word 'cause' means simply explanation, then it may well be true that every event has a cause but it carries no deterministic implications. If 'cause' is interpreted in the strict regularity sense, we can assume that while doing science, for the sake of scientific explanation, the regularity explanation is accepted as a methodological principle (even in the field of science this strict regularity model is questioned). Similarly when we are doing economics, we assume the existence of economic man who buys and sells and is always out to maximise his profits. But it does not mean that every event should have a complete scientific (in the strong sense) explanation and that the explanations of man in the religious, moral and aesthetic fields also require 'man' to be the embodiment of 'economic man'. This is a pious hope as is obvious from the following observation: "Actually, continual apolozising is engaged in behind the scenes, because none of the cafe intellectual Marxists of 1914 predicted that the Revolution would break our in Russia, and indeed their predictions pointed quite to the contrary. If we approach the facts in a more critical and scientific spirit, without an ideological "parti pris", then I think we must conclude with Hook that the Revolution could not have taken place without the individual figure of Lenin And of course, the introduction of human personality multiplies the factors of chance beyond the deterministic ability to press them into any one of his ready made schemes".[7]

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[3] G. P. Henderson : 'Predictions on Human Affairs' : The Human Agent', (ed., Macmillan, 1968), p. 12.

[4] W. Barett : 'Determinism and Novelty' : 'Determinism and Freedom' in the *Age of Modern Science*, edited by Sidney Hook (Coller Books, New York, 1962), p. 13.

[5] Hume Dow : *Science Speaks*; p. 5, (ed. Hume Dow, Oxford University Press).

[6] Hume Dow : *Science Speaks*; p. 5.

If we differentiate the two senses of scientific explanation, the strict regularity and the rational explanation, then we should accept the later model for an explanation of human actions. Human agents are not carried away by the strongest motive. A positive theory of 'freedom' as 'freedom to act', which is much related to 'freedom to choose' is challenged on the ground that we are determined to choose. While Kant makes a distinction between the impulsive actions and the rational ones and regards the latter as 'free actions', he draws attention to the human elements in our actions. Although Kant's doctrine has many limitations and reason can never command one's will, but it must be admitted that he draws attention to one important aspect that practical choice is unlike the choosing, i.e., picking up the heaviest or the lightest out of the given set of weights. Similar view is expressed by some philosophers; "...In other words, action is not a 'resultant' of psychic urge, pressures, yearnings, cravings, attractions and repulsions, forces or bends, not an emergent product of motives, relevant to its context, rather, it is the execution of a decree, issued by something like a unitary self or 'ego' or 'sovereign ruler' who consults these motives and is influenced (inclined, pressured, urged, instigated or coaxed) by these but who in its turn is in control of mobility and directs its workings."[8]

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[7] W. Berett : 'Determinism and Novelty' : 'Determinism and Freedom' in the *Age of Modern Science*, edited by Sidney Hook, p. 53-54.

Freedom to act and to choose is questioned on the ground that our choice may have a cause. It would again reflect the worry on our part that to be caused is to be compelled, and that causal explanation can be explained in terms of strict regularity model only. It would be wise to take a mere realistic view of human rationality which should take our finitary predicaments seriously. 'Freedom' can never be interpreted in an absolute sense. Human freedom in the relative sense would be a kind of freedom which keep room for scientific predictions but which recognises the rational nature of man. To quote Deniel C. Dennett : "...Yes, if we try hard, we can imagine a being that listens to the voice of reason and yet is not exempted from the causal milieu Yes, we can imagine a being whose every decision is caused by the interaction of features of its current state and features of its environment over which it has no control—and yet which is itself in control, and not being controlled by that omnipresent and omnicausal environment. Yes, we can imagine a process of self-creation that starts with a non-responsible agent and builds, gradually, to an agent responsible for its own character. Yes, we can imagine a 'rational and deterministic' being who is not deluded when it views its future as open and "up to" it. ..."[9]

The doctrine of 'karma' may be interpreted in the light of the above discussions. There is one mechanical explanation, when 'karma' is explained in the strict regularity sense, that one is caused to choose. To explain man mechanically and scientifically, a partial explanation of the 'karma' theory in the sense of strict regularity can be said to be accepted as a methodological principle. It purports to say how the inevitable consequences would follow if one decides to pursue one particular cause of action. It is nothing but the ability to predict. The mechanical man acts in a particular way, that his actions and his choices do have a prior cause to them, that his actions would have particular results. The Mahabharats say that the consequences of what a man does will seek him out later, "as surely as a calf does its mother in a herd of cows."

But this mechanical explanation fails to explain the 'whole man', it is a partial explanation of the karma doctrine. The 'karma' doctrine itself is grounded on a moral view of the universe. It points to the fact that there is an ideal of life which it is man's duty to pursue. The doctrine presupposes the possibility of moral growth, The 'karma' or the deed again leads to a double result. The direct result, the 'karma-phala' is mechanical, like the law of causation as a methodical principle it may also be interpreted similarly, it simply claims that an event does have a cause.. The 'karma also establishes a tendency in us to respect the same deed in the future. The significant fact about the 'karma' doctrine is that it keeps room for moral growth. Man is free to regulate his 'samskaras'. To interpret the 'karma' doctrine wholly is to take note of the creative dimension of man, without this respect man would be reduced to mechanical man, to automatons. As observation goes : "We can imagine (just barely, I think) a being who went through a lifetime of "correct" decision making. but always just by sheer luck, never thanks to skill. At every turn, this being just happened to turn the right why, away from the gallows, away from calamity and disgrace. One unlucky misstep. and boom—condemned to a lifetime of disgrace. But this is not the way we are."[10]

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[8] Sir, W. David Ross : *Foundations of Ethics*, p 24.

[9] Daniel C. Dennett : *Elbow Room*, (Clarnedon Press : Oxford) p. 170.

[10] D.C. Dennett : *Elbow Room*, p. 99.

To interpret the 'karma' doctrine mechanically would lead to pessimism. Man will be reduced to automatons. Then life would be a "vale of tears". As M. Hiriyana observes : "It thus postulates a complete lack of harmony between the world of facts and the world of ideals. That is pessimism, pure and simple. It looks upon life as a 'vale of tears', and regards art as nothing more than a hobby or pastime to which man may turn for relief from the troubles of life."[11]

The picture changes when one recognises the creative aspect of man and when freedom is interpreted in terms of agency. It would imply that persons matter, that they have a say in their future, that they can regulate the 'samskaras'. In fact, the concept of 'Jivan mukti' is the ideal free man the complete human being who is a creator, a poet and an agent. "...Jivan-mukti, to speak from the purely philosophical standpoint, marks the highest conception of freedom... The aim of life was no longer conceived as something to be sought for beyond this world but to be realised here and now. It was a mode of living characterised by passionless purity and by equal love for all......"[12]

The poet is the creator, he recreates future. The poet, the free man, the 'Jivan-mukta' not only copies the natural but he creates it new. It is significant that the poet in Sanskrit literature is often found compared to the creator.

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[11] M. Hiriyana : *Popular Essays in Indian Philosophy;* (Kavyalaya Publishers), p. 3.

[12] Ibid, pp. 3-4.

6

Nalimov's Conception of Human Nature

Zhanna Drogalina Nalimov

INTRODUCTION

According to V. V. Nalimov, understanding human nature, or man's place in the universe, has been the pivot for the evolution of various spiritual cultures. A distinct interpretation of this theme, leaving the boundaries of purely mythological structures, can be found in a source as ancient as the *Egyptian Book of the Dead*.[1] This theme occupies the central position in Hellenic culture. Christianity introduced an essentially new approach to man, which determimed for ages the new way of evolution of Western culture. The depths of Christian thought that proved open for the mastery of the external world through its subjection to logic gave birth to the idea that it was possible to treat human nature in the same manner. Human consciousness had to be reduced to something very simple, yielding to logical under-standing.[4] For example, in Marxism, consciousness is reduced to social phenomena; in Freudian psychoanalysis; to instincts; in behaviorism, to behavior, in cognitive psychology, to computer-like logical operations; and in neuropsychology, to the forms of interaction of neuronal chains. Creation of artificial intelligence equal to or even more powerful than human inteligence should (in case it could be realized) complete the struggle begun by science for human mastery over the world, including here man himself (Nalimov 1981a, n.d.).

But, according to Nalimov, human consciousness stubbornly escapes this demiurgical goal. It possesses an amazing treasure :

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[1] E. Budge, *The Egyptian Book of the Dead*. The Papyrus of Ani. (New York : Dover Publications, 1967).

[2] Criticism of several principles of reductionism can be found in J. Margolis, *Persons and Minds*, *The Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism* (Dodrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1978).

meanings that do not obey formal logic. Logic does not operate with meanings; it only reveals connections within symbol systems. Logic lacks creativity. That was well understood by Wittgenstein.[5] Formal thinking should be preceded by profound, prelogical thinking generating new meanings. Being comprehended, these meanings are reduced to the symbolic system of everyday language, which yields to logical operations refining our thoughts and making them convenient for communication (Nalimov 1981b, n.d.; Nalimov and Drogalina, 1984).

In his book on the spontaneity of consciousness, Nalimov (n.d.) draws the reader's attention to those systems of thought that oppose the all-embracing rationalism : criticism by Nietzsche and Husserl and the subsequent existentialism, philosophical hermeneutics, and French personalism. He sees existentialism however, as a bright, but short-lived, splash of European thought because its sharp opposition to science (and its failure to understand it) placed it outside the boundaries of the existing culture. The book also comments on the growing popularity in the United States and other countries of transpersonal psychology and the way that it has acquired a distinct philosophical flavor. Nalimov remarks that transpersonal psychology is strongly affected by a Buddhist outlook that treats negatively the idea of personality as a semantic structure.

According to Nalimov, ignoring the semantic nature of personality made modern culture deficient. Our society proved incapable of understanding and evaluating its own requirements, which can in no way be satisfied by the simple drive toward the growing comfort of living (Nalimov 1979b, n.d.).

Weltanschauung Premises of the Probabilistic Approach to human nature.

Rejecting the depressing reductionism, Nalimov in all his works constructs a semantic model of personality based on the recognition of self-sustained existence of meanings. But having embarked on this road, the author is very careful to avoid the shabbiness of the Cartesian dichotomy. The solution of this problem opens up the possibility of creating a super-unified field theory[4] that would describe

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3 "...If we know the logical syntax of any sign language, then all the propositions of logic are already given" (6, 124); "Hence there can *never* be surprises in logic" (6,1251); and "...without troubling ourselves about a sense and a meaning, we form the logical propositions out of others by mere *symbolic rules*" (6.126) L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophical* (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955).

4 One of the central problems of the contemporary theoritical physics is a construction of a unified field theory describing the four

both physical phenomena and semantic ones, thus removing the notorious "opposition of body and meanings imprinted in it"[5] (Nalimov 1985, 1986a, n.d.).

Solving these problems, Nalimov formulate the Weltanschauung premises proceeding from which he further constructs the calculus of meanings:

1. Semantic theory of personality should be constructed in a deductive way, with the incomplete degree of formalization typical of contemporary theoretical physics.
2. It is necessary to recognize the primordial existence of meanings as a latent semantic potentiality of the universe.
3. Constructing this theory, one must resort both to philosophical ideas of contemporary physics and to certain mathematical structures, regarding them as images through which the vision of the semantic reality of the world can be revealed.
4. It should be acknowledged that semantic potentiality is manifested through texts that are always of a fuzzy nature.
5. To estimate the degree of fuzziness of texts, it is proposed to use a probabilitic measure.

Premise 1 is a challenge to such descriptive sciences as psychology, sociology, and biology, which contain almost no deductive structures. They lack theoretical structures of the type characteristic of

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fundamental physical interactions. It was originally formulated at the beginning of our century and only now seems to be approaching its completion.

[5] For instance, take the program of David Bohm, the well-known British theoretical physicist; its goal is development of a model of the world holisticity of *holomovement*. R. Weber formulates the basic premises of his conception in the following way.

> The foundation and fundamental feature of Bhom's cosmology is the claim that reality is *one*, an unbroken, undivided wholeness which is the background for everyshing in the universe, underlying both matter and consciousness, providing the raw material for all manifest entities and events, begetting, sustaining, and governing everything by its enduring connection with it in the deep-structure of the whole. (p. 124)

The quote is from R. Weber, 'Reflections on David Bohm's Holomovement. A Physicist's Model of Cosmos and Consciousness," in *The Metaphors of Consciousness*, ed. Valle and von Eckartsberg (New York: Plenum Press, 1981), 121-40. See also the article by D. Bohm, "A New Theory of Relationship of Mind and Body", *The Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research* 80, 2 (1986); 113-35, and the book D.Bohm, *Unfolding Meaning: A Weekend of Dialogue with David Bohm* (London and New York: Are Paperback, 1987).

physics. Nalimov poses the question : Is any serious, mathematically lined theoretization possible in these science ? Is it possible to begin with the introduction of the concept of semantic and biological fields as independent entities irreducible to physical manifestations ?

According to Nalimov, the recognition of premise 2 allows us to formulate the concept of the semantic field proper, without reductionism. By introducing this premise, Nalimov actually revives, though in a modified form, the conception of Plato concerning the primordial existence of "ideas." Plato is often abused as an idealist, either objective, absolute, or even numerical. But, asks Nalimov, if this is really so, what about contemporary physics ? It recognizes the primordial exisience of nonchanging fundamental constants that determine the arrangement of our our universe. Why is it allowed to recognize the primordial existence of constants without being afraid of being accused of idealism (i.e. nonscientific approach) and yet not allowed to recognize the primordial nature of meanings ? "Something must exist primordially, or we would not be able to think" (Nalimov 1985, n.d.)

Premise 3 is founded as follows : human understanding comes through images. In this connection Nalimov alludes to Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and even Wittgenstein. People used to borrow images from everyday life, from their direct sensory experience. These images have by now become semantically exhausted. In order to evolve further, philosophical thinking badly needs new images, Nalimov believes they can be borrowed from mathematics Mathematics is his conception is easy to understand : he does not prove new theorems but only makes use of a few mathematical structures as images in order to reveal his ideas better. Substantial application of mathematics in psychology is certainly always of a metaphorical nature (Nalimov 1981c).

The basic philosophical position of Nalimov can be formulated as follows: "Meanings are ubiquitous, they are at the foundation of the Universe" (1981a, 1981b, n.d.).

PHILOSOPHICAL THINKING NEEDS NEW IMAGES. WHICH NALIMOV BELIEVES CAN BE BORROWED FROM MATHEMATIC.

Acknowledgment of premise 4 is the way of philosophical hermeneutics. The essentially new feature in this approach is the statement concerning the fuzziness of texts. It proceeds from the semantic analysis of the texts of everyday language that Nalimov discusses in his books specifically dedicated to this subject (1978, 1981b).

As to premise 5, the notion of "fuzzy sets" is known to have been introduced by the American scientist Zadeh, who demonstrated their universal nature (Nalimov 1981a; Nalimov and Drogalina 1984). However, Nalimov believes his mathematical description of fuzziness to be overcomplicated. Nalimov shows probability density to be a measure of fuzziness of continuous sets. Actually, mathematical statistics always has to deal with fuzzy sets. Differently described, fuzziness and randomness—after a close scrutiny . prove to be only synonyms.

Probabilistic Calculus of Meanings

Nalimov's conception is constructed deductively: (1) he formulates initial notions ("strictly speaking, non-definable, but intuitively clear"); (2) he formulates initial axioms and relates them to some mathematical structures (expresses them through these structures); (3) he proposes rules of inference; (4) he shows the explanatory power of his model (see the sections to follow). It goes without saying that his model can only be regarded as a deeply metaphorical structure.

Initial notions

The key notion is that of *meaning*. The nature of meaning can only be comprehended through the comparative analysis of the semantic triad: *meaning-text-language*. It may be said that meanings generated by human consciousness are revealed through the variety of cultures; *great texts* that existed before, exist now, and will exist in the future. Textual revelation of meanings is realized through the symbolic system that we perceive as a language. Thus each constituent of the above triad is revealed through the other two Having included language in the triad, the author introduces the idea that the existence of the triad becomes possible only when there is the observer, the carrier of consciousness who perceives texts and reveals meanings. The triad becomes synonymous with consciousness (Nalimov 1986a, n.d.).

The nature of consciousness within this system of views has a multi-level structure. Nalimov suggests the following scheme of the cartography of consciousness :

Level of logical thinking. Meanings are revealed here through Aristotalian logic. This is a computer like part of consciousness.

Level of pre-thinking. On this level, the initial premises are worked out whereupon logical thinking per se is based. This is a level of creative activity. The task is to discover probabilstic or, to be more exact, Bayesian logic functioning on this level.

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[6] This is typical of all of Nalimov's papers, but especially striking in his latest works (1986a, 1986b, 1988; n d).

Cellars of consciousness. On this level, sensual contemplation of images takes place. Here we meet with archetypes of the collective unconscious (in Jung's terms).

The structure as a whole. The structure as a whole is based on the *physical body* where neuropeptides act. What is meant is primarily the general somatic state of a person. The altered states of consciousness that are the object of transpersonal psychology arise when the upper, logically structured level is switched off. Switching off is achieved by directed influence of the body : relaxation, sensory deprivation, regulated breathing, special physical exercies or even special massage, and by taking phychedelic drugs. Everything that can affect personal time may be controlled. Within this system of ideas, it is not the brain but the whole body that represents a level of consciousness.

Level of metaconsciousness. This level seems to belong to transpersonal, cosmic consciousness (noosphere, or cosmic plerome of the Gnostics interacting with human, bodily encapsulated consciousness via Bayesian logic). On this cosmsc level, the spontaneous emergence of creative impulses occur (we shall call them "Bayesian filters"). It is important to emphasize that this conception represents an open system (Nalimov 1982, 1985, 1986a, n.d.).

Axiomatics

1. The evolving world that we perceive is regarded by Nalimov as a variety of *texts*.
2. Text are characterized by two constituents : *discrete* (semiotic) and *continual* (semantic).
3. Semantics is determined by the probabilistically given structure of *meanings*. Meaning are reponsible for changing a symbolic system into a text.
4. All possible meanings of the world are primordially related to Cantor's linear continuum, the numerical axis u on which all real numbers are plotted in increasing order.Otherwise,meanings of the world are compressed in the way the number on the real axis are.
5. Compressed meanings represent the packed (unmanifested) world : *the semantic vacuum.*

6 *Unpacking* (emergence of texts) is realized by the probabilistic weighting of axis u : its different sections are ascribed different weights. The metric of scale u is assumgd to be initially given and to remain unchanged.

7 Correspondingly, semantics of each concrete text is given by its own *distribution function* (probability density) $p(u)$. Assume that

the distribution function is sufficiently smooth and asymprotically approaches (if not stated otherwise) the abscissa. In the general case, it is possible to speak about texts determined by the probabilitiy distribution function given in a multidimensional space (Nalimov 1982, 1985, 1986a, n.d.).

Rule of Inference

Changes of the text, its evolution, are related to the spontaneous emergence in a situation y of the filter $p(y/u)$, which multiplicatively interacts with the initial function $p(u)$. The interaction is given by the well-known Bayesian formula :

$$p(u/y)=kp(u)\ p(y/u),$$

where probability density $p(u/y)$ determines the semantics of a new text after the evolutionary impetus y; k is a normalizing constant. Bayesian formula is regarded as a syllogism : from the two premises $p(u)$ and $p\ y/u)$ necessarily follows a text with new semantics, $p(u/y)$. in contrast to the categorical syllogism by Aristotle, in Bayesian syllogism both the premises and the following corollaries are not of the atomic nature but are fuzzy and probabilistic, and at least the second premise is not categorical but conditional (conditioned by the situation y) (Nalimov 1982, 1985, 1986a, 1988; Nalimov and Drogalina 1984).

Nalimov emphasizes the following :

1. His premises form an easily comprehensible idea that meanings in the texts are given selectively. Nobody can know everything. As the English saying has it : To know everything is to know nothing. Function $p(u)$ proves to be the selective window through which we can peer into the semantic world. The emergence of a filter means the change of the selectivity.

2. Filters emerge spontaneously. A concept alien to European culture, spontaneity is borrowed from Tao, the philosophy of ancient China. In the conception discussed, spontaneity acquires the status of a philosophical category.

3. The axiomatics are based on the idea of a continuum, a set without vacant space. Here one has to rely on intuition. If we examine closely the nature of meanings, we shall see their inseparable integrity. The rigorous mathematical notion of the continuum integrity supports the following interpretation of meanings: their compact packing does not allow us to dissect them into adjacent but completely separated semantic units (see the Russian *Mathematical Encyclopedia* 1977-1985).

4. Probabilistic or, to be more accurate, Bayesian logic is dialectical in a broad sense. The essential features are as follows; (*a*) it

is open to the spontaneous emergence of filters; Nalimov relates spontaneity to the transpersonal element in human natu e emphasizing that here he touches on 'mystery", the ultimate reality; (*b*) the syllogism is applied to fuzzy meanings on the numerical continuum: atomic (point-like) meanings cannot emerge; (*c*) logical operations are purely numerical: the right-hand part of the Bayesian formula contains the multiplication sign, which has a purely numerical interpretation; (*d*) strong disjunction is excluded; the language proves free from the law of the excluded middle; therefore, it is free from the rigid discrimination between truth and falsity.

5. Bayesian logic, from the viewpoint of the familiar types of logic, looks rather like the alogical logic.[7] And this is only natural: due to its archaic nature, pre-thinking should contain mythological features. Nalimov alludes to the work of his compatriot, the recently rediscovered philosopher Y. Golosovker.[8]

6. In the above cartography of consciousness, Bayesian logic functions on level 2, supported respectively by levels 3 and 4. The newly emerged system of meanings is passed on to level 1 where it loses its refinement and turns into a system of atomic meanings yielding to Aristotelian logic. Another course is also possible, however; the new system of meanings may be manifested by art, and, moreover, when logical argumentation proves insufficient, then it is realized merely by authority and violence (Nalimov 1986a, 109; nd.).

Understanding of Texts

How do we understand texts? How do we understand one another if we speak the language whose words do not have point-like (atomic) meaning ? For instance, how can we understand the meanings of the English word set explained by 1,816 other words in the two volume English-Russian dictionary ? How do we understand metaphors ? Why are we fond of metaphorically rich texts ? How do we understand obviously alogical phrases that are sometimes formally senseless ? How do we translate texts from foreign languages if the key words often lack semantic equivalents in another language ?

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[7] Here Nalimov again quotes Wittgenstein's *tractatus*. "The logical forms are *anumerical*" (4. 128); "The simplest proposition, the elementary proposition, asserts the existence of an atomic fact" (4. 21); and "Even if the world is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists of an infinite number of atomic facts and every atomic fact is composed of an infinite number of objects, even then there must be objects and atomic facts" (4. 2211).

[8] Y. Golosovker. *Logika mifa* (The logic of myth) (Moscow : Nauka, 1987) Golosovker was an outstanding Russian philosopher who was lucky to survive in the years of mass repressions, but who failed to preserve his manuscripts on the philosophy of myths.

MEANINGS ARE UBIQUITOUS; THEY ARE AT THE FOUNDATION OF THE UNIVERSE

According to Nalimov, the above questions and related issues are crucial both for understanding the nature of our consciousness and for the evolution of artificial intelligence. He formulated these questions in the most acute form twenty years ago.

The first treatment of the subject, though not too thoroughly elaborated theoretically, was the book *Probabilistic Model of Language*, which was later issued in the United States under the title *In the Labyrinths of Language* (Nalimov 1978, 1981b). Nalimov returned to this subject in all of his publications on the problem of consciousness.

The answer, in short, is as follows: while speaking or reading, we get involved in a language game submerging words important for this text into various situations y generating the filter of comprehension $p(y/u)$. The word meaning is thus narrowed down and becomes more concrete.

Language games not only may narrow the word meaning but also expand it. In this case, filters corresponding to a situation y attach a sufficiently high significance level to the section of the scale u insufficiently manifested verbally (for the given word). Another example of expanding the meaning is a formation of a new, two-word term. Such a newly coined term *artificial intelligence*, which many for a long time perceived as semantically perverse because it united two principally different elements. According to Nalimov, the meaning of this word should be regarded as set by a two-dimensional distribution function $(p\ u_1\ u_2,)$ revealing correlation between two probabilistically ordered semantic structures. The author of the conception also introduced the new two-dimensional term *Bayesian syllogism*, which links yet disconnected entities.

Within this system of ideas, the interpretation of scientific, philosophical, and religious conceptions is also Bayesian. For instance, one may ask whether Lysenko was a Darwinist. The answer given by Nalimov will undoubtedly be positive. Darwinism is a fairly fuzzy system of notions. Lysenko approached it from a profoundly personal position. His preference filter became such that the bulk of the probability density of the function $p(y/u)$ got into the tail part of the distribution $p(u)$ that had determined Darwin's theory. This is how we got a Lysenko version of Darwinism. The story of Lysenko is just an ugly anecdote in science. But true discoveries also represents filtering of some streams concealed deep under the cover of scientific paradigms and therefore not recognized for a long time. It was in this way that non-Euclidean geometries were created. The history of

Western European religious thought for almost twenty centuries witnessed continuous reinterpretation of basic Christian texts that resulted in the emergence of new churches and sects. All that was accompained by religious wars, revolutionary outbursts, prisons, and autos-da-fe. Philosophical thinking of the West continues ceaseless reinterpretation of what was born in Hellenism.

Thus comprehension is always a creative process, and sometimes it results in creating essentially new texts. Creativity in its broadest manifestation represents Bayesian uplifting to the surface of consciousness of that which smoldered within its depths. We keep creating new texts, each time revealing in a new way the inexhaustible potentiality of what had been primordially built-in. Human essence lies in man's ceaseless interaction with meanings and is realized in creating still new texts (Nalimov 1982, 1986a, 1986b, n.d.; Nalimov and Drogalina, 1984).

Profound. creative understanding occurs on the level of pre-thinking. Logical thinking is rather an auxiliary process, often majorly communicative. Within the system of Bayesian interpretation, corresponding to the level of pre-thinking, certain ideas are sometimes understood more clearly than they can be understood within a system of purely logical constructions.

Free will. It was Hegel who first drew attention to the fact that the idea of freedom more than any other is subjected to "greatest mis understandings". Indeed, the Western thinkers, in accord with the requirements of logical thought, always tried to separate thoroughly free behavior per se from deterministic behavior, which resulted, naturally, in endless misunderstandings. Within a system of probabilistic notions, matters stand differently. Bayesian syllogism allows the freely generated filter $p(y/u)$ to interact with the deterministic constituents $p(u)$ generated by the entire past of the culture, education, upbringing, and so forth. The emergence of any new, sufficiently serious situation y calls forth the necessity of the emergence of a new value orientation that is regarded as a multiplicative mixture of the predetermined (fate) component and free choice, the *spontaneous principle*. That accounts for the paradoxical nature of the notion of *freedom*. For a person in a state of absolute freedom, the notion of freedom loses sense. An absolutely free person should first of all be free of the selective system of value concepts given beforehand: his ego must degenerate into a rectangular distribution. But having liberated himself of imposed value concepts, the person will lose the freedom of selecting filter $p(y/u)$ because, for the unlimited rectangular distribution, ordinates will everywhere have to talk zero values;

Having lost the freedom of the filter selection, the personality will lose its creative principle (Nalimov 1982, 1985, 1986a, 1986b, n d.).

Three modes of time: past, present, and future. Nalimov quotes the well known statements by St. Augustine and Heidegger on the integrity of time. The past for Heidegger is not something which is no more;it always exists in present and determines both the present and the future. According to Heidegger, the mode of the future is "forestalling"; it is concentration on the future that makes "here-Being" authentic. These concepts, which are commonly difficult to understand, are easily interpreted in the probabilistic language.

If $p(u)$ is a value orientation generated by the past, and $p(y/u)$ is a question from the future into the past in connection with the problem y emerging in the *present*, then $p(u/y)$ is an answer revealing a newiy formed value orientation. Free will makes the choice from the future existing as a set of unrealized potentiality. The future acquires the possibility to affect the present by changing the past gravitating to them. It is thus possible to speak of the *Present-moment* existence of the past and the future because, within Bayesian logic, the past is converted by the future (Nalimov 1982, 1986a, 1986b, n.d.).

Semantic Nature of Personality

In accord with the ideas of hermeneutics, Nalimov views personality primarily as a carrier of meanings. Personality acts a generator and transformer of meanings; it also has the faculty of calculus of meanings. Personality is open to the world; it is capable of actions brought about by new meanings. These actions may become all-embracing, being directed at the transformation not only of society but of the whole world.

In some of his papers. Nalimov isolates four structural components of a probabilistically oriented medel of personality (1982, 1986a, 1986b, n.d ; Nalimov and Drogalina 1985) : *Fgo.* Ego is given by a system of probabilistic concepts recorded by probability density $p(u)$. This function may be either needle-like or fuzzy, sometimes asymmetic or multimodal. This determines, to a certain degree, human types. Ego is not a stable state, but a process, because the system of value concepts changes constantly, the more so in crucial situations.[9] Human ego may be regarded as a text-but a specific, live text capable of ceaseless reinterpretation of itself.

metaego. Metaego is the faculty of spontaneous production of the filter. According to the author, ego is the most powerful characteristic of personality : a person remains himself as long as he preserves the faculty of producing nontrivial filters, especially in crucial situations. This is the way to manifest human dignity in the moral perspective. While human ego represents human openness to the world of actions metaego represent openness to the cosmic, or transpersonal principle.[10] Man is a bridge between two aspects of the world : its present-momentness and extratemporal existence. The cosmic principle is beyond time : it stores both the unexhausted past of the culture and potential variety of the future. Freely selecting preference filters, we enter the trans-personal aspects of the flow of world history, taking on ourselves part of the responsibility for the course of its evolution (Nalimov 1986a, 1986b, n.d.; Nalimov and Drogalina 1984).

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[9] Nalimov's concept of personality here has much, in common with the Buddhist idea of the illusory nature of personality (Nalmov 1986b, 113; Nalimov and Drogalina 1985. 196).

MAN IS A BRIDGE BETWEEN TWO ASPECTS OF THE WORLD: ITS PRESENT-MOMENTNESS AND EXTRATEMPORAL EXISTENCE.

Multidmensionality of consciousness. It is descibed by probability density set on the multidimensional semantic space $p(u,u...,u)$. Thus separate components of personality manifestations are correlated to a certain degree. Each of us is at least two-dimensional, or the inner dialogue that we are ceaselessly engaged in with ourselves would be senseless. Multidimensionality of a personality may be very great. Such a personality was, for instance, Dostoyevsky. His characters are, on the one hand, very different from, and on the other, very similar to the author. I feel that in this way Dostoyevsky was finding expression for the multidimensionality that was a burden to him (Nalimov 1986a, 168; 1986b, n.d.; Nalimov and Drogalina 1984).

Multidimensionality is being broadly discussed in Western psychiatry. It has proved to be related both to obvious pathology and creativity[11]. An absolutely disordered, orthogonally split personality is pathological. In its extreme cases, such splitting may result in manifestations, at different times, of discrete personality components, one being unaware of the other's drives. It may also happen that two components of a personality will separately use the same body. But correlation of the personality components may as well form a harmonious multipersonality open to the free perception of the world. A multidimensional approach to personality is undoubtedly the way to overcome social alienation and aggression. This is a *formation of a new man*, adapted to the environment of social and intellectual polymorphism.

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[10] Note that the conception of the probabilistic nature of consciousness comes close to transpersonal psychology based on the idea that transpersonal experience exceeds the boundaries of individual existence.

[11] Compare, for example, J. O. Beahrs. *Unity and multiplicity : Multievel Consciousncss of Self in Hypnosis, Psychiatric Disorder and Mental Health.* (New York : Brunner/Maseb, 1982).

The increase of the text dimension leads to the growing sophistication of unpacking the semantic continuum: there emerge new parameters of unpacking, namely, the correlation cofficients.

Hyperpersonality; Personality as a semantic structure can be embodied in various physical objects. Example of this are hypnosis the psychoanalytical phenomenon of a transfer; the formation of the collective consciousness in the agitated crowd; the collective ecstasy in religious mysteries; and the special practice of merging personalities in Tantrism (Nalimov 1986a, 169, n.d.; Nalimov and Drogalina 1984).

Comparison to the Experiment

Theoretical conception of Nalimov proceeds on the assertion that our logically structured part of consciousness is based on other, deeper (and more ancient) levels of consciousness where the direct contemplation of images occurs.

In his book *Realms of the Unconscious* (1982), Nalimov describes an experimental practice of many years that was aimed at illuminating the cellars of consciousness by means of meditation[12]. One of the best definitions of meditation was given by a A. M. Pyatigorsky.

> Meditation (Latin *meditatio from meditor*—speculate. ponder) is a mental action directed at bringing human psyche to the state of profound concentration which thus proves both the result and the objective characteristic of meditation. Psychologically, meditation presupposes elimination of extreme emotional manifestions and therefore decrease of responding. The somatic state of a meditating person is characterized by relaxation and his state of mind by elation and some aloofness (from external objects and certain inner experinces).
>
> In various meditation practices (religious-philosophical, psychotherapeutic, didactic-propedeutical, cults, etc.) induction of meditation and its course are usually related to a sequence of mental acts forming a natural process. Therefore in almost all languages the word denoting meditation is semantically linked to the concept of both "mind" and "thinking" as human natural faculties independent of man's conscious intentions (sanskr. *dhyana*, Rus. *dumanye* (thinking), Anc. Gr. *medomai*, "I am thinking", Engl. musing, "dreaming" etc).

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[12] Meditational states are now broadly used in various research and medical centers in the United States as both a research, tool and a therapeutic procedure. The bibliography on this subject is truly immense.

Meditation procedures differ in their techniques and sequences of steps towards achieving mental balance and non-responsiveness of *psyche*. Meditation was specially developed and acquired concrete topical direction in Indian and Buddhist yoga (as one of the main tools of achieving religious liberation), in ancient Greece, as "philosophical ecstasy" of Platonists and Neo-platonists (the first viewed it as a necessary premise for theoretical thinking, mathematical in particular), as Orthodoxical "wise doing" (Logos-meditation" or "Jesus's prayer"), as "exercises" (spiritual) of Jesuits, as the teaching of "the way" of Sufi Moslems, as well as in some contemporary schools of psychoanalysis (C. G. Jung) that had as a goal personality integration.[13]

The peculiarity of meditation experiments described in Nalimov's *Realms of the Unconscious* was that when subjects were in the state of relaxation' a key word was given to them and it was suggested to them that they focus on it, experience it, and become it.[14] After each session, subjects wrote accounts of their states, and professional artists who were part of the group drew sketches. The material was encoded and then processed by the method of multidimensional statistical analysis. A few experiments were carrid out on large groups of subjects (more than one hundred people), but regular experiments included small groups. In the first sequence of experiments, the key words were the semantic triad *freedom-slavery-dignity;* then for two years, we worked with the key word *time* and then, for a shorter period, with other key words.[15]

In the majority of the accounts (70-80 percent), the subjects described a "new" experience not related directly to the experience indicated by the existing cultural paradigm—that is, the experience of remote past. There were texts of "gnostic" nature containing the idea of the multitude of worlds; "hermeneutic" texts looking like ancient initiations; descriptions of "out-of-body" experiences analogous to those that are typical of the people who experienced clinical death. The texts were, as a rule, mythological, emotionally satiated, and full of images and symbols comparable to traditional symbolics, but with a personal flavor (Nalimov 1982; Nalimov and Drogalina n.d.; Nalimov, Kuznetsov, and Drogalina n.d.).

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[13] A. M. Pyatigorsky, *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, vol. 15 (1974). 562 (in Russian). Pyatigorsky is a well-known Buddhologist now resident in Great Britain.

[14] Key words were accompanied by brief poetical texts. often of a paradoxical nature. For each session, a musical piece was chosen corresponding to the semantic tasks—for example medieval church incantations.

[15] Paradigmatically given semantic fields of the words under study were also evaluated by the method of subsequent (step by-step) analysis of the corresponding explanatory texts borrowed from the *Dictionary of the Russian Language*, ed. S. I. Ozhegov (Moscow, 1972).

We got quite a different picture in a hospital for mental diseases where the subjects of our meditation sessions were patients capable of contacts (included here were those with the diagnosis of schizophrenia). Their accounts were very different: amythological, emotionally poor, lacking images, anemic; moreover, their images did not have personal flavor and represented as a rule outdated ideological cliches:

The contents of the narratives of mentally sane subjects proved comparable with the texts obtained by Stanislav Grof in LSD therapy[16]. In this connection, Nalimov (1982, 205-211) believes that the mentally sick (and some sane people as well) have some deep realms of consciousness so closed up that they can be discovered only by very strong means.

Below we give as an illustration a protocol of meditation entitled "Who I am".

> I saw myself as a multicolored clot, as a galaxy in the sky, in the brown, dimly lit space. It is not easy to enter the clot. This is a closed, dense, isolated clot of light. Now it becomes pliable: it expands, its boundaries are washed away' and I enter it. It contains various spaces. They are of different colors and different density. Here is a light, spotless blue space. But it is in some places crossed by a solid red arc. This one is crossed by another, green arc. The latter arc is not so solid: it sometimes breaks down in splashes. Some multicolored arcs are locked together like the chain links. And far away I see again the empty blue space and high above silver-white luminous wings are soaring.
>
> I saw: death is destruction of this clot galaxy. It is liberation of the white-winged angel. (Nalimov n.d.).

The text is of an obviously mythological character; it reveals an ancient concept of human nature. Nalimov emphasizes that the most significant feature is that the revelation occurs through spatial images. Nalimov quotes the well-known Russian philologist Toporov on the spatial nature of text; his ideas have much in common with Nalimov's conception:

> It is possible to regard space as a *potential* text its receptable (such that they are interrelated by the contents). At the same time space *realized* (actualized through objects) should in this conception be regarded as a text...[17]

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[16] S. Grof. *Realms of the Human Unconscious : Observations from LSD Research* (New York ; Dutton, 1976).

Probabilistically Oriented Approach to Global Evolutionism

Of great interest in Nalimov's works is undoubtedly the outlined possibility of constructing a unified model of evolutionism invariant toward all its particular manifestations. The evolution of cultures may be described analogously to the evolution of the human ego, proceeding from the Bayesian logic. In the book *Space, Time, and Life* (Nalimov 1985), an attempt is made to demonstrate the potentialities of a probabilistically oriented approach to global biological evolutionism.

The author proceeds from the viewpoint that the meaning of the texts belonging to the live world are represented by morpho-physiological attributes. He supposes the whole manifold of the attributes is originally packed on the numerical axis u. The live world is then viewed as a probabilistically weighted unpacking of the continuum of biological meanings[18]. Individuals, that is, elementary units of the text, proved to be given by probability density $p(u)$; species, by multidimensional distributions constructed on axes u, u,... corresponding to individuals.

IN NALIMOY'S MODEL, CREATIVITY IS TRANSCENDENTAL SPONTANEITY DEVOID OF PERSONALITY.

If we now omit all the details of Bayesian description of evolutionism and confine ourselves to comparing this approach with the synthetic theory of evolution so popular nowadays, it will look very similar to the comparison drawn by Nalimov before, when he compared Bayesian semantic of everyday language with Aristotelian logic allowing only the existence of atomic facts. The synthetic theory lacks the notion of a field. Its mathematical models (in population and evolutionary genetics) are based on the premise called *Beanbag Genetics*. This is a far-reaching simplification: genes in a genome behave like discrete units whose interaction is negligibly small; the selective value of each allel is constant; the selective value of genes is additive. No matter how great the achievements of this approach, they still remain not isomorphous to reality, which is discussed in detail by Mednikov, a Russian expert of evolution theory[19] (Nalimov 1985, 27).

In contrast to the models based on the idea of Beanbag Genetics, the conception of the live world as an unpacking of a morphophysio-

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17 V.N. Toporov, "Space and Text" (in Russian) in *Tekst, semantika nauka* Moscow : Nauka Publishers, 1983), 227-83.

18 Nalimov proceeds form the ideas of the Russian geneticist R. Khesin. *Nepostoyanstvo genoma* (Instability of a genome) (Moscow : Nauka Publishers, 1984), assening that the elements of the world genotond are united in the common genotond of the live organisms.

logical continuum makes it possible to give a formal description of changeability as a process embracing the entire field of attributes simultaneously. Such a description is much more realistic. In *Space, Time and Life*, this assertion is illustrated by the following examples: the teleogenetic similarity of animals noted by the outstanding Russian biologist and philosopher, Lubishchev, manifested in the fact that evolution produces similar solutions no matter what factors affected them (similarity between ichthyosauruses, dolphins, fish, and so forth); Vavilov's[20] homological series: whole plant families are characterized by a certain changeability cycle; and the neotenic theory of human origin, which justifies the idea of the spotty nature of evolution, that is, rapid and radical change of a whole pattern of attributes.

Unity of mind and nature, reflected in the parallelism between biological evolution and mental processes, represents a well-known problem that was formulated and elaborated by Gregory Bateson,[21] among others. Nalimov tries to illuminate it from another angle, proceeding from different premises.

Comparison to Philosophical Classics

Nalimov's approaeh can be regarded as a further evolution of the ideas of Plato and to a certain degree of Anaxagoras. In Plato's dialogues, we find statements concerning the primordial existence of ideas. His teaching of One (in the dialogue Parmenides) now is seem as an attempt to reveal the concept of the continuum on the level of knowledge of that epoch. According to Plato. One is linked to Many through number. But Many is not part of One; it contains the Whole.[29] Nalimov's model shows the way the primordially existing semantic continuum is manifested through number without dividing it into parts. The resort to mathematical notions allowed the author to make more explicit what sometimes remained insufficiently clear in Platonic teaching.

In the history of the evolution of Western philosophy, one constantly comes across the resonance with Platonic ideas. Therefore Nalimov's model often looks like just a reformulation in a new language of what has been said earlier. Nalimov wrote, "Descartes had a statement (though quite a cursory one) concerming the incalculable

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[19] B. M. Mednikov. Genome as a whole (in Russian), in *Urovni organizaisii biologicneskikh sistem* (Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 1980), 98 103.

[20] The famous Russian geneticist Vavilov starved to death in Stalin's prisons.

[21] G. Bateson, *Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity* (London : Vildwood House, 1979).

[22] Nalimov (1985)find similar ideas in Anaxagoras's teaching as well.

nature of meaning......It would not be easy to enumerate the eternal truths."[23] According to Nalimov, Spinoza's concept of the primary principle, substance, consisting of infinite attributes, looks almost like Nalimov's idea of semantic vacuum. [24] Kant stated that "all human cognition begins with intution, proceeds from thence to conceptions, and ends with ideas."[25] Hegel spoke respectively of the reproductive power of imagination "elevating" images on the surface of consciousness." [26] Nietzsche said, "First images—to explain how images arise in the spirit. Then words applied to images." He said on the nature of personality, "My hypothesis : the subject is multiplicity."[27] According to Wittgenstein, "What the picture represents is its sense.' [28] Merleau-Ponty wrote, "Because we are in the world, we are condemned to meaning."[29] Sartre wrote, "The transcendental consciousness is impersonal spontaneity......"[30] and "Man is condemned to be free"; "man...is condemned at each moment to invert man ;'[31] Gadamer said that "language is a central point where 'I' and world meet or, rather, manifest their original unity."[32] And, last but not least, according to Whitehead, "Creativity is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact..." [33]

In Nalimov's model, creativity is transcendental spontanity void of personality. He wishes to regard the creative principle as the basis of the world. This opens up the prospect of elucidating the meaning of the world and the place man occupies in it. The meaning of the

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23 R. Descartes. 'Principia Philosophia," in *Ueuvres de Descartes*, vol. 3 (Paris : Lepold Cerf, 1905,N XLIX.

24 B. de Spinoza, "The Ethics," in *Improvement of the Understanding, Ethics, and Correspondence* (Washington and London : M. Walter Dunne, 1901), 45.

25 I Kant, *Critiqae of Pure Reason* (London : Bell and Sons, 1930), 429.

26 G; W F. Hegel. "Die Philosophie die Aeistes," *Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* Berlin, 1845).N 455

27 F. Nietzsche, *The Will to power*, trans. W. Kaufmann and R. J. Holingdale (New York : Vintage Books. 1968), N 506. N 490.

28 L. Wittgenstein, *Tractetus Logico-Philosopicus* (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), N 2221.

22 M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962) xix.

30 J. P. Sartre, *La Transcendence de ! Ego. Ecquisse d'une descroptiin phenomenologique* (Paris : Libraire philosophique. J. Vrin, 1978), 79.

31 J. P Sartre, *L'exissentialism est une humanisme* (Paris : Nagel, 1946, 1941), 37, 38.

32 H.G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York : Seabury Press, 1975), 431.

world lies in the revelation of its potential meanings. The meaning of human life lies in the active participation in his process.

Conclusion : Meaning Vs. Matter

According to Nalimov, the problem mentioned in the title is *eternal* and it will hardly ever be completely illuminated. To find an all-embracing solution to this problem means to approach the ultimate reality, and, now, on the contemporary level of our comprehension of human nature, we can only expand and deepen this subject.

Having acknowledged the right for symbols to lead an independent existence, it becomes possible, strange as it may seem, to bridge the gap (though the bridge is still very thin) between a semantic and physical vision of the world without reductionism. Methodologically, Nalimov's approach is close to physics in its (1) possibility of constructing a sufficiently axiomatized theory; (2) nontrivial geometrization of semantic concepts : (3) introduction of the concept of a scalar semantic field", and, mathematical recordiug of the process of meanings functioning. Nalimov underlines that his colleague T. Perevozsky[35] managed to show that "manipulation with texts and meanings in the probabilistic model of meanings has much in common with the process of measurements in quantum theory." Perevozsky gives the following explanations (this is a paraphrase) : The set of meanings u in quantum mechanics corresponds to the set of values q describing degrees of freedom of a physical object. To function $p(u)$ there corresponds the expression $[\psi(q)]^2$ (time is "frozen" here because the results of measurements are correlated with the state at a definite moment). To filter $p(y/u)$ there corresponds value y, which emerges spontaneously during measurement. Then to Bayesian transformation there will correspond transtormation of the wave function $\psi\ (q)$–$\psi'(q/y^n)$ responding to the change of filter y.

Nalimov believes we can go even further and assnme that Bayesian logic is to some extent equivalent to *metrical logic*. The means we can reject the premise of the constancy of metrics and regard the change of function p(u) as a result of deformity of the metric scale in the vicinity of points.[36] Otherwise, a purely geometrical image of the semantic world opens up in front of our eyes. Any text comes to represent an excited (i.e., of different scales) state of semantically saturated space and turns into a semantic exction (Nalimov, n.d.).

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[33] A. N. Whitehead *Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology* (Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1929), 28.

[34] Traditional linguistic regards a semantic field only as a pattern of semantic relations between words.

[35] T. A. Perevozsky, *Probabilistic conception of meanings and quantum theory af measurements* (in Russian) (in press).

[36] Nalimov remarks that here we come close to the ideas elaborated early in this century by the well-known German mathematician Herman Weyl These ideas turned into the general gauge theory. for example, in the approaches of T. Regge (*Essays about the Universe*) and R. Utiyama (*What Has Physics Come To*)

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7

The Concept of Mysticism

S Sreeramamurty

Here an attempt is made to understand the Philosophical nature and validity of mysticism which is not supposed to describe in word like anything else. Its Philosophical outlook is also narrated with my limited sense of expression and focussed it as an internal experience of ones own revelation.

'Each and every concept has its own way of approach' on the basis of understanding, analysis and interpretation of capacity and scope. A system or an approach is to be named according to its qualities representing and exhibiting the concept. There are many concepts which have a strong basis on qualities whether they are exhibiting or attributing its ideas. On the same guidelines we can visualise concepts like spiritualism, theism, monism etc., with basic qualities of esoteric and exoteric. Among the existing Isms, the nature and scope of mysticism is different and has a special quality which needs the highest realisation of understanding. Mysticism claims to envisage 'Feeling', 'Imagination', 'Mystic Vision', 'Ecstasy' and 'Mystic Intuition'. The meaning of mysticism was explained in the words of George Albert thus,

> "Mysticism' means a great variety of religious experiences and practices. They range all the way from a savages experience of "demon possession" to the trance state that Brahmanism represents as a contentless absorption in the one"[1]

Actually the term 'Mysticism' is derived from the Greek 'MYO' the equivalent of which in English is to seal the lips, which means 'not in a position to tell something or convey anything even if he intended to do so or where in this state of action one has to enjoy or experience with ones own embodiment or the elements of the body.

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[1] George Albert Coe. *The Psychology of Religion*, The University of Chicago Press, ILLINOIS, 1929, p. 263.

In this situation no one can expect to learn or to be aware of it without having a personal involvement. Thus Thomous Acquinas opined it as the knowledge of God through experience. Infact he says :

> "The attempt of man is to the ultimate reality of things and enjoy communion with Highest. Mysticism maintains the possibility. of intercourse with God not by means of revelation, or the ordinary religious channels. but by dint of introspection, culminating in the feeling what the individual partakes of the divine nature."[2]

So the state of experience, which we cannot prove as an experience with any from of attempt in the general sense as we cannot trace the external proof of it, where the rational outlook also fails to disclose the things or the matter in the real form to represent with the other as a mystery. In fact Radhakrishnan interpreted this in anyother way where a high level of understanding is to be needed, he says :

> "Mysticism is opposed to the rationalism which categorically denies the existence of God and dogmatism which talk as if it knows all about Him."[3]

While rationalism needs the support of something as its basis for analysis, in the case of mysticism we cannot face things which are based on practical reasoning and to prove them in a systematic way in order to grasp the conclusion.

Mysticism has been accorded special attention in the religious outlook to represent spiritual matters relating to the inwardness of the self which is intended to have communion with the Super-Self i.e. God or Supreme Power in the sense of reality. So, here also we cannot express things which have the content of experience as it is purely connected with one's own internal feeling. In support of this mention can be made of Mukerjee who says :

> "Mysticism roots itself in a psychology of inner adjustment that harness and directs man's unconscious and unpredictable impulses and desires via eternal imagined projections or images and symbols with goals and purposes that partly expressed and partly contradict and transform his inner nature"[4].

We cannot express this state of experience before the public by any means of communications as it is the apprehension and the representation of all and is a harmonious experience of all the senses.

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2 Spence Lewis, *An Encyclopaedia of occultism*, Neeraja Publication House, Delhi, 1920, p. 283.

3 S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, Clarendon Press, London, 1939, p. 61.

4 Radha Kamal Mukherjee. *The Theory and Art of Mysticism*, Asia Publishing House, Calcutta, 1960, p. 13.

In modern times somethings represent the feelings, actions and behaviour of Sri Ramakrishna Paramahamsa who is the very emodiment of all these qualities. He himself represent this as the content of reality within the self which rises from the very depths of the human spirit or action. Dassgupta states that,

> "Mysticism as a theory, doctrine, or view that considers reason to be incapable of discovering or of realising the nature of ultimate truth, whatever be the nature of this ultimate truth, but at the same time believes in the certitude of some other means of arriving at it".[5]

It reveals the essential concepts of the religious outlook with the aim of Ultimate Being or a search for the solution in the understanding of reality. In this connection Bucke says that this experience is not possible to describe. So, it is not possible to express this state of experience as most poets say, it is utterly beyond words, inexpressible.

As William Blake has said 'To see the World in a grain of sand, And Heaven in a wild flower, Hold infinity in the palm of your hand, And eternity in an hour'. Where the poet is trying to explain how the vision of the infinite can be seen in the finite. In the same way Goethe opined it as

> "Mysticism is the scholastic of the heart, the dialectic of the feeling"[6]

It represents frequently the religious desire of an intimate communion with God and it, concentration is the element of keen realisation of the metaphysical unity of existence and the intimacy of the relation between the Finite and Infinite where man acquires the capability of understanding God and attempts to realise and experience the same with intention of having the feeling for unity of self with something higher, i.e., God.

As Patmore says,

> "Mysticism is as communicable to those who have not experienced it as the odour of a violet to those who have never smelt one."[7]

In real sense, mysticism is a religious-idealistic view of the world based on behalf in the supernatural things. So it is like a mystery that is beyond the power of understanding and reasoning. It is a theory which cannot be traced out without proper understanding. Sundararamaiah, G. narrated it as :

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[5] Surinder Singh Kohli, *Philosophy af Guru Nanak*, Punjab University, Chandigarh, 1969, p: 55.

[6] John Ferguson, *An Illustrated Encyclopaedia of Mysticism and the Mystery of Religions*, Thames and Hudson, London, 1976, p. 126.

[7] G. Sundararamaiah, *A Philosophical Study of the Mysticisn of Sankara*, K. P. Bagchi and Company, Calcutta, 1982, p. 5.

> "Mysticism is sometimes understood as speculative mysticism, i.e. a metaphysical doctrine which proclaims the abstract unity of the Godheaded and the obliteration in it of the plurality of the individual souls and finite objects."[8]

We have to experience it but it can not be reliably expressed. In the Mystical experience, the spiritual exercises plays an active role for the personal devotion and public worship which are the training for soul and senses to get the mystical experience. It is like a mystery to have a glance of it and it is a kind of intense experience whereby the subjects feel themselves merging with the absolute within him.

Mysticism is not merely a way of understanding but it is a way of life when we have a communion with it with a view to obtaining the Reality of God. Guru Nanak clarified the nature of mysticism as—

"The ultimate reality cannot be realised by worldly wisdom."[9] The high rate of knowledge is to be required to trace about mysticism. It elevates the reflection of knowledge and experience with a unity of feelings and posits the eternal values such as the Reality of Truth, Beauty and Goodness which transcend any system of human relations, and finds them actual in the concrete human level of conduct and behaviour in dealing with others, It can be seen in the lives of divine personalities like, Buddha, Jesus, Joseph, Mohammad, Guru Nanak, Sankara, Vinobave and Sri Ramakrishda Paramahamasa in their different approaches and their achievement by the introvertive or extrovertive process.

Mysticism is a process by which one has a communion with the unperceivable entity with our sensory experience but it is to be identified with personal experience, hence Otto calls it as 'the Mysterium and Tremendom'. Mysticism is the process of Mind and mental experience of man, Writing on the concept of Mysticism, Caird says that :

> "Mysticism is religion in its most concentrated and exclusive form. It is that attitude of mind in which all other relations are swallowed up in the relations of the soul to God".[10]

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[8] Ibid., p. 3.

[9] Surinder Singh Kohli, *Philosophy of Guru Nanak*, p. 55.

[10] W. R. Inge, *Mysticism in Religion*, Rider and Company, New York, 1969, p. 31.

[11] W. R. Inge, *Mysticism in Religion*, p. 31.

[12] John Ferguson, *An Illustrated Encyclopaedia of Mysticism and Mystery of Religions*, p. 126.

Religion and its outlook is the centre for information leading to all sort of action to get the real fruits from it including behaviour and conduct and apprehend the reality which gives us the highest orientation of life. It is proved about behaviour and the realisation of things concerned with the Finit and Infinite.

By normal process, Mystical experience begins with the attitude of obedience and devotion, in the inner mind which can perceive God's presence, but not with ordinary senses. It is an absolute way of approach which can not be followed without careful understanding and the pure consciousness which we can acquire from daily life. The strong belief or the full immersion of anything is the foundation to have a strong belief on mysticism which will trace out the reality of objects with personal experience. On the same pattern, Pattison described it in two lines of understanding, He says :

> "Mysticism appears in connection with the endeavour of the human mind to grasp the divine essence of the alternative reality of things and to the blessedness of actual communion with the highest. The first is the philosophical side of mysticism, the second is religious side. God ceases to be an object and becomes an experience".[11]

Experience is the real process of life to get proper acquaintance with any thing in the proper means where we can not neglect on the path of realisation of the highest goal of life. In this case the personal involvement is to be considered with a positive approach not mindful of external obstacles. The complete involvement is the broad way to drive man upto the uncommon conclusion which is not possible for all without having the mind of the same. Then only one can grasp the essence or the grace of God or Reality. Arberry disclosed its real nature in such a way as :

> "A constant unvaring phenomenon of the universal yearning of human spirit for personal communion with God"[12]

Mysticism is the impulses of normal human beling, but it starts with concentration and devotion. It points to man's normalcy and health as amplifying the maturation and transfiguration of his hidden essential nature within him. The attitude of humility characteristics of mystics of all religions arises out of the contrast between the divine majesty and worthlessness of self-concentration and immersion which makes a man a mystic. To quote the words of Radha Ramal Mukherjee, He says :

> "Mysticism is not merely a way of understanding, it also a way of life. For even in the most elevated mysticism the herald of knowledge, experiences a unity of feeling, a calm and pure

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[13] Radha Kamal Mukherjee, *The Theory and Art of Mysticism*, p. 8.

> love, joy and blessedness based on unity of being; he apprehends that unity more merely in the depth of his understanding but also in his relations to his fellow-creatures as the surpressing ANANDAM; good and beautiful."[13]

It can express the inner sense of feeling of one's own to enjoy and experience for himself but does not help to express or to communicate.

It emphasises the element of feeling rather than of reality. Here, there is no scope for reality and rationality as it is the personal experience and mental attitude. It cannot be proved like other experiences. It has the impact on mind and feeling of man. Sri Ramakrishna says that this state of experience is :

> "When the mind turns itself inward; it is like shutting the door of house and entering its inner apartments; that is to say, it goes from the gross inte the subtle, thence into the causal, till it reaches the final casual state. In that state the mind is merged in the Absolute and nothing can be said of it."[14]

Experience and immersion of the inner sense calculates the gauge of mysticism and its importance. It persuades man not to be deviated from concentration. According to Goethe Mysticism is the scholastic of the heart, the dialectic of the feelings. So, in general we cannot explain and describe or disclose the mystical values which are very difficult to understand in proper way unless there is no total attachment and communion with one thing or aspect of thinking. Even the intellectual process of thinking will certainly fail to trace out in any means, but it is particularly dependent upon one's own intuition and close interaction by individual and personal realisation. In fact it is the manifestation of one's own internal feeling.

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[14] *Sayings of Sri Ramakrishna*, p. 244.

8

The Paradox of Utilitarianism

John Nelson

What I shall maintain in the following paragraphs is meant to apply equally to all varieties of utilitarianism : act utilitarianism; rule utilitarianism; multiple-object utilitarianism (i.e., a utilitarianism that applies the criterion of utility to not only acts and rules but to institutions, motives, emotions, or whatever else there is that lends itself to a calculation of its utility). What I shall maintain will also apply equally to utilitarianism whether defined in terms of happiness or welfare (conceivably two different things), or in terms of probabilities or actualities, or in terms of superlatives (e.g., greatest happiness) or comparatives (e.g., greater happiness). What, then; is this perhaps seemingly impossible thing that I wish to maintain about utilitarianism ? Paradoxically, it is this : the more successful utilitarianism is the less successful it must be. In short, one might say that like the scorpion of legend, utilitarianism in the end stings itself to death.

I shall attempt to demonstrate this paradox in the following two cases : I), where utilitarianism is defined in terms of maximizing happiness and 2), maximizing welfare. Having completed those tasks, I shall reply to some possible objections.

1. Happiness-utiliterianism

Now every proponent of utilitarianism obviously thinks that utilitarianism is right doctrine and hence should be accepted by everyone : the more the merrier. To that end, for instance, he presents utilitarianism in the most glowing colors he can conjure up, the most powerful arguments he can invent. Hence, first of all, let us suppose that the utilitarian is completely successful, so that being convinced by his arguments and glowing descriptions everyone is converted to utilitarianism. Surely, the utilitarian has to agree that that is an ideally desirable outcome of his argumentation, claims, and so on.

A second agreement that we think is called for is that, for most persons, complicated, uncertain, inconclusive thinking is a painful and frustrating chore. They are unhappy when obliged to engage in such thinking. If required to engage in such thinking almost every hour of every day they would, most of them anyway, suffer the unhappiness almost of someone on a rack. And added to this torment would be their feelings of guilt when, against their conscience, they would connive, as they certainly would, merely to pretend, when called upon, to engage in this sort of thinking or even evade its chore altogether (like Hume in the last section of Part I, Book I of the *Treatise*, taking up a game of backgammon instead or perhaps even a tall whiskey and soda).

Thirdly, I believe that anyone acquainted even with the simplest form of utilitarianism, which confines itself to acts and says no more than that an act is good if and only if it conduces to the greater happiness, will have to confess that it is generally difficult and frustrating to try to determine whether an act does in fact or in probability eventuate in such an outcome. Even in the most seemingly unequivocal cases, carried out in completeness, such a determination is difficult and frustrating to come by. Say that my contemplated act is assassinating Mohandas Gandhi. Say I am trying to determine whether the result of doing so will in the end produce greater happiness than my not doing so. The more honest I am in this determination will not it prove the more difficult and frustrating ? Variable upon variable confronts me. Unknown upon unknown masses against me, until it seems that I am simply overwhelmed. If I am like most persons —for perhaps there are a few who enjoy such uneven and interminable intellectual combat—will I not soon be reduced to painful unhappiness ? Certainly, I must be.

If this same utilitarian determination is extended beyond acts to rules and beyond rules to institutions, emotions, motives. moral dogmas and who knows what else, the variables and unknowns and hence the difficulties and frustrations must obviously multiply astronomically. And so must my unhappiness.

Does it not follow, then, that the more successful utilitarinaism is in gaining converts the more unhappiness and hence the less happiness will be produced ? If any single act's production of happiness or unhappiness can be plausibly determined certainly this is that act. Hence, in a manner of condensed speaking, the doctrine of utilitarianism convicts itself of being non-utilitarian. Or one might say, with some credibility: should everyone be converted to utilitarianism, the more incere the conversion, the greater would be the evil (as evil is defined by happiness-utilitarinaism). QED.

2. Welfare-Utilitarianism

In case it be held that welfare and happiness are two different things, so that the above demonstration does not apply to welfare-utilitarianism, it should be noted that persons being generally reduced to a state of torment where they were not previously in such a state can hardly be said to have been benefited welfare-wise. But even ignoring that plain truism, if persons are reduced to a condition where they cannot arrive at unequivocal determinations of right and wrong or even a general agreement of some vague sort, and that would certainly be the predictable outcome of people in general being converted to utilitarianism, their minds would have to be in a constant state of confusion and chaos. Could wise decisions and policies issue from minds in such a state ? Clearly not. But how without wise decision and policy making could there be an increase of the general welfare? There could not be.

Hence, again, we must conclude that should everyone be converted to utilitarinaism, albeit welfare and not happiness utilitarianism, the result has to be evil (as evil is defined by welfare-utilitarianism). QED.

Objections and Replies

1. It might be argued that if our results (above) apply to utilitarianism they apply to all philosophical moral theories or recommendations. So unless one wants to relegate all philosophical ethical theories to limbo why pick on utilitarianism ?

In answer to this objection, one could point out, first of all, that some philosophical moral theories do not involve their adherents in unpleasant epistemic tasks, like calculating complicated consequences of actions. A realist theory like G.E. Moore's in *Principia Ethica*, but where immediate moral intuitions are extended from *good* to *right* (so a sort of combination of Moore and Ross), commits one only to having intuitions or sorts of perceptions of qualities; e.g., the quality; good, the quality, right. Having perceptions is not typically task-like. On the contrary, it can amount to a pleasant adventure. Indeed, looking to see is something people enjoy and even pay money for. Thus, as I can myself vouchsafe from my own experience as a one time adherent to the ethical realism of Moore's *Principia Ethica*, the experience of determining in the Moorean mode what things have the quality, good, is neither painful nor frustrating. Without having to calculate anything one simply looks, as it were, to see. Surely, therefore; it need not be true that the epistemologies of all philosophical moral systems must involve one in a disagreeable and frustrating task.

But even if they did, it would not follow that a particular ethics was thereby involved paradoxically in its own demise. An ethics that proposed to maximize virtue, for instance, would not convict itself of decreasing virtue because it mandated, on the part of its adherents, some activity that was onerous or frustrating; say, like attempting to determine, as in Kant's ethics, whether or not a certain action could be universalized without contradiction. If the ethics in question called simply for the realizalion of virtue for the sake of virtue itself, it would be irrelevant that that realization might involve one in painful struggles. In fact, that it did would seem only to enhance our realization of virtue.

2. It might be objected that the following way can be envisaged for seeing to it that, although utilitarianism were adopted by everyone, the unpleasant tasks mandated by it of determining what conduces to the greater happiness or welfare could be left to just those few persons who, it happens, delight in such exercises; for example, professional philosophers or technocrats.[1] The latter would, presumably, happily and effectively determine what actions, rules, motives, etc. were in fact or in probability utile in producing more or less happiness or the general welfare and publish their results in tables available to the general public. In turn, the general public would only need to consult the tables in question to find out what they should or should not do, what rules they should defend or annul, and so on. Such simple exercises would not be frustrating or painful, much less conclude in some Hamlet-like indecision or lack of agreement concerning what should or should not be done. Hence, according to to this picture of things, utilitarianism would not be involved inherently in its own refutation and the paradox we originally ascribed to it would no longer be ascribable. The universal adoption of utilitarianism would, on the contrary, conduce to the greatest happiness or welfare of everyone. QED !

The picture that we have just painted in our imagination superfically seems, I grant, to refute our charge of paradox. This seems accomplishable by re-conceiving utilitarianism as "scientic utilitarianism"; an ethical system run on high by professional philosophers or technocrats. It is these who will perform all the otherwise onerous (but to them, exciting and interesting) calculations of utility, which will be then disseminated to the general public as already completed determinations, thus relieving those who find complicated calculations painful or impossible of any work more complicated or painful than merely reading off from tables what is or is not to be done in any particular case of an act, rule, motive, etc. One might here be reminded, for example, of the way that forward observers in the artillery are relieved of the painful and even impossible task of calculating gun adjustments by being provided tables of these adjustments already worked out by mathematicians. So, in this re-conceived "scientific" utilitarianism; an ordinary person, wondering if action X were one he ought to perform or not, would look up in his "utility" tables X's already calculated utility or lack of utility and so know whether to perform X or not, with all frustration, difficulty, unhappiness and indecision eliminated !

Such a picture of things seems almost too good to be true. And indeed it is. One only needs to bring the details of this fanciful painting into focus to see that, like Bosch's painting of the garden of earthly delights, it contains, out of superficial sight, all sorts of grim diabolerie.

For one thing, if (as is the case) a simple tax law spread out in all the complexity of its more particular interpretations takes many densely filled pages, what must be the volume of legalistic prose describing the utility of one act or law or institution with respect to all the almost innumerable circumstances both it and its consequences have to be correlated with ? One has to suppose that what must issue from our philosophico-scientific head-pieces in the way of tables determining all the utilities that have to be determined well constitute such a huge mass of the most difficult reading material that the ordinary person, confronted with the task of assessing from it utilitarian guidance on any matter, will find the task as impossible as it is painful; eveh more so than had he attempted the calculations himself. Nor would computers be of any use, since fitting any particular action, rule, motive, etc. to the correct code of its utilitarian determination would be another as impossible as painful task.

In much the same connection, it could be expected that any particular determination one made from the innumerable tables provided by our philosophico-scientific head-pieces would, due to the inevitable ambiguities and different interpretations possible, be disputed by almost everyone else. The resultant hubub of contention could scarcely conduce to greater happiness or greater welfare.

And finally it has to be expected, from what we already know of such attempted determinations, that our philosophico-scientific head-pieces or chief utilitarians will be generally at logger-heads over their calculations, some maintaining this determination to be the corret one, others that, and still others a third, and so on. Because these determinations are meant to provide all the memhers of a community with their decisions concerning all affairs it can be expected that, however much these chief utilitarians may individually enjoy working on insoluable puzzles, their titles of leadership and captains of conduct now being at stake and on the line, any failure to provide the determinations in question must predictably cause resentment, frustration, anger, and unhappiness even among themselves, not to say their clients. Hence, whether the utile be defined in terms of happiness or welfare, under scientific utilitarianism more evil must predictably result than even under a "democratic" utilitarianism, of and by and for the people

3. But might not we succeed in circumventing the paradox we have been referring to in the following way. Taking our cue from Mill in his *Utilitarianism* or, more recently, Hare,[2] might we not propose that ordinary persons or persons who find mental computations of utility frustrating and painful simply abide by the secondary principles or rules of their culture, e.g., "Thou shalt not commit adultery," etc., without question, just as they generally do anyway, and only in the case where there exist conflicts appeal to specialists or professional philosophers to resolve, on the basis of utilitarian computations, these conflicts ? Surely this procedure must eliminate our particular paradox!

Now I grant that it would seem to; at least if we suppose that professional head-pieces can arrive at some consenus in their resolution of moral conflicts. For the sake of argument, in the face of completely contradicting evidence, let us accede to this supposition. Perhaps, for instance, we could leave these complicated computations in the hands or programs of computers. Have we not, then, rescued Utilitarianism from its own seeming self-defeating generation of inutility ?

As I said, we may have seemed to. Closer examination, however, will show that a final scorpion's lethal sting remains in the tail of Utilitarianism, even as presently construed. Surely, for example, according to that construal, everyone will have to know that in the case of moral conflict he is to submit his problem to specialists for resolution and that these resolutions are to take place on the basis of the principle of utilitarianism. But having logical priority, therefore, are the questions (A) "Whether it is utile—does it couduce to the greatest happiness of the greatest number or their welfare—for each person and thus for me (say) to decide the utility at issue or to let others decide it for me ?" and of even greater logical priority, the question (B) : "Is it right -- does it conduce to the greatest happiness of the greatest number or their welfare—to abide, without utilitarian validation on each person's part, by the secondary principles of his culture or not ?" On the very face of it, A and B impose on each person the very sort of utilitarian determinations that compose the paradox that we have attributed to Utilitarianism. So really, we are no further along than we were before.

Finally, (4) almost the antipodes of "scientific utilitarianism," we might propose something even more democratic than Hare's "two-level" system of secondary principles and critical thinking. That is, we might maintain that ordinary persons possess immediate concrete non-conflicting intuitions of what conduces to the happiness or welfare of people; it is only when these immediate, concrete intuitions are generalized into rules that moral conflicts occur. Hence, cannot we solve our present problem by restricting ourselves in our decisions and actions to the mandates of these concrete intuitions of utility and throwing out all generalizations of them ? we shall then operate with a system like Moore's where Moore's moral intuitions are extended from *good* to include *right* (again a sort of combination of Moore and Ross by why not ?).

Now it is true, I think, that we do have immediate, painless intuitions or something like a painless common sense apprehension of what conduces to the happiness or welfare of people in *concrete cases*. For example, one knows, without having to engage in onerous comparisons or calcuations, that giving one's son at Christmas the sled he has been begging for will make him happy and that seeing he does not smoke—say he is not yet in his teens—will contribute to his welfare. If, then, utilitarian decision-making could be limited to such concrete particular cases we could seemingly resolve the paradox at issue.

So limiting the compass of utilitarian decision making involves us, however, in several obvious difficulties. For one thing, there come times when people generally have to make decisions concerning very broad and general concerns, such as arise, in democracies anyway, concerning political alternatives. Immediate intuitions of concrete utility here tend to run out or to be immersed in irresolvable conflict and controversy. But even of more moment is the following difficulty as regards the present system.

Suppose that we limit our utilitarian intuitions to just those particular. concrete cases where they seem at home (so to speak). Now my concrete utilitarian intuitions seem most at home in what is utile for me. If what is to your utilitarian advantage conflicts with what is to mine, my intuitions have a tendency to concern themselves with the latter and ignore completely the former. The same is true as we extend their compass beyond ourselves to our family (versus other families), to our tribe (versus other tribes), and so on. Thus, left to themselves, our utilitarian intuitions will tend to be partial; and the more concrete they are the more partial they tend to be; Hence, there must emerge when we combine people together an irresolvable war of all utilitarian intuitions against all utilitarian intuitions.

How is utilitarian impartiality and consequent peace to be brought about ? Surely, only by means of the traditional definitions of utilitarian theory which institute that impartiality by construing utilitarian decision making in the most general terms possible; in terms, for instance, of the happiness of the greatest number or maximizing welfare or some such thing. By this means self and family and other ant agonistic partialities are made inoperative. Every one's interest is to count equally.

This impartiality of decision of decision-making is bought, however, at the expense of bare single intuition. We may have an immediate bare reliable intuition of what conduces or will conduce to our own or our family's Christmas happiness or welfare. We may even some times believe that we possess such an intuition of some political alternative's utilitarian rightness. But no one, surely, can plausibly pretend to possess a reliable immediate Single intuition of what conduces to the greatest happiness of the greatest number or what maximizes happiness for all of humankind. These most general ends evoke and can evoke no reliable Single intuition; only the sort of onerous and frustrating thinking we could call, following Hare, "critical thinking." To the extent, therefore, that utilitarian theory to ensure impartiality and harmony, and obviously those are basic desiderata of the theory, it cannot take refuge in bare,concrete intuitions.

The paradox thus remains : the more successful utilitarianism is-to wit, the more persons who are converted to it—the less successful it must be.

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1 A forerunner of my "scientific utilitarianism" is, no doubt, that utilitarianism of Lidwick's run by a governmental elite for the hoi-polloi, which Bernard Williams has aptly named "Government House Utilitarianism" (for William's origination of this name see. for instance, H. N. Hare in *Hare and Critics*, edd. Seanor and Fotion. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 287). Although I have not indicated that my scientific utilitarianism would be operated by a government bureaucracy of some sort, were it ever a fact of life, it is certain that it would be. Hence, added to the painful encumbrances that I have already located in a scientific utilitarianism would no doubt be those further ones that attach themselves, with seeming inevitability, to one's dealing with government bureaucracies.

2 For Hare's two-level moral system or what he calls his "Kantian-Utilitarian rationalistic theory" (Hare, "How to Decide Moral Questions Rationally," *Critica*, Dec. 1986) see Hare, *op. cit.*, above (footnote 1).

9

Indian Empiricism

Shubhada A. Joshi

Indian Philosophical thought is well known for its spiritualistic tradition. The spiritualism can be contrasted only with one materialist school i.e. Lokayata. Unfortunately no reliable positive accounts of this school in the form of Sutra, Vrtti, Vartika are available. It is only through the accounts of opponents a picture of Lokayata Philosophy can be constructed.

In this paper an attempt is made to reconstruct such a picture from the available accounts. The theme suggested in the paper is that 'Lokayata materialism is the result of the empirical approach and standpoint. The empiricism of Lokayata has three implications. (1) Epistemological, (2) Metaphysical and (3) Ethical. It is not possible to develop all three aspects in a detail way in this small paper. So very briefly these three aspects are referred to in this paper.

This paper is concluded saying that is rather unfair to call Lokayata as pleasure seekers and Vamamargi, tantrikas, asuras, kapalikas etc. If Lokayata empiricism is appreciated with proper spirit one may find out the real significance of the abuses used for Lokayata.

This paper is not either to support empiricism or to redicule spiritualism, as the controversy between spiritualism and empiricism is not theme of the paper. It is only an attempt to construct the picture of Lokayata as followers of empiricism.

Empirical epistemology—

It is well known and accepted fact that Lokayatas accepted perception as the valid source of knowledge. The controversial point is whether they have accepted inference or not ? The accounts from Purandara, Manibhadra (Saddarsana Samuccaya) etc. give us the impression that these inferences, within the range of empirically known world can be accepted as valid. Lokayatas have denied Vyapti relation as it can't be empirically established. So it appears that they were the pioneers of empirical tradition in India. They accepted only that knowledge as valid which is based on empirical sources. So they denied the authority of any other pramana, as it can't be empirically verified.

That the Lokayatas were considered as significant branch of logic and philosophy and their works were studied by the opponents can be gathered by accounts such as the Vanaparva of Mahabharata, Arthasastra of Kautilya, Harivamsa, Harshacarita and Milinda Pannhaba' etc. The logical tenacity and empirical approach of Lokayatas should have been a challange to their spiritualist opponents, that is why all Darsanas try to refute Lokayata empiricism and as neither refutation of empiricism nor verification of spiritualism is an easy task, out of anger and frustration, the opponents have called them by various names such as Ausuras, Kapalikas, Pasupatas, Vamacari and Sukhavadins or hedonists.

Metaphysical implications of empiricism–

It is in keeping with their empirical epistemology, they have denied everything beyond the scope of empirical source of knowledge. So obvious position is negation of spiritual substance in the form of either self or God, denial of rebirth and law of karma and rejection of any thing like liberation, as that of eternal pleasure or happiness, as none of these are empirically known. Since there is no rebirth and liberation, there is no need of ritualism. The Lokayata criticism of performances of sacrifices such as Jyotistoma as well as Vedic authority hardly needs any mention. Inspite of this Lokayatas are equated with vamacaris and kapalikas; and also are treated as hedonists.

Ethical implications of empiricism—

Except Lokayata, all other Darsanas believed in rebirth and law of Karma. For them law of Karma and rebirth were the basic foundations of ethics, and offered justification for the faith that virtue will be rewarded and vice will be punished, if not in the same birth, in the next birth. It also explained the situations of virtuous being suffered in this world and vice being rewarded. That is why Lokayata denial of Law of Karma and rebirth proved to be a challange for the opponents.

In keeping with their empirical method Lokayatas maintained that there is no rebirth after the body is burnt to ashes and since there is no rebirth, the question of operation of law of karma is a nonsense.

The spiritualists interpreted it as threat to ethical norms. If there is no assurance that virtue will be rewarded and vice will be punished, why should any one be moral or virtuous at all ? It implies therefore, that denial of law of Karma, may lead to total absence of moral rule. That is why in Sarvadarsana Samgraha, Madhvacarya, equated it with 'rnam krtva ghrtam pibeta'. It expresses the fear of the spiritualist that it may lead to the disastrous situation such as 'rnam krtva ghratam pibeta'. This may be the reason as to why in Sarvadarsana Samgraha 'rnam krtva ghrtam pibeta' occurs only when 'yavatjjiveta sukham jiveta' occurs for the second time. In its first occurance; 'yavatjjizeta sukham jiveta' is followed by 'nasti mrtyurgocarah' and then 'bhasmi bhutasya dehasya punaragamanam kutah'? It is only with second occurance 'nasti mrtyur gocarah is replaced as 'rnam krtva ghrtam pibeta'.

Can 'rnam krtva ghrtam pibeta 'be, logical consequencc of empiricism of Lokayatas ? The answer is affirmative according to spiritualists. That is why they have criticised Lokayatas as hedonists, Sukhavadins or pleasure seekers. The question arises here is, were the spiritualists nonhedonists ? They also have advocated for the attainment of eternal pleasure, or joy or happiness (Ananda) and in order to obtain that eternal joy or happiness, they adviced the life of restraints and sacrifices of worldly pleasures.

The standpoint of Lokayatas was radically different from that of spiritualists. For Carvakas, life alongwith pains and pleasures appears to be an empirical fact, which can be minimised by means of human efforts, as the wise man obtains grain from the paddy by removing ear of corns and the dust. It is stated metaphorically as, just as due to the fear of undigestion one never gives up eating or due to the fear of destruction of crops by wild animals or beasts, one never gives up agriculture, similarly due to the fear that happiness on earth is momentary, one should not make one's life painful. But does that imply hedonism of the type, 'Rnam krtva ghrtam pibeta' ?

In appears that Lokayatas have criticised the concept of Dharma. Many critiques of this school, unhesitatingly state that out of four Purusarthas, Lokayatas accept only Artha and Kama and reject Dharma and Moksa. According to some thinkers Lokayatas accepted only Kama and led a life of Vamacari; and did not care for any type of social, ethical rules and regulation.

That they have rejected Moksa in keeping with their empiricism. But rejection of Dharma may require some careful study. It may also be connected with the problem of meaning of concepts and language i.e. Dharma, if is accepted in one particular sense by spiritualists and not accepted by empiricists in same sense but accepted in some different sense. Some suggestions can be put forward for deliberation. If for spiritualists Dharma is to be accepted in the form of ritualism, God, law of Karma, rebirth etc., then it is and has to be rejected by Lokayatas as empiricists and they have rejected it very emphatically as it occurs in Sarva Darsana Samgraha like, 'if a beast slain in the jyotistoma rite will itself go to heaven then why does not the sacrificer offer his own father in the sacrifice' ? (pasuscennihatah svargam jyotistome gamisyati, svapita yajamanena tatra kasmanna hisyate ?)

And also "if 'sraddha produces gratification of beings who are dead, then in case of travellers, it is needless to give provisions for the journey". Dharma in this sense is not accepted by Lokayatas. As to rely on rituals is totally against the empirical approach, it is equally difficult to accept that Lokayatas, were the followers of ritualism. Some Buddhist and Jaina (Gunaratna and Silamaka) accounts present Lokayatas as 'mantra dhearaka', 'yajna mantresu nisnatah' etc. To accept ritualism is to give up empirical standpoint, as ritualism is necessarily connected with unseen power of supernatural element which is nor accepted by empirism and if we treat the rituals as a part of magic, then we will have to say that Lokayatas tried to control the supernatural which also will imply an end of empirical standpoint. Lokayatas were through going empiricists as they denied self. God, liberation, other world, etc. and they were rigorous in their argumentation can be gathered by many references such as Buddhaghosa called it Vitanda Satta. Sukranitisara mentioned logic of Lokayatas. Manu and Manu's commentator Medhatithi have also mentioned Lokayata logic. Kautilya has treated Lokayata logic as an important branch of knowledge. So it seems that the work of Anandagiri and Gunaratna, Silamaka and many others, have used the terms Vamacari, Kapalika as abuses for Lokayatas: possibly suggesting that denial of law of Karma and rebirth, it as bad as rejecting any ethical norms and following the path of Svairacara of Tantrics.

Though Lokayatas have refused Dharma in spiritual, ritualistic sense, it seems that they were not believers in Svairacara. They accepted dandaniti, i.e. maintaining law and [illegible]. As it occurs in Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha.

> krsi, goraksya, vanijya, dandanityadibhi buddhah.
> drstaireva sadopayh bhogananubhaveda buvih.

They advised the path of hard work and efforts as the path of wise is agriculture, cattle breeding, maintaining law and order. By these ways one can enjoy on earth. In Sarvadarshana Samgraha its negative aspect is presented as :

> Agnihotram trayo vedastridandam bhasmagunthham
> Buddhipaurushahinanam jiviketi Brahaspati.

It may also suggest that tantra methodology and practice of pancamakara would not lead to spiritualism, it will finally end in materialism.

Mahabharata, Vanaparva mentions a Brahmin teacher of Barhaspatya school in the court of Drupada. Harivamsa mentions Barhaspatya as a mark of culture and knowledge.

If these accounts are put together along with those, which mention logical tenacity and regiour of argumentation, it may present a different picture of Lokayata school. Then the question arises regarding the status of Lokayata empiricism in past. As empiricism, it can't be primitive philosophy, nor can it be spiritual, supporting religion and rituals, Then the thesis that it was, a popular philosophy can also be doubted. To maintain a thorough going empiricism in Lokayata spirit may not be acceptable for common man. Loka or common people always believe in orthodox faith and supernatural or God, rather than accepting bold empiricism. Loka may desire happiness and may go to any extent to seek it in this world and may not care for Dandaniti. But that is not philosophy of Lokayata empiricism. They advocated the maintenance of law and order and attainment of pleasure along with unavoidable pain or evil.

It implies a new way of life, based on empirical methods and verification. It considered king, kingdom, maintenance of law and order, industry, commerce, agriculture etc. as importand aspects of social life.

As mentioned in the beginning, this paper merely aims at putting some hints to reconstruction of Lokayata. To judge either empiricism or spiritualism is beyond the scope of this paper.

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10

Why without violence ?

Arguments for nonviolent resistance

Ija Lazari-Pawlowska

I refer the problem of nonviolent acting to political struggle conceived as acts of citizens, resistance against some injustice in their own country. Violence is here understood as killing or injuring persons and destroying objects. What matters above all is, of course, killing of persons as a measure of political struggle.

We are accustomed to consider refraining from violence in political conflicts as something that requires justification, although it is rather the use of violence which should be treated as unobvious and calling for a plea.

The arguments adduced for nonviolence can be devided in two main groups, purely moral (absolutist) and pragmatist (relativist) ones. The subsuming of some of the arguments under the first or the second group may depend on their interpretation.

The arguments of the first group stress that to renounce violence is not a mere tactical matter, but a matter of principle. In the final argument, violent acts happen to be considered as intrinsically bad, wrong in itself. Valuable ends are considered to be worth achieving only at the exclusion of morally despicable means. A morally important argument in this group requires the assumption of a definite attitude teward the opponent (the adversary, the enemy) as a fellow-man towards whom our moral duties continue to oblige. We always have to take account of his well-being. Our aim should not be his (physical or psychic) annihilation, but an attempt to gain his cooperation in realizing a just cause. Hatred and revange should be excluded. We should renounce violence even when we predominate over our enemy.

Self-imposed limitation in the way of means applied, as motivated mainly by an authentic concern of the opponent, is rather an elite phenomenon. Negative effects of violence are usually adduced as an important reason. An argument often mentioned is the danger of an escalation of violence and counter-violence to a degree where it would be extremely difficult to get command of it. Violence produces violence-this warning is well known. Many people would not undertake non-violent struggle should they have believed that peaceful methods offer a chance of success. even a greater one than the chance inherent in violent struggle. Those who evaluate violence and nonviolence on the basis of the expected results, refer usually to certain general psychological regularities. They maintain that to show benevolence, readiness to dialogue, and respect for the digninty of the opponent as a person, weaken his negative attitude and make him more inclined to compromise, can even transform the opponent into a supporter. Such interdependencies are indeed confirmed in many cases. However, there are other regularities which are usually neglected by the advocates of nonviolence. A person may feel to be humilated by the moral superiority of his or her opponent; and the opponent's angelic gentleness may even provoke a more violent aggresiveness. Also, one should realize that some people seem to be deaf to the voice of moral goodness and that it is such people who now and again attempt to strive for the greatest power and are able to do it efficiently.

Nonviolence is not a patent recipe for success. More than that there is no guarantee at all to achieve success in a political struggle, independently of its violent or nonviolent character. However, even in the case of a purely pragmatic attitude much speaks for the renunciation of violence. In a liberal democracy there is no justification for violence at all, because there are countless nonviolent methods in striving to achieve social changes. In a state governed by terror, in a regime whose power is based on violence, the authorities are in a position to suppress any violence by the use of a much greater violence. In such a state violent acting gives smaller chances of achieving any positive effects than the chances offered, for instance, by some forms of noncooperation or civil disobedience.

I have considered situations where violence is used to achieve some positive end. However, violent political acts are sometimes simply eruptions of powerless despair, pent up aggression, hatred, envy, or vengeance. It seems to me that such acts, even if they can be psychologically explained, cannot be morally justified or accepted.

I have said that at bottom it is violence and not renunciation of violence which calls for justification. To make such an understanding commonly accepted much would have to be changed in the current system of values. Every violent act, also one which may seem to be the lesser of two evils, should be evaluated as something regrettable and tragic. Neither war nor bloody revolution should be beautified.

Gandhi has justly said : Nonviolence is a way of life. Renunciation of violence, if not exclusively pragmatically motivated, constitutes in fact a choice of one's own personality and one's own way of life. I declare may moral appreciation of such a choice.

II

Radical Humanism—An Appropriate Philosophy for Today

Lakshmi Rani Pandey

Today, man is passing through a critical period. Be it social, economic, political or any other aspect concerning man's life, he is faced with conflicting value systems giving rise to so much tension in his life. Man is not happy. Being the essential components of the society, man has no escape other then to suffer the brunt of social aberrations.

In my view the crisis is that of an ideology on whose foundation the present social system should be installed. Of course, we have various socio political systems which are based on one or another form of ideology. But evidently they are not providing suitable infrastructure for the present day society. We will try to analyse the inherent defects in those idologies and suggest how a new philosophy known as Radical Humanism is the answer for the present ills. According to academic philosophy all approaches to social philosophy is intimately connected to the coccept of ultimate reality. In traditional societies which are largely influenced by different religious faiths, there is a large scale belief, that ultimate reality is beyond the physical world (and that it is unknowable for man) Evidently we see that the traditional thought makes the man vulnerable to the imaginary powers of the super natural existance, creating lack of confidence in himself. Thus crippling of confidence is inherent in the traditional thought. Radical Humanism comes to the rescue of man at this junture. It places man at the centre of the world. Man is the maker of his destiny. According to this philosophy matter is the ultimate reality and man needs a materialistic philosophy to guide him. This philosophy gives an integrated picture of world. It explains the associated human feelings, emotions and experience without the help of anything which is beyond the physical world. The approach adoptedin this philosophy imposes the faith in man who seeks explanation from his surrounding. Without having faith in himself and his creativity, man cannot be a perfect man. Today the all pervading feeling of helplessness and hopelessness is the out come of the philosophy the traditional society had adopted.

The Marxicism is also not a guarantee of freedom of human beings. It claims that history is made by operation of the productive forces. The man is bound to some mysterious forces of production, so he can not be free. The Marxcist conception of freedom means slavery for individual to certain power groups.

The old social and political ideas have been failed and their failure have created an atmosphere of frustration, dispair and disgust. The mankind, today is asked to choose between these two kinds of slavery. But it is time for man to put aside these alternatives. Man will have the courage to decline the security of slavery, in one form or another, only by regaining faith in himself. But this regaining of faith will not come through any revelation. Every thing new grows out of some thing old. The new philosophy can emerge from the entire stored human knowledge and from the current of thoughts flowing ever since the begining of civilisation. This philosophy would have the capacity to solve, the complicated problems,.

The metaphysical speculation must be based upon physical enquiries. So there will be no scope of dualism. The monistic philosophy can not have adualist ethics. Then the values are facts and for the explainations of these values there is no need of an imaginary existance. The veil of mystry has been Lifted, the man is now regarded as a biological phenomenon. No human behaviour needs to be referred to any extraphysical source for explaination.

The soul is not a mysterious element, now. It is the sum total of the intellectual and emotional excellence of man, it is the sceptre of humanity. Man's supreme value is freedom. It is the supreme value because the urge for freedom is the essence of human existence. All ethical values are derived from the soulless animal heritage of man, so they need no sanction which transcends human existence. Morality is human altribute of animal heritage. To be moral one need only be human.

The function of life is simply to live. Through out the histoy of evolution we see an animal struggle for survival which is actually the struggle for freedom. Every progress, every thing that man has done or achieved has been motivated by one urge. The struggle for free- to conquer the universe. In the process of conquering the universe man acquires knowledge. He conquers his environment by knowing and hence he solves the other problems. Our values are interrelated.

In humanism man finds his proper place. It believes in sovereignty of man and the source of his sovereignty is his creativeness. It is his capacity of knowing which endows him with power. This power is not to rule others, but to create for the benefit of the race and pursue the ideal of freedom further and further.

The knowledge of different branches of science should be integrated. A particular branch of science can give only a partial view of reality. To build the picture of reality is the function of philosophy. But the philosophy had failed on this point earlier. So it is an intellectual crisis and an intellectual bankrupt man is naturally a demoralised man.

The philosophy of today should concentrate on social prab'ems and give due importance of physical man in this physical world. Protagoras in the early of civilisation has clearly said "the man is meaure of all things" and Karl Marx in 19th century has repeated same that man is the root of mankind. There ideas regarding sent mankind may be our guiding principles.

So for as society is concerned it is a fact that the society is the creation of man. Society did not precede the appearance of man. Struggle for surviual with their compined efforts resulted in the organisation of society. So whatever be the complications the basic duty of society is to help every man as an individual to unfold all potentialities latent in him. So the object of all kind of thinking social, political and moral is to ensure the freedom of the individual in society for developing himself. Society and state must be coterminus other wise the power will remain in a few hands only which is dangerons and in this way with all high ideals of democracy becomes futile.

In principle partiamentary democracy recognises the soverignty of the individual but practically only a priviledge few effectively use this savereignty. like parliamentary demacracy in the economic field the concept of free interprises means the freedom of a few to exploit many. In collectivism, means communism man's sovereignty ends up imaginary collective ego. Without individuals cooperation no collectivity is possible. But this basic fact is ignored in collectivism and an individual is helpless Since society consists of individuals, the social welfare and progress should be sumtotal of the welfare and progress of these individuals. Many people believe in socialism or communism but one can ask, "Is socialism or communism in itself our goal"? "No". Under socialism or communism it was felt that man will get greater freedom through which man can achive happiness. From the history of biological evolution it is clear that man is trying himself to free from the pressure of physical environments.The entire process of social evolution is the continuation of the struggle for existence on a higher level and in future it should be guided by intelligence choice and reasoning. After achieving its ideal i.e. freedom man eliminate all restrictions on the unfolding of the potentialities latent in him and in this state all individuals can unfold their potentialities and can enjoy actually all those benifits of social progress which it proclaims and pursues as its end.

This happiness can not be achieved in that political system called parliamentary democracy which is existing today nor it can be achieved after capturing power by exploiting class of worker. But both systems have showed their in adequaey. Men and women on the individual level are not feeling well and enjoying there sovereignity. Communism in itself attained through dialectical process would be the state of stagnation. Further there is no scope of progress. What a self contradictory theory it is.

So the possible philosophy be fitting for the entire human world in this era is humanism. Because the root of society is man, we must find out what is necessary for man and what should be done in order to give man the opportunity to unfold his potentialities, this being the content of his basic urge for freedom.

The structure of society must stand on radical democratic state, which would eliminate the inadequacies of formal parliamentary democracy. As well as it would be aware of the dangers of dictatorship of any class or elite. Humanism is based on philosophical materialism and materialism is the only philosophy which has tried to explain the world without having to transcend this physical universe. But, materialism has not the concept of only of an economic man as collectivists say. There should be synthesis between material progress and the dynamics of ideas. One idea may be incentive for another. Material development and ideas should go together and such a synthesis is possible under humanism. The individual man would have all satisfaction under such a philosophy and that is the philosophy in true sense. That philosophy is called radical Humanism.

12

Philosophy and Intuition— A Study of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan's Views

Vilasini C. P.

Though knowledge is obtained through different sources such as perception, intellect, reason and intuition, Radhakrishnan regards intuition as the most important among these in the context of philosohical enquiry. He argues that it is through intuition that we get the exact nature of the universe. Mere intellect will fail to help us to know the reality behind the phenomenal world. He sees intuition as having its important role not only in our understanding of reality but also in the case of all forms of knowledge such as science, logic, mathematics, and even in our everyday life.[1] However, in the case of our knowledge of reality it is absolutely unavoidable. For "The truth" he says, "is not so much produced as achieved".[2] Hence it becomes necessary for us to have a brief look at Radhakrishnan's idea of intuition.

The word intuition is a very difficult one to define, as it is well known for its extraordinary ambiguity. In the traditional Indian thought intuition is described by the term *aparoksha jnan* or *aparoksha anubhuti* (immediate knowledge or immediate experience). In this sense, intuition is an immediate fusion of mind with reality, and as such it is a state of mind rather than a mere cognition of an object. For, there would be no distinction between knower and the known in such experience. The knower is enabled to grasp the reality as it is, because in essence they are one and the same. As far as the Indian thinkers are concerned all knowledge of the self is intuitive. They regard it as the only true and direct knowledge while all other kinds are mediate and inferential. Samkara says in his commentary on *Brahmasutra* that self knowledge which is absolutely certain, is neither logical nor sensuous. A similar view on the nature of intuition can found in the West also. For example, Fichte regards the knowledge of self as due to intuition. So also does Schopenhauer when he speaks about our awareness of something which is more than phenomenal in our inner experience.

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[1] Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 154, Radhakrishnan makes it specific in a different context, as he says, "The real is not attained by force of intellect or by learning but is revealed to the aspirant whose will is at rest in him. It is through quickening the strivings of the will and the empirical intellect that the conditions are realised for the revelation of the supreme in the individual soul" (Vide *This is My Philosophy*, p. 100).

[2] Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 100.

Radhakrishnan tells us that the word intuition in relation to knowledge denotes a variety of meanings such as process, product, faculty, capacity and source of knowledge. But in general, he distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge as perceptual and integral. Intuition in the coutext of the first variety can be sensuous, scientific, aesthetic or ethical. But it is in the integral intuition that we have both the completion of knowledge and the realization of the identity of being as such. In every case of intuition it can be seen as possessing certain characteristic features which distinguishes it from other froms of knowledge. The chief among them is its immediacy or directness. Other distinguishing qualities of intuition include its certainty and vividness. Thus in *An Idealist View of Life*, he says, "While it may not be clear and distinct, it is sure and vivid."[3] But in every case intuition enable us to "see things as they are, as unique individuals".[4] It results in a close communion between the knower and the known. Since intuitive knowledge arises from an intimate fusion of mind with reality, it is direct knowledge of being itself without the aid of symbols. In other words it is the direct awareness of the truth of things by identity. In the intuitive experience we become one with the truth, one with the object of knowledge. The emphasis, therefore, is on the uniqueness and the individuality of the experience rather than on cognition. He often stresses the point that the deepest things of life are known only through intuition. This is true also in the realm of values. Both the recognition and creation of genuine values are possible only through intuition. Intuition is the most comprehensive among all forms of knowledge because it can move upward to mystical experience and downward to reason.

Radhakrishnan's emphasis upon intuition, however, does not lead him to disregard the value of reason. On the other hand he consider it to be indispensable in the context of all knowledge. Reason, intuition and mystical experience have their respective roles in the context of ultimate truth but they do so only when they are properly directed and coordinated.

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[3] Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 128.

[4] Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 138.

Radhakrishnan does not strictly adhere to one specific meaning of the term intuition. For this very reason it could serve a certain definite purpose in expressing his philosophy. Prof. Robert Browing in his illuminating analysis of the concept of intuition in Radhakrishnan's work points out that it has a number of meanings. According to him, "Sometimes it intimates what cannot be known in other ways, sometimes it means a fuller "realization" of what may be already abstractly known in symbols,......"[5]

Radhakrishnan argues that the various process of knowledge are not to be compartmentalised. There are different ways in which we acquire knowledge, namely, sense experience, discursive thinking and intuitive apprehension. Though we get knowledge from all these sources, it is the last alone that can give us a knowledge of the real.[6] Radhakrishnan, therefore, conceives the human capacities of sense, intellect and intuition in a hierarchy. The highest position is assigned to spiritual intuition or intuition of the Absolute, in which the knower realizes himself as both the knowledge and the known. It is the vision of Reality. Thus the integral intuition is not to be understood as a communion of the individual soul with the soul of the universe. It is a state of subject-object identity. It is also at the same time the integration intellect with instinct leading to a rediscovery of our essential nature in its wholeness.

The validity of certain intuition can be tested by the intellect. The findings of sensuous intuition are capable of verification. But there is no question of testing the validity of an aesthestic intuition: Similarly the correctness of an ethical intuition cannot be verified only on the basis of the consequences of action. However, we can find a kind of double disposition in Radhakrishnan when he speaks of the test and approval of intuitions. At times we see him saying that one can neither verify it nor doubt it. But in some contexts he asserts that it can be verified, tested and evaluated. Further he adds, "Any experience which does not fit in with tested knowledge must be rejected as hocuspocus"[7].

At the same time neither sense perception nor intellect (reason) is really exempt from the pervasive power of intuition. It binds

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5 K. W Wild, *Intuition*, pp. 177-178, Quoted by P. A. Schilpp, *The Library of Living Philosophers*, 1952.

6 Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 134.

7 Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, (Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 24-25.

them together and relates them to the highest intuition which is mystical. Radhakrishnan regards mystical experience as unique and altogether different from all other forms of knowledge. According to him it is the crown and apex of knowledge. Both sense perception and intuition are similar in the sense that both of them are immediate knowledge. Even in the context of intellectual knowledge intuition plays its role with regard to "the postulates of thought, the pervasive features of experience, number, casuality"[8] etc.

Though Radhakrishnan recognises intuition on both the levels of perceptual knowledge and integral experience, he is inclined to emphasize its role in the later sense. Thus he says, "personally I use intuition for integral experience".[9] And yet, there is no doubt that he uses it in its other senses also. We can also find him using the phrase "integral experience", (as also the phrase integral insight) with different connotations in different places. However, usually it is used in an exclusive as well as inclusive sense, either to mean mystical experience where intuition is involved.

An examination of the etymological meaning of the term intuition may, perhaps, enable us to understand the possible senses in which it could be used. It is derived from the Latin word *intueri* which menans "to look into" and as such it can be presumed as a metaphor from sight. Intuition, like the word *Pratyaksha*, in Sanskrit, implies the sense of sight. Hence it could be used to cover all cognitive processes which have a directness or immediacy. It excludes all knowledge by way of inference or hearsay.[10] Epistemologically, intuition stands for knowledge which is self-evident. Thus, according to Radhakrishnan, whenever the quality of self-evidence or self-certification can be attributed to an experience, it should be regarded as intuitive in the generic sense of the term. Hence by definition, intuition is neither necessarily supernatural nor opposed to rational or sensitive knowledge. But in the special sense it refers to what Radhakrishnan conceives as the integral experience by which one comes to the realization of Brahman, the absolute reality. Thus he says, "intuitive knowledge is proved on our pulses. It is the only kind of absolute knowledge and also the ultimate vision of our profoundest being."[11]

Radhakrishnan's concept of intuition is based upon his strong belief in the reality of a spiritual or superconsciousness over and above the animal-level consciousness and the self-consciousness of human beings. It is at this spiritual level that the individual becomes aware of the reality of the spirit. Such awareness is not an intellectual cognition of the object by the subject, but the subject, itself becomes its own object. It is an awareness in which the timeless and the spaceless is aware of itself as the basis and reality of all experience.[13]

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[8] P. A. Schilpp, "Reply to Critics", *The Library of Living Philosophers*, p. 791.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Reply to Critics in Schilpp, op. cit., p. 791.

[11] Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 144.

Thus when he speaks of different types of intuition such as intuition of feeling and rational intuition, he points out also that these are partial. The Absolute or Mystical Intuition stands to reason and feeling as whole to parts. So until the whole is reached all forms of intuitions are bound to remain partial. Corresponding to the three types of intuitions we can arrive at three types of unity. While the rational intuition and the intuition of feeling are similar, the mystical or transcendental intuition is a class by itself. The first two can be called empirical unity because the object with which unity is attained are empirical and the degrees of unity are far below that of the unity attainable in mystical intuition in which the intuitions of feeling as well as reason find their reconciliation and sublimation.

While trying to reconcile between the intuition of feeling and reason Radhakrishnan expresses his disagreement with the views of Hegel and Bergson. Hegel and Bergson are usually regarded as the representatives of the rational (logical) and the intuitive (instinctive) types of cognition respectively. As against Bergson who finds an opposition between reason and intuition, Radhakrishnan maintains that every genuine intuition must contain elements of rationality. Intellect not only must be present but must be on the stretch, he says, for, "in moving from intellect to intuition we are not moving in the direction of unreason but are getting in to the deepest rationality of which human nature is capable."[13] Yet this is not to say that intellect alone can function fruitfully without certain essential elements drawn from the order of the intuition. Hegel fails to recognise this fact and so he makes little use of intuition since according to him intuition is an abstraction unrelated to the rest of mental life. "Hegel is wrong" Radhakrishnan tells us, "When he regards intuition as something unrelated to intellect and incapable of giving anything else than simple being".[14] Intuition should be seen as comprehending feeling and intellect. For, intuition is not a-logical but supra-logical.

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12 Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, 4th impression, pp. 301-302.

13 Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 148.

14 Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 148.

It is the wisdom gained by the whole spirit, which is above any mere fragment thereof, be it feeling or intellect.[15] Thus, in intuition, we think more profoundly, feel more deeply, and see more truly. Here intuition is taken to mean as thinking with a certain totality or wholeness. He says that intuition and intellect that are parallel faculties that exist along side of each other, and also implies that intuition includes the intellect as the whole includes the part. This is clearly evident in the following passage : "Both intellect and intuition belong to the self While the former involved a specialized part, the latter employs the whole self. The two are synthesised in the self, and their activities are interdependent".[16] Radhakrishnan therefore want us that our search for truth should be an all-comprehensive one in which all aspects of our being must find their respective roles in order to arrive at a final vision of reality as it is.

Philosophy, therefore, includes logic, ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy and metaphysics. Philosophy tries to discover the meaning and render an intelligible explanation of experience as a whole. All aspects of reality including matter, life consciousness and value are to be seen intimately interrelated in a philosophical explanation of the world. For it is a study of experience in its concreteness and as such reveals the general structure of reality as a whole. As a sustained attempt to understand the universe as a whole, philosophy coordinated and interprets all significant aspects of experience.

P.T. Raju tells us that the Indian philosophy, "as a pure philosophy, may be said to have begun with the work of Radhakrishnan".[17] He observes that it is Radhakrishnan who has cleared the veil of mystery from Indian philosophy with which it was always associated in the Western mind.

Radhakrishnan strongly believes that philosophy is committed to a creative task and agrees with Marx's conception of the purpose of philosophy as concerned not only with interpreting life but with changing it.[18] He regards it as one of the essential functions of life itself. For, as a comprehensive view of the reality, philosophy alone can help man to overcome the ignorance which hides from us the vision of reality.[19]

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[15] Ibid., p. 147.

[16] Ibid., p. 153.

[17] P. T. Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India*, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1953), p. 14.

[18] Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Bhagavad Gita*, p. 265.

[19] Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Bhagavdgita*, p. 265.

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Editorial :

The Philosophical Aspects of Contemporary Psychology -

Prakash Atreya

Contemporary Psychology like Contemporary Science is multifaced discipline in which many a thinker is treading his way all alone and throwing suggestions towards building a new and more comprehensive discipline in the field of Mind which is becoming .more and more mysterious as individual thinkers proceed. Very often there is no common concept or common presupposition among them. Each school of thought appears to be almost completely independent of others. Even there seems to be no common scientific method accepted by all the fellow travellers e.g., the methods of investigation followed by the orthodox experimental psychologists, by the Psychosomatic medicine, by Psychosynthesis and by Parapsychologists. Those of the by Indian Psychologists and by the so called Religious Psychologists of Japan and also of the mystics of Yoga Schools are quite different and lead to different directions, creating different types of Psychology which can not be classed under any science of mind. Thus no body knows whither Psychology is going and what can be a commonly accepted science of Psychology. There is a greater difference of opinion among the philosophers of the mind than among the psychologists today. It is my purpose to bring here to the thinkers the present chaotic state of mind, about our most fundamental being the Mind, with a view to bring some unity and order in the thinking about mind so that our posterity may steer through the muddle created by free lancers in the arena of Psychology.

1 The most predominant and the prevalent view of Mind held by scientists today is behaviouristic which believes that mind is the function of brain and human being is only a collective and systematic reaction system of the physical body weal that and it ceases to exist and function when the body is damaged or disorganized. Apart from

the brain mind does not exist anywhere and in any way. The task of the whole of Psychology according to this school consists in a systematic study of the reactions and responses of the body to the physical environment. This tendency has given rise to so many tests and experiments which are becoming a burdent to the young students of psychology.

2 Quite opposed to this view is that of the Psychosomatic Medicine-according to which mind is an independent reality or substance which creates and determines every function of the body. It creates all the conditions of the body and causes and cures all diseases. This view is typically represented by the Journal '*Science of Mind*'· published from America. According to this school the mind is almost omnipresent and does not depend upon the conditions of the body and the brain as the behaviourists think. The view of mind gets support from hypnosis in which state the mind gets almost freed from the bodily conditions and controls the body completely by suggestion.

`3 Dr. Sigmund Freud, the father of Psychoanalytic movement thought of an absolutely new method of probing into the mind, viz., by tapping the so-called unconscious mind through evoking the deeply merged repressed and past memories of the individual, and discovering how greatly influential the past and repressed ideals are in the life of the individual and, its seems that really speaking the conscious mind and the behaviouristic reactions are not the essence of man. Freud has discovered several strata of Mind in man which are swift to shed blood (consider the high incidemce of violent crime, are named by him as the conscious, Fore conscious and the unconscious, etc., but he has not discovered any transcendental principle in man which has been the core of the individual thinker, as admitted by psychologists from ancient times both in the East and the West.

In fact there is no word like *Atman* (the enduring Self) which was discovered by the Psychologists of the Upanishadic times in Ancient India in the whole of the literature of Psychoanalysis and Freud could not say whether any layer of the mind could function and exist without its association with the body.

4 Parapsychology has recently discovered a transcendental stream of mental activity far below and beyond the activity of the phenomenal mind.

"It is no longer passible to consider the human being as an aggregate of thought-producing mechanism. The evidence compells admission that we are in presence of a dynamopsychic focus whence emanate manifestations of a power whose limits we cannot define. Beyond consciousness we discover the power to transform living matter, to deprive it of form, to exteriorise it from the body and make it into new and living (ectaplasmic) forms. Beyond the Conscious is found ability to perceive the (normally) imperceptible and to know the (normally) unknowable. Deep in the human being are found in miniature the attributes with which philosophies have adorned the God concept-creative power and knowledge outside Space and Time. And none can presume to say how much more may yet be discovered by exact, methodical, and progressive investigation (Eugene Osty : *Supernormal Faculties in Man*, p. 139)

The parapsychologists have discovered that Mind has got supernormal powers af cognition such, as Telepatey, Clairvoyance, Retrocognition, Precognition and Psychokinesis which function independently of the ordinary powers of Perception and voluntary control, of the physical body. The mind seems to function after the death of the physical body and seems to abide in some plane. Some Parapsychologists have discovered the existence of an astral body which functions independently in some superphysical and astral plane and this astral body passes from one physical body to another and takes rebirth in another form. Some Parapsychologists have also discovered that the astral body of one person who has lived in this world before takes rebirth in the from of other body and that the memories of the previous births are retained sometimes in the subsequent births. Thus the mind according to Parapsychology is very much different from that of the Psychoanalytic School and very much different from that of the orthodox psychology, which is associated with the physical body with which an individual is identified.

5 There are however other Psychologists led by Dr. Assagioli of Italy hold that behind each human personality there is a transcendental Self or Atman which remains unalterably the same and which endures even after the death of the bady. This school accepts the discoveries of Parapsychology about the process of the mind.

6 In Indian Psychology has been a practical discipline—training the mind in concentration and focusing the powers of mind, and in acquiring the extraordinary powers which have been under the back and call of the Yogis who could exercise the co-operative and executive powers by a superior class of beings called the Yogis and Gods. So the entire function of Psychology in India has been acquirement of these extraordinary powers some of which we come across in the so called mediums of Psychical Research.

7. In Japan there has recently been a rise of new Psychology called the "Religious Psychology" in which mystic experiences are cultivated to come in contact with the hidden forces of the world;

and that seems to be the only purpose of Japaneese Contemporary Psychology. Dr. Hiroshi Motoyama is the chief exponent of this movement in Japan.

8 The Structual School of Psychology occupies itself with analysing the nature and functions of mind and tries to discover the bricks and mortar of the human mind.

9 Hormic Psychology of William McDougall tries to find out the basic urges and propensities such, as instincts and emotions of the human mind, and on the basis of them tries to understand the motives and purposes of human behaviour.

10 Gestalt Psychologists decry at the analysis of human mind into elements and emphasises the unity of mind and the wholeness (gestalt) of the mind.

11 Functionalists lay emphesis on attention and concentration of the ordinary mind.

Thus we have in Contemporary Psychology quite a large number of points of view and notions of Mind and everyone considers its outlook as the most important and essential, and tries to build a Psychological school of its own. Studying the Mind from all the points of view and earnest effort in systematising and synthesising these views is very essential for integrating the science of mind at the present juncture of Psychology. Hence these few lines as an introduction to the present confusion in Psychology.

I

The Concept of Sin : Fact or Fiction (?)

Suresh Kumar Sinha

Inspite of the fact that an all round chaos prevails in the modern world and the people are living a miserable life, the concept of sin is considered to be out—dated and irrelevant. The reason is not far to seek. Religion in general and theological concepts like 'Sin' 'immortality' 'God' etc are considered to be not in tune with the scientific spirit of the age. But this is only one side of the picture. On the other hand, there are many among us who are betrothed to the religous tradition and still sincerely believe that the concept of sin has always been a force determining the thoughts and actions of men consciously or unconsciously. In such a piquant situation, our attempt in this paper will be to study the concept of sin in the religious traditions of Judaism, Christanity and Hinduism to find out whether the modern man really takes 'sin' to be a fiction or a fact.

But what is sin ? It is not easy to come to an agreed definition of 'sin'. Different religious traditions interpret sin in different ways. The dictionary meaning of sin is 'transgression against divine laws'; or 'an offence against any code'. If we take sin to be a transgression against divine law, we will have to find out what the divine law is ? And if we take sin to be an offence against some code, we must find out what these code are and what is the authenticity of these codes. But one thing is certain : sin is an offence on any view, an offence—a disrespect to some law; moral, social or divine. Retaining such an idea about sin, let us make a birds eye survey of sin in Judaism as we find it in their basic scripture : The old testament.

The concept of sin in Judaism

Having understood this, now let us turn to the Old Testment, the basic scripture of the Jews to see, in what sense the term has been used. The first part of the Genesis focuses on the beginning and spread of 'sin' in the world. "Then God saw everything that He had made, and indeed it was very good".[1] But God could not ordain that is a joy to the just, is a devouring fire for the sinner. Very clearly it the creature should not be a creature, in absolute dependence on himself. Hence, we find a peremptory law, "Of every tree of the garden you may freely eat; "but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die."[2] Notwithstanding a clear instruction to Adam and Eve from God the serpent insinuates a doubt into Eve's heart :" Has God indeed said,' you shall not eat of every tree of the garden' ? For God knows that in the day you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil".[3] Eve could not resist her temptation to eat the fruit of forbidden tree. As a result of this disaster falls. The Lord God said to the serpent :, "Because you have done this, you are cursed more than all cattle, and more than every beast of the field; on your belly you shall go, and you shall eat dust all the days of your life. ' To the woman He said : "I will greatly multiply your sorrow and your conception; in pain you shall bring forth children; your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you".[4] The creation which should be subordinate to man rebels against him. Women whom God had created to be man's glory, becomes his slave and his plaything. Pain henceforth leaves its mark upon all the people of mankind. Adam and Eve are driven out of God's garden, Cain becomes his brother's murderer death reigns over all generation of man without exception and sin spreads farther and farther.

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[1] Genesis 1:31.

Of course, the account does not attempt to explain where the serpent comes from, but it displays very clearly, the psychology truly remarkable for so distant an age, what is the nature of sin; and how it embraces ruin and suffering for man. The important thing which lies under consideration is that according to the Old Testament every sin arrives always from a weakening— or from a distraction— of the faith by which we are settled in God's light. This light must first grow dim before the will can go astray, what is more, all sin is an attempt to make oneself God, an act of *hubris*. Even if it does not derive from megalomania, from the intoxication of pride, to sin is always to imitate the divine independence, to seek one's own glory rather than God's glory, to wish to make one's own life instead of receiving it from God's hand. That is the first, the fundamental, evil.' And from this evil all others flow. Adam and Eve become aware of their nakedness, having lost the innocence of their mutual relationship. They fall from the grace of God : for God's light, which has been shown that the primary limitation imposed upon man, in order that he may be in the likeness of his Maker and bear the image of the invisible is that of total dependence on God-in that his behaviour to be Godly, must derive directly and exclusively from God's activity in his and through his. Any activity, there fore, in which he may engage; no matter how nobly conceived, which does not stem from this humble attitude of dependence on God, violates the basic principle of his true humanity and the role for which he was created.

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[2] Ibid. 2:16 and 17.
[3] Ibid. 3:1 and 5.
[4] Ibid. 3:14 and 16.

Further, the book of the judges particularly emphasizes that loyalty to the lord is the condition of one's material and moral prosperity. And that whenever Israel breaks the convent into which God has entered with her necessarily brings misery on herself. In the first place, disloyalty : "And the children of Israel again did evil in the sight of the lord"[5] In the second place they decide to run to Lord charactrises the latest development in Hindu thought.

While Judaism and Christianity weave their faith round their ideas of an original sin and vacarious salvation, Hinduism pins its faith on man's responsibility for the bondage of his soul and its liberation therefrom. Man is not a sinner against God by his very birth, nor is salvation of his soul to be wrought through any vicarious atonement. Hinduism maintains that man in his original nature is divine, free from sin and suffring, birth and death,. He is unborn and undying srit, the immortal and blissful self. If still he sins and suffers in consequence and becomes unhappy and miserable, that is because in his ignorance he forget his own devine nature and considers himself separate from God and lives an isolated life. It is the ignorance of the true nature of the self that breeds misery and selfishness, pain, agony and anguish while the individual self is really different and distinct from the body, the mind and the senses, we in our ignorance confuse ourself with the body and become apparentaly identified with the mind-body organism. With this, we become subject to all the limitation and vicissitude of the body. We are swayed by the passions and impulses of our organic life, and become attached to the object of the world which satisfy them. Out of such attachment for things pleasurable, or aversion for things painful, their arises in us all sorts of activities for obtaining or avoiding them. Now to reap the consequence of the action of one life, under the law of Karma we are to be born again and again, untill all our Karma are exhausted and we become free from birth and death.

Although Hinduism asserts that human nature is radically good and may rise to the highest excellence independent of God, but it accepts the very existence of the sin in the world which comes into being due to the ignorance of the human being. On the other hand, Judaism and Christianity weave their faith round their ideas of and original sin. Man may serve God faithfully or rebel against Him. In their saviour for help : "...the children of Israel cried out to the Lord". In the third place, "the Lord raised up a deliverer for them".[6] The same idea occures again and again throughout the book. It appears that this rudimentary teaching was necessary first of all to make this idea firm root in the mind of the people of God—the idea that there is fundamentally only one evil, that of sin. All other evil is only the consequence, how ever far removed, of sin.

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[5] Judges 3:12.

From the above discussion it is clear that sin in Judaism means "broken relationship with God". In judaism, how ever, human being are not seen as sinful by nature. Rather 'Sin' '(hat,' missing the mark) is a personal failure to venerate life by keeping God's commandment. To jew their convent with God is a specific call to be holy. just as God is holy. A complete transformation of human life that restore the relationship with God is advocated. The transformation of human life is through redemption of sin. Redemption of sin is the main feature of jews annual you Kippur (Day of Atonement) but it is also enjoined as a daily occurence. Through prayer, righteousness and repentence judaism as a convent relation with God contains the means ol explating sins.

The concept of sin in Christianity

The Christian position with regards to the notion of sin can be made absolutely clear if we cite three pronouncement from the New Testament. In Adam you are... "being aliented from the life of God".[7] In Adam, "in which you once walked according to the course of the world".[8] In Adam...... "you will die in your sins".[9] It means that each child born into the world since the first man died spiritually has been born "in Adam" acd consequence of being born "in Adam" means he is ceased to be a true man. It was utterly impossible for Adam by this physical process of reproduction to impart anything of the divine nature to his offspring. All born "in Adam" in all succeeding generations have been physically alive soullessly active but spiritually dead"....Dead in tresspasses and sins...by nature childern of wrath, just as the other".[10] Man are sinners not because they

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5 Judges 3:12.
6 Ibid. 3:15.
7 Ephesians 4:18.
8 Ibid. 2:2.
9 John 8:24.
10 Ephesians 2;1 and 3.

commit sins because by nature they are sinners; ......"by one man's disobedience many were made sinners".[11] If nothing happens to change the situation between physical birth and physical death, we will die in condition in which we were born.

In the New Testament sin is viewed as missing the mark—a failure to live up to an expected standard. Another definition of sin is found in First John;3:4" Sin is lawlessnes". According to this verse, sin is anything that is contrary to what the word of God commands or forbids. This definition, however, does not take into account those things about which the word of God is silent. The best definition for sin is found in First John 5:17" All unrighteousness is sin" Each individual man, woman, and child who composes mankind is a sinner. Paul points out in Roman 3:13-16 that "their throat is an open tomb ......the poison of asps (a small; deadly poisonous snake) is under their lips, whose mouth, is full of cursing and bitterness. Their feet are swift to shed blood (consider the high incidence of violent crime, murder, and abortion that infects our society); destruction and misery are in their ways (whatever man touches he corrupts) "All of this shows that there is no person who seeks after God and no person does what is right (page-1143-Rom3:10, 11). Each individual man, woman, and chield needs the righteousness of God. Without God's righteousness no one can ever inter or stand in God's presence. Plainly, every man, woman and child needs to have a new life because each is a sinner.

The notion of sin is a specifically Christian characterization of the human condition but at the same time the New Testament simply does not only narrate the pitiable and horrible condition of the human being. It raises hope by declaring, "If Christ is in you, the body is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of righteousness".[12] What is this righteousness that Jesus exhorts us to hunger for ? Since God is holy, righteous and pure He cannot tolerate sin in His presence. The New Testament makes it very clear that there is no possibility of establishing relationship with God apart from the cross of His son, Jesus Christ. God says, "I will forgive you, but only at the foot of the cross". He says, "I will fellowship with you, but I will fellowship with you only at the cross". That is the reason it is necessary for us to come to the cross in repentence of our sin and faith in His son to forgiveness ond salvation. It is important to note that inspite of our sins and moral uncleanness God loves us. He decided to provide a righteousness for us that is the reason that he gave His son Jesus Christ to die on the cross. God has provided on

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11 Roman 5:19.
12 Ibid. 8:10.

the ground of faith in the atoning death and resurrection of His son and imputed rightousness for all who will receive it. This means that God forgives all past sin and failure. He takes our sins and buries them in the depth of the sea and removes them as far as the east is from the west. In Christianity, thus we find that human being are understood to be sinful by nature and in need of redumption through Jesus Christ.

The Concept of in Sin Hinduism

Since Hinduism has no equivelent word for 'sin' and evil the term *Adharma* serves as a blanket term for sin or unrighteousness and violation of the moral law. The Hindi translation 'Papa' as sin suggests crime; misdeeds or ill behaviour. The opposit of *Adharma* is Dharma derived from Dhri Dhatu meaning stable or steady. Dharma, therefore, is a code of good conduct, a pattern of noble living according to religious rules and observance.

Hinduism has come out of the past into the present by a long trail. It began as the Vedic religion of the Aryans. The basie scriptures, of Hinduism are the Vedas. They include the Rig-Veda and the other Vedas, the Brahmanas and the Upanishads. Early Hinduism was life affirming. In the eyes of the Vedas the world was a dynamic whole in which man had a magnificent chance to achieve happiness. The encounter with Janism and Buddhism resulted in the crucial shift from the Vedic quest for happiness to Hindu quest for release; from the Vedic hope for human fulfillment to the Hindu hope for escape from the human condition. Papa in the Rig-Veda often has a moral sense. People are evil minded: adultry is evil; insect is evil.[13] The Rig-Vedic concept of sin or Papa is related to its concept of *Rta*. Rta Signifies order; what regulates the different aspect of human life. The terms used in Rig-Veda to denote sin 'Agat', Duskrit', 'Ahans', Anrito',—The term Papa appears to be related to Dharma or religion more often than morality in the Rig-Veda. Varuna has been adored in the Rig-Veda to seek the truth and *Unrta* in man. The term '*Purit*' has also been used in the sence of Papa in the Rig-Veda. The Rig-Veda has fixed up seven standard to be observed by human beings and a man who transgresses these standerds commit sin.[14]

In the Upnishans also be find mention of different kinds of sinner. Broadly speaking. *Asteya*, *Brahmahatya*. *Bhrumhatya*, *Surapan* etc are regarded as 'sin'. In the Manu-Smriti also the concept of sin has been expounded. What a man should do and what he should not do has been explained in detail. The issue of social justice has ben taken by Smritikara. The organisation of society was religiously sanctioned and invoilable. It included a way for the individual to walk out on it, by becoming an ascetic, if it became too much. This tendency line with the Old Testament Christianity too come to conceive of the meaning of the natural events as the demonrteations of divine wrath of favour. For example, the Black Death ravaged Europe in the 14th Century was considered to be evidence of God's great wrath upon the generation's sin and disobedience. The sense of divine presence and influence so permeated the Christian that he came to look upon every failure as sin. Sin is rebellion against Diety; deliberate affront of divine majesty, or severance of the relationship of loving sonship. And guilt follows sin like a shadow. Objectively considered, guilt is the consequence of a sin that entails judgement upon the offender, and subjectively it is the feelings of personal responsibility for sin, mingled with premonitions of coming judgment.

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[13] Rv. 4:5, 10:10.

[14] Ibid. 10:5: 6.

The notion of sin, Fact or fiction

Thus we are once more confronted with the question asked earlier in this paper: whether sin is a fact or fiction. Before deciding this issue it is essential to know what determines our view of the fact. What needs to be realised is that what a man gets out of the facts will depend on the way he looks at them. If he decides beforehand that he will accept only the deliverances of his five senses and of logic, he will fail to see large areas of life that otherwise would have something singificant to teach him. Thus a man's interests play a decisive part in the way he comes to see what is meaningful and what is not. His interests determine the objects of his serious attention and act as blinders to the range of his vision.

To the question whether sin is a fact or fiction it can be said that the notion of sin cannot be regarded as fiction. Had it been a fiction, it won't have survived for long. But it is not the case. In the first place, guilt has come to stay in the modern world. Guilt follows sin like a shadow. It is the consequence of a sin. We human being sometime or other feel that we have committed sin, as a result of that we are suffering. As most psychoanalysts are aware, guilt has become one of the major problems of man whether he is religious or not. In the second place, it also cannot be regarded as fiction because its application develops man's higher faculties. 'Some rise by sin and some by virtue fall', says Shakespeare in Measure for Measura, insisting that it is not good enough to decide that virtue is good and vice is bad (which they are !); that the important thing is whether a person rises to his higher potentialities or falls away from them. Normally, men rise through virtue; but if virtue is merely external and lacks inner power. it merely makes them complacent and they fail to develop; similary, what by ordinary standards is sin may set in motion the all important process of development, if its shock causes a man awake his higher faculties which had previously been asleep.

2

Bihar Tour Impressions 1992

S. Christopher

This presentation is a sharing of some of my impressions gained from several field visits to the Gandak and Sone areas in 1992, where the Centre for Water Resources Studies (CWRS) and the Bihar Water and Land Management Institute (WALMI) have ongoing research projects. The impressions are my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of anyone else;they are frankly subjective and based on only a few non-random encounters. These remarks should therefore be taken as suggestive, as food for thought, or as topics for discussion, not as "findings". Others might have come away from the same experiences with different thoughts; systematic empirical observations might show that, even if valid, generalization of the observations may be unwarranted. But this is what I saw, and these are my thoughts in reaction thereto.

I went to the field with three interests. First, I wanted to see, feel, taste, touch and smell what was there. To this end on one occasion I even went by bus and rickshaw from Patna University to Vaishali, a trip which took five hours, and four changes of conveyance. I experienced at first hand how "far" Vaishali is from the metropolis, in terms of time, crowding, heat, dust, and danger. For several miles I even rode atop the swaying bus, dodging tree branches and electric lines, because there was not even standing room inside. I saw the bus helper bribe the police at the intersection to let the bus pass, and I saw a jeep of armed police stop the bus and beat the driver with a stick. I know now what 75 km. in Bihar means.

More importantly, however, I wanted to view the irrigation works, to walk the canals and ditches; to see the motors, the electric lines, the "physical infrastructure". These things I saw, and these things I will tell about.

A second purpose of my several trips in January and February of 1992 was to gain an understandiug of the data collection process. I will have much to say about this.

Finally, I wanted to attend meetings of farmers to hear their views and concerns, and to talk informally with them, in small groups and one to one, to assess their readiness lo take over the management and operation of their irrigation systems. My pre-existing views on this subject were very much strengthened.

The physical infrastructure

At VASFA, the Vaishali Area Swall Farmers Association, where irrigation is done by tubewell, I saw well kept pump houses, well maintained and operative pumps, 'and functional, clear, lined main ditches. I saw an orderly farm community where the living standard was several notches above the subsistance level.

At each pump house I saw in Vaishali there were two motors ; one diesel, one electric. At some places electricity is still used, when available, but at others the wires have been cut at the farmer's request, as the amount which the government can supply is much too small and erratic. The cost is per month per horsepower, instead of volumetric, and at some places the cost simply exceeds the benefits. It seems that the trend is toward the abandonment of dependence on electricity in the villages, if indeed one ever could speak of "dpendence". Perhaps one could rather say the villagers are giving up hope that they will ever be able to depend on electric power, and are ordering their lives accordingly. I noted that at least at some places, biogras is being extensively used for cooking and lighting, further decreasing interest in electricity as a source of energy.

In Paliganj, I saw canals in obvious need of repair, although functioning. I was told that the fact they are in as good a shape as they are because the farmers have made significant progress in taking them over themselves. More of this later.

One interesting observation was that at some tube-well pumps, threshing/winnowing machines that run off the irrigation pumps were in evidence. This was someteing I had never seen or heardmentioned, and represents as economic benefit of the tubewell system which without an on-site visit I would have been completely unaware of.

I saw that the fuel tanks hold 5 liters of diesel, and was told that this amount will run a pump for 12 hours. When I asked to see the reserve supply. I was told they had none; diesel is brought in five liters at a time as needed, from 10 km. away, a round trip of 20 km. I was told, however, that now that diesel motors have become the primary energy source for running the pumps, fuel will be purchased by the barrel in future.

Data Collection

Of more interest to me as as a sociologist was the issue of the timeliness, validity, and reliability of data being collected. Here I would like to tell a story. You will no doubt be able to draw the implications from it yourself, but I will also do so, lest there by any doubt.

I went to one of the IIMI-India Conjunctive Irrigation Project pilot sub-areas, alone. Arriving Sunday afternon, I was well rested Monday morning, eager for a full day in the field. The weather was deligtful. I reported to the project headquarters of the pilot sub-area at eight o'clock sharp, washed and breakfasted. There I met one of the four data collectors in the sub-area. Where the other were I do not know; I never saw them. Let us call this data collector Shri X.

Shri X was cordially polite, and asked me the purpose of my trip. I told him I wanted to physically observe the irrigation works of his area. He said he was "busy" just then, but would collect me from where I was staying at ten o'clock. I spent the next two and a half hours talking with local people in the area, who were friendly and communicative. Incredibly, my horrible Hindi was understood, and they could also make them-selves understood to me, by rephrasings, gestures, and all the rest. Anyway, we talked "of cabbages and kings, and many other things." At 10 : 30, only half an hour late, Shri X sauntered up, very slowly, to where I was, and suggested we sit there and talk. But I was anxious to get going, and said so; he reluctantly heaved himself from the chair, and with an audible sigh on his part we started toward the target area, which, he explained many times, was "3-4 kilometers away". I was undaunted, perhaps because that didn't seem like more than a pleasant stroll on such a beautiful day.

The socio-economic data collector, Shri X, was a city boy, born and bred. He knew little and cared less about farming. He had virtually no command of spoken English, and we often had to revert to Hindi. Those of you who know just how bad my Hindi is will appreciate the purport of this. Of course, from my point of view, there is no reason why he *should* be expected to know English, Tibetan, Eskimo, or any other foreign language, except that he was using an *English proforma*, which he translated *ad hoc*, and he writes up the responses in English. One wonders how valid and reliable his translations may be.

I had been told in Patna, by the way, that Hindi questionnaires were used in the field, and I had actually seen one. Of the existence of such, however, Shri X was totally unaware.

But to get on with the story. Before many minutes had passed, it became clear to me that he disliked asking questions for me of farmers, perhaps disliking to appear ignorant (which he was) in front of them. His ignorance was matched only by his lack of curiosity. Let me give a few examples; I would like you to reflect on the question of whether Shri X could be expected to establish rapport with, and elicit the confidence of, the farmers.

For starters, he did not know the destinations of the field channels; he had never inspected them. He did not know the names of several common plants. He did not know that it was potato harvesting season, although potatoes are widely grown in the area. When we saw a raised orchard being planted, he had not the foggiest idea of what the farmers were about, much less why. His explanation of the raised plinth and surrounding dike was, "the wish of the farmers". It seems he thought they were making giant sand castles as a sort of recreation in their free time ! He was a city-bred son of a city-bred father, who looked at the landscape with the urbanite's blindness and disinterest, and,although he wore casual Indian garb at his residence; when he ventured into the field he was dressed every inch the proper English gentleman. At this point I would like to pause for a quotation from a noted authority, Douglas J. Merry;

> "There is no doubt that one source of the problems faced...... is the relationship......between farmers and......officials. Although some of the......workers have rural backgrounds, their education has seemingly made them unfit for rural work. Possessing a formal degree......they are "officers". They create barriers between themselves and their clients by wearing western clothes, speaking an urban dialect, and doing all they can to create the impression that they possess a superior knowledge and position which ought to be respected. When the clients assert themselves and refuse the officer the respect......he claims......the officer's low opinion of his clients is confirmed in his mind[*].

In the spring of 1992 I listened to two government officials address a group of farmers for a total of about 60 minutes. They used 50 different English words (for which there are Hindi equivalents) while speaking Hindi to the farmers. They used some of these words many times, This no doubt impressee the farmers with official erudition. These are the English words they used;

select
politician
plot
estimate
experiment
training
engineer
chief engineer
executive engineer
delay
adjust
society

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[*] IIMI Research Paper No.4, "Irrigation Management in Pakistan" 198 .

invite
average
threaten
duty
corrupt
election
diamonds
wheat
rich
seven hundred million
five percent
leader
fertilizer
society
association

tender
labor
manager
meeting
member
electric company
million
airport
seven forty seven jet
office
children

maximum
accountant
register
receipt
system
India (sic !)
tax
public
ninety-give percent
heart problem
doctor

In the words of Maloney, Raju and Mehta, "Technical Officers have a tendency to use English words mixed into the regional language, even for local social features such as groups. It is better to consistently use...local language terms.*"

Empirical research shows clearly that the validity of data is directly proportional to the degree of interviewee perceived homogeneity between interviewer and interviewee, and that such perceived homogeneity is greatly enhanced by similarity in dress and speech. Apparently Shri X did not know this. I suspect that in any case he would not care, but that it would be more important for him to be treated as a neocolonialist "saheb" than to collect valid data. But perhaps I am being unfair–though I think not.

After about an hour in the field with Shri X, I suggested lunch. This suggestion was accepted with alacrity, and the return walk took much less time than the walk out. "Back at the ranch", Shri X said he had no time to take me out again in the afternoon, as he had to write a report. I asked if I could watch him in action at his office. He reluctantly agreed. He said the "report" was a clean *pro forma* of the rough notes he had taken on the previous Friday. This means two days per interview : one to conduct it, one to write it up.

The impression of great leisureliness was confirmed when he said that he and the other three data collectors had each done 100 interviews in the last 225 working days. It takes three hours from office to field and back again for one interview. He says he also prepared the household lists from which the sampled household have been chosen.

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* WAPCOS, "Technical Report No. 50", 1991.

At two o'clock, after a two hour lunch break, he took me to his living quarters, which is also his office. He then showed me his "report" which, miraculously, was all written up ! Then he said he had written it up the night before, from an interview done on Sunday, from which he had returned at four o'clock. When I pointed out that I had first met him at half past two, he corrected himself; he had come back at two. So I asked why he had no time to go with me to the field. His response was that it had been his intention to conduct another interview. To which I replied, "May I come with you ?" At that point, however, he recalled that he had to prepare "fooding and drinking" arrangements for a visiting party to come the next day. When I allowed as how I would be most interested in observing this process, he remembered that someone else was taking care of it. Hopelessly cornered, he finally admitted he was too tired from the morning's walk to go out again. In fact, he said he goes to the field in the morning or in the afternoon, but never both; it had never occurred to him to take a packed lunch and stay the whole day, and at the suggestion that he use a bicycle, he felt it would hamper his "freedom of movement". In a rare moment of candor, he confided that he works for the project three hours a day, and spends the remainder of his time studying for an examination for a permanent position elsewhere. He would particularly like to go to Sri Lanka. He said, and I believe him, that none of the socioeconomic data collectors works more than three hours a day, although the Sub-district Engineer, in whose charge he is, would sack them if he know.

Interestingly, Shri X says that although WALMI hired him, WALMI does not supervise his work, nor does he have any contact with WALMI at all. He is supervised by an engineer of the Water Resources Department an hour away by jeep.

Although he had been initially unimpressed by my suggestion he get a bicycle, he showed considerable interest in it when I pointed out he could double his output with the same energy input, thus possibly getting himself an outstanding recommendation for a parmanent job elsewhere.

On the *pro forma* he had put "male" or "female" under the "age" column, in the case of children 12 and under. He said he had been so trained, but had no idea why.

On the filled-up *proforma* which he handed me, he had written at one point that the respondent makes Rs. 5000 a year from agriculture, but at another place that he sells no agricultural products. He saw no inconsistency in this, neither during the interview nor while writing up his notes. When it was pointed out to him, he saw that a mistake had been made, but he had no idea what to do about it, apart from staring at me with blank eyes and open mouth. I strongly suspect that Shri X (I found him actually personally likeable) is typical. He is simply a fish out of water, not fitted for his job, as his colleagues, I would wager, are also not. My impression is that *the problem is not personal, but generic and systemic.*

The above story illustrates why I have developed serious concerns about data validity, and about the selection, training, and supervision of the collectors of at least the socio-economic portion of the data being collected in the areas I visited. And as I am told that the data collection supervisors have been given this task on top of their normal duties, not having been joined by the special division of engineers which I am told the Water Resources Department had originally promised, I wonder how committed the Department is to research excellence. Perhaps they have other priorities in the allocation of their scarce resources.

Shri X possesses an M.A. in Political Science; in my view, however, the socio-economic data collection instrument could be administered by anybody with a primary school education and two weeks of intensive training. I would hire fluently literate farmers from the area itself, give them really thorough training, including extensive role playing, and use "sahebs" only in the capacity of supervisors. An interviewer could expect unannounced visits frequently from any one of several such "supervisors". Further more, I would supplement this by statistical analysis of variance to spot which interviewers may be "cooking', data, and I would hire full time supervisors, possibly supplied by a reputable local consulting firm' who would themselves be thoroughly and well trained, possibly in the same training course as the farmer/interviewers.

Farmer Readiness for Takeover

My impression is that farmers generally believe the officers of government to be inept and corrupt, The farmers also express confidence that they could do better at water management themselves. At the same time, they realize they need "nuts and bolts" training in how to organize themselves and how to run a sustained farmer organization for managing and operating a water management system. The farmers themselves cite some impressive arguments consistant with these views, with which, by the way, I agree.

The VAFSA groups has owned and operated successfully its own tubewell irrigation system for over 20 years. Productivity went up over 40% within two years, economic inequity between farmers and landless has decreased, farm labourers now find it easier to get work close to home and conflict is negligible. This is impressive, and speraks for itself.

At Paliganj the farmers said that when the engineers want on strike for three months, the farmers took over the system (about 40 miles of main distributory) and, with one jeep, did as well as the engineers had been doing, or better. They said in a recent drought year they dan gotten water to within 5 miles of the tail of their distributory, whereas a comparable government managed distributory, a few miles to the north, had gotten water only to 6 miles in from the head. They report that since organizing, conflict between head and tail enders has virtually ceased, and community spirit has developed, as they have found that by working together, everyon's needs can be fairly me.

The farmers of the neighboring distributory spoken of above, are now attending the Paliganj farmer meetings, and want the Paliganj folks to pass on the "how to do it" knowledge they have acquired from WALMI. Paliganj farmers are so confident that they feel that, if need be, they could now get along without WALMI, but they still need WALMI to help interface with the Water Resources Department. In fact they are privately in growing resentment that WALMI has not already delivered on its promise to help them get legally registered. They are impatient with the present situation, and want government either to do the job right, or get out of it altogether and let the farmers take full legal responsibility, including punitive powers against sabateurs. They want to collect water fees, turn 30% over to the government, and manage the system with the remaining 70%. If they need more money they will assess themselves for it, or take out commercial loans. They are champing at the bit and full of confidence. They show up in droves at the WALMI farmer organiser training programs. They want to learn how to set up by-laws of an organization, what by-laws to have, how to distribute responsibility, keep accounts and monitor leadership to avoid corruption. I find them bright and articulate, self-confident but eager to learn those things their life experiences as farmers have not taught them, namely how to set up and run a Farmer Organization for Water Management. They want to decide for themselves when to call for engineering or other advice when and if they need it. They have enthusiastically expressed readiness to hire their own community organizers with their own funds.

A government with spends 6 crore rupees to collect 4 crore rupees in water fees, and whose ,mismanagement in some areas is so patently clear to their "beneficiaries" that officers dare not venture into certain areas for fear of their very lives, should give every encouragement to all possible alternatives. At Paliganj the engineers could not remove a mud embankment even with a police escort, but the farmer organization had no trouble at all in doing so.

I believe that Private Development Organizations such as, for example, the Institute for Emerging Technology, in Pat a, should be encouraged to organize and train farmers to take over water management systems. These so-called 'illiterates", with proper training, will likely do much better than the college educated bureaucracy which has made such a miserable mess of the job, in many instances. Funds for PDO's may come from the state or central government, from foreign donors, or from farmer organizations themselves who demand training and are willing to pay for it. In the Paliganj area alone, they could raise Rs. 1,00,000 by foregoing "pan" for just 2-3 days. This would pay a lot of farmer organizers a lot more than the pittance of Rs. 500 a month they are presently getting, which is a poor joke in bad taste.

The principle obstacle in all of this, in my view, is the condescending attitudes and neo-colonialist habits of *lower-echelon* government bureaucrats. I have faith in the farmers. I think higher level government officials at the *policy level* do too.

These are my impressionistic views. They may be wrong. No doubt some of them are. But this is the way I have come to see things as a result of my recent field tours.

3

Frederick Denison Maurice's Use of the Anglican Via Media in Relating Christianity to the World Religions

Lee W. Gibbs

Frederick Denison Maurice (1805-1872), who flourished during the reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1901), has been designated "the greatest Anglican thinker of the nineteenth century," and his work has been described as being "of greater influence in the Church of England than any other of the nineteenth century."[1] H. Richard Niebuhr has judged him to be the modern theologian who best represents the position that Christ is "the transformer and converter of human culture,"[2]

Living during the heyday of the impact of the Industrial Revolution, Maurice is perhaps best known today for the major role he played in raising the social consciousness of nineteenth-century Anglicanism, along with his leadership in founding the Christian Socialist Movement in England. In theology, he is remembered primarily for his bold assertion of Christology as the starting point for all Christian theology and ethics, and secondarily for his "universalist" challenge of "orthodox" notions of heaven and hell that led to his dismissal as a professor at King's College in London. What is not so widely known or remembered, however, is that he also made major contributions to modern Christian ecumenical thinking. These contributions were daring and pioneering in his own day; even from the perspective of the late twentieth century, his work continues to bear relevance for the Ecumenical Movement at large, and especially for those who are actively participating in the various interfaith dialogues which are currently taking place throughout the world.[3]

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[1] See, for example, Maurice B. Reckitt, *Maurice to Tempie ; A Century of the Social Movement in the Church of England*, Scott Holland Memorial Lectures (London : Faber and Faber, 1946), pp. 19, 80-81. It should be noted, however, that positive judgments about

1. Influence of Early Life upon Later Thought

Since life and thought were so inseparably intertwined in Maurice, his later work cannot be fully understood without some reference to his early biography. For much of his later drive to unify or reconcile warring religious factions with their exclusivist claims to truth can be traced back psychologoically to his personal response to the vigorous religious confrontations which took place in the home of his youth.[4]

Maurice's father, who originally came from an orthodox Presbyterian home, later became a Unitarian minister of liberal persuasion. After an initial period of calm, the Maurice household was disrupted by the religious arguments which soon began to assail the harmony of the closely knit family. His mother, with two of his sisters, joined Baptist fellowships of strict Calvinist persuasion, while another of his sisters joined the Church of England. He later declared that he had been "bewildered into silence" by the heated family quarrels over religion which he had experienced as a child.

The major impression left upon the young Maurice by these interfamilial disputes over religion was the conviction that each family member had come into possession of some valid truth to which he or she bore witness. Each person, however, having become the ardent adherent of a particular party or sect, tended to distort his or her partial grasp of truth by expounding it as if it were the whole truth, and further intensified this distortion by denouncing all the partial truths discerned by the others.

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the profundity and comprehensiveness of Maurice's thought have always been balanced by very negative evaluations. For instance, Benjamin Jowett stated in the nineteenth century that Maurice was "misty and confused, and none of his writings appear to me worth reading." More recently, Stephen Sykes has held Maurice more responsible than any other for what he regards as the generally "shoddy thinking" in the Church of England, along with the accompanying "lamentable Anglican disdain for systematic theology"; see *The Integrity of Anglicanism* (London : Mobray's, 1978), pp. 16-19.

[2] *Christ and Culture* (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1951), pp. 224-229.

[3] For discussions of the ecumenical thrust of Maurice's thought, see William J. Wolf, "Maurice and Our Understanding of 'Ecumenical, "*Anglican Theological Review*, 54 : 273-90, and David M. Murphy, "The Ecumenical Theology of F. D. Maurice," unpublished Ph. D dissertation (1971), St. Paul's University, Ottawa, Canada.

[4] See William J. Wolf, "Frederick Denison Maurice," in *The Spirit of Anglicanism*, ed. William J. Wolf (Wilton, Connecticut : Morehouse-Barlow), pp. 52-54.

Maurice's father wanted him to be a Unitarian minister like himself, and Maurice took it for granted that he would be. Nevertheless, becoming dissatisfied with Unitarianism, Maurice's spiritual pilgrimage eventually led him to find what he perceived to be the most comprehensive expression of truth in the faith and worship of the Church of England. He was baptized into this Communion in 1831, and ordained to the priesthood in 1834.[5]

2. Early Formulation of Theological Presuppositions and Method

By the time Maurice published the first edition of his monumental two-volume work on *The Kingdom of Christ* (London : 1838), he had already clearly formulated the basic theological principles and the *via media* methodology which he would later employ when attempted to relate Christianity to the major world religions. Regarding all dogmatic theological systems as "diseases perpetrated by a narrow sectarian spirit," Maurice never set forth a fully comprehensive and exhaustive formulation of his theological position. Preferring to describe his own intellectual efforts as "metaphysical and theological grubbing," he "dug" for what he regarded to be the foundational principles of Christian theology and ethics.

Maurice's primary foundational principle was that Jesus Christ is the starting point for *all* Christian theology and ethics; the heart of the Gospel as he understood it is that Jesus Christ, the eternal Son of God, is the Head and King of the *entire* human race. The correlary of this initial principle was his conviction that the triune God, who is the basis for all forms of unity among humankind, has created *and* redeemed *all* humankind in Christ. The conclusion that he drew from these theological correlaries is that the Church and the world of human culture are distinct but inseparably interrelated—that is, nations and states are created *and* redeemed by God as well as the Church. He identified this vision of the catholic Church as an intercommunion of national Christian churches with the universal Kingdom of God which Jesus Christ came to proclaim-namely, with that Kingdom which embraces *all* human beings and in which love as the law of Christ governs *all* humankind. This view of the catholic Church and the Kingdom of God provided the backdrop for his self-conscious application of the Anglican *via media* as the most appropriate method for dealing (1) with the schisms and warring factions within Christendom (including the Church of England), and (2) with his attempt to relate Christianity to the other world religions.

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[5] Olive J. Brose has traced the origin of Maurice's most distinctive personal and intellectual characteristics, and finds the key to his thought as a whole, in his conversion from a Unitarian to a Trinitarian in the Church of England; see *Fredcrick Denison Maurice ; Rebellious Conformist* (Athens, Ohio : Ohio University Press, 1971), pp. xv, 5-10.

Maurice did as much as any theologian before or after to develop and elucidate what had by his time become the distinctively Anglican "middle way" of thinking, acting, and being in the world.[6] He vigorously argued that, from the very beginning, the *via media* of Anglicanism was *not* a mere "compromise" or balancing of opposite opinions derived from Roman Catholicism on the one hand, or from Protestantism on the other. Rather,the Anglicanism established during the Elizabethan Settlement and perpetrated thereafter within the Church of England must be understood in terms of *comprehension*—a comprehension wherein individuals and individuals within a National Church embody in dynamic tension a complex unity of principles that are all too often thought to be opposite and exclusive, when they are in reality equally valid and complementary. Maurice argued that this ideal of comprehensiveness, which he identified as the greatest strength of the Englilsh Church, implies the affirmation of truth wherever it may be found, and the rejection of error whatever its source. The Church of England, he concluded, when it is at its best will therefore comprehend within itself whatever is discerned to be true and beneficial (that is, in accordance with the three interrelated Anglican authorities of Scripture, tradition, and reason), and will exclude all that is contrary.

In *The Kingdom of Christ*, Maurice employed this *via media* methodology in his effort to bring about understanding and reconciliation between conflicting Christian and Anglican factions. In the first volume, he analyzed Quakerism, "Pure" Protestantism (that is, Lutheranism, Calvinism, Zwinglianism, and Arminianism), Unitarianism, Roman Catholicism, and other current religious, philosophical, and political movements. He identified what he discerned to be *the* basic positive principle or truth in each of these various movements, readily acknowledging the validity which every positive insight possesses. Then, however, he immediately proceeded to show how in every case the positive "principle" fails to maintain itself by being forced into an exclusivist, self-contained "system."[7] The subsequent negations of the truths inherent in the positive principles of other Christian movements, he argued, are also compounded into the theological "systems" which divide human beings and shatter the unity of Christ's Church.[8]

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[6] For a mature expression of Maurice's fully developed understanding of the Anglican *via media* as comprehension rather than compromise, see his *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy*, 2vols. (London : Macmillan, 1890 [rpt. 1872]), 2 : 138—139, 192.

[7] On Maurice's positive use of the word "principle" and negative use of the words "notion" and "system," see Richard Norris, "Maurice on Theology," in Frank McLain, Richard Norris, and John Orens,ieds., *F. D. Maurice : A Study* (Cambridge, Mass. : Cowley Publications, 1982), pp. 10-16.

In Volume 2 of *The Kingdom of Christ*, Maurice recognized and described the true "hidden hunger" manifest in all of the partial theological systems in and among their divisive tendencies. He then attempted to alleviate these distortions by appealing to the Bible, which he interpreted as manifesting a succession of progressive covenantal relations between God and humankind first in terms of family, then of nation, and finally of the catholic Church as the Kingdom of Christ.

When he finally turned his attention specifically to the Church of England, Maurice pointed out that the Anglican communion is only one branch of the true church. He felt, however, that the foundational principles to which the English church was called to bear witness were being denied by the humanmade factions within the English church, namely, by the Anglo...Catholics or the High Church Party, by the Evangelicals or the Low Church party, and by the Lati itudinarians or the Broad Church party. Each of these Anglican factions, he observed, tends to become just as narrow and divisive as any sect, but between them they outline the basic principles to which any branch of the universal Church ought to bear witness. The fact that these conflicting parties can and do stay together in one communion testifies to the divine union which the Church as the Kingdom of Christ was meant to proclaim to the world.

3. The Relation of Christianity to the World Religions

Maurice delivered the Robert Boyle lectures in London during 1845 and 1846, and they were published the following year under the title *The Religions of the World and Their Relations to Christianity*. In this work, he built upon the same theological principles and utilized the same *via media* methodology that he had used in *The Kingdom of*

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[8] Murphy has given the following excellent description of the highly dialectical *via media* methodology utilized by Maurice in *The Kingdom of Christ*: "This method is exercised through a continual contraposition of one truth against another, of one truth against the whole truth, of a truth against the ensemble of the system which enshrines it, of a truth against a pattern of practical denial of it, of a truth against the material counterfeit which it almost inevitably calls forth', ("The Ecumenical Theology of F. D. Maurice," pp. 56-57. Sykes called this method of analyzing and reconciling the partial truths of opposed pariies "excessively synthetic" *The Integrity of Anglicanism*, p. 17).

Christ to seek understanding and reconciliation among some of the conflicting factions within Christianity.[9] In Part 1 of the Boyle Lectures, "The Religions of the World" (the first set of four lectures delivered in 1845), Maurice proposed to carry out the following "experiment":

> to examine the great Religious Systems which present themselves to us in the history of the world, not going into their details, far less searching for their absurdities, but inquiring what is their main characteristical principle. If we find...good in each of them, we shall desire to know what this good is, and under what conditions it may be preserved and made effectual.[10]

In Part 2, "Relations of the Religions of the World with Christianity" (the second set of four lectures delivered in 1846), he considered the relation in which Christianity stands with regard to each of the different faiths considered in Part 1.

In the first lecture of Part 1, Maurice stated that he did not intend to treat the diverse religions "in their historical order, but rather according to the extent of the influence they have exerted over mankind." This principle led him to deal in the first three lectures with "the great prevailing faiths of the world," namely, Islam (the balance of Lecture 1), Hinduism (lecture 2), and Buddhism (Lecture 3). In the fourth lecture, he considered the "defunct" pagan religions which, he argued, even though they now belong to history, still continue to exert great influence at the present day; in this chapter he dealt with the religions of the Old Persians (Zoroastrianism), the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Romans and the Goths and other Norsemen. Since he regarded Judaism and its relation to Christianity as being special and distinct from all the previous religions, discussion of this tradition was deferred to the first lecture of Part 2.

It is of more than passing historical interest and significance to see just how Maurice treated each of these religious traditions, to find out what he found to be the strengths and the weaknesses of each, and to reflect upon how he related each of those strengths and weaknesses to Christianity.

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[9] See notes 6 and 8 above. Herbert G. Wood has given the following summary of Maurice's *via media* methodology in *The Religions of the World*: "His task...is to discover the elements of truth in other religions, to show how Christianity, rightly understood, can do justice to them, to admit that in actual fact Christianity has needed the corrective contained in the insights of other faiths, to suggest that Christianity, again rightly understood, can supply what is lacking in other faiths". *Frederick Denison Maurice* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1950). pp. 77-78.

[10] *The Religions of the World and Their Relations to Christianity*, 4th ed. (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1861), p. 10.

a. Islam.

Maurice identified the basic first principle of Islam as its belief in an absolute living God and the demand for submission to his will as the law of the universe. He exhorted Christians to be taught by Muslims to believe, and to act upon the belief, that every individual and nation exist for the purpose of doing battle to exterminate falsehood and drive evil out of God's universe. But, Maurice continued, since this first principle of Islam is not counterbalanced by another principle which recognizes that the Will governing all things is a loving or self sacrificing Will, that initial principle continually changes into a counterfeit of itself. Hence, in Maurice's accountg Muslism belief in the mighty, living, acting Will of a Personal Being passes into its opposite- the acknowledgment of a dead necessity, a Fate, against which there is no struggling but only a submission that can only lead in the end to despair. Maurice observed that this distortion or "temptation" of Meslims toward "fatalism" is also a temptation of Christians—especially of Augustinian and Calvinist predestinarians, and that Christians in all ages and at all times must beware of falling into this same error.[11]

b. Hinduism.

Maurice found a direct opposite to Islam in what he identified as the positive principle of life and belief in the oldest religion of India, Hinduism. He discovered the end or goal of Islam in action, while he discerned that of Hinduism to be in rest. For Islam, God is Will, while for Hinduism Brahman is Intelligence. He compared and contrasted submission and obedience in Islam with contemplation and mystical absorption in Hinduism. The real *key* to the whole Hindu "system", however, Maurice found in its adherents' experience of and teaching about the twice-born human being, this experience of being twice-born, he argued, lay behind the privileges of that caste of Brahmin priests who aspire to be (and find that they actually *are*) one with Brahman, whom they contemplate and adore.

Maurice acknowledged validity and truth in the Hindu desire for converse and relationship with a Living Being in the unseen world.

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[11] Maurice indicates elsewhere that there is a particularly strong tendency within calvinism to fall into the temptation of Muslim fatalism; see *The Kingdom of Christ: or Hints to a Quaker Respecting the Principles, Constitution and ordinances of the Catholic Church*, 2 vols., ed. Alec R. Vidler, based on the 1842 ed. (London~~: SCM~~, 1958), 1:106-108, 115-123.

Moreover, he found the emphasis upon the experience of being twice-born to be as characteristic of the Christian faith as it is of Hinduism. The Chrisitan Church, he pointed out, claims to be a society of twice-born people who witness to the privilege which *all* humans have of conversing with the Unseen and Infinite. Maurice saw these true insights discerned by Hindus changing into their opposites or counterfeits, however, because of an inability on the part of Hindu mystics to distinguish sufficiently between the being of God and that of the world—including the selves which contemplate and adore Brahman. Hence, according to Maurice, Hinduism in the end yields to the temptations of polytheism and priestcraft. In keeping with the dialectic of his *via media* methodology, Maurice was quick to follow this negative judgment upon Hinduism by observing that these same erroneous tendencies to which the Hindus have acquiesced have been and remain temptations not just for Christians past and present but for human nature at large.[12]

Maurice found another striking correspondence between Hinduism and Christianity concerning the necessity of sacrifice and the blessing it brings. But, he continued ;

> it is just in the point of deepest sympathy with this ancient people that we arrive at the secret of our opposition. Upon the question to whom the Sacrifice should be offered, whether by it we apropitiate a Siva, or surrender ourselves in faith and trust to Him who cares for us and loves us; whether it is to overcome the reluctance of an enemy, or is the offering of our own reluctant wills to a Father in the name of one who has presented and is ever presenting His own filial and complete Sacrifice—upon this issue, let us understand it well, our controversy with Hinduism turns.[13]

c. Buddhism.

Maurice related what he regarded as the main principle of Buddhism to the popular revolt in India against the priestly exclusivism of the Brahmin caste. Buddhism, he argued, is at one with Hinduism in contemplating Pure Intelligence and in seeking absorption into Him. But, he continued, Buddhists rejected the notion that a caste of priests is necessary for such worship, and therefore denied the reality of that Hindu distinction between human beings which was implicit in the doctrine of the twice-born person.

Maurice, as a Christian believer and apologist, claimed that the profound respect for the human spirit found within Buddhism reached its highest expression and fulfilment in Christianity. But, he argued,

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[12] *The Religions of the World*, p. 178.

[13] *The Religions of the World*, pp. 177-178; compare pp. 61-62.

Buddhism went on erroneously to develop a monastic tradition which manifested a powerful tendency toward an ascetic renunciation of the temporal world and a total negation of the self. Maurice identified two dangerous tendencies deriving from this proclivity toward the establishment of monastic orders—temptations to which Buddhists have succumbed and which have continued through the ages to plague Christians as well. The first is found in the record of monastic religious orders which nobly rise up to reform society, and end by becoming complacent in their wealth and even more intolerable despots than those against whom they originally protested. Maurice found these dangerous tendencies associated with the establishment of religious orders, whether Buddhist or Christian, in the history of Mysticism and Quietism:

> Individuals went on, till their hearts grew puffed up and proud, till they began to boast of wonderful discoveries vouchsafed to them alone, till they became the subjects of all nervous impressions, fantasies, disorders, more sensual than those whom they charged with being so.[14]

In discussing Buddhism as a social system, Maurice noticeably focused upon Tibetan Buddhism with its teaching about the Dali Lama as the one in whom the spirit of the Buddha supremely dwells and as the supreme representative of Perfect Intelligence. Maurice clearly focused upon this particular Buddhist tradition and its teaching so that he could counter the figure and role of the Dali Lama with the Christian claim concerning Jesus Christ, namely that there is but *one* perfect Utterance of the Divine Voice, *one* perfect image of the Divine Substance, *one* in whom the Fullness of God was pleased to dwell, who, because He humbled Himself, has been exalted to be the High Priest of the *whole* human race forever.[15]

d. "Defunct" Pagan Religions.

In examining pagan religions of the past which are now "defunct" but still continue to exert considerable influence in the contemporary world, Maurice first examined the religion of the ancient Persians. Zoroaster, he said, rose up as the witness for Ormuzd, the Lord of Light, to testify that light comes from him, and not from the outward material things whose Lord is Ahriman, the Lord of Darkness. Maurice found the substance of the old Persian faith in the conviction that Ormuzd would at last triumph in the cosmic battle with Ahriman; Maurice affirmed the truth and validity of this claim that the Kingdom of Light is mightier than the Kingdom of Darkness. But, according to Maurice, the distortion within Zoroastrianism is to be found in the tendency to deny God's dominion over the temporal world, resulting in the justification of licentious indulgence and the overall destruction of morality. Maurice concluded that early Christians, seduced by these Persian speculations, produced some of the darkest of the dualistic heresies which plagued the ancient church-namely, Gnosticism and Manichaeism.

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[14] *The Religions of the World*, pp. 207-208.

[15] *The Religions of the World*, p. 195; compare pp. 201-202.

The religion of the ancient Egyptians was the second of the "defunct religion" to be analyzed by Maurice. This tradition was, he observed, permeated by images derived from the animal Kingdom. The Egyptians, Maurice thought, rightly intuited that there is something sacred beneath and expressed by visible things; they rightly questioned all of nature to tell of Ammon, the hidden God. This Egyptian perception of a mysterious meaning lying at the root of all things exercised a remarkable influence over Jews, Greeks, and early Christians—especially those living in the Greek cities of Egypt. The ancient Egyptians, Maurice concluded, were by divine design among those addressed by early Christian evangelists with the words: "the hidden God whom you seek, Him we proclaim to you".

Maurice opposed the ancient Greeks to the Egyptians as the ones who regarded the bright, clear human form as expressing the dominion of human intelligence over the animal. This thesis led him to argue that the most prominent divinity among the Greeks was Apollo, who was regarded as the teacher of wisdom, the model of human beauty, and the source of harmony. Yet, Maurice continued, the Greeks were also perceptive enough to recognize that all of their gods were themselves subject to an unknown and overriding Fate. Furthermore, in their Mysteries, they manifested their sense of something too sacred for utterance or for any image to represent, yet which must nevertheless lie at the very root of all thuman life and civilization. Maurice concluded by stating that all which was good and true in Greek mythology was met at every point by the Christian Gospel. The Greeks asked for one who should exhibit humanity in its perfection; they were offered a Son of Man who was declared to be the divine Son of God; They had a world without a center; the preachers of the Gospel made the Center know to them.

Maurice found the key principle in the religion of the ancient Romans to be theif valid sense of divine order as made manifest in the family and the nation. The bonds of family life, Maurice maintained, were viewed by the Romans as the necessary basis and continual support of the commonwealth. Rome, the capitol where Jupiter dwelt, was the center giving cohesion to the entire civilized world.

Eventually, however, a visible Emperor took the place of that previously invisible Law and Presence; Not surprisingly, Maurice declared this Roman tendency toward worshipping the State and the Emperor, who was believed to be its living embodimet, to be perverted and evil. With the arrival of Christianity, however, all that was distorted in the religion of the ancient Romans was corrected, while all that was best and true in their former beliefs and yearnings was fulfilled through the proclamation of Jesus Christ as a King who, unlike an earthly Emperor, is the perfect fulfilment of Law and the Center of the true universal society.

The last of the "defunct" pagan religions considered by Maurice was that of the Goths and other Norsemen. He discerned in the religion of these North Europeans the mighty power of death and darkness struggling to draw all creatures into itself, and even mightier powers of good struggling against it. The Norsepeople were haunted by ideas of consuming fires that destroy what is corrupt, of life coming out of death, of second birth and resurrection. For Maurice, these people could find no clue for solving the strange mystery. Yet they felt that it was near them, and that there would be some bright sun which would one day came forth to scatter the shadows and show all things in their true relations and proportions. Maurice concluded that, although among much confusion, these north-European barbarians welcomed the tidings of a Redeemer in whom they could recognize both their Lord and their brother;

e. Judaism.

Maurice, because he perceived that Judaism was related to Christianity in a special way that differentiated it from all the other world religions, deferred discussion of this tradition to the beginning of Part 2 of *The World Religions*. He justified this special treatment by arguing that the first promulgation of the Jewish faith, as recorded in the Old Testament, is held in reverence by Christians as well as Jews. Maurice regarded the key principles of the Old Testament as being held in common by Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, namely: (1) faith in the existence and the unity of God as a Living Being who acts, speaks, and rules; (2) belief in God as the Lord of All who makes His Will known to humans by "speaking" so that they can hear and obey His Voice; and (3) recognition of the need for a written record of God's utterances in a Divine Book of Revelation.

In turning to Judaism as a religion, however, Maurice made a sharp distinction between what he interpreted to be the living principles of the Old Testament on the one hand, and later extrabiblical Judaism on the other. In extra- or post-biblical Judaism, he argued, those living principles derived from the Old Testament have become dead letters for empty disputation. Maurice contended that in Judaism, the acknowledgment of the Divine Unity has degenerated into a dry formula among the orthodox and has been lost in panthesistic phrases among the liberals and intellectuals. The orthodox, Maurice argued, stifle the Divine Book under piles of rabbinical interpretation, while the liberals avail themselves of phrases about a Living Voice so that they may throw off the burden of those interpretations and, in fact, the Book which those interpretations were written to oppress.

Maurice, in this uncharacteristic and more than usually vitriolic argument against Judaism, found the major perversion or distortion of truth in the Rabbis' mistaken interpretation of Israel's election by God as an exclusive possession which set the Jews apart from all other nations. Both Christianity and Islam part company with Judaism, he continued, by their claims to be universal religious seeking a truly universal society. Christians affirm that Jesus Christ, the Messiah, is the foundation and Lord of this universal Kingdom. The true function of Israel's election by God, from Maurice's Christian point of view, was to bear witness that *all* nations belong to the Divine Order and have God as their Loving Creator and Invisible Lord. In Maurice's thought, *every* nation has been elected to perform specific tasks in service of the universal fellowship of nations.

Maurice's analysis and interpretation of Judaism is obviously biased and inadequate, and this particular chapter is probably the weakest and most unsatisfactory of all those published in *The World Religions*. Even in terms of his own theological principles and *via media* methodology, he should have been more aware of his own tendencies toward Christian exclusiveness and divisiveness in this particular context.

However, given the highly dialectical nature of Maurice's *via madia* methodology utilized throughout the other sections of *The World Religions* and his other major works, it should probably come as no great surprise to observe that when he is close to being at his worst he is also near to being at his best. For at the conclusion of this very deficient and unappreciative chapter on Judaism, while still reflecting upon the unique contribution which *every* nation has to make to the universal fellowship of nations, Maurice left his readers with a passage filled with great spiritual power and truly inclusive catholicity :

> Only if our cultivation be of that kind which is truly human, which delights to discern the essential humanity of each nation, to honour it, to sympathize with it, shall we understand that which is peculiar in our subjects, or reform that which is

corrupt in them. Only if we have received the Gospel as the answer from heaven to inward perplexities which we have a thousand times tried to stifle, but could not; only if we have learned that these perplexities are groans of the human spirit within us crying for deliverance; can we with honest confidence speak to that spirit in whatever region it dwells, in whatever language, clear or inarticulate, it utters its voice.[16]

4. Conclusion

Maurice delivered his Boyla Lectures and published *The Religions of the World* (1847) at a time when the scientific or comparative study of religion was just beginning. His repetitive use of his particular version of the Anglican *via media* method to find the *one* or *two* key ideas or beliefs in each of the world religions, which are then demonstrated to deteriorate into their opposites or counterfeits, leaves the contemporary reader with the impression of being far too schematic and oversimplistic in dealing with the complexities and diversities of the various schools and traditions which we now know to exist within each and every one of the world religions.

Maurice's particular manner of applying his *via media* methodology to each of the world religions also reveals the powerful Christian bias of what can only in the long run be described as his apologetic efforts. His commitment to the principles of the Triune God as the only foundation for human unity, to Christ as the only-begotten Son of God and Head of everyperson, and to the supremacy of Christianity among the world religions clearly prevented him from studying other religions objectively for their own sakes.

Furthermore, in light of the current state of knowledge about the world religions, definite gaps in his information and errors of judgment are easy to identify. For example, he was mistaken in holding that the original religion of the Hindu Vedas was monotheistic rather than polytheistic; he specified sacrifice as an essential ingredient of Hindu belief, but he did not mention reincarnation. In his discussion of Buddhism, he did not distinguish between the Theravada and the Mahayana traditions. He said that the three great religious systems of China (Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism) coexisted side by side without ever combining, thereby overlooking the rise of Ch'an Buddhism. His unifying conception of Christ as the Center prevented him from accepting the revelation of the Old Testament as interpreted by later Jews as a valid revelation of God in their own experience, thereby undermining the building of the trust and mutual respect so necessary for maintaining the ongoing Jewish-Christian dialogue.

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[16] *The Religions of the World*, p. 182.

Nevertheless, in spite of these and other limitations, Maurice's position is--especially when compared with his contemporaries and many of his successors--remarkably enlightencd, and he did anticipate many of the insights of the rising "history of religions school." For example, he was acutely aware of the tension between the Christian claim to absoluteness over against the relativity of the historical and manifestations of *all* religion, including Christianity itself :

> Might not particular soils be adaptee to particular religions? Might not the effort to transplant the one into another involve the necessity of mischievous forcing, and terminate in inevitable disappoint-ment?[17]

This awareness of the influence of culture upon religious expression also makes him sensitive to the dangres of an acculturated Christianity, along with necessity of separating the Christian Gospel from notionalism and social or economic classes :

> A faith which boasts to be for humanity cannot test its strength unless it is content to deal with men in all possible conditions. If it limits itself to England, it will adapt itself to the habits and fashions and prejudices of England, of England too in a particular age.[18]

Hence, although Maurice is committed to the superiority of Christianity among the world religions, he is able to acknowledge that Christianity itself is often If not usually distorted by social and cultural conditions throughout history, and that those distortions must be judged as deficient and falling short of the glory of God. This ability of self-criticism, of judging oneself and one's own religious tradition, is an absolutely necessary prerequisite with regard to all serious participants engaged in interfaith dialogue.

Another distinctive theme which recurs throughout *The World Religions* anticipates the thesis of "original monotheism" (*Urmonotheismus*) argued by Father Wilhelm Schmidt in *Der Urspring der Gottesides* (12 volumes, 1912-1955), although Maurice's position is based more upon speculative interpretation of religious texts rather than upon data derived from a cultural-historical approach to the study of religion. The thesis that the earliest religious experience of humankind reflects the worship of a "high God" is reflected not only in Maurice's treatment of the monothesistic religions of Christinity, Islam, and Judaism, but also in his accounts of the original monotheism of the early Vedas in Hinduism; the developmect in Buddhism from theism to atheism to pantheism to the deification of human saints or heroes; the process in Egyptian religion whereby the various characteristics of the Godhead very soon became gods; and the diffusion of the light and wisdom concentrated in the central figure of Apollo in Greek mythology into different forms, male and female, each having some particular locality and presenting some different aspect to the Greek mind.

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[17] *The World Religions*, p. 3; compare Ernst Troeltsch, *The Absoluteness of Christianity and the Hisrory of Religions*, trans. David Reid (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1971).

[18] *The World Religions*, p, 243.

There are some passages in *The World Religions* where Maurice seems to advocate the Christian exclusivism represented in our own century by the theological position of Karl Barth in his essay on "The Revelation of God as the Abolition of Religion."[19] For instance, Maurice sometimes argued that religions must be regarded as human inventions and idolatrous, whereas Christianity is grounded in the initiative of God and divine Revelation. More specifically, he claimed that all the acts, services, and sacraments of the Brahmin priests imply an effort or scheme on the part of the creature to raise himself to God, whereas all Christian acts, services, and sacraments imply that God has sought for the creature that He may raise him to Himself. Or again, Maurice described the Buddhist as starting from a human perspective, and then denied that a human being can originate anything.

Such apparently "exclusivist" passages must, however, be set in the broader context of Maurice's dialectical *via media* method of relating Christianity to other religions. He saw the various religions arising from what he regarded as a valid attempt to express and solve the basic problems of human existence. Each religious tradition in its own way lays bare true spiritual problems of human life; but, he always added, none expresses the whole truth. Distortion and error inevitably arise, for instead of believing that God Himself will take the initiative as the Revealer and the Deliverer, humans always become anxious and try to know God by their own reason and to redeem themselves by their own works and sacrifices. This preverse and idolatrous way of seeking salvation ultimately leads people either into pride or into hopeless despair.[20]

Recognition of this "human" side of all religion, including Christianity, is intimately related to Maurice's identification of the crisis of belief in his own day as grounded in the secularist humanism which looks upon all theology and religion as having their origin in the nature add faculties of human beings.[21]

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[19] *Church Dogmatics*, ed. and trans. G. W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 280-354.

[20] See Torben Christensen, *The Divine Order A Study in F. D. Murice's Theology* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), pp. 105-106.

> This was assumed to be the explanation of other systems, why not apply it to Christianity ? The questions we have asked are, Is it the adequate explanation of *any* system ? Do not *all* demand another ground than the human one ? Is not Christianity the consistent assertor of that higher ground ? Does it not distinctly and consistently refer vvery human feeling and consciousness to that ground ? Is it not *for this reason* able to interpret and reconcile the other religions of the earth ? Does it not in this way prove itself *not* a human system, but *the* Revelation, which human beings require ?[22]

The balance and comprehensiveness of Maurice's inclusivist theological principles and *via media* methodology reflected in this and similar passages demonstrate that he did recognize revealing and saving powers in all religions. He was thereby enabled to approach the plurality of the diverse world religions wite respect and a genuine spirit of inquiry. His belief in the Divine Logos which enlightens the mind of eaery person, and his commitment to the principle that the cosmic Christ through whom all things have been created also redeems *all* human beings, made it possible for him in good conscience to seek freely and recognize truth wherever he could find it, to listen carefully to whar others believe, and to learn from them without abandoning the truth and reality which he discerned in his own Christian inheritance. The very principles of his own Christian faith and his *via media* methodology called him not only to hear and undertstand but also to assimilate and transform the wisdom found in the other religions of humankind; in that process he himself and his faith were deepened and transformed.

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[21] Brose asserts that "Maurice saw more keenly perhaps than any other Englishman of his day, the nature of this unbelief". *Frederick Denison Maurice*, p. xxii.

[22] *The World Religions*, p. 240.

4

Death and Survival

Sukumar Agarwal

Death means the end or extinction of life and is a normal natural phenomenon as all life ends in death and all those who are born must die one day. It is a total and permanent cessation of existence. All vital functions stop after death. The branch of knowledge dealing with scientific discourse of death is called thanatology. Life is a co-ordinated activity of physique or physical body, mind or psyche and soul or self. Sensations and intelligence are a part of mind. Even soul is an extended part of mind. Soul is consciousness and life force. Brain stem is the seat of consciousness. A person dies when the brain stem stops functioning. Bhagwad Gita, the Hindu scripture has called, "death as the last truth of life". Dr. Sigmund Freud has pronounced "death as the ultimate goal of life". Death is a reality from whom none can escape whether he is a king, physician or philosopher.

Death is of two types.[1] Somatic or systematic or clinical death is the complete cessation of the function of brain, heart and lungs; This type of death is assessed by the clinical diagnosis indicating that brain, heart and lungs have stopped their functions. Molecular or cellular death is the end of the functioning of the tissues and cells responsible for bringing the body to the temperature of the surrounding environment. Cellular death occurs usually about 3 to 4 hours of the clinical death and is accompained by changes in the skin, eyes, muscles, visceras and blood. It is because the cells continue to function for a few hours after the somatic death due to their intrinsic surviving capacity by the presence of glucose and oxygen in the cells.

For practical purposes, somatic or clinical death is of importance. Life is basically maintained by brain, heart and lungs, called the 'tripod of life'. On this basis, there are primarily three modes of death in which either brain or heart or lungs fail first and are called coma, syncope and asphyxia respectively.

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[1] I. P. Modi and N. J. Modi, *Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology*, (Bombay, N. M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., 1972), p. 108.

Coma means deep sleep, unconsciousness and loss of sensation terminating in death which is because of the involvement of vital centres in the brain stem resulting in the stoppage of function of brain. The pre-coma condition is called stupor in which an individual can be aroused by deep touch; pain, hot and cold sensations and has exaggerated reflexes. During coma, the individual does not respond to both external stimuli and internal emotions. The reflexes are lost, all sphincters are relaxed, pupils are usually dialated though sometimes contracted but always non-reacting, or very mildly reacting to light, body temperature becomes usually sub-normal though it is raised in heartstroke and lesions of pons varolii, respiration becomes low, irregular with laboured sounds called death rattles due to collection of mucous in bronchioles, bronchi and traches. The important causes of coma are compression of brain from injuries of brain or skull, brain haemorrhage, embolism, throumbosis, malignant and benign growths, abscesses and inflammation; epilepsy, heat stroke and frost bite; exogenous poisons like alcohol,brabiturate and opium; endogenous toxims liberated from diseases or hypofunctioning of liver, kidneys and pancreas resulting in cholesmia,uraemia and acetonaemia respectively.

Synope is thc transient unconsciousness and fainting fit resulting in decrease of circulation with or without decrease in respiration because of cardiac arrest: Syncope is a condition in which heart stops its function first which may result in death if the functioning of heart is not revived. During syncope, the body becomes pale, skin cold, pupils dilated, with dimness of vision, restlessness with premonition of impending death, pulse weak, blood pressure falling, respiration gasping with feeling of nausea and vomitting. Here, the individual initially retains consciousness. Cause of syncope are external or internal haemorrhage resulting in anaemia; sudden shock from danger, attack, injury and acute temperature fluctuation resulting in stimulation of vagus nerve, which stops the heart; heart diseases like infarction, fatty degeneration, valvular diseases and toxins reducing the functioning of heart muscles called asthenia and chronic debilitating diseases.

Asphyxia means suffocation when respiratory system stops its functioning first. Asphyxia, in reality, results from the deprivation of oxygen to the tissues at the cellular level. Self induced asphyxia is seen in Yogis and occult mystics who voluntarily stop their respiration called suspended animation and are believed to survive like hibernating animals. During asphyxia, initially there is difficulty in inspiration followed by dyspnoea in both inspiration and expiration. This is followed by convulsions because of increased level of carbondioxide reaching the central nervous system by blood. The pulse becomes rapid, limbs are cyanosed, sphincters relaxed and the individual begins to lose consciousness. Ultimately, exhaustion occurs and respiration fails completely. Causes of asphyxial deaths are mechanical obstruction as in suffocation during drowning, accumulated respiratory secretions, foreign bodies, strangulation and hanging; pathological obstruction as in laryngeal diphtheria, pneumonia, tumours, bronchospasm and glottis spasm; paralysis of brain centres of respiration as in barbiturate and opium poisioning, diseases of lungs, tetanus, deficiency of oxygen at high altitudes and sudden exposure to cold.

The important signs of death are stoppage of functioning of brain, heart and lungs resulting in flat elcctrocencephologram (E. E. G.), absence of all reflexes, flat Electro-cardio-gram (E.C.G.) with absence of pulse, blood pressure and respiration. In eyes, the pupils become dilated and fixed with absence of corneal, conjunctival and light reflexes. The body cools to the environmental temperature within 24 hours. The muscles initially become flaccid in primary relaxation which lasts for 2 to 4 hours, then become stiff in rigormortis or cadaveric rigidity lasting for 20 to 48 hours and finally again become soft in secondary relaxation. The dead putrefies and decomposes by the action of micro-organisms and enzymes with greenish-purple discoloration of skin and release of foul smelling gases. In a few cases, saponification and waxy adipocere formation occurs of the dead body instead of putrefaction as in drowning or other cases with body lying in watery soil. Sometimes, mummification may occur with shrivelling of dead body particularly in dry, windy hot summers.

The general conception of death has been challenged in various ways. The yogic-mystics and occultists have power of voluntarily inducing death like trance state without any perceptible heart beat, pulse, respiration and measurable blood pressure.[2] Even their sensations are lost and have no reflexes with dialated, unreacting fixed pupils. In rare instances, ants and termites have brought mud and burrowed their homes on their body. Even then the Yogis survived after awakening from the state of trance. There have been yogis who have indwelled themselves in the caves dug underground with the mud covered over them. Electrocardiogram machine, sphygmomanometer and stethoscope were fitted on the yogi with the machine connected by long tubes. When the yogi went in the state of trance the pulse dis-appeared, blood pressure became un-recordable and the electrocardiogram flat. When after the stipulated time, the cave was dug, the yogi revived from the state of trance. The stethoscope had heart beat, sphygmomanometer recorded blood pressure and electrocardiogram became normal. This voluntarily induced suspended animation is like the hibernation of cold blooded animals like amphibians and reptiles when their oxygen and food requirement as well as their physiological activity becomes minimal. As mammals have evolved from reptiles, their unconscious mind has the past experiences of hibernating and man being an intelligent animal can regulate his autonomic nervous system according to his will and desire.[3] There have been involuntary conditions of suspended animation after shocks from electricity, mechanical accidents, chemical burns and acute psychological trauma. There have been instances when individual declared dead by medical doctors after being thoroughly examined have woke up in in the graveyard at the time of burial. These facts baffle the medical sciences in their traditional attitude towards death.

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[2] *The Hindustan Times*, April 27, 1992, UNI and PTI reported that a woman emerged from Samadhi. Forty seven years old Keiko Aikawa, a Japanese woman lowered into a ten feet deep pit on April 21, and emerged unscathed from a four-day Samadhi without food. water and air.

Another problem associated with death is the irreversibly damaged brain and the normally functioning heart and lungs. In such cases, if glucose-water and other necessities are supplied regularly intravenously or to the stomach by gastric feeding tube, the comatosed individual can survive for years. Even if the heart and lungs stop functioning, pumps and machines working as artificial heart and lungs can be employed. If the deep coma is reversible, these techniques are justified. But, if the brain, damage is irreversible, there is no justification on in employing these artificial manoeuvres, because death of brain means the death of the individual self. When brain has died, the self is no more, even though other organs of the body may continue to function normally. Even the whole comatosed body of an individual can be freezed and preserved by artificial monoeuvres for a long time and he can become normal after a period on removing the defects.

Organ transplantation after somatic death but before cellular death has become of great importance in the present surgical and scientific era. As the individual has necessarily died at the time of somatic death, his organs like kidneys, heart and eye retina can be used by other human beings who need them. These organs can be used and transplanted before cellular death which takes about three to four hours of somatic death.

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[3] Hereward Carrington, *The Storyof Psychic Science*, (New York, Ives Washburn publisher, 1931), p. 184. Tarah Bey, Rahman Bey and Hamid Bey demonstrated at Paris and other European and American cities in the early half of this century the capability of varying pulse rate in different parts of the body as well as to start or stop bleeding from wounds at their will.

Another question associated with death is the right to suicide. Homicide is undoubtedly wrong, but is suicide justifiable ? An individual should be free to take his life if he so desires. It is strange that most countries punish the individual who fails in his attempt to commit suicide. Suicide is committed by mentally diseased persons in a bid to free themselves of their physical disability and social stress or because of their intrinsically deranged mind with a suicidal tendency. If the individual is intrinsically mentally ill, he should not be punished, because due to his ill mind, he is incapable of taking a proper decision Secondly, he should be treated by a psychiatrist. If social circumstances have stressed him so much as to commit suicide, the society and not the individual is resposible for his decision. However, in such cases, a suicidal tendency is always there which is precipitated by social stress. Even, if he commits suicide, a mentally diseased person has died which is a burden on the society. Also, he will attempt to commit suicide in future. In a severely ill, physically disabled person who is bearing constant and irreversible pain and suffering, suicide should be allowed on humanitarian grounds. Even a physician should be allowed to make him die a painless death if the person so desires by death machine or otherwise. In all cases of suicidal attempts and tendencies, the death instinct abnormally becomes stronger than the normally much stronger life instinct,

Premonition by the same person or by other persons regarding his death can be explained by a clear view of certain tendencies and correct interpretation of varions facts including the understanding of his physical and mental health. The future of anything is governed by the present status of that thing, the course of change and the effects of surrounding environment on it. Also, if a person takes the prophecy of a person regarding his death to be true, he may actually die at the prophecied time due to heart feilure as a result of fear and by regulation of autonomic nervous system. At the time of death, mental confusion occurs in some persons which may result in visuo-auditory hallucinations. These facts precipitated by the potential ideas of such beliefs are responsible for a dying person talking about spiritual visions. In some dying persons, the mind becomes more active with clearer ideas along with better exploration of unconscious mind which results in better understanding of certain issues and forecasting some predictions which prove to be true in due course of time.

Post mortem survival is not of the physical body as it decomposes and mixes with the earth. 'Dust thouart and unto dust thou shall returneth' is a great biblical saying. But does the personality as mind or soul survive after death ? One is baffled at the idea of accepting that life is temporary and transient and all its pleasures are few and far between. All attractions of life are transient and end in eternal darkness of death with dissolved ego and self. The perfection for which an individual strives for his whole life comes to be deceitful. Whatever may be true, it is however certain that human beings with limited perception and thinking by the five senses and mind can only think of death as the end of everything. Annihilation of an individual at the time of death is the only acceptable answer to a scientific mind. Everything in apparent form dissolves, decays and destroys with time. Of course, the cases of children speaking of their previous lives and cases of trance in which an individual communicates to dead persons should be thoroughly studied in a scientific spirit.[4]

Survival after death of an individual is there in several forms. There is an end of the physical body and mind in concrete form but existence of an individual remains as—

(i) Biological immortality as continuation of genes of the individual in his offsprings. The progeny is continued after the psycho-biological make up of the parents. But only fifty percent genes of an indididual psss in the next generarion which continues to be diluted in the subsequent generations. The new scientific techniques have so evolved that sperms and ova have been stored in freezers and can be used even after several years of death of an individual. By this scientific manipulation, the individual can reproduce even after his death.

(ii) Social immortality is the survival of a person by his words, works, achievements and deeds. Social immortality is seen only in human beings unlike biological immortality shared by all forms of life. Social immortality is present in human beings because human societies have given importances to intellectual, spiritual, physical, ethical, cultural and character aspects of human personality because of highly evolved human mind. There aspects and values when reached to great heights have made human beings immortal. The great noble and creative ideas and ideals are immortal and become eternal truths. A great work becomes a thing of goodness and beauty and works as inspiration, enlightenment and beaconlight to others.

(iii) Physical immortality may be considered to be present as the dead body decomposes and mixes with the elements of the earth. The basic elements of the physical body eternally remain in the world. Even the dead physical body can be preserved by use of certain chemicals for centuries as pyramids of Egypt.

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[4] Lodge, *The Survival of Man*, p. 221.

(iv) Survival of mind and soul as quasi-subtle body in some form is doubtful. Its existence outside the physical body is perhaps not possible as mind and consciousness, however evolved they may be, are the products of the physical organ of the body called brain. Denying its existence is a question mark on the rationality of the universe, but unless clear cut clues are found, immortality of the soul cannot be accepted.

Human beings have a fear of death, so the concept of endless duration of self has arisen. Death is the greatest fear of human beings. Human beings desire to be immortal and it is their sweet ardent wish that their selves as souls should exist forever. The unknown, dark and irrational powers of nature determine the human fate and destiny. The fear of death is because of the powerful life instinct present in all forms of life. The death instinct is the absence or reduction in the thrust of life instinct of the self but present normally as homicidal instinct which is indirectly also for the preservation of the self. It is because of the existence of life instinct that life has survived and because of it the intelligent and rational human being dreads death. However, there is some element of unconscious drive towards death which increases with advancing age because of physical and mental decay but it is too meagre in comparision to the survival instinct. The living organic matter has a tendency and wants to return to the primal form of inorganic matter from which it arose. Death is the eternal sleep and, in fact, a return to the pre-birth condition of an individual, At death, the physical body dissolves in the natural elements from which it was formed.

In India, soul is not only considered to be as something apart from the body and immortal as accepted by most religions of the world, but there is a concept of rebirth and transmigration of soul which is a part of the Indian culture.[5] Perhaps, there was a humanistic approach in propagating the idea of immortality and transmigration of soul. When it was seen that evil and wickedness enjoyed whereas truth and goodness suffered in this world because of imbibition of culturo-ethical values in their lives by good people, they were provided psychological satisfaction by religion that their goodness and virtues would be rewarded in their next lives. Belief in reincarnation and life after death are a result of irresistible wishes of survival which are justified by intellectual manipulation, blind faith and sentimental attachment. Causes of transmigration of soul and rebirth can be explained easily by other reasons. Religious concept of immortality of soul as something that survives death of the body as well as the Indian belief in rebirth and transmigration of soul has no scientific and medical basis till now.

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[5] B. L. Atreya, *Parapsychology* (Banaras, The International standard publications, 1957), Memory of past Lives. P-112.

5

Laudation for Leszek Kolakowski

Ija Lazari-Pawlowska

To decide on which part of the achievement of Professor Leszek Kolakowski—considering its volume, diversity and excellency—bring to relief in the present address was not an easy task. My address should not be very extensive given that all those present expect in the first place to hear the voice of the Laureate himself, once we are fortunate to play host to SUCH A SCHOLAR.

The Rector, Dr. Michal Sewerynski, presented the scholarly accomplishment of Dr. Kolakowski, pointing at his achievements in various spheres of humanist reflection—the achievements which brought to him the world fame greater than that of any other Polish philosopher.

When in the fall of 1945 all the twelve of us were beginning to study philosophy at the University of Lodz, we thought of ourselves as of philosophy students, but it was only Leszek Kolakowski who actually became a PHILOSOPHER. Those colleagues who, like myself, later became university teachers concentrated on logic, whereas I focused on ethics. Even though logic and ethics are counted among philosophical disciplines, neither logicians nor ethicians do "philosophize" in the sense in which philosophy is plied by Leszek Kolakowski. One does find, admittedly, among his writings the works in history of philosophy (or, more broadly, in history of ideas) highly appreciated for their original approach in giving account of the philosophizing of others, and yet his main creative passion is the philosophizing of his own.

What is it that the philosophers live by ? I still remember this question that Leszek Kolakowski did ask back in 1956 Then he attempted to define—but also to justify--the place philosophy holds in society. Later he kept coming back to the role of the philosopher, the style of his inquiry, the language in which he constructs his visions of the world, the legitimacy of the assertions he makes. Insofar as in his early years he presumed the "anthropocentrist' (as he himself called it) character of philosophical cognition—because the "consciousness of obligations placed on the individual by virtue of his participation in collective life" was of such a great importance to him—in his later years, after he had recognized the "autonomic ontological status of personality", he assumed that the main task of philosopher is certainly to undertake metaphysical problems. "Since times immemorial people have been asking 'What are we?' and 'What are we living for?'" "We never did, and probably never will, cease asking such questions. We will never rid ourselves of the temptation to perceive the world as some secret code the key to which we are persistently trying to find".

What do the philosophers live by ? By anxieties, by metaphysical anxieties—is what Leszek Kolakowski replies today.

He counts himself among the philosophers whose minds had been shaped to a considerable degree by the Enlightenment, and who would be loth to reject this heritage outright, and yet he is reluctant to accept it in all its totality:" "I think that we will always be asking ourselves the questions which cannot be constructed in terms of analytic mind, and yet our culture obligates us to consider these questions, to give answers to them, knowing fully well that scientifically valid answers can never be provided."

"In the light of what I think and feel, all the philosophical effort is directed mainly at exposing the illusory nature of all attempts at representing the world on the basis of empirical observations and logical thinking as the rational order."

Leszek Kolakowski abides by his self-critical incertitude, and it is capacity for self-critical incertitude that he considers the characteristic feature of our cultural tradition. While appreciating this tradition, he nevertheless comprehends —and perhaps more than comprehends; perhaps even shares—this need for certitude applied to the world "endowed with meaning"; the world in which there is some order that was pre-existing and not established by humans. Still, the intellectual discipline does not allow him to turn his eyes from the failings of philosophical arguments and conclusions. Aware of the potential existence of reasons counter to all metaphysical constructions; aware of their one-sidedness resulting from the assumption of arbitrary premises; conscious, finally, of the mutual untranslatability of languages in which individual philosophical schools articulate their visions of the world, he arrives at the conclusion that a philosopher who indicates some allegedly unquestionable universal order, is merely deluding himself. It is not to cure but to expose the crises of "philosophical knowledge" that Leszek Kolakowski wishes to do.

In religion the questions of "the meaning of the world", "the meaning of life" "the vocation of man" are presented differently since religion–the way Dr. Kolakowski perceives it–is neither a knowledge nor a collection of words, assertions, statements, but "a way of life in which understanding, trust and assumption of duty are blended in one act." Therefore, it seems that, given this conception of philosophy and this conception of religion, a human being yearning to find the KEY is more likely to find it in religion than in philosophy.

To ask final questions is the field of philosophy, whereas to point out that there are no final answers to the final questions within philosophy is meta-philosophy, that is reflections on philosophy at a critical distance. Perhaps it is precisely the combination of these two tasks that makes Leszek Kolakowski's writing such a fascinating reading ? After all, the satisfactions that the reader draws from his works are by no means only of intellectual order. These satisfactions are also of the sort given by the contact with the work of art. Professor Kolakowski once deemed (and rightly so), that "every one of the great philosophers by whom we live today is a work of art; is something valuable in itself and irreplaceable".

May I be allowed now to say a few words about the field of ethics, so important in Leszek Kolakowski's writings.

He held that the superiority of intellectuals resides in their competence in using words and so, should defining them as seducers be pertinent, then they cau seduce both for right and for wrong. And when it comes to telling right from wrong their teachings are not necessarily any less erratic than those of other people's,

How to tell good from evil since—as Leszek Kolakowski points out—there is not a single universally human intuition which could serve as a recourse in case of incompatible moral opinions ? What criteria are to be applied ? Professor Kolakowski seems to be in accord with this school of meta-ethics which assumes that ethics does not have any rational (meaning here; sufficiently substantiated by experience and logic) criteria, and thus one cannot prove absolutely that something is good but may only in relation to other more general values. After the question of rational legitimization of moral convictions has been settled with a negative result, he points to the tradition as to the possible point of support and says that "education for tolerance, for selflessness, for overriding tribal customs in favor of all-human solidarity, calls for powers which may originate ony with tradition; the powers which so far can be found mostly in the great universal religions".

One could take the methodological stance presented above and yet at the same time firmly and unequivocally plead for specific values. If some wished to perceive in the aforesaid certain sort of inconsistency (as I do not), Professor Kolakowski could rest the case by saying that he does not care for a model of consistently consistent man, and that he goes as far as proclaiming—within limits, to be sure—the praise of human inconsistency...

Professor Kolakowski has been acting for many years—and has been avidly listened to—as a spokesman for definite moral principles. He emphasizes personal dignity of every human individual, his "irreplaceability" and his "unsubstitutability". He commits himself as a champion of human rights and speaks for the democratic order in the world. He values toleration, hates fanaticism and warns against acts motivated by hate, envy, vengefulness, or craving for power...

In 1977 when the peace award of German booksellers—having among its former laureates Albert Schweitzer and Martin Buber, and posthumously Janusz Korczak—was being bestowed on Professor Kolakowski in Frankfurt, he delivered a lecture in which he called for education against hate, and education for dignity.

I would like to quote a few fragments of this lecture:

"That who recalls Spinoza's simple words 'Hate can never be good'; that who remembers St. Paul's admonition from his epistle to Romans 'Overcome evil with good', runs the risk of being hated as the enemy of the better world.

And so I repeat principles which may be considered the essence of what is not merely the best, but also the most indispensable to us, and the most unalterable in the moral teaching of many religious prophets and many great philosophers:

—that there is no right to hate, no matter what the circumstances;
—that to say that someone deserves to be hated is nonsense;
—that we are able to live without hate;
—that to renounce hate does not involve to renounce struggle..."

He spoke of the spirit of conciliation and readiness to compromise without cowardice or conformism; of the ability to reduce the excessive hostility without yielding in the crux of the matter—he spoke of it as of the capacity that no one is certainly given easily as a gift of nature. "However, it is on this ability that the fate of all demoratic order in the world depends".

He said that hate is this kind of evil which is not to be removed by any institutionalized actions. "In this case we are entitled—without incurring ridicule—to assume that every one of us while suppressing this evil within himself, contributes to its suppression in the world, and so carries within himself the shaky and fragile anticipation of a more tolerable life on this ship of fools of ours".

I think that the people in the former church of St. Paul who were listening to those words in 1977—and these were people of the cultural elite of Frankfurt—realized that there is a special wisdom and a special greatness of a philosopher when—having trod a long spiritual road—he manages to return to simple truths of simple human heart.

Dear Doctor Kolakowski !
Dear Leszek !

"The Presence" is the title of the memorial book of essays published a few years ago in your honor. It seems important that you know how much were you—through all this time you were absent from the country—present in Poland through your word. In the 1970's the censors deleted your very name from academic texts. And yet the scholars were well acquainted with your writings. Your works—brought from abroad contrary to all bans—were circulated among intelligentsia, were read and discussed. At the University of Lodz—and not only there, I am sure—some of your writings belong to obligatory texts. Those teaching the history of philosophy courses were using your three volumes on main currents of Marxism. The independent thinking was being spread by such honored institutions as the Flying University and Society of Scientific Courses, and still—even though this was not a mass phenomenon—individual teachers at non-flying universities considered it their duty to claim their right to the freedom of speech, disregarding what the current authorities thought commendable or off-limits.

And so here you are now—"in person" at last,
Dear Leszek !

That you are here today with us; that we can enjoy your presence—we thank you with all our hearts.

Translated by
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Ija Lazari-Pawlowska

6

Space and Time—Its Philosophical Essence

Tapati Parui

1. CONCEPTS OF SPACE AND TIME

An Indian proverb says :

> Time is but one thought taken to be many
> Some time for many thoughts is space
> Time and space coming together is causality
> From them arises the world around us.

By "the world" is meant that the totality of space and all it contains. More accurately it may be defined as the totality of space, time and matter i.e. space-time-manifold. But what is space and what is time ?

Space, commonly we think, as a great void in which bodies may exist and through which they move. It seems to exist in three dimensions, left and right, up and down, forward and backward, even to be infinitely divisible, since any portion of it could be divided into two portions and so on forever. So, space, as we think, is not dependent upon bodies on it and would continue to exist like a kind of immense receptacle. This reflection upon the space idea divides space into two :

(a) Emperical Space—the space of our actual experience (sensary). From our various senses and immediate perception of certain relations between objects (spatial relation described as left and right, up and down, forward and back ward) this perceptual space is said to have three dimensions and that space itself is objectively real.

(b) Conceptual Space—It is slightly different from perceptual or sensational space, as described above.

It is an ideal space extending indefinitely in every direction and it seems to us like a void or receptacle. It seems infinite in extent, which means nothing more than that we can not think of any limit to these possible spatial relations and thus appears to be a construction of our mind, and to lack that kind of reality which is possessed by the space of our perception.

Time—during the experience of right and left, up and down, far and near gives us also another kind of experience i.e. experience of before and after, or succession. We call this time. Time is usually thought of as the 'measured or measurable period in which an action, process, or condition exists or continues'. Time is a function and perspective or relative objective existence. Time is thus manifestly connected with the motion of space and with material substance. It is a unique kind of experience. Time seems to flow on like a stream and we distinguish this stream into three—present, past and future—the present being real in experience, the past constructed in memory and the future anticipated in imagination. Conceptual time, like conceptual space, is a little difference from perceptual time. Conceptual time is the abstract time that we think about in mind. In this, present is zero duration—and the past and the future stretch away to infinity.

2. PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS ON SPACE AND TIME

The Greeks often hypostatized time into a single entity, cosmological principle or God. Heraclitus (c540—c475 bce) first introduced the idea of 'perpetual change' against the belief that the existing social order would remain forever. According to him—

> "Everything is in flux and nothing is at rest. Even in the stillest matter there is unseen flux and movement".

This emphasis on time and change, particularly on change in social life. But in this flux of change, struggle and selection, only one thing is constant and that is the universal law of nature, He added—

> "It always was, and is, and shall be".

Moreover, it is the same for all things i.e time is independent of object.[1]

Plato (c 428—c 348 bce) adopted much of Heraclitus philosophy of change. He believed that—

> "All things in flux, all generated things are destined to decay".[2]

He felt that the forces which are at work in evolution are 'Cosmic' in origin. But whatever is the nature of these forces, Plato believes that the law of historical destiny, the law of decay, can be broken by the moral will of man, supported by the power of human reason. According to Plato—

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[1] Popper, K. : *The open society and its enemies, I ; Plato.* Routledge & Kogan Paul, London, (1945).

[2] Gal-or, B. : *Cosmology, Physics, and Philosophy*, Springer-Verlag, N.Y. pp. 457 (1983).

"...Time came into being together with the heaven..."
"...in order that time might be brought into being, Sun and Moon and five other stars... were made to define and preserve the numbers of Time'.

This meant that time and the universe, according to Plato, are inseparable; time, like space, is not regarded as a 'pre-existing' framework into which the universe has been fitted, but is itself a 'product' of the Universe, being an essential feature of its rational structure. 3. 4, 5, 6.

But time, according to Aristotle (c384—c322 bce), is infinite and continuous, and it can not have, as Plato thought, a 'beginning' or an 'end'. Thus, for Aristotle—

"...time is this, the number of motion according to prior and posterior"

"...time is not defined by time..."

For, he claimed, had there been beginning to motion, a prior change or motion would have been required to start it. But this prior motion would itself have required a still prior motion, and so on. i.e. there must always have been motion, and consequently time. Therefore, time cannot have a beginning, nor for similar reasons, can it have an end.

Rejecting the Aristotelian definition of time, Plotinus defines time as something independent of motion. Infact he identifies it with the life of the 'Intelligence', which is a kind of 'extension' and 'succession'. It is varied in its nature and is a process of transition from one act of thought to another, the unity of which exists only by virtue of a certain kind of continuity. It is Plotinus' contention that the Universe moves within this kind of 'intelligence'[7] i.e. there are two kinds of time. One is indefinite time; the other one definite. But both are independent of motion. The main differences between the Aristotellian and the Plotenian definitions of definite time are :

(i) According to Aristotle, time is generated by motion; according to Plotinus, time is only made manifest by motion.
(ii) According to Aristotle, time is the measure of motion; according to Plotiuus, time is measured by motion.

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[3] Gal-or, B. ; in Ref. 2, pp. 441.

[4] Feigl, H. & Maxwell, G. : *Current issues in the Philosophy of Science*, Holt, Rinehart & Minneapolis (1962).

[5] Granbaum, A. : *Philosophical problems of Space and Time*, Knopf, N.Y. (1963).

[6] Whitrow, G. J. : *The Natural Philosophy of Time*, Thomas Nelson and Sons, London, pp. xi, 28, (1961).

[7] Ariotti, P. E. : *The Study of Time* II, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, (1975).

Therefore, in Plotinus philosophy the term duration appears as something independent of motion.

The Jewish Philosopher Hasdai Crescas criticized the Aristotelian philosophy and developed a new conception of 'time—universe'. Crescas defines time as—"the measure of the duration of motion, or rest, between two instants", thereby trying to free time from motion. As a consequence of his definition he concludes that there had existed time prior to the creation of the world.[8] Following Aristotle in in viewing time as a product of motion, another Jewish Philosopher Maimonides (1135—1204) argues that it could not have existed prior to the creation of the world. Nevertheless, he states, we may have, in our mind, an idea of a certain duration, which existed prior to the creation of the world. He calls that duration "a supposition, or imagination of time, but not the reality of time". Therefore, Maimonides tried to combine the Plotinus time (partially) with the Aristotelian time. On the other side, Philosopher Joseph Albo (1944);a pupil of Crescas, tried to harmonize Crescas with Maimonides. He asserts that there are two kinds of time. One is "unmeasured duration which is conceived only in thought, and which existed prior to the creation of the world and will continue to exist after its passing away". He calls this "Absolute time" and identifies this Absolute time with the concept "imagination of time" that Maimonides has conceived. Albo's second time is the Aristotelian one, which is numbered and measured by motion, and to which the concepts of past, present and future apply. This he calls "subjective time". Thus there emerged the doctrine of the existence of two worlds—a material world and a divine spiritual world.

In the Seventeenth century this dualistic conception was crystallized into a distinct philosophical system by Descartes, He attempts to show once and for all that mind are two distinct, separate and independent substances. Matter, he concludes, is extensive, innert, subject to mechanical laws, having no desire, purpose, or power of spontaneous motion. The mind, on the other hand, was for Descartes a substance with no extension, whose essential nature is to think. By "thinking" Descartes meant all of those activities which we commonly associated with the mental, namely, desiring, feeling, judging, willing, etc. It is important that Descartes insisted on the "substantive" character of mind. The mind, he says, is essentially active—its activity being to 'think'. Now it is impossible to think of activity as such apart from an agent or subject of such activity. In the same way, Descartes holds, there is no thinking apart from something which thinks. So the mind is that thing which thinks and that thing is a

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8 Gal-or, B. : in Ref. 2, pp. 442.

substance vastly different from and independent of the great space-time mechanical world of physics.[9] Therefore, Descartes maintained three propositions :

(i) The physical nature is a 'close system' in which all physical events are completely explicable in terms of physical law.

(ii) The mind is a substance of a different nature and separable from anything physical.

(iii) Every mind is in intimate causal connection with same physical body.

This extreme dualism of Descartes performed the great service of laying a solid foundation for the development of modern physical science. But it brings up difficulties in accounting for their (i. e. mind and matter (body) action upon each other.

Rejecting Descartes' theory, Spinoza used Descartes' method to demonstrate that 'free will' is an illusion festered by ignorance. He explains that it is the philosopher who can aspire to freedom of a sort by studying nature and accept it; not as something opposite to a superior creator, but as the single whole of all that there is to conceive about. Here Spinoza seeks to deliver individuals from 'human bondage'. According to Spinoza :

> "We are a part of universal nature and we follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding of this, that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves; will assuredly acquiesce in what be falls us, and in such acquiescence will endeavor to persist".[10]

Thus, in so far as man is an unwilling part and parcel of the whole of nature he is in 'bondage; but in so far as, through understanding, he has grasped the nature of the whole, he is free.

This appealing doctrine of an immaterial substance received its first rude shock from Hume, who said that we have no experience of any such thing as a 'mind' at all, and no evidence for its existence[11]. Experience gives us nothing but a lot of impressions or perceptions, and ideas or memory images, and we have no way of showing or reason for believing that the mind is anything more than the collection of these impressions and ideas.

Kant held that Hume was correct in saying that 'mind' is never revealed in experience, but did not go far enough in his analysis of the situation. It lies in the very nature of the case that 'mind' what ever else it might be, is in the indefeasible situation of being the subject of experience 12, 13. He attempted to study the inherent strncture of human mind, for, according to Kant's premises, it is a problem of "transcending-sense-experinece. The first stage in this mental process, according to Kant, is the "coordination of sensations" by applying to them the "froms of perception"—space and time. The second stage is the "forms of conception"—the 'category' of thought. Thus human mind initially employs two simple faculties to classify the material presented to it : the sense of space and the sense of time. Therefore, they are "a pariori to all ordered experience", which involves and 'presupposes' them. Without them sensations' could never become 'perceptions'. Thus, for Kant, space and time are subjective concepts for they are part of our own apparatus of perception 14, 15. Yet Kant believed that the external world causes sensation and that our own mental apparatus orders this sensation in space and time. For him "things-in-themselves", or "noumena", the causes of our sensations, are unknowable; they are not in space or time, they are not substances, nor can they be described by any of those other general concepts which Kant calls 'Categories'[16].

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[9] Patrick, G.T.W. : *Introduction to Philosophy*, Surjeet Pub,, Delhi, India (1989).

[10] Spinoza, B. : *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy*, (Eng. Transl.) Wisdom Library, N.Y. pp. 138-75, (1961).

[11] Patrick, G.T.W. : in Ref. 9, pp. 245.

Hegel tried to solve the problem in another way. On one hand, he apopted Spinozism and on the other hand, he adopted Kant's metaphysics. He defines time as follows :

> "Time, like space, is a purə form of sensibility or intution : it is the insensible factor in sensibility............It is said that everything arises and passes away in time, and that if one abstracts from everything, that is to say from the content of time and space, then empty time and empty space will be left. i.e. time and space are posited as abstractions of externality, and represented as if they were for themselves. But everything does not appear and pass in time; time itself is this becoming, arising and passing away...
>
> Time does not resemble a container in which everything is as it were borne away and swallowed up in the flow of a stream. Time is merely this abstraction of drstroying. Things are in time because they are finite; they do not pass away because they are in time, but are themselves that which is temporal..."[17]

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12 Patrick, G.T.W. : in Ref. 9, pp. 246.

13 Kant, I. : *Critique of Pure Reason*, (Eng. Transl.) London (1933).

14 Reichenbach, H. : *The space problem in the new Quantum Mechanics*, Erkennt is 35, no 1-3, pp. 29-47, (1991).

15 Gal-or, B. : in Ref. 2 pp. 386.

16 Gal-or, B. : in Ref. 2, pp. 445.

17 Hegel, G.W.F. : *Philosophy of Nature*, 1, pp. 229-40, (1970).

Henry Bergson rests his doctrine on the 'liberation' of 'mental intutions' from the idea of space and notion of time. According to Bergson—the "separation" between 'intellect' and 'instinct' is fundamental. It is the "intellect' which separates in space and fixes in time, it represents 'becoming' as a 'series of states'. Thus Bergson regards time and space as profoundly dissimilar in the sense that intellect is connected with space while instinct or intution with time. According to Bergson time is the essential characteristic of life or mind. What he calls "mathematical time" is a form of space, while the time which is of the essence of life what he calls 'duration'. The latter exhibits itself in 'memory'. He says—

> "Pure perception which is the lowest degree of mind—mind without memory is the really part of matter, as we understand matter"[18]

He could not accept strict determinism, the idea that the present moment is the product of matter and motion of the moment before—and so on, until we arrive at the very beginning of the world, as the total cause of every later event, including life and intelligence. He argues :

> "one must relate time to life, to mind, to consciousness, to choice and to free will. Each moment is not only something new, but something unforseeable..., for a conscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating one's self endlessly".

3. SPACE AND TIME IN MODERN SCIENCE VIEW

A new conception of space and time was made by Newton. Newton's doctrine was the first major generalisation of the problem of time and space in the history of science. It had its roots in the mathematical ideas of Euclid, Galelio, and in the philosophical ideas of Demokritos, Epicurus, and Lucretius. Newton distinguished absolute (objective) concepts from subjective (apparent) ones. According to Newton :

> "Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and immovable; Relative. space is some movable dimension or measure of absolute space; which our senses determine by its position to bodies; and which is commonly taken for immovable space":[19]

It followed from these propositions of Newton's that space was not connected with matter, and was not one of its properties, but existed as some independent substance. Space was represented as a kind of receptacle filled with material bodies.

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[18] Bergson, H. : *Duree et Simultaneite, Bibliot eque de Philosophy Contemporaire*, Paris (1922).

[19] Newton, I. : *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 6, (1934).

In regard to time, Newton distinguished absolute and relative time. Absolute time, he represented as uniform, pure duration, existing independently of the material world and not connected with events taking place in nature. It was one dimensional, continuous, and homogenous throughout the Universe. Newton wrote ;

> "Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself; and from its own nature, flows equally without relation to anything external, and by another name is called duration : relative, apparent, and common time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time : such as an hour, a day, a month, a year".[20]

For Newton, space and time were considered independent not only of mechanical processes (independent in relation to moving matter) but also relative to one another.

Thus, Newton's doctrine of space and time was—"the consequence of his identifying of the material world with substance or particle matter", the result of that level of development of science.

On the otherhand, Leibnitz approached the problem of time and space from the angle of a broader notion of matter. This other conception took its beginning from Aristotole and found further refleetion in the philosophy of Descarte and other thinkers. First of all, Leibnitz saw that Newton based himself, in his conclusions about time and space, on a limited metaphysical notion of matter, and saw that as the main reason preventing disclosure of the deeper space-time properties of nature. He stressed that ancient's idea of the existence only of atoms and void had impoverished out notions of the world, and reduced material reality simply to the existence of the simplest elements of matter. His own words :

> "It cannot be said, that the present quantity of matter is the fittest for the present constitution of things. And supposing it were, it would follow that this present constitution of things would not be fittest absolutely, if it hinders God from using more matter. It were therefore better to choose another constitution of things, capable of something more".[21]

Thus, according to him the material world was not limited just to the existence of substance, matter. He also extended the concept of matter not only to material objects but also to light and magnetic phenomena and other 'non-seeable media'.[22] He considered that matter was present everywhere. Leibnitz' recognition of the qualitative diversity of the forms of matter, and reduction of substance only to a partial case, enabled him to reject the Newtonian idea of an absolute vacuum and consequently of absolute space as a separate self-contained principle existing alongside matter and independent of it. In his view, time and space could not be considered outside things and processes, but were properties of matter. The necessity for matter to exist only in a certain order and in certain relations followed from this character of it. He considered that matter played a decisive role in the space-time structure.

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[20] Newton, I. : in Ref. 19, pp. 7.

[21] Alexander, H. G. : *The Leibniz-Clarke correspondence*, Manchester Univ. Press, UK., pp. 40, (1956).

[22] Alexander, H. G. : in Ref. 21, pp. 65-66.

Like Leibnitz, the Irish philosopher John Toland came to study of space and time from matter and came to the same conclusion about the limited nature of the Newtonian doctrine of time and space. He criticized the Newtonian ideas of vacuum, and absolute space and time. For him matter was objective reality. He also suggested that one could arrive at these ideas if one simply accepted existing notions of matter as local material bodies unconnected with one another. In his view, however, these notions were limited and wanting. The material world was divided into parts only in our imagination, while an absolute vacuum did not infact exist.[23] The division of material formations was relative and due to the incompleteness of our notions of matter. In his view space and time did not exist outside matter and outside its processes as independent substance. Space and time were properties of the material world.

The concepts of space and time to relate to the material world took a new trend when Russian Scientist Lobachevsky developed the theory of space and time with the creation of his geometry from the deeper notions of the properties of the material world. Before him, there had been a single mathematical science of the spatial forms of matter, viz, Euclid's geometry, the theorem of which had been confirmed in practice. That fact had given Euclid's theory an absolute character. For Newton and for other scientists it was the theoretical basis that most deeply revealed the properties of space. The authority of the sole geometry had been indisputable for more than two thousands years. Lobachevsky first tried to throw doubts on its absolute character. His undoubted merit was that he was able to refute the stability of Euclid's fifth postulate (about parallelism), by constructing a new geometry in which this postulate was not satisfied. Therefore, he demonstrated that objective reality could be reflected by other geometries as well. The spatial properties of matter, it turned out, were richer than had previously been thought and as recorded in Euclid's geometry.

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[23] Toland, J. : *Letter to Serena*, Bernard Lintot, London, (1704).

This new concept's success was due to his taking a philosophically deep approach to contemplation of the essence, unity, and diversity of nature and to his understanding that our knowledge of nature was a far from full, rough reflection. He was convinced that nature dictated knowledge to us, and not vice versa, and that it was necessary to start in cognition from an analysis of reality. Lobachevsky wrote :

> "Stop toiling irrationally, trying to derive all wisdom from reason; ask nature, she guards all truths, and will answer all your questions certainly and satisfactorily".[24]

According to Lobachevsky—the initial object of geometry should be material bodies. Geometrical concepts like surface, curve, straight line, points, etc. were abstractions, the result of analysis of reality. He postulated that several lines parallel to a given straight line can be drawn through a point (and likewise his propositions derived from it) which contradicted the Newtonian doctrine of space and time. As he considered his theoretical conclusions about relations followed from the properties of the physical world, he stressed that space was inconceivable without physical bodies.

German Scientist Reimann first realised the Lobachevsky's idea of the possibility of there being properties of space different from Euclidean ones. Thus, he created spherical geometry to define the geometrical properties of a spherical surface and pointed to the connection of spatial characteristics with the physical properties of natural objects. He also assumed that the space between bodies was filled with a substance that could be represented as "a physical space the points of which move in geometrical space".[25]

Thus, the physical problem of space and time took a new shape when Reimann pointed to the connection of spatial characteristics with the physical properties of the material objects which could be represented as a physical space the points of which move in geometrical space. Einstein observed that this conception of space and time could not be extended to all moving systems and the whole Universe when the concepts like "simultanity", "moment of time", "earlier", and "later" arose, According to Einstein the magnitude of the time interval between two events does not depend on the state of motion of the material system in which it is considered. Therefore, concept of motion arose alongwith the notions of space and time.

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[24] Lobachevsky, N. I : *Tri Sochineniya po geometrii Gostekhizdat* Moscow, pp. 16, 214 (1956).

[25] Riemann, B.: *Gesammett Mathematische werke und wissenschaftlicher Nachlass*, Verlag von, B.G., Leipzig. (1892).

The ancient thinkers drew attention to the universal character of motion, and to the fact that it was an inherent property of matter i.e., space, time and motion are interconnected. The concept of motion was most fully developed in the Theories of Galileo and Newton. Motion was treated in classical mechanics in a certain sense as a substance isolated from matter, as a simple displacement of bodies in a space-time continuum unconnected with them. The view was held that motion of objects did not affect their internal state.

Newton wrote :

> "Absolute motion is the translation of a body from one absolute place into another; and relative motion, the translation from one relative place into another".

His appeal to non-material forces as the source of the motion of cosmic bodies indicated that it was impossible to solve the problem of motion as an attributed of matter solely within the mechanical form of motion.

A scientific and philosophical analysis of the foundations of Newtonian mechanics led Einstein[26] to conclude that its concepts like "simultaneity", "moment of time", "earlier", and "later" could not be extended to all moving system and the whole Universe. The same applied to making an absolute of the spatial notions of classical mechanics, if only because the velocity of light was finite. To understand it clearly let us assume two electric lamps are flashing at two points A and B on Earth (say, on the stationary platforms). Will these events (the flashes) seem simultaneous to observers located respectively at an immobile point of Earth i.e., on the platform and in a train moving fast ? Obviously they will seem simultaneously to the observer on the platform when the beams of light from lamps A and B reach him simultaneously. Let him be located at the point C midway between A and B. But what will the passenger in a train moving past say when he comes alongside the stationary observer ? He will say that the lamp at 3 towards which he is moving flashed earlier than the lamp at A that he is travelling away from, since the train is moving towards the beam coming from point B, and getting away from that coming from point A. The observer in the train will say that the events on Earth (i.e. on platform) did not occur simultaneously. Which is right ? According to Einstein's theory both are right, because absolute simultaneity does not exist for all frames of reference. In this case, the events are simultaneous in relation to the platform and simultaneous in relation to the train.[27] Every body of reference has its own time so that the course of time always has to be related to some material system. Non-relative, absolute time passing at an identical rhythm throughout the Universe. The magnitude of the time interval between two events depends on the state of motion of the material system in which it is considered i.e. time is closely linked with motion.

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[26] Gribanov, D.P. : *Albert Einstein*'s *Philosophical views and the theory of relativity*, Progress Pub. Moscow, (1987).

By analysing the concept of the spatial distance between two points in moving and stationary systems Einstein demonstrated the interconnection of space and motion. Thus, special theory of relativity undermined the Newtonian metaphysical notion of time and space. While it had previously been held that bodies existed in time and space, theory of relativity demonstrated that a change in the velocity of a thing led to a change in its space-time characteristics.

So, special theory of relativity brought about a drastic change in the concepts of space and time. This theory gives the natural connection of mass (m) and energy (E) through the relation $E=mc^2$, where c=the speed of light. According to this theory, the mass of a body increases with an increase in its velocity. Einstein expressed the proposition that if the accretion to the mass of a moving body was due to its kinetic energy, the mass proper of a stationary body was connected with an energy which, however, though hidden from us, was the internal energy of the body. This theory indicates the inseparable connection of matter of motion. It also linked the two material spheres of the objective world——substance and field——physically, and through that link expressed previously unknown space-time properties of matter.

But this new view of space and time could not be able to define space and time in a non-inertial system. For, its gravitational mass should also increase by virtue of the equivalence of inertial and gravitational mass.

The general theory of relativity made a substantial contribution to the physical theory of time and space. It arose through the extension of the principle of relativity to the gravitational field. Einstein understood that gravitation, like electromagnetism, was a field area of the material world. Its properties, like electromagnetism, were not, something seeming for him, some subjective phenomenon, but were manifestations of matter that he had to take into account when studying the structure of material world. From it, for example, it follows that "the gravitational field influences and even determines the matrical laws of the space-time continuum.[28] In the general theory of relativity the matrics and gravitation proved to be identical in a certain sense because they were ultimately determined by the distribution of masses. Einstein wrote :

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[27] Gribanov, D. P. : in Ref. 26, pp. 210.

> "According to the general theory of relativity the geometric properties of space are not independent, but they are determined by matter".[29]

In spite of Newton's view, space proved to be non-uniform; it was deformed by the influence of gravitation; The denser material objects are greater in the distortion of the space around the bodies. The gravitational field also determines the rhythm of time. The more massive cosmic bodies exert a stronger effect cn slowing its rhythm, and vice versa.

Discovery of the fact that the mass of bodies determines the geometric structure of space and time indicated the existence of an organic link between time, space and matter. While this link was determined in the special theory of relativity solely by the external material factors (it depended on the relative positions and movements of the material bodies), in the general theory inner connections were discovered and it was shown that the matrics of the space-time continuum depended on the distribution of matter in the Universe i.e. material conditionality of space and time properties.

This theory also shows that space, time and matter, all three, may have a common matrix. Even starting with our own experience, what we seem to have is not space and time as separate elements in experience, but rather four sets of relations, namely, up and down, right and left, forward and backward, and before and after. All events are space events and all points in space are points events. It has been suggested, therefore, that the reality which we seek is neither space not time but space-time; and that which really exists is not space with three dimensions and time with one, but space-time with four dimensions (called space-time continuum). There is another view, close to this one, which claims that ihe concepts of time and space lose their independence in the theory of relativity and merge into a single whole.

III. RELATION WITH THE MATERIAL WORLD

Thus we see that instead of thinking of an "absolute" Newtonian space of three dimensions, and an independent time of one dimension, it is possible to think of an original "Space-Time manifold" of four dimensions, in which time is the fourth dimension. At this point, however, Einstein's General Theory of Relativity passes beyond the mere solution of the problem of space and time and approaches a metaphysical theory of reality : for it supposes that the space-time continuum is, so to speak, the ultimate physical reality of the Universe. If this be true, it becomes of great interest; for it appears that it can be shown mathematically that such a four dimensional manifold under the relativity theory is not a homogeneous affair, but tends to inequalities, or "singularities" and, so it is said, "such singularities are what we call matter". Matter, as it were, is a kind of kink in the space-time manifold, and where these kinks occur, space is warped or distorted.[30]

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[28] Einstein, A. : *Die Grundlage der all gemeinen Relativitat Stheorie*, Berth, Leipzig, pp. 136, 137), (1916).

[29] Einstein, A. : *Relativity : The special and General Theory* (trans. by R. N. Lawson) Hartsdale House, NY. pp. 135, (1947).

We bave usually thought of Gravitation as a kind of force "pulling bodies together. Newton himself thought of it as a "force" drawing material bodies out of the straight line in which they would naturally be moving; and toward other material bodies, the forces being proportional to the inverse square of the distance between the bodies. But no one knows about any such force, nor how it could 'pull' things together. Now from Einstein's theory it is possible to Gravitation in a simpler way by the supposition that it is due to the nature of space itself; that space is distorted or puckered or curved in the region of masses of matter, and that the behaviour of any particle when it enters this gravitational field is due, not to any mysterious 'force', but to the puckered character of space in such a field, which determines the path of the particle.

Thus the mass and bodies determine the 'geometric structure of time and space indicating the existence of an organic link between time, space and matter. The gravitation introduces a certain degree of order on the distribution of matter in the Universe (space-time continuum dependent) into cosmology i.e. material connecting thread between cosmic body, structure of the Universe. The special theory of relativity refutes the thesis of the uncreatibility of matter through the relation $E = me^2$. Mass and energy are the physical properties. Mass is the measure ef inertia and gravitation, energy is the common measure of various kinds of motion of matter.

The discovery of gravitation has introduced a certain degree of order into cosmology. The matarial connecting thread between cosmic bodies had been found that made if possible to get rid of the problem, like the finiteness and infinity of the Universe and the density of matter. Einstein's theory of gravitation made it possible to give a more substantiated answer to the question the structure of the Universe. The Newtonian Cosmological doctrine according to which there was a great concentration of stars at the centre of the Universe, while their density decreased with distance from she centre, no longer suited scientists. Basing on the material conditionality of space-time properties Einstein attempted to determine the geometrical structure of the visible world. If the velocity of motion of cosmic bodies was small compared with the velocity of light, he suggested, cosmical material objects could be considered nearly at rest and the geometrical properties of the cosmical bodies could not be in Euclidean in the stellar world. Taking the mean density of matter in the Universe as other than vero and the distribution of matter Einstein concluded that the world was a finite spherical formation. His model of the Universe was static.

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[30] Patrick, G.T.W. in Ref. 9, pp. 88.

This cosmological model suffered from an essential defect. So, that the object corresponding to it would not collapse through the effect of gravitational forces. The Soviet Scientist Friedman showed the fault which was the hypothesis of the stationary character of the Universe, and the invariance of its radius in time. He theoretically substantiated the dynamic character of the Universe, and pointed to its expansion. The world, according to him, was not a closed system. Friedman's theoretical conclusion obtained several experimental confirmations such as red shift of the spectral lines of cosmic bodies. The amount of this shift was proportional, in accordance with the Hubble constant, to the distance of the object from the point of observation. This inhomogeneity of the magnitude of the shift is evidence of a dispersing of the galaxies. The observations initiated by Friedman's conception of an expanding Universe led him in turn to the assumption that the visible part of the Universe was formed as a result of a "Bigbang". According to this hypothesis the metagalaxy was once a superdense point body. Several hypothesis of the character of the Universe's evolution appeared on that score. Some scientists consider that she dispersing of the galaxies is an eternal process. Other consider that Universe is pulsating (oscillating) in which case the stage of expansion would give way to a reverse process of collapse after a certain time, as a result of which the galaxy would merge into a single material formation which will lead once more to a "Bigbang" and repetition of the cycle of expansion.

The idea of the "Bigbang" has recently had an important new confirmation. In 1965 Penzias and Wilson[31], trying to eliminate radio noise from a receiving installation, come to the conclusion that it was impossible to do so. The noise, it turned out, was due to some back ground radiation (known as 3^0K cosmic background radiation) filling the whole Universe, which had a relict character and, it was suggested, developed as a consequence of the "Bigbang".

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[31] Penzias, A. & Wilson, R.W. *Astrophysical Journal 142* (1965), 419.

The discovery of 'Quasars' and 'Pulsars' gave a new impetus to development of the theory of relativity. The properties of "Quasars" did not fit into the framework of existing notions. Quasars are receding from us at very great velocities, and moreover, emitting colossal energy. Modern science is still unable to provide an equivocal answer about their nature and behaviour.

In 1967 Pulsars discovered. Pulsars radiate electromagnetic waves of high intensity at quite definite intervals of time. It is supposed that they are neutron stars. The discovery of pulsars is evidence that stars, like the universe as a whole, are evolving. Gravitation affects them, constantly altering their qualitative state. The immense temperatures and presures within them create conditions for the synthesis of chemical elements, a process that leads to loss of their energy and to cooling. As a result a moment may set in when non-gravitational forces are unable to check the forces of gravitation, which will compress the star more and more, ultimately the formation of white dwarf or neutron star or blackhole depending on the mass of the collapsing star. A neutron star (Pulsar) arises, the space and time of which are strongly deformed by the gravitational field. Elementary particles (including photons) have difficulty in leaving the surface of the neutron star. The field of gravitation of blackholes is so great that no material object, including quanta of light, can break away from them.

In proportion as the size of a cosmic body decreases, as a result of its gravitational compression, the passage of its own time slows down. The passage of time stops completely when this body reaches a critical size equal to its gravitational radius. But a body's reaching of its gravitational radius is not the limit of compression; after this point is reached gravitational collapse sets in, a catastrophic compaction that brings the body to a superdense state.

The very basis of Eastern philosophy is the idea of the unity of the cosmos and the unity of all life. The Eastern view of the world is an organic one; all things and phenomena we perceive with our senses are inter-related and are manifestations of the same ultimate reality. The basic universal reality which is simultaneously spiritual and material. Hence there is no essential difference between mind and matter. In this view, the division of nature into separate objects is artificial and comes from our measuring and catagorising mind. Any such objects, which are called "maya" in Hinduism, have a fluid and ever changing character. According to Buddhism—

> "When the mind is disrtubed, the multiplicity of things is produced, but when the mind is quieted, the multiplicity of things disappears".[32]

Eastern philosophy makes no difference between living and dead matter : the whole cosmos is unity and the whole cosmos is alive. This dynamic view of the Universe which contains time and change as essential features which are comparable with modern science.

In the philosophical sense matter reflects one property, objectivity, i.e. the capacity tn exist independently of our consciousness. Energy is the essence or real character of the Universe : energy is life itself. All that is, is energy. Everything in the objective and subjective Universe is alive with energy. From the subatomic and nuclear particles to the great cosmic entities, all is energy. Matter is simply crystallized energy, energy or life that is constrained and limited to the expression of form. Matter is objective substance, energy in the form of building blocks, whether it is physical, emotional, or even mental matter. Matter is negative (passive) energy, that is moved or manipulated or transformed by positive (active) energy. Energy can not be created or destroyed, but it can be modified or transformed from one form or domain to another. From the objective perspective, the densest matter is reality and the superphysical is the realm of illusion where in the higher (subjective) perspective matter is illusion, and the world of forces and energies is the only reality. Spirit and matter are the two extremes of energy and constitute a duality (pair-of-opposition).[33] Spirit is liberated matter and matter is crystallized spirit. Thus is energy the common reality.

The concept of wave-matter duality (equivalence) leads to the realization that time and space is an illusion (a matter of perspective). In classical physics the atom is composed of particles : photons, electrons and neutrons. But in modern physics, it has been demonstrated that the particles appears to behave as a solid sphere (or point) of matter in one experiment (perspective) and as a wave of energy under another perspective. Each elementary (and secondary) particle, then can be envisioned as an energy resonance that may appear as matter or as a wave, depending on how it is viewed. But it cannot appear to be both simultaneously.

Matter is alive, being crystallized spirit. Matter is energy in a form of limitation. Matter is composed of holes stretched in a cosmic aether (absolute emptiness). Time and space are phenomena as-

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32 Capra, F. : Particle Physics and Eastern Philosophy seminar given at XI Int. Uni. Swochen fur Kernphysik, Schedming, 2 Feb. 21 March 4, (1972).

33 "Matter and energy", *The Upper Triad*, Virginia, USA., No. 4A.

sociated mostly with the densest of matter, that which is physical. If matter is considered to be a variance of resonant energy then, time and space are variances within the illusion of the physical world. From the lower perspective, the planet Earth appears to be a solid sphere existing at ab point in space and at a point in time. But space is an infinity, and time is an eternity. And from higher perspective the planet (and its life) is an energy resonance distributed through time and space, coexisting in several ways. The past exists as fact, though through an infinite number of perspectives. The future exists as arch types and probabilities.

Time and space do not exist as realities beyond the physical plane. As the disciple begins to think in terms of consciousness which transcends the limitations and illusions of time and space, then shall higher realities begin to be known and understood. One can hardly learn of the higher dimensions with any real understanding or comprehension until one can look beyond the physical illusions. Space that is expanded to an infinity becomes nonexistent, and time that is expanded to an infinity becomes nonexistent; for eternity is space, and space is life, and life is a unity which transcends all limitation and existence.[34],[35]

The Treatise on Cosmic Fire[36] provides a basic outline of the divine plan by treating both subjective and objective aspects of consciousness (mind) as the relationship between spirit (energy) and matter. This treaties begins with a statement of introductory postulates upon which foundation follows the remainder. There is one boundless principle (absolute reality) which antecedes all manifested existence (being). All that is manifested is derived from and contained within that principle. There are three aspects (in the highest sense) to manifested existence :

(i) the First Ray (the first universal logos) precursor to (of) manifestation, being impersonal and unmanifest

(ii) the Second Ray (the second universal logos) of spirit-matter

(iii) the Third Ray (the third universal logos) of universal world soul.

From this great trinity are successively derived an ordered sequence (depth and breadth) of logic manifestation; from the absolute to the universal triple logos, to galactic or super cosmic logoi, to cosmic logoi, to solar logoi, and ultimately to planetary logoi. There is a basic law of cyclic activity (periodicity) which governs or qualifies all of manifestation, which is linked to three cosmic laws correspond-

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34 "Time and Eternity", *The Upper Triad*, Virginia, USA., No. 175.

35 "Space and Time", *The Upper Triad*, Virginia, USA., No. 3.

36 "Cosmic Fire", *The Upper Triad*, Virginia, USA., No. 29.

ing to the three aspects : the law of synthesis (spirit), the law of attraction (consciousness), and the law of economy (matter).

This treatise demonstrates the process of individualization, incarnation, and Pralaya. Individualization is a form of initiation and marks the beginning of (human) self consciousness. The human being is ultimately) the triad in (full) manifestation (on human levels) : the self, the non-self,and the intelligent link: Shiva, Vishnu and Brahma[37]. Shiva is the third aspect of the Hindu trinity (of Brahma-Vishnu-Shiva), the God of dissolution and destruction, the destroyer of ignorance, and God transcendent (the supreme reality/the absolute). Shiva is predominantly indirect and subtle in its manifestation. Shiva is the creator-destroyer in the sense of (1) having purpose, (2) evoking manifestation in order to serve and fulfil that purpose, (3) providing the fundamental underlying rules (orders) of manifestation and (4) eventually (and periodically) destroying the forms. Shiva is the periodic forcing function (from which the cycles of Brahma are evoked) in a number of ways (cycles within cycles).

Vishnu is the second or intermediate aspect of Hindu trinity, the sustainer (preserver) of manifestation. Vishnu is the preserver in the sense that it provides the connection or relationship between the precursor (cause) (Shiva) and the field of consequences (manifestation) (Brahma). Without that connection there would be no means of qualification or manipulation (adaptation) of matter and material forces.

Brahma is the first aspect of the Hindu trinity, the creator of the (manifested) Universe.

Incarnation is the process by which some lifeform (cosmic, solar, human, etc) manifests for experience and expression (evolution). Incarnation proceeds (progressively) cyclicly, with period (pralaya) of quiescence between incarnations (more properly, pralaya is viewed centrally with incarnations excursions). Pralaya is the "work of abstraction" and the means of imparting principal (impulsive) qualification (or momentum for incarnation and subsequent withdrawal and abstraction is imparted). Each Pralaya "may be considered merely as a transference of force from one direction into another". The idea of a gigantic cosmic dance naturally comes into mind when we imagine this creation and destruction which goes on every where in the Universe. This is compareable with the "Cosmic Dancer" whose beautiful image is given in Hinduism. One of the main Hindu Gods is Shiva, the Cosmic dancer. According to Hindu belief all life is part of a great rhythmic process of creation and destruction, of death and rebirth, and Shiva's dance symbolises this eternal rhythm.[38],[39] [0] Here modern science and Eastern mythology express the same view the basic intuition of life.

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[37] "Shiva, Vishnu and Brahma", *The Upper Triad,* " No. 165, (1989),

There are three classes of rebirth—"Avatars", "Adepts", and "Jivas seeking development". Keys to the principles of rebirth can be found in the correspondence between "devachan of the reincarnating jiva, the nirvana of the adept, and the pralaya of the some cosmic entity". Each case involves "periods of development, long cycles of meditation, and interlude between stages and activity", and the methods of manifestation should be interpreted in terms of force and energy.'[1] Though an Avatar is defined conventionaly as an incarnation or embodiment of some spiritual concept or principle or as "a variant phase or version of a continuing basic entity" (an incarnation or appearence of God) but according to Cosmic Fire Treatise.[42] Avatar is a ray, emanated from a spiritual source, a ray of effulgent and perfected glory, clothing itself in matter for the purpose of service. A Cosmic Avatar represents embodied force from some cosmic centre "as far removed from the consciousness of man as man is from the consciousness of the atoms of substance".

We can find a similarity with the 3°K cosmic background radiation in Cosmic Physics. In 1965 Penzias and Wilson[37] observed this radiation and confirmed that this radiation has a spectral distribution corresponding to that often electromagnetic radiation in equilibrium with a blackbody at a temperature around 2.7°K. They provided such a basis by finding an isotropic microwave radiation that comes not from the sun, not from our galaxy, not from any identifiable individual source, but from the depth of space.[43]

Thus it is seen that the physical plane is characterized by space and time. In the astral world there is only a slight, rather vague correspondence to time and space. Beyond the astral world time and space have little significance, if any. The essence of each plane is energy. Spirit and matter are the two relative poles of energy. Spirit is the highest aspect of matter. Matter is a momentary expression, while spirit is eternal. The highest worlds are created first, the lowest worlds last. The lowest planes are the first to disintegrate and

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38 Capra, F. : in Ref. 31.

39 Capra, F. : *The dance of Shiva*—the Hindu view of matter in the light of modern physics, preprint ; ICTP/70/37 (1971).

40 Radhakrishnan, S. : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, Delhi India.

41 "Cosmic Fire", *The Upper Triad*, Virginia, USA., No. 170, (1990).

42 "Avatar", *The Upper Triad*, Virginia, USA., No. 169, (1990).

43 Galor, B. : Ref. 2, pp. 21.

pass into obscuration, while the highest planes are the last. The septenary manifestation of matter comes and goes with a breath of Brahma who is regarded as creator of the Universe in Hindu Scrpture ‘ Vishnu Purana”[44], but God, the Absolute, persists. Thus Eastern View of Brahma's breath is the similar one with the modern view of “Bigbang” concept.

In a more moderate perspective sense, Shiva is more remote and more subtle in its working (influence) and operates on a vastly longer time scale than either Vishnu or Brahma. Shiva works through Vishnu and Brahma. Thus Shiva provides qualification (of Vishnu and Brahma) and yet remains uninvolved in the working out of its energies (i.e. Shiva sets the stage (the field of manifestation), plants the seeds (life) and established the rules (underlying order), then remains withdrawn while its indirect influence upon manifestation (through remote qualification) enables the working out of its purpose, and finally (shiva) withdraws (assimilates) the fruits of manifestation.

CONCLUSION

We see from the above that space and time had different treatments both in modern science and in philosophical senses. Some represented that space and time reflect the external world and are fundamental properties, modes of existence of matter; some represented the existence of the reality i.e. matter in motion, independently of our mind, materialism must also inevitably recognise the objective reality of space and time.

Previously,

(i) time is not linked either in space or with matter, and passes identically through out the Universe in any frame of reference

(ii) body existed in time and space.

Presently,

(i) a change in the velocity of a thing led to a change in its space-time characteristics

(ii) the natural connection of mass (m) and energy (E) $E=mc^2$ c being the velocity of light i.e. mass of a body increases with an increase in its velocity i.e. the inseparable connection of matter and motion

(iii) a link between two material spheres of the objective world—substance and field—physically, and through that link expressed previously unknown space-time properties of matter.

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[44] Narlikar, J. V. : *The Structure of the Universe*, Oxford University Press, UK., pp. 105.

7

Shri Aurobindo's Approach to Heraclitus

Constanca Marcondes Cesar

The works of Shri Aurobindo are one of the most significant experessions of contemporary Indian thought.

He had an European education and mastered english, french, greek and latin languages. He also had a deep knowledge about the philosophic tradition of India and became a real authority in this sense. All these factors contribute to the fact that his approach of Heraclitus is a relevant theme.

Shri Aurobindo's text on Heraclitus is polemic: is there a relation between the Greek philosopher and the Eastern philosophy ?

On one hand, Masson-Oursel (and Aurobindo) points out the agreement between the two traditions; on the other hand, Axelos refuses it, saying that there are great differences between these two worlds and that Aurobindo did not notice them.[1]

The kinds of the different approaches between the heraclitical philosophy and the Eastern thought (the Indian one, the Persean one, the Chinese one and even the Egyptian one) have been tried in three levels, according to Axelos: (a) the level of the effective influences; (b) the level of the common philosophic subjects; (c) the level of the study of the relations between the heraclitical thought and the Eastern philosophy, established a posteriori.

The comparative study of the common philosophic subjects seem to us the most interesting: we shall try to approach it without (we shall) forgetting to consider the differences between the "two worlds. In the first place, we shall discuss Shri Aurobindo's theory, (that states that are) in which some points of agreement between the Greek philosopher (thought) and the Indian tradition, is worked out, by studying the text of Heraclitus and while (by) looking into some

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Translation to English, by Ana Maria Moreira Cesar.

[1] Axelos, *Heracliteet aa Philosophie*, Paris, Minuit, 1962, p. 216.

(for, it) other works of Aurobindo, more details of the subjects are gained (that he studies).

We shall also compare Shri Aurobindo's approach to Heraclitus with the Axelos' approach, indicating that (we shall try to show) that Axelos' criticism to Aurobindo is not pertinent. It consists in He refuses to Aurobindo's true comprehension of the heraclitical philosophy and (in) accusing him of reducing the Heraclitus thought to the categories of Eastern spirituality.

We think that on one hand, the Indian philosopher reduced the differences between the religious-metaphysic philosophy of the *Vedas* and the *Upanishads* and the speculative one of Heraclitus, emphasizing a common subject. On the other hand, however, Aurobindo's approach to Heraclitus translates a poetical thought that characterizes not only the Greek philosopher but also the ancient Indian tradition.

By poetic thought we shall understand, according to Axelos, the thought that seen a totality, never forgetting all that is presented in a fragmentary way.[2]

According to the doxography,[3] Heraclitus writes his work as a large poem dedicated to the Muses; in his turn, Aurobindo is a metaphysic poet.

Such a poetic way of thinking is cryptic and enigmatic; its language is hermetic, aphoristic and symbolic.

More than a scientific Knowledge, it is the wisdom that the ideal of the philosophic life expresses: the one of the awake man, opposite to the common somnambulistic man; the one of the man that acknowledges the invisible harmony and knows that everything is one, opposite to the vulgar man that is unaware of the logos and only notice the war between the opposites.

Because it tries to apprehend an antinomic totality, the heraclitical thought is prophetic and poetic: it expresses itself by errantry.[4] The thought that is refleted in language tells what it is; this language is vivified by the logos.[5]

A tragic philosopher, Heraclitus sees the cosmic harmony as a game and a fight between the opposites, which occurs in the time.

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[2] Axelos, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

[3] Axelos. *op. cit.*, p. 27; Diogenes Laercio, IX, 12, *in* Berge, *O Logos Heraclitico*, RJ, INL, 1969, p. 303.

[4] Axelos, op. cit., p. 79.

[5] Id., ibid., p. 74.

The harmony implies construction and destruction, in the unity of the opposites: life and death, beautiful and ugly, good and bad.

For the Indian philosopher, the symbolic and intuitive language has characterized "vedas and vedantics clairvoyants, occult masters of the orphic mysteries"[6], for philosophy in Greece and in India, appears related to mystic, thus making use of its sources and language. According to the author, there are some analogies between the darshanas and the pre-socratic, between the rationalism of the budhists and logic Indians and the philosophies of the sophists and Socrate.

To Aurobindo, Heraclitus started a line of thought that has influenced Plato, Stoicals and Neo-platonism: the philosophical ideal and its value to human life, explaining the man's fate and nature, his relations to God and to world. Heraclitus' aristocratic conception of life, linking wisdom and human quality and seeing the reflect of the divine law in the human laws, finds similarities with the Eastern thought. We can find in this philosophy a relation between *psyche* and *Logos*; the divine *Logos* is present in the *psyche*. This Logos is never understood by men (fragment 1). No matter where you go, you will never find the limits of the soul, because it *Logos* is extremely deep (fragment 45).

According to Aurobindo, this is what yoga aims at: to act with a true intelligence and as a result, obtain a true will, heavily established in the ONE, to act with conscience of the sole I in every body and to act according to this I's serene equality[7].

In India the thruth is sought to be applied in life and *Bhagavad-Gita* points the way of the knowledge: a meditative lonely spirit that draws away from the crowd[8].

And Heraclitus criticizes the vulgar men and asks: what's their spirit or their understanding? They believe in the street singers and their master is the people, so, they do not know that the majority is bad and few are those who are good (fragment 104).

For Heraclitus, philosophy must acknowledge the identity between passion and death, between Hades and Dionosius. He exalts thus, the "dry soul", condemning the "moist soul" (fragments 36, 77, 118), that is disturbed by the impure wine of sensual ecstasy, of the emotional excitement. Dionysius is the god of this inebriation delirium, says. Aurobindo[9]. That is way we have in Heraclitus the identity between death and pleasure, between the god of wine and Hades. The pre-socratie sees life as a death process, the war is the father of all entities and the cosmic existence, that looks like life, is in reality, death (fragments 21, 48, 53, 88).

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[6] Shri Aurobindo, *De la Grece a l'Inde*, Paris, Albin Michel, s/d, p. 25.

[7] Shri Aurobindo, *Bhagavad-Gita*, Paris, Albin MIchel, p. 64.

[8] *Bhagavad-Gita*, p. 231.

The identity between passion and death must not be seen negatively, but as an expression of the unity of the opposites, that we shall approach farther on. The conscience of this unity is liable for the "dry soul"—for Heraclitus belittles the ignorance, not the *passion*.

Indian philosophy acknowledges the contraposition and identifies the pure conscience with the ecstatic adoration, *bakti*[10]. Our author sees a certain parallelism between this conception and Heraclitus way to the "dry knowledge". He points out besides that tantrics gives two ways to the knowledge : the way of the left hand, the tenebrous passion, and the way of the right hand, *mysticism* and *intuition*. And in the Upanishads, life is the domain of the King of Death; it is the opposite of immotality[11], and all existence is used has a pasture to death.

Heraclitus criticizes the decadence of the Mysteries, telling that they have become magic, and requiring new symbols, a new way of thinking that refuses the idolatry and the sacrifice of animals (fragment 5). For the Greek philosopher and the *Vedas*, the Knowledge disappeared, and "invisible harmony" (fragment 54), must be sought.

In Aurobindo there is also the idea that the passion and the ignorance of the common man must be rejected and in return, many must surrender to God. The wisdom and the force of the divine energy, Shakti, the eternal Beauty constitute the power that takes man, from this world of darkness, lies, death and sorrow, to the Truth, the Light, Divine Life and to the bliss of the immortal[12].

With such a search Heraclitus acknowledge fire as *arche*. Not that physical fire, considered only as physical, but as a physical aspect of a force, a substancial desire of mutation.

Aurobindo points out that the *Vedas* and the *Upanishads* mention a divine principle that they identify with Fire and that becomes present in all things, a spiritual principle closely associated to the physical world, that edifies worlds.

In Greece as in India there is reference to she primordial elements considered in a symbolic sens. The principles of presocratics are not material, although they may have a concrete expression[13]. Fire is, for Heraclitus, an activating force. It becomes real but is not reduced to flames[14].

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[9] Shri Aurobindo, *De la Grece a l'Inde*, p. 24.
[10] id., ibid., p. 25.
[11] id , ibid., p. 22.
[12] id., ibid., p. 167.

In the *Rig-Veda* and in the puranic myths, *water* is identified to the inconscious entity, the occult divinity, the primordial element. Like the ether, water is a symbol of the infinite; In its turn *fire* represents the creative power of the infinite, *the air* a life principle.

Bhagavad-Gita's text states that these five element, the mental one, the reason, the ego, represent the divine nature, which is divided, octuple[15].

For Heraclitus, the cosmos results from the evolution and involution of the sole principle: the Fire that is the agreement between the opposites, the fiirst substance, the symbol of the creative and transforming energy, the divinity, the *Logos* (fragments 1, 30, 31).

The *Logos* is the universal reason that acts on the multiple, according to an order or a mesure. Man participates in the divinity, because he has an immortal soul : you cannot find the limits of soul (fragment 45).

Indian ancient tradition is present in Aurobindo's text : man has a divine ego and he has to look for it, because the existence is a constant manifestation of the Spirit, and the man's live soul is an eternal portion of the Divine.[16] And also: Man is God hiding himself from nature, in order to possess it by means of fight, insistency, violence and surprise. God is the universal and transcendent man that in the human being hides his own individuality.[17]

To the Heraclitical logos correspond the Vedantic Atman, a clairvoyant and thoughtful Lord.

In the Indian philosophy, Brahma is the cause and the origin of everything, it is the absolute existence, the organiser desire immanent to everything. The *Vedas* present a supreme intelligence and desire; both are originary determinant and they all form the Prajna-Purusha, the Lord, the cosmic man. Heraclitus' Logos is the reason, unique, universal, the leading sens of reality. It is the structure of world has a discordant harmony[18].

Heraclitus proposes the unity between the eternal and finite, saying that gods are mortal, men are immortal (fragment 62); the

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[13] Axelos, op. cit., p. 94.

[14] id., ibid., p. 96,

[15] *Bhagavad Gita*, p. 142.

[16] Shri Aurobindo, *Bhagavad Gita*, p. 329.

[17] id,, *De la Grece a l'Inde*, p. 102.

[18] Axelos, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

Vedas employ the same words to design men and gods and point out an immortal principle that lives in man.

The problem of the opposites, appear in presocratic philosopher, under many perspectives. One of its most important aspects is the one that associates such an idea to the problem of the One and the multiple, of paramount importance in the Greek philosophy.

For Heraclitus, unity and multiplicity are true and eternal our experience shows that above the multiple, there is an eternal unity: and from everything there is a One and from this One, everything (fragment 10).

According Axelos, in Heraclitus the One and the totality are linked and unity and multiplicity are in a dialogical relation.[19]

Accordingly, something is considered as eternal and always unique: the god symbolized by the fire, by the desire of becoming something, by the *Logos,* by the original principle. The universe is in movement and in constant mutation, but above this mutation there is an identity principle: we go and we do not go into the same waters; we are and we are not (fragment 49a). So, the Greek philosopher concludes that there is a unity between life and death, night and day, youth and old age: the unity of the opposites (fragment 88), and states that it is wise to admit that all things are one (fragment 50). This means that everything is an Entity, an identic eternity that contains the opposites; that everything is One, but his One becames everything each minute and the universe results from the evolution of the energy, from an originary force, that is transformed in five principles : ether, air, five, water and earth.

The reference, in Indian philosophy, to the primordial elements, has already been pointed out.

Thus Aurobindo presents the Indian tradition on the subject : there is one Matter, but various atoms; one Enigma, but many forces; one ental, but various mental entities; one Spirit, but many souls[20].

When he comments *Bhagavad Gita,* he states . the multiplicity is part of the spiritual nature of the One[21]; the unity is the biggest truth, the multtiplicity is the smallest, although both of them are true and none of them are illusion[22]. It is, thus, the vision of the Unique in the multiple, of the multiple in the Unique and all them are the One[23], which is accepted by the Indian philosopher. Aurobindo reiterates *Bhagavad-Gita*'s text : the life of the dualities, that is to the creatures a state of vigil, it is like a night to the wise that can see[24].

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[19] id., ibid., p. 55.

[20] Shri Aurobindo. *De la Grece a l'Inde*, p. 29.

[21] id., *Bhagavad Gita*, p. 58.

[22] id., ibid., p. 144.

[23] id., ibid, p 202.

Aurobindo seeks the transcendent sense of the con-tradictions, in order to free man. The sense of pain and death, of the limitation, of the finite, is the desire of the absolute, that lives in man, and that impels him to surmount himself continually, seaching the agreement between the finitude of body and the infinitude of soul.

This topic, the One and multiple and the unity of opposites, is found in various Indian authors.

Accordingly, *Ramanuja* and *Madhwa* conclude that the existence is unique and multiple, and the advaitists ask what is the One and they look for it through yoga. The nihilistics budhists affirm the existence of a principle of unity, that lives in the heart of everything and that influences actions; the *Upanishads* affirm that the supreme unity is the Brahma, present in everything like the Atman; *Somkya* affirms that the unity of the nature leans on the Prakriti, the substance of everything. *Vishinuists* aknowledge that God is eternally multiple in his nature, and the advaitists oppose the One and the plurality (Maya). For the *Vedas*, the One is absolute, who consider everything as good and fair.

Another aspect of the unity of the opposites is related to notions of being and becoming in Heraclitus' thought. To Heraclitus, being and becoming are not totally contradictory, but two aspects of an ever living Fire (fragment 30). The world in mutation is a game of the Time, that is characterized, according to Aurobindo, by a double movement of periodic criation and destruction of the Universe.

In the Indian thought, there is being and becoming, eternal and real existence and temporal apparent existence. For the *Upanishads*, exist in the Vedantic philosophy and in the nihilistic budhism, the source of the mutation is the original Not-being, the Emptiness. The eternal Nothing is a game of God (lila).

Aurobindo says : After all, what is God ? An eternal child, playing an eternal game in an eternal garden[25] The universe is not only war or fight, but it is the joy of a God that loves himself, it is a child's game, it is the never ending multiplication of himself, made by a poet who is inebriated by the ecstasy of his own power of a never ending creation[26].

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[24] *Bhagavad Gita*, p. 71.

[25] Shri Aurobindo, *De la Grece a l'Inde*, p. 99.

[26] id., ibid., p. 97.

Bhagavad-Gita's text points out his antinomic character of the divine creation and destruction : You must understand what is the origin of everything. I am the beginning of a whole world and its dissolution[27]. I am the Spirit of the Time, the destroyer of the world[28].

To Aurobindo, the external aspect of the universe is the existence of the world and the human existence advancing through fight and hecatomb; the internal aspect of the world is the universal Being who accomplishes himself in a great creation and a great destruction. Life like a battle and a killing field[29].

The unity between life and death, creation and destruction, eternity and time, have been detected by Heraclitus, who identifies Hades and Dionysus (fragment 15).

world as a divine game, and time like its expression characterize the philosophy of Heraclitus : time is a child that plays, moving the stones of his game there and here; royalty of a child (fragment 52).

Axelos shows that the heraclitical god plays a divine game. God is, then essentially wise, playful and serene[30]. It is, also connected with time. Logos expresses the harmony and the opposition of the contraries. in a Cosmos which is in mutation, through the force of the Fire; and all this trough the Time[31].

Confrontation between eternity and time is solved because time is eternal and eternity is manifested in time[32]. The cosmic 'mutation obeys a rhythm, a mesure, a eyclical and alternant march. The eastern character of the division of time and of the relationship man-universe in Heraclitus, are pointed out by Axelos[33].

We find here an apparent contraposition between Axelos and Aurobindo. The former talks of a periodic destruction of the universe, stating that this conception is accepted both by the Indian philosophy and Heraclitus' philosophy. Axelos, in his turn, refuses the thesis of a periodic destruction of the universe. To him, there is no *pralaya* in Heraclitus' philosophy, but an eternal time, an eternal fire, that is the life of the world. Heraclitus would have not said that the world would perish in fire, for if the earth becomes water, air and fire, the fire will also becomes air, water and earth[34]. There is no destruction *of* the universe, but mutation *in* the universe. The universe is never a gigantic flame. Fire can not be defeated and annihilate the other elements. because justice is discord and harmony is fight[35].

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[27] *Bhagavad Gita*, p. 145.
[28] id., p. 207.
[29] Shri Aurobindo, *Bhagavad Gita*, p. 37.
[30] Axelos, op. cit., p. 126.
[31] id., ibid., p. 100.
[32] id., ibid., p. 54.
[33] id., ibid., p. 101.

To solve the discordance between Axelos and Aurobindo, we have listen to Heraclitus. Is there any *pralaya* ?

If we collect all the fragments that refer to mutations of fire, we will have :

This world, is the same one for everybody none of the gods and none of the men did it; it is, it has always been, it will always be an eternally living fire, that lights and extinguishs itself according to the measure (fragment 30). The mutations of the fire : first, the sea; and one half is a hot wind. The earth dillutes itself in sea and it receives its measure according the same law, as it was before it became earth (fragment 31). Fire lives from earth's death and the air lives from the fire's death; the water lives from the air's death and the earth, from the water's death (fragment 76).

Schematically, the cycle of mutations could be represented in the following way :

↓ Earth
↓ Fire
↓ Air
↓ Water

Heraclitus also says that in the circumference, the beginning and the end are mixed (fragment 103) that is, mutation is eternal.

We have also to consider the following fragments about mutation:

Fire changes into everything and everything change into fire, as we exchange goods for gold and gold for goods (fragment 30). Cold becomes hot, hot becomes cold; moist be comes dry and dry becomes moist (fragment 126). To all souls, to die is to become water; to the water; to die is to become earth. However the water comes from earth and the soul comes from water.

Schematically, we would have :



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[34] id., ibid., p. 103.

[35] id., ibid., pp. 104-105.

That is, the way downstairs and the way upstairs is one and the same (fragment 60), the way of the never ending spiral of the mutations, which is straight and curved is one and the same (fragmant 59).

We can affirm then that Heraclitus does not talk of destruction but of perpetual mutation of an eternal living fire, whose periodic act of lightining and of extinction constitutes the very mutation (fragment 30). Fragment 36 points out very clearly this character of mutation of the universe.

In our opinion, there is an agreement between Axelo's interpretation and the effective texts of the Indian tradition, for in the *Bhagavad-Gita* we find : what actually exists can not stop to exist; accordingly, what does not exist cah not start to exist[36]. This one is not born nor dead; it is a non-born, ancient, eternal; it is not dead when the body is dead[37].

It is Aurobindo himself that comment the *Gita* and states that the opposition between being and not being has an end when we urderstand that the soul is the unique I imperishable, and through this soul all this universe was extended[38].

The opposition between periodic creation and destruction of the forms of the universe (and not of the substance), is solved, in our opinion, through the conception of eternal mutation, that characterizes not only the Indian thought, but also Heraclitu's philosophy.

To Aurobindo, Indian philosophy transcends Heraclitu's perspective. The Greek philosopher identifies the fight with the justice and the harmony with the equilibrium of the opposites (fragments 8 and 51). He sees the mutation of the universe guided by a reason, a Logos, a suprem intelligent principle (fragments 1, 2, 41, 113, 114, 115). The Indian philosophy sees the presence of a reason in the world, but also a universal happiness and love, a bliss and an ecstasy, a spiritual beauty—as being essential. Indian philosophy admits that the mutation implies not only war, but also interchange, a grant to the other. The secret of life is love and not war.

According to Aurobindo, love is what we must accomplish, a new dimension of the existence to be fulfilled. And with love, knowledge, happiness, life, and union with God; for up to this moment, all we did was hatred, mistake, pain, war and frailty[39].

Heraclitus, the philosopher of *polemos*, and Aurobindo, the philosopher of love, are in reality complementary, having established a

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[36] *Bhagavad Gita*, p. 44.
[37] id., ibid., p. 45.
[38] Shri Aurobindo, *Bhagavad Gita*, p. 45.
[39] Shri Aurobindo, *De la Grece a l' Inde*, p. 96.

"harmony of opposing tensions" (fragment 51). as a union of contradictory things.

The unity between love and war, life and death, is present in the great poems of Greek and Indian traditions. He said *Theogony* broaches the union between Ares and Aphrodite, and result of this union a daughter, which was called Harmony. In *Bhagavad-Gita*, the god tells to the warrior : I am immortaiity and also death, existence and non-existence[40].

Heraclitus saids : God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace (fragment 57).

Heraclitus add Aurobindo belong to these great traditions, and each one expresses its two antagonic faces.

The task of those who study Heraclitus and Aurobindo is to recupreate the prefoundity of these philosophies.

For Heraclitus reflect polemically in all the Western thought, from Parmenides to Heidegger; and Aurobindo retakes an ancient tradition, and translates it into a contemporary language, in his political, poetical, philosophical, historical works.

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[40] *Bhagavad Gita*, p. 180.

Book-Reviews :

Shri Niwas Sharma : *A Critical and Comparative Re-valuation of Ethics of the Neo-vedanta*, Published by Darshana Printers, Moradabad (1992), Price Rs. 200/—

The present work is a thesis on the re-evaluation of the ethics of the Neo-Vedanta. The ethical philosophers whose views have been studied in the thesis are Kabir, Guru Nanak, Swami Dayanand, Swami Ramkrishna Paramhamsa, Swami Vivekananda, Swami Ramtirtha, Rabindra Nath Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi, Aurbindo Ghosh and Dr. S. Radhakrishnan. These are prominent thinkers of modern India and therefore their ethical thoughts have importunce. The author himself has stated in his preface

"The present work aims at portraying a chiselled stature of the ethics of these philosophers and also giving a clear picture of their theories in relation with practical bearing on actual life."

The work has been divided in eight chapters viz. Introduction, A General Survey of the Ethics, The Impact of the Vedanta, Ethical Philosophers of Neo-Venanta, Ethics of the Neo-Vedantism Simiarities of the Neo Vedantic Ethics with Modern Ethical Theories of the West, Critical Estimate And Supreme Ideal, and Conclusion. Bibliography too has been added.

The work has an academic end of presenting the ethical views of Neo Vedanta and it has succeeded in doing so.

Thinkers like Kabir, Nanak and Gandhi worked for the establishment of human society where people belonging to different religions shall not quarrel over the names of religions and shall remember that God is one and He resides in the innermost recesses of every heart. It is the ignorance of this fact which is responsible for the conflicts that take place in the name of any religion.

Vivekananda expressed his view-point in the following poem :

'The God is here before thee now,
Revealed in all these myriad forms;
Rejecting them, where seekest thou
His prsence ? He who freely shares
His love with every living thing
Profess true service unto God ?

Such thoughts of universal love have a special relevance to our nation which is witnessing an ugly drama of violence and destruction at present in the name of religion.

The book may be found specially useful by the student of philosophy as it may help him in having a comparative knowledge of Indian thinkers and the Western thinkers in the domain of ethical philosophy. However, the book is more informative than critical because it is concerned with ten thinkers which leaves the author little space for undertaking a really critical evaluation. This however does not diminish the importance of the work. The interested readers shall find it a profitable reading.

P. K. Bandopadhay : *Nath Cult and Mahanad: A Study in Syncretism*, B. R. Publishing Corporation, New Delhi.

Nath Cult is an important religious cult of India. It has drawn inspiration from Trantika and Shavaite traditions. Popular tradition calls it Nath Yogi sect. Mahamahopadhyao Gopinath Kaviraj has done a commendable pioneering work to give a systematic exposition of this cult.

The supreme goal of this cult is to realize the union of Shiva and Shakti. According to this cult, Shiva is eternal, infinite and the Ultimate Spiritual reality. It is changeless, formless, self-luminous and beyond time and space. It is Sat, Chit, Ananda, Shakti is the self-unfolding and dynamic source of temporal existence. Thus this cult is inspired by the basic philosophical temper of spiritual truth.

The book gives a systematic account of this cult in nine chapters viz. The critical Frame work, Nath Cult as an Amalgam, Antiquity of Mahanada, Nath Center at Mahanada, Land of Nadasadhana, History of Gorakshanath, Tenets of the Nath cult, Divisions of the Sect, and Reach of the Cult. As is clear from the scheme of chapters, the author is more interested in sociological study of the cult than in a study of its philosophy. Hence the work is important for the knowledge of the development of this cult, culled from historical data, archaeological information, literary evidence, folklore and myths.

Inclusion of twelve photographs makes the book, all the more enlightening. The book is thus a valuable piece of historical account of the Nath Yogi Cult.

Inspired Thoughts of Swami Rama, Himalayan International Institute of Yoga, Science and Philosophy of the U. S. A., Honesdale, Pennsylvania. U.S.A.

The book presents a compilation of lectures and articles of Swami Rama.

Its reading is quite inspiring, as it offers the elevating and rational thoughts of the Swami on various topics. The lectures included in the book are thirteen viz. The Path of Raja Yoga, self-discipline, Therapeutic Value of Meditation, Mystery and Mastery of mind, Relevance of Meditation to the Modern Science, Inner Peace, Love is the Lord of Life. Emotions and their positive use, Desirelessness, Role of Women in Society, Yoga and Family Life, Keys to Successful Living. Self analysis and self enlightenment, Selfless Service. The articles include topics like What is Yoga and India's Contribution to Holistic Health. The reading of the book is most rewarding. The Swami writes "The ancient sages of India emphasized the need for holistic health. They understood the whole being". and "Happiness can never be given by any one; happiness comes through the right attitude of mind".

A reader is adviced to go through the entire book as it will enrich his thinking process.

S. K. Pandian, *The Hidden Heritage*, Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi.

The book is a result of author's 'unstructured research'. The author is of the opinion that the Dravidian civilization is one of the earliest civilizations of the world and even the Mohenjodaro and Harappa cultures were the creation of this very Dravidian civilization. He asserts that both Telgu and Tamil are older than Sanskrit. The scholarship of the author may be admired, but his views appear at present rather fanciful. It appears that the author has decided to establish the antiquity of Dravidian culture and prepared his case in his own way. The lovers of Indian culture may find this work enlightening even thought it is not possible to agree with the author entirely.

The Foreword by Dr. Murti states the position correctly. "Most of the interpretations, contentions and conclusions herein do not have the support of the majority of leading authorities."

A. J. Alston (Translator), *Yoga and the Supreme Bliss*, Heritage Publishers, New Delhi.

It is a collection of translated poems of Swami Rama Tirtha, the well-known and the unique Advaita thinker of India. Almost all the Hindus are acquainted with his name. A meritorious student and Professor of Mathematics, his inner experiences impelled him to become a sanyasi, a recluse and to wander in the lonely but lovely places of the Himalayas. Poetry flowed from his pen. He can be considered an Upanishadic sage who spoke and sang as a modern ma . He can be considered a prominent poet-thinker who expressed in modern terms the wisdom of the Upanishads.

His address to Death before his actual bodily death is worth noting

'Oh death, go and strike my body : I have millions of bodies to live in......" To soul, he says

"I salute you, O my soul.
You are ever Existence, Consciousness and Bliss.
Why undergo delusion, fear and grief ?
If no one has come to a house,
How can anyone leave it ?"

The Vedantic message when conveyed through poems all the more impressive. The present work contains 152 poems in English. The glossary too has been provided which helps in understanding the meaning of the poems.

The book has been nicely printed. Every lover of spiritual knowledge should try to go through this collection of Swami Rama's poems who has been compared with famous Christian mystic Meister Eckhart.

Rihan A. Dunuwila, *Shaiva Siddhanta Theology*, Motilal Banarsidass Delhi.

The book tries to survey the tradition of the Shaiva Siddhanta in the contexts of history, literature and religion. It is mainly based on Aghorashiva's commentary on Bhoja's (1058A.D.), Aghorashiva postulsted an inner plurality of the Godhead untainited by the phenomenal. Divine plurality in unity is the fundamental tenet of the Siddhanta.

The author has tried to compare this view with Christian view of Trinity.

The concept of Trinity is supposed to be mysterious. But the author bases his view on the testimony of Anselm's opinion that 'there is, in the supreme unity, a certain wonderous plurality that is both ineffable and inevitable. 'Inspired by these words the author concludes

"If this conclusion is acceptable, as we believe it is, then, as the sense of ineffable and inevitable plurality within the divine unity is also the Siddhanta's fundamental insight-however unacceptable some of its formulations to Constantinopolitan orthodoxy-we make bold to suggest that it derives from the same supernatural Revelation as Christianity, and from no other source."

This academic work deserves a reading by every lover of Indology as it represents an attempt of unifying the Shaiva (Indian) and Christian (Catholic tradition) view points in its own way.

Paul Vjecsner, *On Proof for the Existence of God. And Other Reflective Inquiries*, Penden, New York.

The title of the book reveals the nature of the book.

The book is divided in four chapters viz. Language and concepts, Reality, Logic and Mathematic and Transcendent Regions. The believers in God's existence have been trying right from the dawn of human civilization to prove that God does exist, and the non-believers in God, in the same way, have been trying to prove that there is no cogent proof that may establish the presence of God. Man being a speaking and reading animal derives joy in proving or disproving God. But those who have faith in God remain indifferent to such attempts because for them God is an undeniable reality.

The author of the book tries to prove God's existence through his scientific proofs. The lovers of God should try to go through book.

The problems of heaven and immortality besides God's existence, too have been discussed.

The book has 258 pages in all.

The author himself remarks :

"The writing itself can furthermore, in the light of the voluminous other writings on the subject matter, be seen to be of substantial brevity. This because of its dependence on conclusive demonstration". The topic of God is such that no single opinion can be accepted as satisfying to one and all. Hence, it can be added that although the author may think that his view is logically very sound, the fact is otherwise.

However, readers with scientific temperament shall find the work quite stimulating.

Antonio Rosmini, *Conscience*, Rosmini House, Durham. U.K.

Romini (1797-1855) has presented his ethical views in his first book Principles of Ethics. In the present work we find development and conclusion of his earlier ideas. He has drawn both from a rational approach as well as a theological approach in formulating his ethical philosophy.

Common man thinks that conscience is the best judge of moral conduct. Osmini writes "If we reflect only upon the object of our knowledge, but not of the act of the spirit which is the means of knowledge. If we reflect upon both the object of knowledge and the act of our spirit (the means of knowledge), we acquire consciousness, that is, a general conscience of our intellective act in relationship with the object to which it refers". (p. 9)

Giving his opinion on the origin of conscience, Rosmini writes: "Morality begins at the first level of practical reflections. To establish the level at which conscience originates, we recall that 'conscience is a judgment on the morality of our actions' or 'a speculative judgment on the morality of our practical judgment:' But if the morality of actions is based in the practical judgment, which belongs to the first level of reflections, conscience, in order to judge about morality, must reflect on the first level of reflections, to which morality belongs. The judgment, then made by conscience, is a later reflection than that of morality; it is at least a second-level reflection. Conscience, therefore, cannot begin before we have reached at least the second level of reflections in our development" (p. 19).

It is accepted that our actions possess moral quality prior to the development of conscience.

The topic of conscience has relevance to the present period too. Even now the questions such as 'Is conscience the final arbiter of morality' 'Is it possible to develop right type of conscience ?' 'It is possible to distinguish between false and upright conscience?' 'What is to be done when one is in doubt about the morality of act' arise. ı. our own nation Gandhi gave supreme importance to conscience;

Rosmini's following words may be found useful in this direction. "There is a light in the human being, and a light that is human being; the light in the human being is the law of truth; the light that is the human being is an upright conscience..... We become light when we share in the law of truth by means of an upright conscience in conformity with truth,'

The book deserves a perusal by the lovers of ethical philosophy. The book is a translated version of the original work.

B. Bhattacharya, *Towards a Tantric Goal*, Sterling Publishers Pvt; Ltd.,New Delhi.

The book is different from other books on Tantra.

It has been divided in four books which have been given the respective titles, Recognition, Meeting, The Means, and The Seeker-Sought.

The first book viz. Recognition stresses the need of a Guru, a teacher.

'Thus, a Guru become an inevitable stage in the spiritual evolution of the inner growth of the self, for the realisation of the soul'

The second book i.e. Meeting describes the qualities needed for becoming a good disciple, Shishya

"Complete dedication and submission are the hallmarks of a novice shishya. A shishya has to try hard to 'submerge' enntirely his sense of the personal, his ego, his self-interest in the interest and will of his Guru'.

'A perfect union between the one who corrects and the one who seeks correction depends on total submission.'

Hence there is a need of an ideal shishya as there is a need of an ideal Guru for learning Tantra.

The third factor necessary in the Tantra is the Mantra.

Under the title 'The Means' the desirability of a living mantra has been indicated.

'A Guru selects a mantra to suit a seeker, a chela, a shishya." "who is this Guru ? And who could be accepted as a chela?"

This question leads to the fourth book.

Just as a Shishya needs a competent Guru, a Guru too needs a competent shishya. 'A Guru-shishya compact is an intimate compact.' The ultimate aim of Tantra can be imbibed only through the right' 'Guru'

'Man's march to his ultimate destiny starts with the right selection of a friend and guide.'

The book is quite readable. A reader shall find it easy to understand it

The lovers of Tantra shall find the work quite lively and enjoyable.

M. P. Pandit, *Studies in the Tantras And the Veda*, Sterling Publication Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi.

M.P. Pandit was a well-known author of book on Tantra. He was associated throughout his life with Aurobindo Ashram, Pondichery. He states in the Preface :

'It is generally believed that the Tantra is an exotic growth running contrary to the spirit of the Veda. The Vedic hymans too are treated by many scholars as nothing more than child like prayers by a primitive people to a plethora of gods. The studies in this Volume seek to underline the fact that both the Vedic and the Tantric traditions run parallel to each other in the long history of the Indian subcontinent".

The present work tries to prove this very fact.

Part I of the book is devoted to a short study of various Tantra books. Part II discusses Purusha Sukta, Hymn of Creation Godhead in the Rigveda, The Nivids, Gayatri Upasana and the Veda and Upanishads.

According to the author and ancient tradition Tantra Shāstra is a pratyaksha shastra 'a science which, like medicine and astrology, is verifiable at every step. It is a rational science based upon a doctrine or a set of doctrines which lends itself to be tested by any individual at any stage. Prior faith in the word of the Shastra is not indispensable. 'Practise what we say and see the results for your self, then faith will be born' says the teacher of the Tantra''.

Tantra harmonises Donism and Dualism. The ultimate Reality remains the Brahman. However 'the universe is a manifestation by the Supreme as Shati out of its own being for the delight of Her play with the supreme as the Lord'.

In the Chapter 'Shankara and Tantric Tradition' it has been shown that even that well-known Advaitin accepted the importance of Tantra. 'He installed the Shri Chakra wherever he established or caused to establish centres of worship.

Another interesting chapter is 'The Chakras or Lotuses in Shri Aurobindo's Yoga'. An account of Chakras i,e. centres of consciousness is enlightening,

The author has tried to emphasize that the Tantra is a great mevement for the uplift of human existence. for the recovery of whole of man to God. Thus Tantra has great significance for real human upliftment.

The book can be of much help in understanding the fundamental tenets of Tantra.

It is fact an anthology of different reviews and articles written by late Dr. Pandit. But together they give a fairly good account of Tantra.

Every reader interested in Indian culture and philosophy should go through this short work to have a clear view of the objective Tantra.

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Neoplatonism as a World Philosophy

R. Baine Harris

I. Introduction

The hope for the resolution of human conflict through the unification of thought is one of the oldest ideas in the history of civilization. Thinking people in all ages have seen that intellectual disagreements over religious, social, and economic matters have been one of the major causes of war and various other forms of human devastation, and have longed for the intellectual unification of all mankind. In virtually every culture some poet or philosopher has dreamed of a society in which men live together harmoniously because they have intellectual agreement, a society in which men "study war no more" and "the lion lies down with the lamb". This hope for an ideal human society, "a city not made with human hands," has often been merged with the idea of heaven, especially in the minds of those who have given up hope for the possibility of its actual realization on earth. For all who have not yet given up on mankind, it remains as the ideal that gives them the strength and courage to work for a better world. It is the reason why they seek to aleviate human suffering and to remove injustice, ignorance, and greed wherever they occur.

The necessity for consensus on the nature of the basic issues of life has been recognized as essential to harmonious living in society from the dawn of early civilized life. It has been one of the causes of totalitarianism in government, in marriage, in religion, and in various other areas of human life; and in some instances it even has been used as a **justification** for totalitarianism. It also has even been used as a justification for war. Generally speaking, it may be said that throughout human history, societies that allow intellectual pluralism within them have been a rare occurence, and only in very recent centuries and in relatively few countries has it been promoted as an ideal.

Besides war, another means for achieving intellectual agreement in society has been through the propagation of religion. Throughout history, a very great number of people have believed, and a large number of people still believe that religion is the only way to intellectual harmony. For them nothing less than a common religious experience and common religious commitments can cause people to agree on the basic intellectual issues. Having observed that when men have a religious experience and make their peace with God, they are no longer at war with themselves and with other men, they believe that religion is a necessary factor in getting men to resolve their intellectual conflicts. Their hope is that there will eventually be enough people with similar religious views to allow a unification of thought.

Yet another group of people have believed, and a few still believe that the only way to establish intellectual harmony among people is in the wider expansion of science and scientific knowledge. Their hope lies in the eventual widespread expansion of scientific knowledge and understanding to the vast majority of the people of the world. They believe that science alone is the key to a greater understanding of the major intellectual issues about which men disagree.

The main difficulty we see with both religion and science as candidates for bringing about universal intellectual harmony is that in their actual practice both are philosophically pluralistic. Although there are many common elements in religious experience as it has been interpreted in various religious traditions and also many common elements in science as it occurs in its many forms, neither religion nor science as such is internally **philosophically** unified. The philosophical unity that they have is not inherent in either of them. Both tend to become philosophically confused in their various expressions over the years. Religions, especially, tend to take on a variety of philosophical forms with the passing of time. They try out various philosophical formulations and some of them become very closely identified with particular philosophical schools of thought, so much so that some of their adherents give the same sacred character to their philosophical expression as they give to the original vision of their founder or founders. Sectarians do develop both in religion and science, but much less in science, and although they have the great advantage of presenting a much more highly unified expression, it eventually becomes clear that much of the unity they possess is founded upon the unity of the philosophy with which they have become identified.

To say that neither religion nor science has an inherent philosophical unity is not to deny that each has its own internal unity. We must make a further distinction between religious unity, scientific unity, and philosophical unity. Religion is a way of binding people together and any given religion is an expression of some form of religious unity. Science also is unified as science. Any given science is highly unified in its content, scope, and methodology; and because of its extreme objectivity is highly universal in its practice. There is no real difference in Russian, French, and Hungarian biology. However, societies may have differing evaluations of the significance of biology and its relative importance in human life, and these evaluations are essentially philosophical evaluations. In its actual function in human life, any science will become involved in philosophical issues. Science may provide quite valuable information concerning the nature of the material world, but it leaves the spiritual world blank. Science **qua** science cannot handle values. There is no axiology in mathematics. In short, although both religion and science are worthy in themselves, and if properly developed have much to offer mankind, neither in themselves can deal with all the metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological issues that must be dealt with and show the relations that exist between them. Both must function within the framework of some philosophy.

Although we would not wish to overlook the fact that religion has been a significant factor in helping men to live harmoniously with each other, it is also the case that it has been a major factor in contributing to the various intellectual differences that divide mankind. Religions survive to the degree that the original unified vision of their founder or founders is capable of being reinterpreted in an intellectual expression that is meaningful to each new generation. The original vision of the founders may have had some specific philosophical assumptions that came with the vision, but in any case it is very likely that new philosophical notions will be added along the way in later expressions of it. This has been the case in Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. As a rule, new philosophical expressions of the vision lead to the formation of various sects within the religion, and the leaders of the various sects begin to promote the views of their particular sect, sometimes at the expense and discredit of other sects. A basic question that usually arises among them is whether the believers should hold only to the original views of their founder or founders in their original philosyphical formulation or should go with some later or contemporary philosophical expression of them. The extremists among them often present their particular sectarian expression as if it were the only one that is correct and they often conflict with other extreme sectarians, religious or otherwise, who are also doing the same thing. All of this leads to greater conflict and greater religious pluralism.

The real problem with the intellectual unification of mankind, as we see it, lies in the fact that intellectual unity is necessarily a **Philosophical** issue, and there is no one philosophy that is now universally accepted throughout the world. Only philosophy deals with all of the intellectual concerns of mankind and shows how they may be related to each other. Only philosophy deals with every dimension of human intellectual interest metaphysically, epistemologically, and axiologically and relates every element to every other element; and even it must do so within very definite limits, namely the sort of unification that is possible in terms of the particular set of presuppositions inherent in that philosophy. Both science and religion deal with some of the same areas of reality as does philosophy, but neither of them deal with **all** aspects of reality and neither makes the effort to relate every aspect of human intellectual concern to every other aspect as philosophy does, and thus cannot make an adequate contribution to the unification of human thought. They are able to contribute to the unification of thought only when they are enhanced with some philosophy, which, as a matter of fact is the way they are presented most of the time. Indeed, both do make a major contribution to the unification of thought. The problem is that they, by themselves, cannot make a sufficient contribution.

What we really have had throughout human history and still have in present world conflicts, as we see it, is a battle of philosophies. It is a fact of life that men do disagree philosophically with each other. They differ concerning the basic presuppositions on which a philosophy can be built and they differ concerning the methods that should be used in constructing one. Philosophers do not all philosophize alike. They seriously disagree with each other not only on how to philosophize but on which aspects of philosophy are most important and which elements of human life and human experience are philosophically significant. It is a fact of life that the philosophers are intellectually at war with each other, and the consequences of their war fare are felt in the lives of almost everyone. Philosophies and philosophers differ because people differ in their intellectual needs and interests. This is the way it is, the way it has been, and the way it will continue to be in any society that is able to allow its citizens the luxury of freedom of thought and freedom of dissent. Totalitarianism is not a situation in which there is the absence of philosophy. It is rather a situation in which only one philosophy is allowed. For better or for worse, philosophy cannot be ignored; it is entirely too significant in human history and in human life. The issues with which it deals are intensely human and cannot be avoided.

Religions qua religions, we think, do not conflict with each other as much as do the philosophies with which they have become identified. There is a remarkable similarity in the nature of the vision of the various founders of the major world religions, a similarity great enough to lead some thinkers such as Ramakrishnan to believe in the essential unity of all religions. Even though the initial religious vision of the founder may in itself be highly unified, and even though all of the visions of the various founders may have a remarkable degree of unity with each other, this unity does not remain for very long once the various later philosophical interpreters become involved with it. The pure theology of the vision becomes mixed with the philosophical theology of the its later interpreters.

Although philosophy has always been important in human life and history, its importance has increased even more so in recent centuries and in most recent times due to the changes brought about in the world as a result of modern technology. The modern technological miracles of rapid communication and rapid travel have succeeded in bringing societies and cultures that previously were unknown to each other into close contact with each other. The same miracles have also brought the various philosophies of the various cultures into a close confrontation with each other and the differences that have always existed between some of them have more serious practical consequences than they used to have. In past times when people seriously disagreed with the established authorities they simply moved on, if possible, to some other location and made a new life for themselves and were able to avoid meeting the challenge of the other conflicting philosophy. But such a luxury is now no longer possible for it is no longer possible for societies to live in isolation from each other. Philosophies that have been incompatable with each other for centuries are now encountering each other in open warfare, and they are doing so with increasing intensity and effectiveness, aided by recent advances in the technology of modern communications. With the advent of international home television directly from satelites in only a few decades from now the same sort of confrontation of cultures and philosophies that is now occuring on a national level will occur on an international level and will cause even greater problems. Extreme sectarians do exist in philosophy just as they do in religions and they are equally as effective in working their mischief in society.

The present ideological difficulty in world affairs, as we see it, comes from the fact that we are now becoming a global society and thus are being forced to face on a global level the same sort of ideological self-definition problem that every society has to face. In some respects we are now facing on a global level a situation similar to what the various German States faced in the unification of the Germany or some Russian and Asian Republics faced in the union of the Soviet Socialists Republics. At issue is **whose** set of values, whose economic methods, whose view of life—in short, whose philosophy is to prevail. The real question is whether the various nations can settle their intellectual difficulties with each other through discussion and compromise or whether they can only be settled by war, as has been the case so many other times in history, and notably in the various dynasties of Egypt, Persia, India, and China and in the case of the Roman Empire, the rise of the European states, the development of the Americas, and the recent imperialistic ambitions of a number of modern nations including England, Spain, France, Germany, Japan, the United States and Russia.

At face value it would appear that the solution would be for all the nations of the world to have the same philosophy. The probability of this ever happening, however, is not very high both because of the present political situation and the low probability of attaining any agreement on which philosophy would be acceptable. Most societies tend toward philosophical pluralism whenever they are free to do so; and if we look at history alone, the most likely situation that would allow one philosophy for the whole world would be when all the nations of the world are under the same totalitarian political authority, a situation which would mitigate against those benefits gained from having one. However, the concept "world philosophy" does not necessarily need to be taken to mean that it would be the **only** philosophy in the world. It may only mean a universal philosophy, a philosophy "for the whole world," one that could be applicable in a wide variety of cultural and intellectual traditions throughout the world, and this is the meaning that we prefer to give it. If we may settle on this meaning, we will be able to find a large number of philosophers who support the idea even though it will still be offensive to some others who are concerned only with truth for the sake of truth and hence do not wish to add any other qualifications to their search for it. For them, any attempt to consider the marketing potential of a philosophy would be the vulgarization of the truth.

There is a sense, however, in which all genuine philosophy is universal philosophy. All philosophers attempt to speak universally.

They attempt to present a unified expression of the truth as it applies universally and thus they automatically address what they have to say to the whole world. But, as a matter of fact, all of them are actually culturally orientated. They are products of particular intellectual and cultural traditions in a particular historical setting, and no matter how much they may try to transcend the presuppositions of their own culture, they never quite succeed in doing so. Pythagoras, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus still remain ancient Greeks. Kant, Hegel, and Marx still remain Germans. Confucious and Lao Tze remain Chinese. Spinoza remains Jewish. Descartes remains French. Hume and Adam Smith remain British. Aurobindo remains Indian. They are still great philosophers, nevertheless, because their views do have some universal value. Some element of their thinking can be transfered into other cultural and historical contexts. The relevance of Marxism in modern China depends upon the extent to which Marx was able to transcend his Germanic perspective and the relevance of Confucianism in contemporary Western Europe depends upon the extent to which Confucius was able to be non-Chinese. However universal a philosopher may wish to be, he is still trapped in his own context.

It is also the case that no philosophy can ever be completely universal in its application. Most cultures prefer to have their philosophical notions expressed concretely rather than abstractly and in terms that have cultural meanings. Philosophers may be able to keep their ideas abstract when speaking only to other philosophers, but when their views are presented to the average citizen they must be expressed in more concrete cultural terms. There are also historical, economic and political factors involved in the acceptance of a philosophy from another culture. It is no accident that the Germans are still mainly interested in German philosophers, the French in French philosophers, the Japanese in Japanese philosophers, and the Indians in Indian philosophers. Even within the philosophical profession itself, the study of the whole history of philosophy has heen a secondary concern. However, some philosophies do succeed in being accepted in other cultures more than do others and we should consider what general characteristics these philosophies have if we are interested in discovering which features in a philosophy tend to make it more universal.

II. Some Requirements Of a Universal Philosophy

General—As we have already suggested, a universal philosophy will have to be a general philosophy. Not every philosophy is a general philosophy, although most are. By a general philosophy we mean one that focuses upon generalities and makes quite a number of general statements. For example, in its philosophy of man a general philosophy would make very general statements about mankind as a type as opposed to those that would apply to only certain races or cultural groups. In its philosophy of nature it would focus upon the general laws of physics, or chemistry or biology, etc, rather than upon those that apply in some specific area. In like manner its basic concepts would be stated in their most generic formulation and attention would be given to relating them to each other in an abstract way. Science, religion, and art, for instance, are not abstract in their actual practice. They are not practiced in general, they become generalities only when they are talked about. An ordinary description of a scientific experiment or a religious or artistic experience would likely not be a general one, since it would more likely be a concrete description of a concrete situation. A philosophical treatment of the same, however, would be a more general treatment. As a philosophical treatment it would be relatively general, since various philosophers may choose to deal with the same data in varying degrees of generality. A philosophy has a greater chance for universal acceptance if it is phrased in general statements and if the concepts it uses are presented in their most abstract formulation when they are related to each other in some generic way.

Comprehensive—A universal philosophy will also need to be comprehensive in scope. It must be humanistic in the sense that it deals with all aspects of human life and human experience. It must have a theory of the nature of reality and a theory of its organization, a statement about the nature and proper role of man, and some idea of God. It must also have a theory of knowledge and some suggestion about what can and cannot be known, along with a theory of value that accounts for art, reason, morality, religion, social life, etc. No aspect of human intellectual interest can be left out of it and all the various types of things must either be related to each other in the philosophy or have the potential for being so related on the basis of the principles and general assumptions of the philosophy. Quite obviously, not all philosophers agree to such a broad definition of philosophy and not all of them make any effort to deal with all aspects of human experience. It is our opinion, however, that those philosophies that do so are stronger candidates for being universal philosophies.

Rational—A universal philosophy must also have a definable and well-ordered logic embodied within it and make a strong appeal to reason. We must distinguish between those philosophies based upon reason and those that rely upon it in the development of their metaphysical systems. Those that are based upon reason alone, whose intial presuppositions are very rational ones, are relatively scarce in the history of philosophy; but some do exist. We may also distinguish between those that restrict their metaphysical speculation within the limits of reason and those that suggest the possibility that its presuppositions and basic principles may be extrapolated beyond the limits of logic, in which case the resulting product would be both trans-logical and trans-rational, and also, in the strictist sense, trans-philosophical. By a "rational philosophy" we mean one that appeals to reason in the inner structuring of its metaphysical system, one that moves logicallv from one assertion to another in the development of its system of thought, regardless of whether or not its basic presupposition or presuppositions are themselves reasonable. An "irrational philosophy" would be one in which there is no appeal to reason or logic in this movement, and, according to our understanding would be a contradiction in terms. But again, philosophers do vary in the degree in which they appeal to reason in the development of their systems, with Aristotle, Spinoza, Descartes and Kant being illustrations of extreme rationalists and Plato, Zen Buddhism, and Kierkegaard being illustrations of weaker rationalists. In our opinion, those philosophies that make a strong appeal to reason are stronger candidates for being universal philosophies than those which do not do so.

Religious—A universal philosophy will also need to be religious in some respect. It must deal with the phenomena of religion in the world, as any philosophy must do so in some way, but it must do more than this. It must take religious meanings seriously and integrate them with all the other meanings that it takes seriously. By a "religious philosophy" we mean one that does not take all religious experience to be an illusion or delusion or some aberrant form of human behaviour and allows a place for it either within or beyond its metaphysical system. More precisely, it is one that is able to deal with religion and religious meanings with the same degree of effectiveness as it does with all the other sorts of meanings with which it deals. We are not suggesting that a philosophy must be religious in order to be a philosophy but rather noting that some are and some are not and that those that are religious have a higher probability of being accepted as universal philosophies. Such acceptance is not necessarily based upon their greater worth as philosophies because they are religious, but is likely the result of a widespread world-wide interest in religion and religious phenomena. This requirement is mainly a practical one.

Clear Terminology—A universal philosophy will need to have concepts that are capable of being understood by most educated people. They should have a certain stability in their meaning but also allow some degree of flexibility in their interpretation and understanding. Although words like "soul," "man," "nature," "good," and "God," are loaded concepts since they have been philosophically enhanced by so many thinkers down through the ages, they still communicate some common meanings to most people. To substitute highly technical definitions for them, as Heidegger and Whitehead have done, may well serve a good purpose within the intentions of their philosophies, but their resulting philosophies are useful only to those who are willing to play their language games with them. The Classical German philosophers, for example, have a notable predilection for highly specified terminologies and rigidly controlled concepts that make their essays much less delightful to read than the essays of their French counterparts. Philosophers, like scientists, must define their terms and they have every right to do so, but they are not candidates for a more universal acceptance if their primary concepts are highly specialized notions that require stipulative definitions and do not allow some plurality of meaning in their interpretations. Philosophy, after all, is not a science; and it need not be overinfluenced by the methods of science any more than it should be influenced by those used in religion and in art. A universal philosophy, we think, needs to allow for the possibilty of multi-dimensional levels of meaning of its basic concepts.

Modest—A universal philosophy should recognize its own limits. It should recognize the general limits of all philosophy and those limitations of thought and experience that are required on the basis of its own presuppositions and its own general principles. No matter how comprehensive it may be in its scope and concepts, it must in some way recognize the limits that must be put upon organized rational life. Even though it may have universal possibilities, it should not proclaim itself as universal, completely adequate, and final. In some way it must allow for myth and mystery in human experience, although this does not necessarily need to be done within its own metaphysics. While respecting logic and reason and seriously involving them in its own formation and development, it must allow for the possibility of their transcendence—and even for the possibility for its own transcendence as a philosophy.

A universal philosophy should be so designed to allow for its future reformation. All philosophies are necessarily based upon dated concepts, but some concepts are more dated than others. All philosophies are also products of the logic of organization of their times. Thus they need to be continually revised and even reorganized and reformulated as logic and science and a larger compendium of knowledge develop. At issue is the requirement that the philosophy have built into it the possibility of is own reformation. It will soon join the fate of hundreds of other philosophies and be only an anachronism if it does not do so.

Surely any philosophy that deifies reason or proclaims itself as a "final philosophy" is a joke.

III Neoplatonism As A Universal Philosophy

Neoplatonism is an eclectic form of Platonism that was developed in Rome in the Third Century A. D., some six centuries after the death of Plato. It first began in Egypt with the efforts of Ammonius Saccas and others to revive Platonism as a spiritiual form of philosophy that could compete with Epicureanism and Skepticism and the extreme materialism of the Stoics. Its real founder, however, was Plotinus (205-270), one of Ammonius' students who eventually emigarated to Rome where he succeded in founding both a school and a school of thought during his twenty six year stay from 244 to his death in 270. Neoplatonism is often identified with his thought as expressed in his only book, the **Enneads,** but as a school of thought it also includes the views of his immediate associates, Amelius Gentilianus and Porphyry as well those of Proclus (c. 409-c. 485) and other later interpreters. As a school of thought it has had a direct influence on the development of philosophical theology in Early Christianity, Medieval Judaism, and in Islam, and through its Renaissance interpreters has also been a significant factor in the development of Modern Western European thought and culture. It would not be an overstatement to say that it has been one of the most influential philosophies in the history of the West.

Its significance as a universal philosophy lies in the fact that it was conceived as a universal philosophy, namely, as a form of Platonism that could be relevant to the diversified intellectual needs of the late Roman period. Rome was still a world power at that time but was experiencing considerable internal intellectual unrest as a result of the increasing conflict of the various cultures and philosophies within the empire, a situation very similar to what we are now experiencing in our world at this time. It occurred at the end of more than eight hundred years of intense philosophical speculation within the Classical Greek philosophy tradition and as such it is both a revised version of Plato and to a lesser degree of that tradition. It is a form of Ancient Greek Philosophy and as such is outmoded in many of its elments, and especially those that relate to Greek Science, but it is also a general philosophy dealing with the larger relationships that hold between the various realms of human experience and the various ways that reality may be conceived, and in this function transcends its Greek origin. Its philosophy of science, philosophy of man, philosophy of God, logic, ontology, and epistemology have not been outmoded by its Greek

Science and are still able to be relevant in the modern world to those who are able to accept its presuppositions about the nature of reality and truth. As a general philosophy it still remains as one of the few major comprehensive philosophical options that have ever been devised.

Essentially, Neoplatonism is a form of Platonism, but it is a more universalized form. It is not the pure Platonism of Plato's **Dialogues** but a revised and enhanced version embodying some elements of later Pythagorean, Peripatetic, Stoic. and especially Aristotelian thought. Some observers also see elements of Egyptian, Persian, and Indian thought in it as well. Coming at the end of six centuries of criticism of Plato's thought, including the sophisticated criticisms of Plato made by Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Skeptics, Neoplatonism emerged as a corrected version, and one more capable of serving as a universal philosophy. It is hardly the reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle, as some of the early Islamic Neoplatonic Philosophers claimed, but it is at least a highly Aristotelianized Platonism, and is much stronger as a philosophy because of it.

As a matter of fact Neoplatonism has already proved to be a universal philosophy in view of the fact that it already has been utilized in a number of differing cultures and historical settings. At a crucial time in the early development of Christian theology it came to the aid of Christianity by providing a more advanced philosophical analysis of the notion of deity and its necessary relation to the world than that available in Christian thought at the time. Although not Christian itself, its philosophical ruminations about the necessary non-material aspects of deity were not inconsistent with it and were enthusiastically accepted by various Christian thinkers. It remained as a residual element in the philosophical parts of the thinking of such basic Christian theologians as St. Augustine, Origin, the Cappadocian Fathers, and even St. Thomas Aquinas. It may have had an even greater impact on Western Christianity if the Christians had been able to understand the Christian Neoplatonism of Eriugena. It had no small impact on England in the late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries thought through the writings of the Cambridge Platonists, who were in fact latter day Christian Neoplatonists. Neoplatonism was also a major factor in the development of Byzantine thought and culture and the entire Greek Catholic tradition has a strong affinity with it.

Neoplatonism also came to the aid of Islam, becoming the main tradition in Islamic philosophy through the work of Al-Farabi (c.870–950). His major efforts to adapt Neoplatonism and Islam to each other were preceded by Al-Kindi (c.866.d) who wrote a commentary on the anonymous Neoplatonic work called the **Theologia Aristotelis,** which was in fact a paraphrase of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth **Enneads** of Plotinus. The Muslim theologian Avicenna (980–1037) was strongly influenced by the Neoplatonism of Al-Farabi as was also the Spanish Arabic Islamic Philosopher, Averroes (1126–1198). Neoplatonism also has close ties with Islamic mysticism in various contexts, but especially in Sufism.

Neoplatonism has had a much lesser impact upon the development of Jewish thought, but it has had a role to play in it. Around 485 a Palestinian Jew named Marinus succeeded Proclus as the head of the Platonic Academy in Athens, which by this time had become Neoplatonic, and is likely responsible for introducing the thought of Plotinus into the Medieval Jewish traditon. He may also have had something to do with the mysticism of **The Book of Creation,** the **Sefer Yezirah.** The Spanish Jewish philosopher Solomon ibn Gabirol (1020–1070), also known as Avencebron, shows a heavy Neoplatonic influence in his chief work **The Fountain of Life** and a pantheistic variety of Jewish Neoplatonism was developed by Abraham ibn Ezra (c. 1092–1167) in the early Twelfth Century. It would be fair to say that Neoplatonism has made a contribution to the development of the Jewish Mystical Tradition as expressed in the medieval document, the **Kabbalah.**

Neoplatonism, of course, has had no influence in the development of any form of Asian thought but it does, nevertheless, have some remarkable affinities with some traditions. Modern Indian scholars have noted similarities between Plotinus and certain Brahmanic and Buddhist thinkers and one Japanese scholar sees a similarity between his thinking and some elements of Japanese Neo-Confucianism and Shinto thought. No great effort has been made to find similarities between Neoplatonism and various other major cultural traditions, but we believe that the potential exists for doing so.

Why do we think this potential exists? It is because Neoplatonism has those characteristics that we judge to be necessary in a universal philosophy. We will now further consider some of them and how they are found in Neoplatonism.

(1) Neoplatonism is a General Philosophy—We have already suggested more than once that Neoplatonism is a general philosophy. It is a philosophy about things in general and how they can be said to be related to each other. It suggests that most of the relations we make are scientific ones. They are lateral relations, relations in which we relate things of the same general type. Philosophy, however, requires that we do more than define and classify. It requires us to think vertically, to imagine what a thing must be in some higher order of its existence. To take anything seriously is to understand that it is more than it appears to be, to understand that it does belong to some higher order of things and is itself an exhibition of some principles that are greater than it is. It is to understand that a thing by its very existence is significant not only in its lateral relations, but because it also shares in some higher order of being and in a whole network of higher relationships. Thus a thing is not just a thing. It is a part of, and a lesser exhibition of something that is greater and more profound in its significance than it is.

Neoplatonism in its broadest possible conception is an effort to relate all things to all things by showing that each thing can simultaneously have different kinds of reality. That which may appear to be inert in its present observed state may actually be active in another higher or lower level of its being. Essentially, Neoplatonism suggests that all the objects we know are simultaneously bodies, souls, principles, and part of the Divine. To be at all is to be alive in some sense, and hence to be a soul. But souls, as living things, are not independent. They are in some way related to the higher laws of nature, to the larger principles of order that are in effect in the whole universe. Logic demands that even these principles are not independent and free in themselves, but are governed by their relationship to the highest order of reality, which must be independent, free, and possessing the highest possible degree of internal unity. Neoplatonic metaphysics is all about the various levels of reality and the way things can be related to each other on the various levels. It allows a certain mystery about the being of anything, as Kant, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein do, for even to know a thing well on one level of its existence is not necessarily to know it well on another level.

The generic character of Neoplatonism is to be found in the way it deals with concepts in their more abstract formulation and considers the unseen and more general relations that things have with each other to be their more important ones. Thus, the resulting philosophy is not a careful analysis and description of individual things and their relation to other individual things in the world but is a general description of the general nature and relations of the types of things to which each individual thing belongs. In like manner the general philosophy that it develops is not an accurate and adequate description of reality in its existing state, but only a general statement of the general relations that hold between types of things in their highest generic orders, which Neoplatonism in true Platonic fashion takes to be their most real form of being. Its metaphysical system is not a correct description of nature, but only an architectonic formulation of the way that logic would demand that the various higher types of being must be related to each other. This is why Plotinus in spite of his numerous serious concessions to Aristotle still remains closer to Plato in the main thrust of his philosophy. He still remained a generalist and still held that the highest form of reality must be located in its most abstract form.

The specific relevance of all this to the case for Neoplatonism as a universal philosophy rests upon our earlier suggestion that those philosophies that are only general philosophies are more likely to be acceptable in other cultural traditions. They are more dependent upon logic and less dependent upon science and a particular scientific view of the world and thus are less dated and less threatened by changes in scientific views. They are also less dependent upon the particular philosophical notions of the culture that produced them and are thus less likely to clash with those of other cultures. Furthermore, it is always easier for a specific formulation to adjust to a more general formulation than it is for it to adjust to another specific formulation.

(2) **Neoplatonism is a Comprehensive Philosophy**—We have already labeled Neoplatonism as an eclectic form of Platonism. As a Hellenistic philosophy in a Roman World it was forced to be eclectic to some extent as were all of the philosophies that were functioning there at the time. Coming at the end of the development of Greek Philosophy it was also forced to take into account all of the criticism that the various philosophers since Plato had hurled against him and also against each other. It was the nature of the case that a later Platonism had to be a broader and more eclectic form. One of the criticisms that had been made of Plato and the Academicians in general was that they were irrelevant. Their philosophies were seen as being too general, too abstract; and too abstruse to be understood by most people. A great interest in having a philosophy of life as opposed to having a general philosophy developed and gave rise to Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Scepticism as philosophies of life. Another factor that also had to be dealt with was religion. Although both Plato and Aristotle philiosophized about religion. they deal with it in a rather academic and even detached way and do not appear to take religious experience as such too seriously. It would probably not be correct to label either of them as religious philosophers. But by the time of Plotinus, religion and religions had become very important factors in human life. Various new religions had come to Rome and added their claims to those made by the old established Greek and Roman forms. The Mystery Religions

both Greek and Persian, had a large following and State Religion was also practiced. Even if he had wished to do so, Plotinus could not possibly have avoided dealing with religion in a more significant way in his new revised Platonism.

As it finally developed, Neoplatonism seems to have almost everything in it. It is a general philosophy in the standard sense. It does have a metaphysics, an epistemology, and an axiology and it relates them to each other. It is very logical and has a well-formed metaphysical system that is of an Aristotelian type even though it is Platonic in content. It does take the claims of both science and religion very seriously and it also has an essentially religious philosophy of life embodied with it. It does not ignore any really important areas of human life and human experience and succeeds in relating rational, scientific, social, artistic, and religious experience to each other in a way that allows each one to tolerate and even chance the other. (Footnote: One possible important omission might be physical sensations, which are taken to be rather important by most people. Plotinus might have had an even stronger philosophy if he had been able to integrate some of the views of Epicurus into his system.) Historians of philosophy agree that Neoplatonism is one of the most consistent and comprehensive forms of philosophy that has ever been devised in any historical setting in human history. Its possiblity for universality would not be limited by its lack of scope.

(3) **Neoplatonism is a Rational Philosophy**—As we may have already intimated, the chief methodological difference between the Platonism of Plotinus and the Platonism of Plato is the way they use logic in devising their metaphysical systems. There is no radical difference in their epistemologies. Plotinus follows Plato's view that there are levels of reality and levels of being and that there are different types and levels of knowing corresponding to the levels of being. There is a significant difference in their metaphysics and especially in the way they proceed in devising them. When one reads Plato one comes to the conclusion that an artist is at work. When one reads Plotinus one soon concludes that there is a logician at work. Their difference, we think, is caused by Aristotelian Logic. Plotinus is a logician of an Aristotelian type and he actually uses Aristotelian Logic and some of Aristotle's categories in developing his metaphysical system. Plato's system may by described as a "loose system" based upon a loosely logical progression from general stage to general stage, whereas Plotinus' system may be described as a "tight system" based upon a striclly logical progression from each point to the next, much in the same way as

Spinoza and Descartes do. In short, he takes logical deduction very seriously in forming his metaphysical systems and constantly reasons from one position to another. This is one of the reasons why he is so difficult to read and is much less entertaining than Plato. He is incorrect in his information sometimes and even inaccurate in his Greek grammar, but he is rarely incorrect in his reasoning. It is his view that philosophy **qua** philosophy necessarily entails the use of logic, that a metaphysical system as a system is the product of careful reasoning about a certain set of assumptions. He explains that dialectics is the heart of philosophy and its best part. He does take language very seriously but is suspicious of the capacity of specific logical terms to convey the concept they intend adequately. He constantly irritates his readers by using various terms to convey the same concept, and especially those who feel that there should be only one term per concept.

Although Plotinus takes reason very seriously and has produced one of the most closely reasoned metasp in history, he emlca syshysit does not take reason, or at least logic, to be final. He is in the final analysis a mystic, not because he is a confused metaphysician or a confused thinker, as so many mystics are, but because he is able to see that logic and language, and even metaphysics itself has its limits. While pushing reason to its limits he would say that there is more to life than reason. It is not that we should ever elect to be unreasonable or irrational, but rather that there are some aspects of human experience that reason cannot possibly encompass.

(4) **Neoplatonism is a Religious Philosophy**. Although it would be correct to call Neoplatonism religious, it is only religious in some senses and not in others. The word "religious" has numerous connotations, so many that it would not be possible to be religious in all its senses, and to be religious in some senses rules out being religious in some other senses. Plotinus, himself, was not a formally religious person and would have likely not been lebeled as "religious" by his friends. He did not attend the public sacrifices to the gods, celebrate religious holidays, or participate in the state religious exercises as some of the other professors in his school did. Porphyry reports that he said "The gods must come to me, not I to them." However, he had a religious philosophy of life and was benevolent in his concern for his friends.* The important point for our concern, however, is that his philosophy is religious in the sense that it takes religious experience seriously as a legitimate form of human experience and accounts for ti

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*(Footnote : He managed the estates of a number or orphans, but it is presumed that he got a fee for doing so.)

in his scheme of things. Not only does he have a philosophy of religion, as does any general philosophy, he has one that gives religion and religious experience an important role in human life.

In the strictest sense, his metaphysics is not a religious metaphysics. It is not a metaphysics based upon an ontology that has religious meaning as its basic meaning, as would be the case in the metaphysics of Spinoza and to a lesser degree in the metaphysics of Descartes. He does include religious meaning in his ontology but it is only one among many other types of meaning included. For him, metaphysics is a logical and not a religious operation, as we have suggested earlier. He is a true mystic in that he accounts for religious experience as a trans-metaphysical and supra-rational function. He would have found it to be incongerous and even offensive to involve mysticism in **metaphysics**. For him there is a legitimate place in life for myth and mystery, but it is not within metaphysics.*

It would be correct, however, to say that the epistemology of Plotinus, and of all the Neoplatonists is religious. Plotinus and the other Neoplatonists are all in the tradition of Plato in their epistemologies. They, like Plato, believe that there are higher and lower ways of knowing to correspond to the higher and lower orders of reality. That which is of a higher order of being must be known in a different and higher way of knowing. One knows truths differently from the way one knows bricks and one knows God differently from the way one knows truths. A brick mason may know his bricks very well and still not know the truths about bricks. He may not know how to make bricks or what would make a brick a better brick. It would take a chemist or a physicist or a physical chemist to know such truths and he would have to know bricks in a way of knowing that is different to the way a brick mason knows bricks. The same analogy applies in knowing God. Knowing truths is not knowing God and knowing the truths about God is not knowing God. Plotinus and the Neoplatonists recognized that a change in the knower must occur before he is capable of knowing that which is next higher in the order of being.

It would also be correct to say that the axiology of Plotinus and the Neoplatonists is religious due to the way in which they establish it on the basis of their epistemology. The gist of the matter is that in art, language, morality, and the practice of religion the real quality of the accomplishment depends upon the level of knowing and understanding of the individual involved. Great art require higher awareness of the unity of truth, and logically and ultimately requires an awareness of God. The same applies in logic, in language, in dialectics, in morality, and in the practice of religion.

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*(Footnote : A interesting point of contrast between Plato and Plotinus is the different role and function they assign to the use of myth.)

Plotinus' notion of "The One," or the ultimate real, that which has no necessary dependence upon anything else for its essential character, is the ultimate object of religious experience in his epistemology. The concept itself, we think, is essentially a necessary logical production in the tradition of Aristotle's "Unmoved Mover," but draws upon the Platonic tradition for its content of meaning. It is a Platonic notion with an Aristotelian twist, as are, indeed, so many important elements of Plotinus' philosophy. In short, Plotinus uses the reality of "The One" as a necessary logical extension of both his epistemology and metaphysics, as the unseen reality that must be the foundation for all phemomena, just as Aristotle's Unmoved Mover is, but he seems to think that the latter concept is not rich enough and enriches it with a merger of the Pythagorean "One" and Plato's "The Good." The resulting notion is thus much richer than the notion of ultimate being or reality in either Plato or Aristotle.*

Neoplatonism should qualify religiously as a universal philosophy on the grounds that the particular teachings it has about religion and religious experience would not be contradictory to the conception of religious experience found in a large number of religious traditions. As we have suggested earlier, a philosophy is not likely to have universal acceptance unless it does treat the phenomenon of religion in some serious way. Regardless of whether or not most philosophers take religious experience seriously, most people do; and on pragmatic grounds a philosophy will not be very widely accepted unless it also does so.

Neoplatonism has Clear Terminology. To anyone familiar with the **Enneads** of Plotinus the idea that Neoplatonism has clear terminology may cause some amusement. In dramatic contrast to the **Dialogues** of Plato, the book itself is not very easy to read. It is very poorly constructed, contains misspelled words and numerous instances of bad Greek grammar, and does not develop its ideas in an orderly progression. No college composition teacher would give any one of the six enneads or essays a passing grade. Yet the content of what is being said is very rich, like Swiss chocolate, and quite profound. Reading the **Enneads** requires both patience and endurance. We maintain, however, that Plotinus is clear in the central notions that he uses, not that the notions themselve are clear, but that he eventually succeeds in making them clear by expressing and explaining them in a variety of ways. Plotinus did not believe in the actual univocity of terms, and the concepts he uses, although common ones, are so rich and provocative that it is not easy to settle on just one clear meaning of them. He uses the Greek equivalent terms for "matter", "body", "soul", "mind", "principle", and "spirit", terms that most people know and commonly use, but terms that are capable of quite elaborate philosophical meaning. His concepts are clearer than his terms and he feels free to use a variety of terms to describe the same concept. He uses at various other terms, for example, to refer to "The One", terms such as "The Father", "The Good", "The Infinite", "The First", "The Simple", "The Unconditioned", etc. Any philosopher has the problem of making his concepts philosophically clear and cannot risk using ordinary terms in the common usages since they will have already been contaminated with the philosophical meanings of some other philosophy. He has no choice but to redefine his own terms. Some elect to abandon all ordinary philosophical terms and invent entirely new ones of their own in order to insure the purity and consistency of their meaning. Others, including Plotinus, choose to stick with routine terms but provide them with a new and enriched meaning. The terms Plotinus uses are philosophically complex and even difficult, but he does eventually succeed in making them clear through his various ways of explaining them. Any one who can finish reading all of the **Ennead**, and very few people have, will have a reasonably clear understanding of Plotinus' concepts.

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*(Footnote : His notion of "The One" should be understood in the Pythagorean sense of the base unity of all multiplicities, the one "principle" that contains all principles as inherent within it,--except that it is really is not a principle—and not in the Parmenidean sense of "barrenness of being" or "absolute nothingness." It is no one thing only because it is super-rich—it is in a sense everything.)

Another factor in Neoplatonic terminology is that the same concept may have a somewhat different meaning on a different epistemic level. For example, Plotinus maintains a basic distinction between the concepts "body", "matter", "soul", and "nous". The term "body" has a perfectly clear common sense meaning in its normal practical and scientific usage but if the concept is to be given some philosophical meaning it must be tied into something else that has a still higher meaning. Plotinus suggests that a body is really a lower form of a soul, that a body as a body has some life principle or life force within it sustaining and maintaining it as a body, so that in his philosophy it is necessary to understand what a soul is in order to understand a body. The same situation applies on up the line, so that it is necessary to understand "nous" in order to understand "soul", etc.

Concerning the case that can be made for the clarity of the terminology of Neoplatonism as a contributing factor aiding in its more widespread acceptance as a general philosophy, the point is that Plotinus and the Neoplatonists do succeed in making their complex philosophical terms clear. They do so through a persistent and tedious, and even irritable process of redefinition of concepts at all levels and stages of the development of their system. This, we feel, is a superior procedure to the invention of all new terms that entail highly stipulated definitions and even a new language system. It is one that is much more likely to be accepted by most people.

Neoplatonism is a Modest Philosophy. Although Neoplatonism presents itself as a complete philosophy, it does not claim to be a final one. Neither Plotinus nor any other Neoplatonic philosopher we have read presents his own system as a final one that is adequate to all intellectual needs. Quite the contrary, Plotinus presents his own thought as an effort to be philosophical rather than as philosophy itself and thus remains true to the Platonic tradition of anti-Sophistry. Neoplatonism was born and developed in an intellectual setting that was permeated with higher criticism and debate. The spirit of criticism prevailed in the whole of Later Greek Philosophy and there was no exception to it in Plotinus' Roman philosophical academy. Porphyry tells us that the professors there were not more sniviling assistants to Plotinus but freely and openly disagreed with him on vital points. Although Porphyry was Plotinus' chief editor, promoter. and biographer he was also one of his critics. In his own writings he clearly disagreed with Plotinus on a number of crucial points, including even abandoning all of Plotinus' categories and substituting those of Aristotle for them instead, an act that was to create another whole type of Neoplatonism that continued in its ripple effect on through the Middle Ages and to and through St. Thomas. Another senior professor of the school, Amelius Gentelianus, was constantly showing the differences between the views of Plotinus and those of Numenius of Apamea, another late Platonist or semi-Neoplatonist whom he greatly admired. Iamblichus, a student of Porphyry's, returned to his native Syria and founded another school of Neoplatonism that was notably deviant from the views of Plotinus and Porphyry. A hundred years later Proclus made an even more logically rigid reformulation of Neoplatonic metaphysics, one that Hegel greatly admired and judged to be much superior to the metaphysics of Plotinus. Generally speaking, it may be said that all the later Neoplatonists deviated from Plotinus and that all the Neoplatonists are really Neo-Neoplatonists. Plotinus himself could be labeled a "Revisionist Platonist" since his own philosophy is a variation on a theme by Plato.

Perhaps the revisionist mentality which we find in the Neoplatonists is endemic to Neoplatonism itself and can be found in its rather "low" conception of the nature and role of philosophy in life. Contrary to the Christians, who have always been willing to make as much use as possible of philosophy without actually doing it themselves, the Neoplatonists do make philosophy essential to salvation. It is one of the steps through which one must go on the upward path toward the attainment of personal salvation. But the important point is that they see it as only one of the steps, one among others, and not as enlightenment itself. They see coming up with a viable metaphysics and a settled philosophy to be a most worthwhile and even most necessary thing to do, but they do not see philosophy as the end of human life and human meaning. Like the Christians, they see it is only a means to accomplishing something more important.

To be a bit more specific, Plotinus was the production of a philosophy to be the result of the practice of dialectics, namely, the use of logic to show how the various necessary categories of thought might be related to each other. A philosophy is a proposal of how being may be seen to unified. It is a very important human activity and among the most noble functions of mankind, but in any given case it is still only a proposal and nothing more. It would be ludicrous to propose that any given finished proposal would be final, and suitable for all people in all times. No matter how complete and adequate it may be for those for whom it was produced, that particular proposal will be dated and another proposal will have to be made again to take into consideration all the new knowledge that has become available in the meanwhile and all the newer ways of viewing things. Hopefully, the new proposal may need to be only a revision since not everything will need to be changed, only that which can not be held any longer in view of an increase in our knowledge and understanding of the world. In short, Plotinus' view is that philosophy is an ongoing human enterprize and not a finished product that can be marketed forever as finished. He would have agreed with Tennyson that "our little systems have their day".

It would appear to us that this non-final character of Neoplatonic Philosophy would make it easier to be accepted by persons in a variety of cultures. It is an optimistic and constructive way of thinking that does allow the possibility of philosophy. After all, it developed as an alternative to hedonism and skepticism. It is only skeptical about the finality of philosophy.

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A Critical Estimate of The Concept of Liberation

According To Gnosticism, Neoplatonism And The Bhagavadgita

M. L. Sharma

The concept of Liberation or Redemption is the central concept of any philosophical or religious system worth the name. The human condition throughout the ages has been a condition of some sort of suffering, and yet every thinking man has intimations from the depths of his being that though his original nature is characterised by freedom, perfection and bliss he has fallen from that nature due to some metaphysical and moral lapses on his part. The human quest for salvation from the existential predicament of bondage and suffering has found expression in the philosophical speculations of the Lord Krsna, Yajnavalkya, Kapil, Buddha, Mahavira, and Sankaracarya among the oriental sages, and of Pythagoras, Socrates, Jesus Christ, Valentinus and Augustine among the Occidental Seers. So far as the Indian philosophical systems are concerned, it has been universally recognised that the motive force behind their speculations has been the search for Moksa or Liberation. But the historians of western Philosophy have generally highlighted only those ancient and modern philosophers who conceive philosophy as purely an intellectual exercise unrelated to the existential problem of the redemption of human condition. They castigate the philosophers of Neoplatonic and Gnostic schools because of the concern of these schools with the problems of God, human soul and its salvation. They also call the period of Middlie Ages as the dark age for philosophy because medieval philosophers were guiding their speculations by the truths revealed in Christianity. Such an estimate of the Neoplatonic, Gnostic and Medieval philosophers on the part of historians of philosophy is evidently an expression of their deep-rooted prejudice against every attempt to highlight the central problems of God, human soul and its salvation. A reassessment of the contribution made by above philosophies is the need of the hour, and from that angle the theme of the current international session of the ISNS viz., 'Gnosticism and Neoplatonism' would provide an opportunity to undertake serious discussions in that direction.

Gnosticism which combines Christian teaching with a higher esoteric knowledge (gnosis) flourished in the first two centuries of our present Era. 'Gnosis' is a supra-rational knowledge gained by a mystical intuition regarding the original nature of the human self, its fall from that nature, its present predicament and the manner of its redemption. The characteristic feature of 'Gnosis' consists in an immediate vision of truth, a direct first-hand apprehension of the true nature of God and communion with Him.. The attainment of the vision of God depends on the fulfilment of two conditions. Firstly, the aspirant must possess a heart that has been sanctified by the practice of asceticism. Secondly, there should be a powerful Master who is able to reveal the 'gnosis' to the disciple because he himself has realised the same.

However, the significance of 'Gnosis' has to be understood on the background of the dualistic metaphysics of Spirit and Matter Which was ultimately derived from the Zoroastrian principles of Light and Darkness. At the head of the universe stands the supreme God who is conceived as the abstract ground of all existence. Far from being a personal Deity, it is the ineffable ultimate Reality variously called as the pure Light, the Unknowable, the Abyss which is absolutely transcendent in nature. The Unbegotten Reality is the source of all being, the Father of all. From Him proceed a number of beings in descending scale of reality arranged in pairs of male and female (syzgies) which in their totality make up the 'pleroma' or the fullness of the Divine being. According to Valentinus the members of pleroma bear the name of Aeons and are created in successive pairs by a process of emanation. The member or Aeon called Sophia that stands lowest in the rank has a fall from the pleroma and sinks into darkness of the world of matter. Gnosticism speculates that Demiurge, the Jewish God, who is a son of Sophia, creates the world of Matter which is evil in principle and governs it like a tyrant holding the soul in bondage of the material existence. The bonded soul craves for deliverence, but it has to wait till the arrival of an Aeon of supreme rank (the Soter of Christus) who gathers to himself the seeds of Divine Light scattered in the world of darkness, and finally reascends along with the rescued Sophia into the pleroma. In Christian Gnosticism this Redeemer is identified with/ Christ who, however, remains distinct from the historical Jesus, a man of preeminent spiritual nature united for a time with the heavenly Redeemer. According to the Naassenes this union takes place at the time of the birth of Jesus, but according to the Justinian Sect it occurs when Jesus is twelve years of age or when he is baptised. Before crucifixion the Divine being separates himself from Jesus. By means of the knowledge imparted by Jesus as preserved in the Gnostic tradition the higher natures are freed from the earthly bondage and restored to the Kingdom of Light. In brief, the basis of Gnostic metaphysics is the belief that a spiritual essence has come to imprisoned within the sphere which is radically alien to it, hence there is a need for a redemption to be achieved by some supernatural power. The captive soul is then enabled to escape into a world of freedom by circum venting the hostile planetary powers by means of the secret discipline and knolwledge which are the hall-mark of Gnosticism. The soul freed from its limitatioms is reunited with the pleroma in blessedness and perfection. However, such redemption is reserved for a limited number of chosen spirits who alone are capable of the redeeming 'gnosis'. Other men of the grosser make-up donot deserve any sort of deliverence, and God is not responsible for them.

The Gnostic doctrines became overlaid by an occult lore which consisted of participation in mysterious rites and instruction in magical watchwords and secret words. This praxis was supposed to help the imprisoned soul in its efforts to shake off its material fetters. Besides this, an elaborate mythus was also developed as a supplement to the praxis. But freed from the occult praxis and mythus, Gnosticism's central idea seems to be the reascent of the fallen soul through successive stages of being. Its ultimate object is the individual salvation.

Just as the Gnostics endeavour to offer a philosophy of nascent Christianity, the Neoplatonists attampt to construct a religious world-view or theosophy within the frame-work of Plato's philosophy. Neoplatonism finds its most charactaristic expression in the philosophy of plotinus. According to plotinus, God is the source of all existence, absolutely transcendent, pure Unity prior to all thought and being. He is the causeless Cause of everything because from Him everything emanates and yet the notion of causality does not apply to Hlm. "Generative of all. The Unity is none of all.; neither thing nor quantity nor intellect nor soul; not in motion, not in rest, not in place, not in time : it is self-defined, unique in form or, better, formless, existing before Form was, or Movement or Rest, all of which are attachments of Being and make Being the manifold it is." (Enn. 6. 9. 3). The world owes its existence to God and yet it can neither be regarded as creation of or evolution from God. It is an emanation from God, an irresistible and inevitable overflow of His infinite power and perfection. Just as light radiates from the sun without loss to the sun, even so the world proceeds from God without in any way exhausting its infinity and perfection. The cause does not pass over into or lose itself in its effect. In the process of emanation from God, it is the Intellectual-principle or Nous that comes first, then comes Soul and at end comes Matter. This emanation is a procession from the perfect to the imperfect. The farther down we go in the scale of being, every later stage is more and more imperfect becaus it is a copy of its preceding stage. But every later stage also looks back to its source in the preceding stage and finds its purpose or goal in it. The Intellectual-Principle is an Intellectual Kosmos containing all the manifold ideas of the phenomenal world in a unified system. It contemplates intuitively its ideas all at once. It also contemplates the Godhead. From the Intellectual-Principle proceeds the World-Soul as a faded out copy of the former. It is outside time, incorporeal, and indivisible. It operates rationally and yet it is not conscious. It has two aspects, the one inclining towards the Intellectual-Principle and the other looking downwards to the world of Matter. Out of the World soul emerge the individual souls. At the limit of emanation comes the Matter which being farthest removed from God is utter darkness and evil. It is of the nature of nonbeing and serves as the ground of all plurality. Matter "is utter destitution of sense, of virtue, of beauty, of pattern, of Ideal principle, of quality-this is surely ugliness, utter disgracefulness, unredeemed evil." "By its alienism in regard to beauty and good of Existence, Matter is therefore a non-existent." (Enn. 2. 5. 1). It serves as the material out of which the Soul fashions the particular sensible objects in space and time as sensuous images of the intelligible world contained in the Intellectual-Principle.

The Human Soul being a part of the World-Soul is incorporeal and free. In its original nature it contemplated the Intellectual-Principle in mystical intuition, and was inclined God ward. But due to its incorporation in the body and its impulse towards the sensuous life, it fell from its original free nature and became involved in life of sin in preference to the contemplative life. It can regain its pure contemplative nature wedded to God only by turning from sensuous life to the life of contemplation.

The escape from the material world and exaltation to God constitute the goal of life. This goal is attained through four stagges of purification or Katharsis of the soul from everything earthly by the cultivation of moral virtues, training in discursive philosophical thinking, intuitive ascent to the Intellectual-principle, and the final exaltation into God or Unity by means of trance, rapture or ecstasy. The soul is identified with God in ecstasy, but such raptures are only momentary. As plotinus puts it, "the beholder becomes one with the beheld; it was not a vision compassed but a Unity apprehended......This is the life of gods and of godlike and blessed among men, liberation from the alien that besets us here, a life taking no pleasure in the things of earth, the passing of solitary to solitary." (ENN. 6. 9. 10).

In the context of Gnosticism and Neoplatonism when we come to the consideration of the Bhagavadgita, we come across the same sublime theme of the alienated Human Soul seeking to regain its unity with God. Arjuna typifies the benighted and bewildered soul groping for redemption. He goes to the Lord Krsna in the spirit of surrender befitting a disciple before the Master, and makes Him an earnest appeal for instructing him in regard to his Duty and the true goal of human life. (B. G. 2. 7.). Lord Krsna tells Arjuna that the root-cause of all human suffering and bondage is man's ignonance of his real nature as the Atman or Brahman, hence the sovereign remedy for curing the chronic human malady is the cultivation of the Brahma-Vidya or the realization of the Brahman or the Atman. According to the Gita the Brahman is the one ultimate spiritual Reality which is at once Personal (saguna) and Impersonal (nirguna). As Impersonal or Nirguna, the Brahman is the imperishable Reality by which all this is spread out. Neither is he born, nor does he die; neither at any time having come into being, will he cease to be again; being unborn, eternal, everlasting since antiquity, he is not killed, though the body be killed. (B. G. 2.17, 20). He is eternal, all-pervading, steadfast, inconceivable, and immutable. (2. 25.). As Personal or Saguna He is the best Purusa of all (Purusottam), known as the Paramatman, the imperishable Lord, who having entered into the three worlds, sustains them. (B. G. 15. 17, 18.). It is His Prakrti in its lower (apara) and higher (para) aspects) that has created the world of matter and empirical selves (Jivas) and sustains it. All thought and being are strung on Him like beads on a thread. (B. G. 7. 5, 7). He is the origin of the entire world, and in Him it is dissolved again. (B. G. 7. 6.). He resides in the hearts of all beings, and he is before the beginning, in the middle and also after the end of all beings. He has infinite powers and manifestations. (B. G. 10. 19, 20). Having pervaded this world by a fraction of Himself He remains transcendent. (B. G. 10. 42.).

It is on the background of this metaphysical background that Lord Krsna tells Arjuna that the latter's all-consuming sorrow (soka) over the possible killing of his kith and kin on the field of battle was the result of his excessive attachment to the material side of life (moha) which again was due to his ignorance of the Atman (avidya).

The 'Dehin' or Atman is the infinite, eternal, unborn and imperishable reality which alone exists before the beginning, in the middle, and after the end, while the 'deha' or body is merely an ephemeral appeaearance or 'yvakta-madhya' behind which there is infinity and before which also there is infinity viz., the Atman or Brahman. Where is then the room for grief ? (B.G. 2.28). When this Atman or Brahman is realised, it becomes evident that body and the material side of life and world are evanscent appearances on the Brahman. This redeeming knowledge of the Atman or Brahman can the realised by the faculty of Intuition or Buddhi-Yoga which is awakened by the grace of God or the powerful Master who has himself realised the Brahman. (B.G. 10.10). with the attainment of the Brahma-vidya man is not only enabled to achieve freedom from the good and effects of his actions, but also from the bondage of birth and death. Such a Brahmayogin or realiser of the Brahman has to cultivate ethical virtues and train his intellect, feelings and willing by undergoing the discipline of Jnanayoga, Bhaktiyoga, and Karmayoga respectively. The liberated individual combines contemplation (jnana) and action (karma) by virtue of which he is a denizen of two worlds, the spiritual and the mortal. He remains in unison with Brahman or God by transcending the three gunas of sattva, rajas, and tamas, and yet fulfils his obligation to his fellow beings by helping them morally and spiritually. He remains unperturbed as a rock inspite of the greatest of calamities B.G. 6.19.22), and yet he is also occasionally expected to be tumultuously busy in the affairs of the world, in the wars of the nation, in the assemblages of saints, and among the afflicted and the sinners, with a view to lift them up and bring them on the path of God. He performs actions while renouncing their motives and fruits (niskama-karma) and dedicating them to God.

We have now before us the views of Gnosticism, Neoplatonism and the Bhagvadgita on the sublime theme of the ultimate reality of God or the Absolute, the original divine nature of the human soul, the fall of the human soul from its divine nature and the redemption of the human soul. Apart from the common theme, there are common elements in these three systems. All of them posit the supremacy of Spirit over Matter, the essentially spiritual nature of the human soul, the existential predicament of the human soul in the condition of its fall, the indispensibility of the ethico-spiritual discipline, and of the grace of the Spiritual Teacher for redemptive self-realization, and the intuitive vision of God and unison with Him as the be-all and the end-all of human existence. Gnosticism sets store by a secrect and mystical knowledge (gnosis) and thereby a direct vision of God and communion with Him. It is based on a frankly dualistic metaphysics of Spirit and Matter. God is conceived as the absolutely transcendent reality from whom issue the Aeons by a process of emanation. The evil world of Matter is created by the Demiurge which holds the fallen soul in the captivity of the material existence. Deliverence of the soul depends of its purification through the practice of asceticism and the arrival of a Redeemer who is none else but Christ. However, redemption is earmarked for only a limited number of chosen souls. Men of the grosser type have no chance of getting redemation. It is clear that the chief defects of Gnosticism are its ultimate and irreconciliable dualism of Pleroma and Demiurge, of Spirit and Matter, its asceticism, its eternal denial of redemption to the souls of grosser type, and its mythus concerning esoteric rites and rituals as the precondition of the acquisition of the saving knowledge or Gnosis. The Neoplatonism of Plotinus is palpably more logical in its metaphysics in comparison to Gnosticism. God or the Good is the indefinable, eternal causeless cause of all being and becoming. The world of Matter is conceived as the limit of the process of emanation from God. It is of the nature of privation, and does not possess an independent status along with God. Thus the Neoplatonic metaphysics does not break into dualism, as is the case with Gnostic metaphysics. Neoplatonism is also comparatively rational in contrast to the mythological overtones of Gnosticism, though Plotinus believed in the existence of good and evil demons in the sublunary regions. Moreover, unlike Gnosticism it does not deny salvation to any class of souls eternally, so that any soul can aspire for it. However, some glaring inadequacies of Neoplatonism emerge to our view when it is juxtaposed with the doctrine of Liberation enunciated in the Gite. Metaphysically, the God of Neoplatonism is absolutely impersonal and transcendent having no relation with the world of Matter, and this transcendence is reflected in the nature of the liberated soul inasmuch as he withdraws him in complete isolation from the suffering humanity steeped in ignorance, sin and sorrow. In contrast to this, the God of the Gita is both impersonal and personal, transcending the world and at the same time pervading it. As a consequence of this, the liberated individual who becomes identified with God is able to combine detached contemplation with works directed to the moral and spiritual upliftment of the suffering humanity. Whereas in Neoplatonism the final goal of permanent unison with God is impossible of attainment in this very life, according to the Gita liberation is attained finally in this very life by the Brahmayogin who lives and moves in the world as a jivanmukta serving the humanity even while he is lodged in the Brahman. Thus the Gita which has been aptly called by Professor R.D. Ranade as the Philosophy of God-realisation offers a doctrine of liberation which answers to the highest aspirations of humanity.

3

Plotinus and Sankara : Where do They Meet?

Anil K. Sarkar

This paper wants to compare the mystic unitive experience—the **One** of Plotinus, a resident of Lycopolis (Egypt) in the second century A. D., with the transcendent non-dual self-shining experiential continuum (**Svyamprakas**) of Sankara, a Vedantist of India of the eighth century A. D.

The basis of this comparison between these two unique mystics of two different centuries and of two cultural areas-one representing the West and the other representing India—is in their respective historical contexts, and hence their mystic-philosophic attitude, can be placed as a consequent process of their respective cultural inheritances.

The Plotinian mystic mode, as a transcendent experiential process of integral consciousness (the One)—emerges in the background of the contemplative attitude of Plato as reflected in his dialogues, specially the **Republic** and **Parmenides**. It has some suggestions from Aristotle's metaphysical notions of an ultimate reality but not in the intellectual ways of actuality and potentiality. According to Armstrong[1] Plotinus was influenced greatly by Ammonius Saccas, and even by the anti-Aristotelian group among the middle Platonists. According to Armstrong, again, the philosophy of Plotinus 'is not only a philosophy but a religion—a way for the mind to ascend to God.'

Commenting on the mystery religions of the Plotinian period, Armstrong says, that Plotinus took from his contemporaries, a certain type of decorative symbolism, in connection with divinity. There is no evidence that Plotinus had any direct contact with orthodox Christianity, rather his **Enneads**, from his direct disciple, Porphyry, shows that he knew very little about Christianity—his was a different type of religious thought.[2]

K. Jaspers, speaking of Plotinus says, that, Plotinus was dissatisfied with the philosophical trends of his time until he heard of Ammonius Saccas. "This was the man I was seeking for" he declared after the first lecture, and stayed with him for eleven years. When thirty-nine he took part in the Emperor Gordianus' Eastern campaign in order to familiarize himself with Indian wisdom, but he was far removed from Sophist grandiloquence, his delivery suggested friendly conversation.[3]

Criticizing the notion of some kind of dependence between the Plotinian and the Indian Vedantic thought then stretched to Egypt from India—Paul Hacker, in his paper, **Cit and Nous,** or **The Concept of Spirit in Advaita Vedanta and in Neo-Platonism** (read in a session of International Conference on Neo-Platonic Society and Indian Thought) says that 'I do not think that such dependence is proven in any way, though I would not deny the possibility that Plotinus may have had a vague and dim knowledge of one or two Vedantic doctrines, mediated to him through inexact translations or accounts.[4]

All of these thinkers, in their own ways, try to establish the uniqueness of Plotinian mysticism, and choose to develop it, in Western contexts only. But this writer while admitting the uniqueness of Plotinian mysticism in its Western contexts and developments, would like to suggest that there are some common ideas, though the realizations of them could be possible, in different ways. In a sense, the Plotinian and Vedantic mysticisms have their special importance, they should be discerned in their cultural contexts, but their similarities cannot be ignored.

Armstrong refers to the three streams of the Plotinian periods—Gnosticism, Neo-Platonism and Christianity, but he contends that these three currents maintain their respective specialities all-through. But each one is aware of the other two currents. Speaking of Christianity, Armstrong says that, 'Christianity assimilates what it takes from the other two but remains itself.'[5] This is true of both Plotinian and Gnostic mysticisms.

The Plotinian transcendent **One** transcends the God of Christianity, and as a mystic experience of a Godhead, could be developed as influencing the entire Christian mystic processes from Dionysius the Areopagite of the fifth century A.D., to Eckhart of the thirteenth century onwards through the Hegelian and post-Hegelian periods to the modern times along phenomenological and existential lines, not excluding the contemporary evolutionists, Bergson,[6] Santayana,[7] and

Whitehead[8] among others; Plotinian influence touches the post-Hegelian Absolutist Bradley[9] as also pragmatist William James.[10] Plotinian influence could be found among the medieval Islamic mystics from Ibn Sena (Avicena) to Jalal al-Din Rumi[11] to contemporary Indian Islamic mystic Iqbal,[12] who stood for Pakistan, during the period of Indian Independence from the British rule. If the Plotinian mysticism was so dominant with its influence upon the two major religious currents—Christianity and Islam—of the medieval West, it will be unnatural to feel that it had not influenced the mystic trends of Judaism also. But this writer will persist in holding that each of these mystic trends had its speciality, belonging to its respective religious backgrounds.[13]

In the context of these mystic trends through the centuries, this writer will clarify the mystical experiences and specialities of Plotinus in some details, following chiefly Armstrong and Jaspers as below.

While Armstrong refers to the currents of Christianity and Gnosticism, surrounding the Plotinian mysticism, Jaspers sticks to the main principle involved in the Plotinian notion of emanation from the transcendent **One** to **Matter,** through the intermediaries of the **Nous** and the **World-Soul,** as an identical expression with no loss of the perfect vision, only becoming progressively diminished by the distances from the **One** to **Matter**. In the words of Jaspers, 'In every stage, however, the begetter is simpler and better than the begotten.'[14] The other peculiarity of the descent-process is its 'unwilled consequence,' not that the creator decided at some time to bring it forth as in Plato's **Demiurge,** or, in a different cultural area of Indian **Aitereya** Upanisad, where the transcendent self had a desire to penetrate into the createn orders. The Plotinian mystic process of descent is not the creatiod out of **nothing** of the Christian God. On the other hand, the evolutionary process as expressed through descent in Plotinus, is not a drive towards a final actuality beyond all potentialities, as in Aristotle. In Plotinus the world came into being by emanation, which is not a concept, but a mystery expressed through countless images or symbols. The universe, as apparently experienced, flows from a source which feeds its waters which never get dry or dispersed. It is like the one around which the circle moves. There are other metaphors also—the product is no less an independent being than is its source. A son is not an artifact depending for its existence on its maker; he is an independent self, yet it was not himself but his father who brought him into being. Plotinus calls the **One** the father, the **Nous** the son, and the **World-Soul** the grandson. But generation comes through vision. All being is the product of seeing. Thus the

One engeners the **Nous**. Standing still in order to see, it becomes **Nous** and enters into being. Looking upon the earlier stage as a prototype, each stage engenders its copy in the following stage which sees in turn, vision engendered by vision, and carris on the cycle. Decent-generation and upward contemplation are two aspects of the same process[15]—a process that has symbolical variety and novelty but with no estrangement from the inspiring transcendent basis.

Elaborating the descent-process, from the **Nous** to the next steps—**World-Soul** and **Nature (matter)**—Jaspers says, 'looking upon the archetypes in the Ideas of the **Nous,** the World-Soul engenders the world without any plan or activity, without sound or effort. Nothing escapes it. Perpetually it regains its domination over conflicting things. For it is always the All.[16] The inspiring basis never ceases to be, separating itself from the evolutionary orders and stages.

When Jarpers thinks that 'to each step downward in the generative process, there corresponds an ascending movement—the contemplation of the higher stage—he seems to develop the Plotinian thought to the advanced notion of process of the evolutionists like Whitehead of the contemporary West and Aurobindo[17] of contemporary India, for the descentprocess in all these thinkers, is a kind of involution to a last limit,—**matter**—with a simultaneous ascent (evolution) from **matter,** to the transcendent One (Plotinus),—to Creativity with a move from the forms to the formless (Whitehead),—to Supermind—or the Fourth of Aurobindo.

Jaspers generalizes the descent-ascent process as a single impulse at work : the souls drive towards its source, which it finds in contemplation and love; in the recollection of its origin; in self-purification. To attain this source is the soul's greatest joy. It confronts two possibilities : ascent or further fall. This kind of analysis of Plotinian mystical experience, whatever the cultural difference, is non-different from the Upanisadic notion of the apparent orders of experiential processes as psychic states from the ignorance of the deep-sleep to the subjectivity of the dream and the subjectivity and objectivity of the waking, but all these confronted orders of experiential processes are grounded upon the ever-shining transcendent consciousness of Turiya, the Fourth, which like the Plotinian One, is indescribable through concepts.[18]

According to Jaspers : For Plotinus as for Plato the transcending process consists of two steps—'the first transcends sense-perception and attains to that which cannot be seen but only thought.' Here this writer's suggestion will be to change the expression 'can be thought' to 'can be contemplated upon.'[19] In the Platonic way 'This ideal world of necessary thoughts is the infinite world of archetypes, of which the sensuous world discloses infinite copies.'[20] If rendered in the Upanisadic way, it is a detached contemplative or meditative way, with no reference to the archetypal ideas.

This transcendent **One** of Plotinus, 'is not manifold……it is uncontained . . . nothing can be above it.'[21] Here also there is a closenss between the Plotinian **One** and the Upanisadic **Turiya** or the **Fourth**, but there is a difference in the contemplative ways, and also in the ways of their detached attitudes. Both Plotinus and the Upanisadic thinkers take recourse to negative schemes or statements. They say what the transcendent **One** or **Turiya** is 'not.' Whatever we can think, we must say : it is not this.[22] The aim of this transcending is named : the First, the **One,** the **Good**. But it is not what these words mean.' This is also true of the Upanisadic transcendent **Fourth,** which can be named as **Turiya, Atman** or **Brahman,** but not what these words mean. All these are negative statements. Jaspers refers to Plotinus here to say 'Over and over again Plotinus enjoins us : Take away all other things when you wish to speak of the **One** or to achieve awareness of it. And when you have taken everything away, do not try to add something to it but ask whether there might be something that you have not yet taken away from it in your thinking. Even Being is imputed to it only 'under the pressure of words.'[23] Strictly speaking we may not call it **this** or **that**. Here also one may find some similarities of expressions between Plotinus and the Upanisadic thinkers, but, we know, there is difference between them. These two thoughts can be stretched to posterior Western and Indian thought, with similar differences, from their respective cultural backgrounds. The Plotinian elimination of the positive statements can be extended to Husserl's principle of bracketing or elimination,[24] and the Upanisadic elimination of the positive orders can be interpreted by Sankara's doctrine of Maya as a veiling and superimposing process of the self-Shining transcendent on-dual reality, by the doctrine of Apavada or refutation or elimination of the entire veiling and superimposing process (Maya), beyond the Buddhist thought of India in contrast to the thoughts of the Upanisads.[25]

The Plotinian mystic experience of the transcendent **One** from the orders of emanation from **Nous** to **Matter** is primarily a speculative and general discipline recommneded to all who choose to follow the Plotinian way. His is a life of simplicity and exalted deliberation, but, in the context of Sankara, we shall find a dual discipline, which is not only a general speculative discipline but a yogic discipline also; it is recommended to those who are willing to choose such a disciplined ife. In his context Sankara has a view which governs the Indian thought from the days of the Upanisads to Buddhism, that each individual collects in is or her body-mind construct a continuity of ignorant process from his/her past activities (**prarabdha karma**). The reference will be to Sankara's one of the small treatises, entitled, **Aparoshanubhuti**[26] (Self-Realization), and not to his other small or great tratises or commentaries, for clarifying the core of his philosophic and practical attitude; it is a method with an extreme brevity, but not losing the fundamentals of his contributions in the advanced lines of deliberations beyond the Upanisads and Buddhism. In this small treatise of Sankara, there is a dual discipline, speculative and yogic, in the advanced aspects beyond the epistemological positions of the great Buddhist logicians, and beyond the Yogic practitioners in the systematic ways of the Yoga of Patanjali. The advanced epistemology is exhibited by Sankara's doctrine of Maya, which is a veiling and a superimposing process, and is followed by a process of refutation (Apavada), which is not only speculative, but also Yogic by a reinterpretation of the eightfold yogic disciplines of Patanjali, by a total change in the practice of breath-control (pranayama), which is no more a stoppage of breath after the ingoing or outgoing breath-processes, but continuing the process of continuity as to attain the spontaneity of the ultimate continuum of the self-shining reality (svayam-prakash). The final objective is not discipline, but a complete freedom from disciplines after following all disciplines (sadhana-mukti). In a very summarized form, the fifteen disciplines of Sankara will be referred to with a suggestion for the ultimate condition of the freedom from all disciplines (sadhana-mukti). These fifteen disciplined ways of Sankara are : (i) Yama (control of the senses), (ii) Niyama (control of mind), (iii) Tyaga (renunciation), (iv) Mauna (silence), (v) Desa (space), (vi) Kala (time), (vii) Asana (posture of the body), (viii) Mulabandha (a posture of the body restraining the roots of sense-organs from one's anus), (ix) Dehasamyam (a condition of equipoise of one's body), (ix) Drksthiti (firmness of one's vision), (xi) Pranayma (control of one's breathing mechanism), (xii) Pratyahara (withdrawal of the mind from the sense organs and sensations), (xiii) Dharana (concentration), (xiv) Dhyana (continuance of concentration) and (xv) Samadhi (complete absorption in a continuity of concentration).[27]

If due to the accumulated ignorant processes due to one's past, not merely of one's present life-process, but also of one's past life-processes, in a series—is granted, as accounting for the apparent presented orders of experiential processes from the Ignorance of deepsleep to the subjectivity of dream and to the subjectivity and objectivity of waking–then, to Sankara, this apparent process can be eliminated or refuted by his dual disciplines–speculative and yogic,as mentioned earlier. Except the practical yogic practices, Plotinus also has a similar suggestion for the elimination of the presented orders for getting back to the condition of the transcendent One. For Sankara, one can refer to the verse 98 of his above treatise, **Aparokshanubhuti,** and for Plotinus, one may refer to Jaspers' chapter on Plotinus from pages 56 to 63. Eliminating the details, only some select expressions from Plotinus, may be quoted : To Plotinus, the **One** is self-sufficient, perfect and undivided. Hence the **One** looks upon itself, it has nothing other, but is itself alone. All questioning into the ground of the **One** takes place in the shattering category of the ground that is groundless. Plotinus has only a philosophic discipline, which, in his words, is a vision and a speculative dialectic, and, in both cases, a purification of the soul. The aim of philosophy is not merely to know Being and the World, but through this knowledge to life up the soul. The soul has the altelnative of slipping downward or of rising upward.[28]

Plotinus' view of the emanation from the **One** to **Nous, et al,** is just general, and he is talking about the universe (which is obviously the apparent), not like Sankara's; for Sankara speaks in details about each individual having a body-mind construct with a past ignorance. The scheme of Plotinus is beyond and above the ways of the Gnostics and the Christians, for his is a raising of the temporal perishing process to the eternal and transcendental order of the **One**, but he cannot also go beyond his speculative generalizations. The individual is left with infinite **time** to prepare himself for the final lift, but Sankara tries to expedite this process of evolution by his dual disciplines—speculative and yogic.

This writer, however, does not want to dogmatize on Sankara, he is ready to modernize his position by indicating a prospect, both in the Western and Eastern way—by Western developments, in some from of meditative ways, as in Whitehead's **peace**, or by his minglings of **logics,** as suggested in the **Adventures of Ideas,**[29] or, in terms of the Indian and Chinese-Japanese way—in the yogic ways of Aurobindo and in the ways of Japanese Suzuki's Zen, not alone in the aspect of Dhyana (or even **Vijnana**) but also in the aspect of Prajnana. According to Suzuki, **Dhyana** (in the context of **Vijnana**) is still ideational, and it stands for silent meditation, whereas Prajana stands for continuous activity-process with no specific content, even in the context of the higher orders of meditative processes.[30]

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4

The Questioning of the Limits of the Self in Plotinus :

Its Historic Meaning and its Possible Modern Value

Annick Charles-Saget

Questioning the limits of the self is a procedure common to Plotinus and to psychoanalysis. The boundaries of the self are uncertain. The self is played upon by forces so powerful that by ignoring them, one risks the destruction of that very self. In Plotinus, however, the field of selfhood bears a refusal of self imagery, whereas psychoanalysis grants fundamental value to narcissism. The child's identification of himself with his image—what Lacan calls **the mirror stage**—represents an essential step in the construction of the self. We shall examine the meaning of this point of divergence and ask how Plotinus can avoid the dissolution of a self to which he denies both limits and the support of an image.

The difficulty which the self experiences in attempting to gain a clear self-knowledge may be seen in its attempt to grapple with two questions which at first sight have little to do with one another. "Where am I, I who am speaking thus ?" an "How far am I myself ?" The first question rouses the experience of a plurality of selves, and the usual answer to it consists in analysing out the various elements which constitute the self. Such is Plotinus' question at VI 4 14.15 : "Who is this 'we' ? Are we this soul or just something which comes close to the soul and which is given birth to in time ?" Every form of psychology has a duty to itself to try to determine the "parts" of the self, and psychoanalysis is no exception. Only such an analysis allows us to bring to light the diversity of the psychological structures, the play of balance or of imbalance, the combinations and the strategies (isolation, encirclement, displacement, disdain) which are in fact so many forms of existence. If the problem can perhaps be seen as one of unification, then the simplest way of finding a solution to it will be to ask oneself which part it is or should be which dominates the whole. Plato, in the **Republic,** has shown us the way. Plotinus follows after him. treading for the most part the steps Plato had trod before him.

However that may be, the analytical isolation of the highest or noblest part is not really of much help to us when the frontiers between the various parts themselves, slip, slide and disappear. The soul, it is true, can perhaps be sucked upwards by the intellect and by being, VI 5 7.1). She can also be fascinated by the disorder of the material principle. By the merest glance into matter, the soul is contaminated, and becomes evil. (I 8.4.21–22 :). In this rising on high and in this fall, the self loses that which is in a way most truly itself : its uniqueness, its singularity. This is so, oddly enough, whether it becomes fouled with rolling in the mud, or whether it is exalted.

The two questions noted above of the localisation, of the placing, of the self, and of its limits, cannot therefore really be held apart, for the limits between one and the other are so delicate that they may be broken at a touch. And equally fragile are the various shapes and rhythms, the various configurations, which the existence of the limits, so long as they were present, made possible. The human self does really draw what is most peculiarly itself from this uncertainty—the uncertainty which clouds its frontiers and which masks its true centre of gravity, from itself as from others. To exist : is not that precisely to be off-centre, or ill-centred ? The experience which corresponds to that question is self-evident. The standing aside, even the withdrawal, from social roles and from activity in general, plays a part for Plotinus which is similar and parallel to the weakening of the master-conscience which Freud tells us of. It allows, and even calls into play, the open awareness and display of powers which the self cannot keep away from its own confines, since from one point of view these powers are indeed its own. "We do not take hold of them within ourselves : it is they who take hold of us". (VI 5.7.5–6) Psychoanalysis is the only discipline which really takes the measure of this type of experience. Psychology cannot be reduced to one description of the diversity of the kinds of being. She has it in her, and she must therefore, answer to the fundamental question : the question, "How to be ?", "How to live ?", "How to heal oneself ?". Yes, we can even say : "How to be saved. And it is because psychology has made an attempt to answer these questions, to give some kind of reply to our suffering, to the powerlessness that we feel when faced with our own existence,—it is because of this, that psychoanalysis has roused and has answered to so many echos. It is also because Plotinus has called into words our deepest desire as being a desire for being (VI 6. 18.50 :) that his words can still seem to ring in our ears, as from the present, and not from the past.

But that is not the parallel which we have in mind to pursue. The risks of anachronism which we should have to face would be too disconcertingly obvious. It is a difference, a parting of the roads, that we want to call attention to today. Our subject is the relation of the self to its image, the way in which, for Plotinus, this relation is itself a way of the self's keeping its distance from its image. Psychoanalysis can only serve here to strengthen our resistance to Plotinus' honeyed words, and to make sharper and clearer the reasons for our holding back. That warning is an essential one. In the whole history of Greek philosophy we know of no other system of thought or ideas which is able to outstrip Plotinus in the force with which it drags its reader inside the precinet of itself. Yes, Plotinus forces us to come within, to face the element of Inwardness. He does so, by using the fascination which was so natural to a man with a Greek frame of reference : the fascination of light. The light which Plotinus calls forth gives itself with sweetness and with gentleness. It is a fire which does not burn. It is a fire which surrounds, which embraces, which flashes out "from frame and face" (as Hopkins says). Which lights up a sudden word. Plotinus' disciples knew well the fascination of which I speak (cf. **Vita Plotini** 13). How could one refuse the advance towards such a light—a light which was also a life ? Can one indeed love without falling into perversion the reflection more than the being whose reflection is cast, can one prefer the shadows, death, dust, darkness and decay ?

I should be the first to admit that the words I have just used are metaphors, metaphors drawn from contrasted symbols, contrasted as are forces which attract and which repel. But these metaphors are also pictures drawn from the world, images of the way the world does in fact work, and the literary play is not easily separable from the philosophical declaration and assent. The detail therefore which we shall attempt to light upon, however unjustifiable at first sight it may seem, and which for the moment we shall state boldly and without qualification, although the intricacy of light and shade will be needed later—the detail is this : In the light of Plotinus we lose our face, we lose—more drastic still—the right to possession of a face. That statement implies that such a loss looms before us as more serious and more sad than any mutilation, and as approximating to a denial of existence itself. But can one really make such a complaint of Plotinus—once one has recognised the very special place which is occupied in the imagery and in the substance of his thought by light and by a face ? What was a "face" for Plotinus ?

In his treatise **On Providence** (III 2) we find the clearest signs of the way in which Plotinus sees a face. "In every living being the higher parts the face and head, are the most lovely; the middle parts and the inferior parts, less so." Plotinus carries on : "Now in the world as a whole men are in the middle and lower regions; while above is the place of the sky and of the gods which have their home there" (III 2.8.2–5) The structure of this passage is plain. Plotinus takes note of a hierarchy (face or head/the rest of the body), and this hierarchy is then made part of a proportion : what the face is to the body, so are the gods to the world taken as a whole" (III 2.3.10–11). The face is therefore first of all a part of the whole, even if then it is itself singled out as being the loveliest part. This circumstance makes it especially lovely and desirable, but still leaves it anchored in the sensible world, the world of what is Without. Whether he attempts to describe the effects of Providence or the effects of universal harmony, the face plays its vital role, at once noble and wretched. "Why, for example, do the feet have the length which they do ? It is because some other organ has the length or size which it does. To such a size for the feet there corresponds an appropriate size for the face." (VI 8.14.26.27) One may agree to fall in with so desirable and perfect arrangement. But is Plotinus still really talking to us of a face ? The connection of face and head, in III 2. 8, was quite plain and explicit. And so too was the analogy of face : body :: sky : world. If the face is not the most beautiful part of a generally mediocre constituent, must one then not really give one's preference to the part which really is the most beautiful of all, and so choose to prefer the sky ? If the face is not the face of someone else, if it is not my own face either, if therefore—in a nutshell—there is a face but no **look,** if the face does not look at itself—and if it does not look at me—then the face disappears. One can of course still call a part of the body : a face. But there is really nothing there other than some entity homonymous with "face". Plotinus, always awake to homonymy, at least to the homonymy of the word "life", and indeed of many other dignified entities which it would be open to one casually to confuse with their inner reflections, never seems to awake to the homonymy of the word "face." True, he does speak of "seeing the image of beauty in a face, and of being transported therefore into the intelligible realm". But that really does not mean for him that the face loses the status which it has always had of being just one part of the world, among others. Its beauty is therefore really no more than the occasion of its effacement : "from what (other) beauty can come this beauty !" (II 9.16.49)

It is, I think, on this point that Plotinus is furthest from Plato. Plotinus has no room in his thinking for this "wave of desire" which succeeds in passing from the eyes of the lover into the soul of the beloved; he has nothing of this awakening of the other to the love of self, and to desire, when he is himself loved (cf. **Phaedrus** 255C ff.). For Plotinus the gaze generally is turned to a higher plane, sometimes to a lower one—It turns towards the exterior, or perhaps even towards the interior. But whether it turns to Without or to Within, it has not the slightest awareness of true reflexivity. Never it is turned back to itself by the look of the other or even by the effect of a mirror. No : the interpretation given of the myth of Narcissus (I 6.8) is really a proof of blazing and unmistakable clarity. Narcissus, in Plotinus' version of the myth, does not represent the person who falls in love with himself. He is simply the edifying example of the unhappy lot which befalls someone whose fancy is entangled in any kind of pretty image. Plotinus thus completely destroys the special place and character given to the image of the self. He concludes only and merely that to identify oneself with an image, is to tie oneself to bodiliness, and so to death. The image is thus a shadow. It is never the privileged terrain of a recognised awareness, wherein the Within and the Without may become one. Not one single trace can one light upon in Plotinus of what Lacan calls "the taking up in rejoicing of the image of the mirror" (**Ecrits** I p. 90 : "l' assomption jubilatoire de l' image speculaire"). This is the joy which the child feels when it is not able to walk yet and, in spite of its rudimentary exprience of its body, all at once discovers both the other and himself, in the mirror. That is the first meeting-point of the Within and of the Without. This childish rejoicing, is it a stage to pass through, or a temptation to turn oneself away from ?

We can hardly fail to be aware of the prudishness of Plotinus when he has to think about a mirror, and when he has to think about a look, a look of love. I shall quote briefly two incidents when this prudishness was particularly noticeable. In his **Life of Plotinus,** Porphyry describes the "crush", the really quite passionate affection, which the disciples felt for the face of the Master. So much so, that they desired to possess his protrait (**Life** chapter 1). In the **Enneads** there is no sign at all that Plotinus has succeeded in making such an experience his own. He has not been able to handle it in any way, either as an image or as a meeting-ground for a possible theoretical reflection. Plotinus merely derided the silliness of any protrait—the mere image of an image, the reflection of a reflection. His reaction was wholly one of objectivity—and was wholly crushing. He denies both the meaningfulness of the look of the other towards me and that of my visible presence in the compay of the other.

My second example. All the way through Plotinus' account of "bringing to birth", all the way through the treatise **On love** (III 4) and **On the two material principles** (II 4), the leading theological insight is couched in these terms. "In the heaven there is no marriage" (III 5.2.18). The births of Aphrodite and of Eros possess the perfection which they do possess for Plotinus in virtue of the fact that the one was born without a mother and the other without a father. The birth of Eros issue from the contemplative love of Aphrodite for Cronos, and if the heavenly Aphrodite is "without a mother" then the meaning, the traditional meaning of the text for Plotinus, is that she is wholly free from association with matter. The treatise **On the two material principles** will pursue this same analogy relentlessly, insisting time and again on the analogy between the principle of femininity and of fecundity and the principle of the matter which is also the receptacle. The point of this idea is that there should be no foothold for any love that could properly be considered a human love. The crude alternatives for Plotinus are that either fecundity is honorable, and in that case she is the product of an isolated contemplation, or else she is ugle and sensible, but then the matter-woman is bound to be—she has no face. **Penia,** the wretched, penniless beggarwoman, has no face—it has been sliced away.

What lesson can we draw from this avoidance ? Whence arises this refusal, at the very centre of Plotinus' theorising ? It clearly is a refusal, in his theorising, of something that lay in his actual experience. If Plotinus never knew what fatherhood was, he did nonetheless take the place of a father to many children who were brought up in his house (cf. **Life** 9). And as for friendship, he was the object of tender loving care to his dying day (**Life,** chapter,).[2]

Our first hypothesis must be to consider the weight, the constraint, that Plotinus' theories exerted upon him. It seems to us that this constraint drew him to despise or at least to turn his back on certain experiences which did not seem to him to fit in neatly or easily with the axioms that strengthen and buttress his thought. Plotinus, logic is a hard logic. There was a corresponding intractibility in the sweetness and gentleness which one generally portrays in him (cf. P.

Hadot, **Plotin ou la simplicite du regard,** Paris 1963, ch. 6). On this point, as earlier, Plotinus is very far from Plato. In Plato we find a certain mixture of personalities and a diversity of characters, a sense of liberty within the relative cohesion of the Dialogues. On occasion this freedom can even call up shimmering and dazzling experiences. Plotinus' voice is the only voice we hear. And it rings with tenacity in our ears. He is constantly forcing back into "their proper place" the experiences which might otherwise have broken out and escaped. The "stretched will" (cf. P. Hadot, **op. cit.** p. 115 : "volonte tendue") which Plotinus speaks of is constantly made the foundation of Plotinus' theory in the **Enneads.** The Good and the One are identical. The Good is not a mere jumbled heap of miscellaneous benefits. Everything which is not **the** Good must either be mastered or cast aside. The Good is also self-sufficiency. (I 4.4.23) True happiness is repose. It has no lack, and no relation with anything other than its own self. The refusal of every compromise finds expression in the refusal of all mixture. "A mixed being can never attain to satisfaction." (III 5.7) The demand, the unremitting demand, for purity, takes on a religious tone and religious language, where the empirical and practical gives way and makes way for the divine to have priority at every point. These themes in the thought of Plotinus are well known. There is still however a call on us to show how these themes draw Plotinus away from, and force him to exclude, all true meaning to the human face—and which literally rids his system of all true in corporation of this experience.

Two theoretical obstacles seem to us to be opposed to an understanding of the face. First, the hard and fast separation between the Within and the Without, the interior and the exterior. And secondly the incompatibility between distance and co-presence. 1/If there is distance, there is exteriority. And then we are in the realm of the sensible. 2/if there is co-presence then there is no distance, and that is precisely what makes the Intelligible what it is. (The two terms are 1/ and 2/ .) Now the face can be thought of only as a sort of reciprocal intertwining of the Within and the Without, of the visible and of the invisible. It is indeed what makes the invisible visible, and it is also just as much what makes the visible invisible. In the world, and yet not an object of the world. Out of the world, and yet without being a reflection from what lies beyond the world. And there is more to it yet. The face, a thinking presence, keeps its distance and can never flex itself except in the distance. And thereby it imperils for Plotinus the two postulates which for him are fundamental, the separation of Within and of Without and the incompatibility between Co-presence and Distance.

One could perhaps object that Plotinus, far from turning his back on or denying the face gives it a high place in his system. True that may be. But my purpose here has been to show that to exalt a face is also to destroy what is most essential to a face. I will quote one passage from the treatise VI 5 : **"The One can be everywhere"**. Plotinus tells us how on our way aloft to the Intelligible realm we are ourselves all beings that there are : "We ourselves, we are but one". How is it that we can so easily overlook this unity ? Plotinus' answer is in the form of an image. "We are all like a head which has many faces turned towards the outside, and which on the other side, the side within has a single form. Could we but turn around, or could one but have the luck to have one's hair pulled by Athene, then one could see, encompass in a single glance, God, Oneself and Universal being." (VI 2 7.9-13). Could one hope for a clearer expression of the point than this ? Either the face is turned towards the outside, and in that case there is nothing to see, or else it is turned towards the inside, and in that case there is no face.

The conclusion is clear. It is true that Plotinus is not an iconoclast. If the image is a reflection, then she can draw both meaning and beauty from her origin. But her value lies in her transparence. And the value of transparence, lies in the point that, for her, difference is without distance. Let us put it more bluntly, or at least in more modern terms : there is otherness, but there is no other. So what can we make of this—we who do not believe any longer in the transparency of the world and who no longer believe in the luminosity of the world, with no shadow of the intelligible ? We must take up the question afresh. We must renew the dialogue. Dialogue demands distance. But once we lose transparencey, then if we can still regain dialogue, we shall find at the same time that space of shade and shadows where faces live and breathe and have their being.

5

The Moral Philosophy of Plotinus

M. L. Sharma

Plotinus was a God-intoxicated philosopher. His ethical ideas are saturated by the spirit of Mysticism which connotes a direct, first-hand contact with Reality. He gives us a moral philosophy which but an expression of the life Divine led by him. It follows as a logical corrollary from the mystical metaphysics propounded in the Enneads. According to his metaphysics the One or the Good is the only reality which is indescribable. The Good is identical with God who is all-perfect. God in His perfection overflows as if and there comes into being the Intellectual Principle, the Cosmic Soul., the individual Souls and the world of Matter. Plotinus pictures the Good as the central light which becomes weaker and weaker as it emanates and ultimately disappears into darkness at the farthest limit. It is farthest limit that is called the Matter which is of the nature of Non-Being as opposed to the Good which is of the nature of Being. Matter is also inherently evil. Thus, as Plotinus says, the Evil is "haunting this world by necessary Law."[1]

In this metaphysical scheme man as an individual soul holds an "intermediate rank" because he exists "midway between gods and beasts". Though man are not born Divine, yet "man is a noble creation, as perfect as the scheme allows. He holds a lot higher than that of all the other living beings of earth."[2] Man's soul which is inherently like God has fallen from its heights to the level of Matter which is the source of all Evil. As such "soul's design is to escape from Evil" which has accrued to it due to its contact with the material body. "The soul is evil by being interfused with the body and its passions." It is by the cultivation of virtue that man can free his soul from bodily evils. According to Plotinus "the way of virtue" is veritably the way of "purification", which restores to the soul its original "likeness to God."

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[1] The Six Enneads, p. 6.

[2] Ibid, p. 86–87.

It is against the background of this metaphysical nature of man as composed of Soul and Body which are mutually absolutely antithetical that the moral philosophy of Plotinus emerges in bold relief. The Soul which has fallen from God has become associated with the body which is alien to its nature. "Disengagement from the body" and the pursuit of an upward path leading ultimately to the reunion of the soul with God is the supreme end of human life. Plotinus emphasizes that man's highest good lies not merely in sinlessness by dissociating his soul from the evils of the body, but it consists in attaining to the Godhead. "Our concern not to be sinless but to be God...At height man is the very being that came from the Supreme. The Primal excellence restored, the essential man is there : entering in this sphere he has associated himself with the reasoning phase of his nature and this he will lead up into likeness with his highest Self".[3]

In this context, Plotinus depicts the ideal of perfect Life to which a man ought to aspire. The perfect Life is the life of "likeness to God". All other forms of life are incomplete, are uglyphantoms, imperfect and impure. Perfect Life is within human reach because every man "potentially" possesses that life. Man realizes perfect life when he commands the life of Reason and Authentic Intellection. At this lofty level virtue takes the form of Wisdom "which consists in the contemplation of all that exists in the Intellectual-Principle, and as the immediate presence of the Intellectual-Principle itself".[4] Plotinus says that there are definite 'signs' by which we can recognize that the state of perfection has been achieved by any person. Absoulte desirelessness is the natural sign of a person having attained perfection. "The sign that this state has been achieved is that the man seeks nothing else." This is the very spirit in which the Upanisadic Sage Yajnavalkya having realised the Brahman (aptakama) becomes bereft of all desires (akama). Secondly, the Sage who has attained perfection is no longer the "complement of his body" and as such he can not only be disengaged from the body but also becomes capable of disdaining-its nominal goods.[5] Thirdly, the perfect man lessens and reduces his body so that his Soul may shine forth or that

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3. Ibid, p. 104.
4, Ibid, p. 104.
5. Ibid, p. 105.

the veritable man who was hidden behind appearance of the body may show forth. Lastly, the perfected Sage experiences unmixed happiness because he "draws his good from the Supreme." As Plotinus further puts it, "Plato rightly taught that he who is to be wise and to possess happiness draws his good from the Supreme, fixing his gaze on That, becoming like to That, living by That." This reminds of the Brahma-Yogi of the Bhagavadgita who experiences unending bliss within himself because remaining unattached to the external contacts of sense-objects he becomes attached to the Brahma-Yoga.[6]

In the moral Philosophy of Plotinus God occupies the central position in two important senses. In one sense God is the fountain-head of all goodness and beauty. God or "the Good is the First : directly deriving from this First is the Intellectual-Principle which is pre-eminently the manifestation of Beauty; through the Intellectual-Principle Soul is beautiful. The beauty in things is of a lower order-actions and pursuits for instance—comes by operation of the shaping Soul which is also the author of the beauty found in the world of sense." Thus it is clear that all beauty and goodness ultimately flow from God In the second sense, a man can attain virtue, goodness and beauty only through God-realization Plotinus had the boldness to make God-realization as the central virtue from which all other virtues can be derived. As he puts it, "And it is just to say that in the Soul's becoming a good and beautiful thing is its becoming like to God, for from the Divine comes all, the beauty and all the Good in beings."[7] In this regard he tries to show that all important virtues flow necessarily from the central virtue of Wisdom. Wisdom or the state of Intellection as the central virtue consists in having a vision of God or the Good. This Wisdom frees the Soul from all bodily evils, thus generating the other virtues of Temperence, Fortitude and Righteousness. Temperance or Sophrosyne is the virtue of remaining unaffected by passions of the body; Fortitude consists in remaining fearless at the parting from the body; and Righteousness in the virtue of submitting oneself to the rule of Reason and Intellectual-Principle which is the manifestation of the supreme Godhead. The Soul's true good lies in devotion to the Intellectual-principle which is its kin. But when it is alienated from the Intellectual-Principle and frequants strangers i.e., the body and its material pleasures, it contracts evil. Plotinus expresses this idea by saying that "a Soul becomes ugly by something foisted upon it, by sinking itself into the alien, by a fall, a descent

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6. Ibid, p. Bhagavadgita, V. 21.
7. Ibid, p. 24.

into body, into Matter." Gold is degraded when it is mixed with earthy particles, but it regains its original purity and beauty when it is isolated from those particles. Even so the Soul which becomes ugly due to its intimate converse with bodily passions and desires regains its native goodness and beauty the moment it is purged of all that embodiment had thrust upon it. "The Soul thus cleansed is all Idea and Reason, wholly free of body., intellective, entirely of that divine/order from which the well-spring of Beauty rises and all the race of Beauty."

Plotinus time and again emphasizes the metaphysical, mystical and moral significance of the concept of Good or God. To quote his own words. "The Good is that on which all else depends, towards which all existences aspire as to their source and their need, while Itself is without need, sufficient to Itself, aspiring to no other, the measure and Term of all, giving out from Itself the Intellectual-Principle and Existence, and Soul and Life and all Intellective-Act." As we have already seen all the vice and ugliness of the Soul arise from its contact with Matter and body. Therefore, the Soul must ascend again towards the Good.

This ascent towards the Good is the desired of every Soul. The Soul has to take the upward path, and for this purpose it has to cast off all heavy burden that it acquired by its contact with Matter during its descent. Only when we have laid aside everything material and sensuous through a process of purification we will be able to set off for the upward flight, Our Soul has to approach God in entire nakedness and solitude because God Himself is the solitary-dwelling Existence, the Apart, the Unmingled, the Pure, "that from which all things depend, for Which all look and live and act and know, the Source of Life and of Intellection and of Being. The Soul must hunger for the vision of God with a passionate longing to melt itself in that vision. The Vision is beautiful beyond description and it fills the Soul with the antithetical emotions of awe and gladness, terror and love. He who has attained this vision can be said to have gained ultimate success, while he who has failed to do so has failed utterly. "For not he that has failed of the joy that is in colour or in visible forms,not he that has failed of power or of honours or of kingdom has failed, but only he has failed of only This, for Whose winning he should renounce kingdoms and command over earth and ocean and sky,if only, spurning the world of sense from beneath his feet and straining to This, he may see."[8]

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[8] Ibid, p.

As regards the path of attaining this vision of the inaccessible Beauty, Plotinus advises the aspirant to withdraw into himself by turning his back on the material beauty which is only a copy, vestige or shadow of That heavenly Beauty. His counsel is that "Let us then flee to the beloved Fatherland" whence we have come, "and There is The Father". But journey to the Fatherland cannot be undertaken by our feet, nor can the coach or ship carry us there. Instead we have to sit in solitude, close our eyes and meditate for the arousal of the "the inner vision" which is the birth-right of all, but which few turn to use. Our Soul must be trained for having this inner vision by engaging in noble pursuits, acquaintance with the work of beauty created by noble souls and searching those noble Souls.

Souls that produced the works of beauty. But the only way in which the Souls of the creators of beauty can be searched and envisioned is to look into one's own Soul intently. One has to diligently remove all crookedness and ugliness, angularities and roughness associated with one's own Soul before one can become qualified to have a vision of the virtuous and noble Souls and thereby gather the requisite inner strength to attain the vision of the "First Beauty". Just as the artist assiduously goes on chiselling and polishing the statue till the unblemished beauty emerges before his trained eye, even so the aspirant has to remove every vice, impurity and weakness from his own Soul till it emerges "self-gathered in the purity of your being, nothing now remaining that can shatter that inner unity, nothing from without clinging to the authentic man, when you fiind yourself wholly true to your essential nature, wholly that only veritable Light which is not measured by space . . . . . , when you perceive that you have grown to this, you are now become the very vision."

According Plotinus only those who become godlike and beautiful can see God and Beauty. The eye which has become sunlike can alone see the Sun. Such a divine and beautiful Soul will mount to the Intellectual-Principle and survey all the beautiful Ideas which are Beauty incarnate. Beyond the Intellectual-Principle the Soul will encounter the Good which is the Fons et origo and Principle of Beauty. "The Primal Good and the Primal Good have one Dwelling-Place."[9]

In conclusion we may point out the exact parallelism which exists between the ethical teachings of Plotinus and the Bhagavadgita. The ideal of perfect life according to Plotinus lies in appropriating the Intellectual-Principle and leading the life of Reason and authentic

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[9] Ibid, pp. 24-26.

Intellection. Similarly the perfect man according to the Bhagavadgita cherishes the life of wisdom above all (jnana-vijnana triptatma). Just as for Plotinus the Soul's true good and felicity lies in devotion to the Intellectual-Principle, so also for the Bhagavadgita even the acquisition of even a little of the religion of the Spirit frees man from the greatest of the terrors (svalpam api asya dharmasya trayate mahato bhayat). According to both Plotinus and the Bhagavadgita the disengagement from the body and its pleasures and pains is recommended for the perfection in moral life. Again, Plotinus thinks it necessary for the Soul to ascend upwards for realising the Summum Bonum. In like manner the Bhagavadgita says that one who is endowed with the sattva-guna (the qualities of purity, knowledge and virtue) ascends upwards to meet the Divine which is the highest Good of human life. (urdhvam gacchanti sattvastha). Like the Bhagavadgita, Plotinus is not satisfied with merely the cultivation of the Civic Virtues which enable man to lead a good social life. Both fix their gaze on the vision of the Life Divine (Brahmi-stithi). Nothing less than man's lodgment in God would satisfy Plotinus and the Bhagavadgita. Thus the perfection of moral life for both Plotinus and the Gita consists in the realization of God.

6

The Religious Mysticism of Plotinus

Dr. (Mrs.) Rajni Sharma

I. Philosophy and Mysticism.

Philosophy has been variously defind by philosophers according to their temperaments and states and attitudes. They have been advanced in keeping with the attitudes they take up to the world in which they live. There is no end to the definitions of the term Philosophy and it is evident from them that while each of them emphasizes some element of truth contained in them, none perhaps represents what, in fact, it stands for. The different conceptions of the nature and function of philosophy, as its past history shows, have been determined by the impact of social conditions and demands made upon them. It is not quite plausible to isolate philosophy from man's social conditions to meet the challenges of which and offer solutions of the problems raised by them does it make its appearance and it is clear that the diversity of the nations or ideas of philosophy also stems from the diversity of the answers or to the questions of the different epochs of man's history. Philosophy, therefore, is not an utterly **a priori** construction. In fact nothing short of the totality of human experience is the object of the inquiry of the philosopher. The egregious ignorance of the common, ordinary, pedestrian folk the hardly ever take the trouble to probe the mystery of human existence and of the universe, completely immersed as they are in the occupations of their biological existence, incessantly striving hard day and night to vegetate upon the senses, precludes him from thinking if there are truths of his existence which are more basic and fundamental than the demands of his physics, and biological existence. As to experience being the very root and foundation of philosophical thinking, the soil in which alone is it born, and apart from which it can not be understood, Pringle-Pattison quotes the following extract from Hegel reckoned by many as one of the most extravagant a priorists : "The own of Minerva dies not start her flight till the evening twilight has begun to fall. 'It is only when the actual world has reached its full fruition that the ideal rises to confront the reality, and builds up, in the shape of an intellectual realm, that same world grasped in its substantial being," It is only those who are utterly ignorant of the nature and function of philosophy that ridicule it by saying either that it is nothing more than beating in the air or a mere play of imagination. Like all other branches of knowledge it too has its strong root struck in experience but while they are all specialised studies, philosophy is the most general study taking account of the whole range of experience. It is basically human in that man is at the centre of all its thinking for human experience is such that no level of experience or knowledge is excluded by it. 'Philosophy is and can be nothing more than the critical interpretation of human experience; and in that experience the systems of knowledge represented by the different sciences have obviously an important part. Philosophy is, in reference to them, a criticism of the categories or principles on which they proceed." (Oringle-Pattison, **The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy**, P. 67, Oxford University Press, London, 1920.)

The term'experience, however, needs to be taken in a wider sense than is the fashion on the part of contemporary Western philosophers to take in which case philosophy is reduced to anything but a quest of knowledge and wisdom, the meaning which is implied in its etymology. Philosophy, as it has been traditionally understood, is love of wisdon and wisdom. It is certainly not mere knowledge but is both theoretically and practically a unified and integrated view of it such as is characteristic of man himself. Since we are men and it does not need much reflection on the nature of knowledge we do have to be convinced of the truth of the conclusion that there are many levels and forms of it and we have constantly to attend to all of them, all of them having their centre in man, it can not be restricted to sense experience as the empiricists like Locke, Hume maintain and as is the habit of positivists and naturalist to maintain Contemporary Western philosophy is mostly empiricial in its characteristic outlook in as much as beginning withl ocke Berkeley and Hume it comes to have its most vigorous and vociferous form in Ayer's logical positivism for which nothing which is not amenable to sense verification can be supposed to possess any meaning. This radically iconoclastic, aggressive and rather narrow standpoint in philosophy is the basis also of analytical and linguistic philosophy whose function is nothing except the attempt to analyze and clarify the language of science which has manifestly its background in empirical knowledge.

This cleavage between empirical and transcendental knowledge is the result of sloth or laziness on the part of the se-called philosopher to exercise his power of thought and reasoning upon knowledge itself. The whole process of knowledge is viewed excdlusively from the point of view of its product rather than its conditions whereas an adequate view calls upon us to contemplate the process as a whole taking the whole nexus of causes and conditions and circumstances and the product together and not in a spirit of exclusion of one another. If there are factors and circumstances and conditions which determine the occurrence of knowledge and in absence of them, it cannot happen or take place, could we not say that they are not less known than the objects known by them? "The transcendent" then should be taken to mean that which exists in its own right beyond our categeries of thought and explanation; but not neeessarily that which is entirely outside our experience in all its modes. For our basic experience may be constituted by a responsive relation to, or even interpenetration with, "transcendent" events and objects." (Dorothy Emmet, **The Nature of Metaphyscial Thinking,** p. 66, Macmillan & Co. Ltd, London, 1961) Empiricists facuss stress on the product only by excluding the whole process which is point of fact, produces it. Kant was initially right in his contention that the conditions of knowledge are transcendent but wrong in not carrying out his view through and through with the drastic result that for him knowledge worth the name turns out to be the empirical or scientific knowledge and his position amounts to the same as Hume's.

Kant is of the view that ultimately the self is the unavoidable,indispensable condition of knowledge and it is rightly designated by him as the synthetic or transcendental unity of apperception. Kant cannot consequently question the reality of self because he himself is tired of saying that the synthesis of sensations and propositions is effected by it alone. He nevertheless, stops short with saying it is a mere logical unity whose reality we cannot consistently affirm.

But when we come to his conception of Ideas of Reason, we find him advancing views of the most extensive syntheses in knowledge. He says that there are systems of knowledge and as far as the self is concerned, we can say that there can be knowledge pertaining to them also although they do not belong to the same category or class of knowledge to which the ordinary objects of the world known by the senses and the understanding belong. Hence, Kant is forced by his own logic to tell us that there is what we call knowledge of the self as well in addition to the knowledge we have, of the objects of the spatio-temporal world. Once this is taken for greated, there can be no alternative to the view that the range of knowledge must be extended to the extent that it is allowed to comprehend such areas or spheres of it as scientific knowledge as well as moral and religious and aesthetic experience. Experience in these areas cannot be questioned just because it does not fit into the positivist or empiricist framework of thinking or pattern. Even in science which is empirical through and through we nowadays hear of their knowledge being shadowy and inacourage and indirect as it cannot be claimed that in them there is any direct contact with the objects. Physicists tell us that the knowledge they possess is that of symbols and mathematical equations, pointer readings only and of nothing else of the effects rather then of causes also producing them. Hence it would be a flagrant, dogmatic and the most blatant error on the part of the philosopher to deny the title of knowledge to that sphere of our information which pertains to such ranges of experience as moral, aesthetic or religious intuitions.

Philosophy being a quest of unified and integrated knowledge must do justice to the moral and religious experiences as well. It is by consideration of the extension of the range and scope of knowledge that we come to the conclusion that mystic experience cannot be supposed to be beyond its purview. Philosophy, among many other functions of it is called upon to assess, examine and evaluate moral and religious experiences as well. Mystical experience is the experience to which a countless number of mystics in both East and West bear elequent and incontestable witness; and philosophy in its synthetic function, is committed to its task of providing a ressonably adequate view of it.

As there are many levels and farms of reality, so of man there are many dimensions and corresponding to them there are many experiences all qualitatively distinct from one another and yet they all cohere and complement one another. The problem is how is human experience so constituted and structured that in spite of differences and oppositions, in man they are all perfectly integrated and unified. This is the problem which philosophy alone can solve and by the coordination of all of them present an adequate conception of man for the division of knowledge into an endless number of branches and special fields characterizing explosion of knowldge in the present-day civilization is a matter of common knowledge. This has led to what is called the vice of specialization due to which modern man is bewildered and lost and is deprived of the sense of direction, balance, harmony and integration. knowledge is attained but wisdom is lost. We see the trees for the wood.

The present chaos in civilization all the world over may legitimately be traced to chaos in the fields of knowledge; and it may ask where the remedy is to be found.

II. Mystic Experience : Its Nature and Status

Of all the different experiences that man possesses, the one that is most comprehensive and most enthralling and most characterstically human is that experience which is mystical. The mystic experience has a mystical ring about it not because it falls outside human experience but because it is totally different from all his other experiences, though it is continuous with them The dimensions of the human ersonality are all different from one another and yet they constitute, a continuum. Mystic experience is the only characteristic human experience because it alone throws immense light on the peculiarities and uncommon features of it and presents man in his true character and essence.

It may be asked wherein lies the true character and essence of man. The answer is that man is spirit, higher than mind and intellect, always seeking the Reality which is the Highest of all to which he is akin. Just because man is spirit, he is consciously striving in all his undertakings and activities and preoccupations to transcend Himself by finding his ultimate resort in that which is the highest in order of value and the Ultimate in the order of reality. As St. Augustine tells us, "Thou hast created us for thyself and our heart cannot be quieted till it may find repose in Thee.", "As birds open their beaks to be fed,' says Homer," because they are hungry, men open their heartsand minds, because they are hungry, because they hunger and thirst after God, because they want to be fed." (Max Muller, **Anthropological Religion,** p. 334) "God has put salt in our mouths so that we shall thrist for him." (Allan W. Watts, **The Supreme Identity,** p. 33) In the luminous words of James Bissett Pratt, "In our safe and same and sober fear of emotionalism and sentimentality, we seem tempted to disown the spiritual nature which is part of our human heritage. The glow of feeling, the sense of the Infinite, the intuition of a Beyond, the aspiration for the more than earthly, these are and always must be an important, if not an essential, part of religion. And they are genuinely human as well,— as genuinely natural **ends** as are the biological processes of digestion, assimilation, and reproduction. It is certainly of great importance that we should consider what we and our slum friends shall eat and what we shall and what we shall drink and wherewithal we shall be clothed; but there are one or two other things which it is well to seek, and perhaps the "kindgom of God" is one of them. And while many will respond that the "kingdom of God" consists just in the proper physical and social conditions, I cannot forget that one who spoke with authority on this matter said, "The kingdom is within you." **The Religious Consciousness**, p. 479, The Macmillan Campany, New York, 1956) Man is restless till he finds or discovers God and enjoys union or communion with Him. Man is neither finite nor infinite. The dichotomy of finite-infinite is what expresses his ideals on values—kratumaye hia yam purusah says the Chandogya Upanisad. If man were self-contained, there would be nothing he would seek. But we find that God made man in His own image. These statements are in point of fact only utterances accentuating this dichotomy characterizing the structure and constitution of man. Man cannot seek anything of which he is totally ignorant. He can seek only that which he somehow implicitly is. As Pringle-Pattison puts it "The finite self, in short, with which Descertes appeared to start as an absolute and independent certainty is not really an independent being at all. It can neither exist nor be known in isolation; it knows itself only as a member of a longer life. The idea of God, Descartes says, elsewhere, originates along with the idea of self-and is innate in the same sense as the latter. The absolutely finite, if the paradoxical expression may be pardoned would be entirely shut-up without the four walls of its independent entity: it would be a universe to itself with no consciousness of any Beyond, and of course, therefore, without the consciousness of higher or lower. But man is not finite in this sense. Man is by contrast a finite-infinite being, conscious of finitude only through the presence of an infinite nature within him." (The Idea of God the Light and Recent Philosophy. pp. 247).

The Presence of the infinite in the finite, of God in man is the secret of creation. The Infinite and the finite need not be placed in watertight compartments for then, there would neither be any awareness on the part of the latter of the former, nor any anxiety or hunger for it. But religion consists not only in the finite seeking the infinite. The infinite also seeks the finite. They both play the game of hide and seek. The Upanisad teaches that having created the world, God Himself entered into it and the New Testament emphasizes the religions phenomenon of God seeking man. This is what in plain and simple language we can call mysticism and this is the very heart and centre of what we designate as religious mysticism. Further, religion is the quest of values the ultimate value, that which fulfils and enriches the being of man: it prompts to attain to that by attaining which nothing remains to be attained or by knowing him nothing is left to be known. (**Gita** VI. 22, VII. 2)

III The Religious Mysticism of Plotinus

New, if there can be no religion without God and God is what alone dispels the mystery surrounding the world by explaining the presence of place, order and purpose in it and again He alone is the source of all values to which man aspires and contributes to the enrichment, Integration and unification of the multiple dimensions of his personality, then He becomes the necessity of human nature. As W.L. Devidson puts it: "God is a necessity of a human nature; which means, not only that in Him this natural sparitual want finds satisfaction (which is something, but further, that it never could have arisen apart from Him as objectivity existent. In other words, the existence of the Object as real is implied in the actual existence of the want, just as in the case of hunger, on the lower or animal side of our nature, hunger as a want obviously could not originate save in a living organism whose very existence depends on its being nourished by food and, therefore, presupposes the real existence of its object, food, so on the higher or spiritual side of our being, the actual fact of our need of God, laid deep in the human constitution, implies that God is, as both originating and satisfying it." (**Theism as Grounded in Human Nature,** Lecture V. quoted in **Recent Theistic** Discussion pp. 29-30, T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1921). "Human desire differs from animal desire in that it is at root insatiable. Man is characterized by a hunger for the infinite, for an eternity of life, love and joy which, whether he knows it or not, can be nothing other than God. Assuming that God exists, it will follow that God is man's true end, for the appetite of a living organism show its function. The stomach hungers for food bacause its function is to digest food. As physical taste and hunger may often be mistaken as to their true object, desiring nothing but caviar instead of a balanced diet, man is often mistaken as to the goal of his life, desiring wealth, power or physical pleasure instead of God. But his real appetite continues to be God, for which these lesser goals are always unsatisfactory substitutes. These who set their hearts on finite goals are always discontented; they must always have more and more and more of what they desire, and failing this are frustrated and miserable. profound content is only enjoyed by animals and primitives, in whom infinite hunger has not been awakened, and by the saints and mystics wno have realized union with God. Thus it is that, known or unknown, God is the ultimate object of human desire, whether that desire is highly spiritual or grossly sensual. "Even in the midst of the lowest pleasures, the most abandoned voluptuary is still seeking God; may more, as far as regards what is positive in his acts, that is to say in all that makes them an analogue of the true Love, it in God Himself who, in him and for him, seeks Himself." (Allan Watts, **Behold the Spirit,** pp. 65-66, Vintage Books, New York, 1971.)

Mysticism is the generic term employed generally by theologians and philosophers for any experience that lifts man above the ordinary level of his being; in short whatever bestows on him the vision of something larger, more expansive deifying and elevating than that with which he is associated or occupied. "The term mysticism in popular usage is sometimes applied to all forms of religious feeling or experience, even to the vision of the poet or the enjoyment of music; 'mystical', in fact come to be simply the opposite of scientific; wherever man claims to apprehend the infinite through the finite or the eternal through the temporary. he is popularly called a mystic." (N. Micklem, **Religion,** p. 153, oxford University Press, London, 1950.)

There are different types of mysticism all of which conform to the generic definition of mysticism mentioned above and all cannot be called religious mysticism. For example, in Wordsworth we meet with the illustration of what is called Nature Mysticism in which communion with Nature is experienced. The felling of ecstasy is the outcome of the experience of oneness or identity with Nature. There is also the mysticism of self-realization in which the soul purged of its imperfections and impurities obtains the vision of its own nature in its pristine purity The realization or cognition of the soul in its purity is the aim and goal of the spiritual discipline in Advait a Vedanta. There is no reality higher than the self with which the feeling of identity may be experienced. it is only the third form of mysticism in which the soul experiences identity with the Supreme Reality that is religious mysticism. The knowledge of the self in its pristine purity is the condition of the direct, immediate experience of God and of the attainment of the state of communion with Him. Miss Underhill remarks that "The central fact, it seems to me is an overwhelming consciousness of God and of his own soul, a consciousness which absorbs or eclipses all other centers of interest. It is said that St. Francis of Assisi, parying in the house of Bernard of Quintavalle, was heard to say again and again. "My God ! my God ! what art Thou ? and what am I ?'! Though the words come from St. Augustine, they well represent his mentalattitude. This was the only question which he thought worth asking; and it is the question which every mystic asks at the beginning and sometimes answers at the end of his quest. Hence we must put first among our essentials the clear conviction of a living God as the primary interest of consciousness, and of a personal self capable of-communion with Him." (Richard Woods (Edited), **Understanding Mysticism,** p. 27, The Athlene Press, Landon, 1980.)

Mysticism is religion in its most concentrated form. According to Bernard Lonergan, the author of his **magnum opus** Insight, mysticism is the very heart and centre of theology in the sense that for it there in no consciousness except that of the Infinite. Consciousness of anything else is utterly wiped out.

It is vitally important to note that Plotinus was the mystic far excellent and his mysticism was a model of religious mysticism.

Plotinus maintained after the fashion of the Upanisads' that man cannot find satisfaction in the finite for real happiness, eternal bliss lies only in the infinite **nalpe sukhamasti ve vai bhuma tat sukham.** Plotinus mysticism is the explicit expression of the relation of the soul to God. It is true that man does not possess a clear and indabitable awareness or consciousness of the Infinite. It is all the same a ways implied and involved in it.

7

Plotinus And Haridas Chaudhuri Their Experiments With Integral Experience

Plotinus,[1] a mystic known to be a resident of Lycopolis (Egypt) of the second century A. D., and the late Haridas Chaudhuri[2] of India and America of the present century—in their experiment with integral experience, in the advanced lines of philosophic delibertions of the their times and cultures-have some similarities and differences. These will be considered in this paper with a purpose to develop Plotinus' mystic purificatory exalting processes, and Chaudhuri's philosophic and yogic exercises and possibilities, one in relation to the other.

Plotinus, in the post-Aristotelian cultural milieu of the Greeks from Parmenides and Pythagoras to Plato and Aristotle, and the religious atmosphere from Judaism and Zoroastrianism to Christianity and Gnostic mysticism,[3] with some obvious impacts from India, was not very satisfied with the prevailing cultural atmosphere of the time, so he was in search of a person who could inspire him in a new direction not present in his inherited backround.[4] Plotinus' mystic aspirations became evident from his joining the Emperor Gordianus' campaign against the Persians to proceed to India in search of Indian wisdom,[5] but unfortunately, according to Armstrong,[6] Gordianus was murdered in Mesopotamia in 244 A. D. and Plotinus escaped to Antioch with difficulty and later settled down in a place called Campania in Rome, where Roman liberal rule prevailed. Emperor Gallienus and his consort Salonina, according to Zeller,[7] held Plotinus with high respects for his noble and pure character. Plotinus found a man of his choice in one Ammonius Saccas, a man born in a Christain family having a leaning towards Plato's philosophy, yet with a difference. Plotinus, in his contact with Ammonius Saccas-and some disciples of Ammonius Saccas Origen and Cassius Longinus, formed by contrast an advanced mystic mode through his ecstatic experiences which have more of the Platonic transcendental touches and less of the Aristotelian realism with an abstract conceptual metaphysical proneness.[8] If viewed from the-then religious atmosphere of emergent Christianity and mystic atmosphere of Gnosticism, Plotinus' novel mysticism has not any element of vacuous otherworldiness nor any pessimistic element. His was a buoyant spirit of the Greek good life with a mystic prospect in progressive purification and simplicity of a transcendent One, needing to be preserved in its integrality and in its energetic association and confrontation of auniverse of multiplicity and change.[9]

Zeller and Armstrong, in their critical review of Plontinus' transcendent **One**, in contrast to his apparent presented universe of many and change, try to deal with the two orders of experiential processes with a balance and togetherness. While presenting the special character of Plontinian mysticism, Zeller distinguishes between Plotinus' Idea of God (One) and his demand for Unity with God, where the God is taken as original in contrast to the confronted occasion, which is secondary, but not beyond God. He is what lies beyond all presented orders of beings, as supra-sensuous and supra-intellectual possibility. The concepts of unity and good, when attributed to the transcendent One, are only figurative or symbolical, in absence of any other better expression.[11] In this aspect, Plotinus' mysticism touches Lao Tzu's transcendental Tao, which is nameless, before all confronted named processes. Lau Tzu, a Chinese mystic preceded Plontinus by several centuries.[12] But in his own Western tradition, Plotinus is the forerunner of the entire mystic modes of the later emergent religious processes of Christianity and Islam of the medieval and modern periods, and can distinguish himself from the different types of mystic attitudes expressed through such Christian mystics as Eckhart of the thirteenth century, and Boehme of the sixteenth century.[13] Plotinus' transcendent One is not a principle like Spinoza's God, conceived by itself and existent by itself, of the rationalist of the seventeenth century.[14]

Plotinus rather confroms himself to Platonic and Aristotelian heritage, and is operative beyond Christian religious, Gnostic, and Stoic rationalist materialist processes, in the line of Ammonius saccas, with a difference, in a mystic psychological direction. This, according to Armstrong[15], is a kind of balance between his inherited metaphysics (tension or fluctuation) and mystical aspirations (release or freedom from tension). This becomes evident from his several hypostases which are broad postulations of continuous descent-ascent processes in togetherness from the first hypostasis, the transcendent One. The descent is to the Nous, World-Soul, Nature, Body and Matter. Of these hypostases, the Nous is the most efficient in its dual aspects of descent and ascent, as close to the first hypostasis, the transcendent One; it stretches itself to the last of the hypostases, the Matter, but retains the capacity to redirect it through the higher orders of hypostases, the One, without being trapped by non-being beyond matter. The Matter, the last of the hypostases, is the most deficient, having the least of luminosity of the transcendent One, it is almost darkness, if not complete darkness (non-being) itself[16]. All these hypostases or rather symbolic postulations for dealing with the two orders of experiential processes, transcendent and apparent, in togetherness, with continuity and prospect, can be modernized with the additional ideas, which emerged in both Western and Eastern (broadly Asian) and very specially in Indian traditions. The aim of this paper will be a development of the Plotinian mysticism in broad symbolic directions, in both its wings, transcendental and apparent, without restricting onself to any fixed notions of the transcendental and apparent orders, by continuously confronting the apparent universe through the human organismic processes, in which, according to whitehead, a twentieth century British/American Philosopher and scientist, the two Natures—non-senuous past causal Nature—and apparent, sensuous, intellectual and post-intellectual Nature—meet, and evolve together in further possibilities[17]. Along with this project of development of Plotinian mysticism in symbolic ways, there will be another program of developing Plotinian mysticism, very specially in the Indian mystic contexts, with further prospects beyond western. Indian and also in Asian contexts, with special reference to the mystic notions of Haridas Chaudhuri,[18] beyond Aurobindo and whitehead, for, according to Haridas Chaudhuri, there is no finally, afinal.[19]

In developing the notion of descent-ascent process from the first a hypostasis–the transcendent One–to Nous, Plotinus differs from Origen, disciple of Ammonius Saccas, is showing that the Nous is distinct from the transcendent one. Cassius Longinus, another disciple of Ammonius Saccas, separates the Platonic transcendental Ideas from the Plotinian God and the Nous, and Ammonius Saccas was non-commital, so Plotinus, in that background, was left to deal with his hypostases in his own way, his main motive, in his descent ascent process, was dual—to proceed and yet not lose control over the process —by maintaining a kind of pull from the transcendent one, and as well from the second hypostasis, Nous.[20] His transcendent One stood for the excess of luminosity, and his other hypostases stood for a dual process of descent and ascent, as an overflow of a surplus so that the stretching to the surplus aspect is not a production or a modification, but only an outflow, not descending to a total non-entitiy (not-being), for the transcendent One has always control over it. Plotinus mode of deliberation is therefore mystical or broadly symbolic, dealing with the possibilities or the possibles, with no restrictive discernible intellectual-sensuous modes. Hence his apparent orders of hypostases—from Nous to Matter-are stretched between God and not-being. In this development of a transcedental mysticism with expressions and controls, Plotinus can always maintain his speciality, in terms of his Westtern tradition and in its development, but to restrict it only in that aspect, as Armstrong[21] suggests, will be a mistake, for, whether one does not wish to develop in the Indian or in Asian directions, is one's option, but to exclude these further possibilities would be arbitrary. History is also variously interpretable. Taking[22] note of all these reflective ways, one can get some relevent materials for development of Plotinin mysticism in broad intercultural contexts if one follows the suggestions of W. T. Stace, Jaspers, Otto and others. These masters of comprehensive philosophic attitudes interpret philosophy from deep historical insights pertaining to philosophy in continuous development.

From a comparative intercultural perspective, Stace, in his The **Teachings of the Mystics**[23] examines the mystic processes in introvertive and extrovertive ways. According to Stace and this writer, Plotinus has certainly a place along the introvertive line, with a speciality, for he feels the need of the confronted situation and facing it also, in his symbolic hypostatic ways.

Jaspers, in his **The Great Philosophers,**[24] feels the need of treating the philosophers and mystics of the West with that of the Asian countries, as Anaximander Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plotinus Lao Tzu and Nargarjuna, as also Socrates, Buddha, Confucius and Jesus. In this connection, he considers the Plotinian mysticism as concerned with a process between Above-Being and non-Being. To him, "To philosophize is to think."[25] The thinkable is an intermediate realm at whose limits the unthinkable is encountered. If this limit is surpassed in moments of union with the One, Such moments are arrived at by thought, and as long as man is engaged in temporal existence, they are followed by a return to thought.

Jaspers concludes his comments on Plotinus by stating that "For Plotinus thought has no other purpose than such union with the one. Consequently he seeks knowledge of the things of the world, not for their own sake, but only in order to transcend them."[26] In this transcendent development of the apparent orders of experiential process, Jaspers seems to agree with Otto, who in Appendix V of his book, **Mysticism East and West,**[27] relates and yet separates Plotinus from

Eckbart, the Buddha and Sankara, for, his pursuit of knowledge over mere salvation, and in this aspect, Otto thinks that Plotinus is Hellenic in spirit, and transcends exclusive mysticism, by a further process, in a realist direction, which, in an aspect, relates him to Boehme, a Christain mystic of the sixteenth century after Eckhart and also to further consequent possibilities in intercultural contexts.

If this realist aspect of Plotinus is further developed, this writer thinks that the Plotinian mysticism had a dual impact on the mystical modes of the major religions of the West-Judaism, Christianity and Islam, through the Medieval and Modern periods, and also beyond the Modern to the post-Hegelian anti-intellectual currents of the Phenomenologists, Husserl and others, influencing the varied Existentialist modes from Heidegger to Sartre, Merleau Ponte and others, and also several individual thinkers in the Pragmatist lines, Peirce, James and Dewey, and evolutionists, from Bargson and Santayana to Whitehead. not excludingsuch neo-Hegelians as Bradley and Bosanquet.[28] Harris, in his **A Brief Description of Neoplatonism** in The **Significance of Neoplatonism.**[29] prepares the ground for such a comprehensive project of developing neo-Platonic process from its early to later stages, through medieval, modern and recent periods, of Western thought, indicating the influence of Plotinian mysticism, in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, as also in the advanced evolutionist modes of deliberations of Whitehead in post-metaphysical, post-theological and post-epistemological directions. Referring to whitehead's **Process and Reality,** Harris thinks that it "is a modern example of the type of system produced by Plotinus within the level of Nous."[30] But, according to this writer, Harris' stretch of Plotinus to Whitehead, could be as well extended to the comprehensive modes of Aurobindo and Haridas Chaudhuri, reinterpreting Nous, further.

In such comprehensive extensions of Plotinian thinking in broader realist or supra-mental or, for that matter, beyond the apparent directions,-wherein a new kind of mysticism can be developed, not ignoring the scientific developments and acquisitions-one can also reflect on the transcendent philosophical deliberations of such modern thinkers, like Suzuki,[31] a radical Zen Buddhist of Japan and of Thomas Merton,[32] a Catholic missionary and philosopher. One can as well feel like Merton to expand Eckhart's mystic Catholic spirit[33] to the subtle mysticism of Zen Buddhism of Suzuki. In an aspect, Buber, representing the advanced Judaic Mysticism, is not far aloof from the mysticisms of the different religions of the world, and Bawa,[34] a contemporary Sufi-Islamic thinker, suggests in that comprehensive mystic attiude, that the real seeker of God must eventually depart from all specific religious and philosophic traditions. In simple, all these movements are beyond their respective cultural milieu-metaphysics, theology, theory of knowledge et al., to new prospects where all dissolve their idealities to seek a prospect in internationalist ways breaking any boundries, for grazing in spaceless timeless horizons of continuously changing prospects. This cultural transcendence in all of these thinkers is possible because all think beyond thought in supra-mental ways.

While developing the comprehensive mystic process in broad realist ways detaching onself from any restricted intellectualism (if any in Nous), in the advanced lines of international consciousness, in the way suggested above through Suzuki, Thomas Merton, Buber, Bawa and others-Lex Hixon, who had associated himself with the great Vedantist of the Ramakrishna Mission in New York, Swami Nikhilananda, and also conversant with Indian Krishnamurti, who remains unassociated with any religious tradition of the world-gives a very comprehensive interpretation of Plotinian mysticism, by a title: **There is Only The One,** in his book **Coming Home** (The Experience of Enlightenment in Sacred Traditions).[35] Lex Hixon refers to the transcendent One of Plotinus by a series of negations, not in terms of the posterior traditions of Christianity with a theistic slant as in Erigena, or in some prior traditions of other cultural processes, Indian or Chinese; in Upanisadic-Buddhist contrast or Taoist-Buddhist contrast or Confucius-Buddhist contrast, the transcendent One of Plotinus,according to Lex Hixon,is not an abstraction,an entity, or something static, but it is like a power or energy-continuum in expression, with no intellectual frame to depend upon, but it is a suffusing process with a kind of ever-present wholeness of superfluity as recognised in advanced ways in Whitehead, Suzuki, Merton et al, and to this writer it is like a flash of Zen Buddism of Suzuki or like an ingression of the **eternal objects** of Whitehead into the occasions of the apparent universe, which may or may not emerge, but if they emerge, it is there in its wholeness, inspiring it to further possibilities. If there are emanations they are emanations of the One by nature turned to contemplate or praise their source. They are medias of expressions of wholeness. They inherit the basic spontaneity, the boundless power of the One. The procession of a series of Beings may be imagined as movement outward from a center, like the growth rings of a tree,[36] but really from Nous to Matter—it opens itself mysteriously within itself to a possible inconceivable intermediary in order that there be room or open space as it were of some sort, for the manifest universe to take shape deep within the transcendent Divine. Yet, all forms that manifest within the One, are only, in the words of Plotinus, the clear light which is itself. There is only the One with a little stretch. Again according to Plotinus, this one is an activity, without losing itself in a specific function. The overflow of the One as Being has no purpose or restrictedness. It is like the transcendent Void (Sunya) of the Buddhists as a reasonable stretch in contrast to the Upanisadic transcendent Fourth (Turiya)—a possible emptiness if that possibility is allowed, it is then an open space imposing no obstruction to manifestation. Plotinus, in a similar vein, remarks about the One as having nothing within it, so that all things come from it with a possible advantage remaining in itself without undergoing any diminution. The one has no investment in any manifestation, it is a kind of entertaining the possibles without getting into the monotony of transcendent silence or perishing processes of non-being. Again Plotinus explains, 'The one is imminent by its very transcendence, but it is not beyond any life or any concern, no matter how microscopic. The One transcends transcendence.'[37] In other words, it does not obstinately exclude the possible but entertains it by a courtesy or a concession not stooping so low as to lose itself it complete non-being or nothingness.

Plotinus would go further to say like the great Indian contemporary sage Ramana Maharshi that Enlightenment is simply to admit that we are already enlightened, already the One not merely as something past but as entertainable forever. This involves a revolution in our attitude, a turning around to what we have turned our back on—a seeking of a possibility ahead of us. The enlightenment, according to Plotinus, is to awaken as the One to this kind of fluency or possibility as far as stretchable, rather than to know or see the One in the restricted way as the subject experiences an object.[38]

Lex Hixon calls this kind of enlightenment of the possibles, according to Plotinus, as utterly a primal or simple nature of the One. Plotinus calls this awakening as the 'flight of the alone to the alone'.[39] But to this writer, the prospect as suggested is nothing categorical but broadly hypothetical. The Zen masters speak of red flowers blooming red. This circularity condenses into primal affirmation, which in turn disappears into its source, the One, revealing the entire drama of Being as the One alone. Hence lex Hixon concludes as follows: "The way of wisdom followed by Plotinus is not a philosophical system but a powerful path of initiation that actually serves to awaken us to the One"[40] and, to this writer, to its stretched possibilities. The writings of plotinus provide inspiration for actual contemplation and practice, in a broad hypothetical direction with no restrictedness.

In this context, this writer has utilized the writings of some specialists on Plotinus, as of Zeller, Armstrong, Jaspers, Stace, Harris and Lex Hixon, in general, cutting off their restrictive details, and bringing to focus only their similar modes, in intercultural contexts and prospects where Plotinian transcendent One, as a mystic experience in integrality, does not ignore the presented orders from Nous to vital and mental orders to matter as possible focal points of possibilities for consideration. All these presented orders is descent, fall within the open space of the transcendent. One construed as a hypothetical centre, where the presented orders are entertained for a lift back to the transcendent. One with a kind of novelty and enjoyment. Therefore the presented, orders are not just nothing or merely shadows of Plato in contrast to this abiding trans-sensuous archetypal Ideas,[41] nor are they just processes to be entertained in a possible sphere of contrasts of totally dispassioned conditions of Nirvana (extinction) and vacuity or Śunyata of the Buddhists[42]. They are comprehensive processes or emergent possibilities always fed by the ever-present plenary light or open space of the transcendent One, through the focussed modes of the presented orders, which are decent-ascent processes, constantly shedding off their relative restrictness by contrasting ways.

This kind of interpretation of the presented occasions or the possibles in the sphere of the superfluous expressions from the transcendent One of Plotinus, can be found in advanced scientific-philosophic ways in the presented occasions of perceptual situation of a living organism of Whitehead, where the transcendent Nature, in its pre-sensuous causal past meets or ingresses into the apparent sensuous, intellectual and post-intellectual processes as eternal possibilities of varied contrasting orders, and lifts the basic spatio-temporal occasions to further possibilities. So Whitehead makes the presented occasions many dimensional centres of "subject-superject processes" and possibilities[43].

Developing the Indian transcendent mystic modes from the Upanisadic Turiya (Fourth) to the tranecendent modes of the Buddhist Nirvana and sunya [completely freed conditions from intellectuality] and to the Vedantist Sankara's transcendent ever-present continuous flashes [Svyamprakas], which entertain both the subjective and the objective orders of the presented situations as concrete and possible occassions—Aurobindo similarly proceeds to a further comprehensive mystic-transcendent-disciplined process in the advanced lines of Yoga and Tantra beyond Sankara, in his new Fourth [transcendent basis and possibility] which he calls the Supermind process and possibility, which like Nous of Plotinus in decent-ascent ways, entertains, maintains, and also transforms [this idea is not present in Plotinus] the entire presented order stretched to the stage of Matter and to the basic transcendent conditions of existentiality, consciousness and bliss. Unlike Plotinus, to whom the transcendent One is not interpretable in any exclusive presented terms—Aurobindo entertains the transcendent basis as a possibility also, along with a special function of it in the Supermind, which is both a prior and a posterior condition of presentability of possibility—for, the transcendent existent-consciousness-bliss of Aurobindo, from its beginning, is many-dimensional unrestrictedness and contrast, and hence it is freed from the possible restricted intellectual modes, so that Aurobindo's supermind transcends the Plotinian Nous, by progressive contrasts in the traditions of the Unpanisads, Buddhism and the Vedanta.[44] The thinkers of the Upanisads, Buddhism and the Vedanta, in terms of their Fourths, only waited for Aurobindo, to be expressive in the form of the Supermind as developed here.

Haridas Chaudhuri by his historical study of Indian philosophy, Yoga and Tantra, to the stage of Aurobindo, and of Western philosophy to the stage of Whitehead—discerns a prospective evolutionary process beyond both these contemporaries. The reference is here to his books : Sri Aurobindo : The Prophet Of Life Divine, **The philosophy Of Integralism,**[45] **Integral Yoga,**[46] and **Being, Evolution And Immortality**. In these works, Haridas Chaudhuri, with an insightful brevity, indicates his mastery over Indian and Western thought in the advanced lines of Aurobindo's **The Life Divine** and **Savitri,**[47] and Whitehead's **Process and Reality**[48], and **Adventures of Ideas,** pointing out that there is no finality of the possible visions [even taking note of the Supermind et al, this writer's addition] in both the areas of experiential processes—transcendent and apparent. Both of these aspects of experiential processes, dynamically move towards further symbolic possibilities, by the new discoveries and visions of insightful and resourceful personalities, all over the world, when they participate and exchange one another's ideas and discoveries.

Haridas Chaudhuri considers his evolutionary scheme in broad symbolic ways in the advanced lines of experiential processes or contrasts—transcendent and apparent. So, in the developments through the centuries, of both the corners of experiential processes, both can be employed for mutual prospects, revealing the secret lying behind the transcendental, and facing beyond the apparent. Haridas Chaudhuri rightly sees in the Supermind-possibilities beyond the apparent cosmic-psychic orders of diversity—a transcendent non-dual prospect, so that the new supra-mental age will dawn, in the present human situation of relative disorder, a prospective order, Without violent regimentation of life and thought, heralding a world-peace without the suppression of individual freedom and national self-determination, Haridas Chaudhuri wants to transcend the achievements of Yoga Tantra of the earlier types from the Upanisads to the Vedants beyond the Budhists. and also beyond the types of the various Vedantic schools, by pointing out that the supra-mental process and possibility is not in a prior static existential field, but it is for ever in a possible if—than contexts or contrasts from the two winged experiential continuum of the transcendent and the apparent in their focal posibilities in which none of the centres are without the other—one of the centres are without the other—one opens up for the other and returns to the other. Symbolically, It is a Siva-Sakti process in transcendence and immanence as also life and death, creation and destruction, emergence and perishing, involution and evolution, light and darkness in togetherness and possibility, like the overflowing process in integrality of the transcendent One to the hypostases Nous et al. of Plotinus, and not a mere returning to the transcendent condition as it was before, in the case of Plotinus, but as processed through and through by the two wings of the experiential processes in togetherness and in development, without the vacuous restrictedness of each level, so that one could say that the prospective or hypothetically oriented integral philosophy of ever-fresh possibility and vitality unifies in its world-view the vision of pure transcendence beyond all systems and the evolutionary process of building system without end in the space-time continuum.[50] The total truth is always the unity of opposites, not in the existential way, but in the possible open way of if-then frames of reference, as this writer has tried to develop in the advanced lines of Whitehead or Aurobindo in the paper. The ultimate of integral truth is the unity of systems and non-systems in if—then ways where there is no inherited restrictive suggestions. It is thus the meeting ground of science and mysticism in their prospects towards transcending possibilities. It is a process beyond both Nature and Spirit, beyond both objective ways: it envisions the supreme mystery of Being (Brahmn) as understood as a possible beginning, which may be entertained as the ultimate ground of all emergent possibilities, not excluding the basic possibilities. In this transcendent attitude, Haridas Chaudhuri seems, to this writer, to return to some form of unitive truth-vision, which is the apprehenstion of the many as a possibility, spontaneously outpouring its relative Oneness, but this writer feels that if there is any revival of the Plotinian spirit in the sense of exclusive oneness, it has to be modified. Hence, this writer would prefer to stick to the advanced Whiteheadian modification of all transcendent modes, neither by any kind of specific unity (or oneness) nor by non-duality, but by a kind of openness for a process of one-in-many and many-in-one, for, the transcendent or even the apparent, is not finally known by thought in any specific way; it is an experience in continuity, not in the existential order, but always in the hypothetical many-dimensional possible order. This will also maintain the core of Haridas Chaudhuri's integral experience that the final, is never the final it lies in progressive movements, in ground-consequent ways of openness and understrictedness, all in transcendent-hypothetical ways or possibilities.[51]

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2. 1913–1975
3. Armstrong, A. H. Plotinus, Collier Books, N. Y., 1962, Introduction, pp. 11-39.
4. Ibid., pp. 12, 22-4
5. Zeller, Eduard. **Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy,** Meridian Books, Ninth Printing 1962, first Printing, 1955, pp. 311-323, for the campaign to India: pp, 311-314
6. Armstrong : **Plotinus**, p. 13
7. Zeller : **Outlines**, p. 314
8. Ibid., p. 313
9. Armstrong : **Plotinus**, p. 21
10. Zeller : **Outlines**, pp. 313-315
11. Ibid., pp. 315-316
12. Waley, Arthur. **Three Ways Of Thought In Ancient China**, A Doubleday Anchor Book, N. Y., 1939, pp. 12-18; Jaspers, Karl., **The Great Philosophers,** Vol. II., Harcourt Brace Javanovich, N. Y./London, 1966, **Plotinus**, pp. 32-86, and Lao Tzu, pp. 87-114, and Stace, W. T., **The Teachings of The Mystics,** A Mentor Book, New American Library, N. Y., 1960, for Taoist Mysticism, pp. 102–109, and Plotinus, pp. 110-123.

13. Otto, Rudolph--**Mysticism, East And West,** Meridian Books, N. Y., 1957, Appendix V. pp. 252–3—places Plotinus to a prospective order of the mystics beyond Eckhart, Buddha and Sankara, whose ultimates are some kind of salvation, to the somewhat realist suggestions of mystic Boehme.

14. Prelman, Ch., **An Historical Introduction to Philosophical Thinking,** Random House, N. Y., 1965, Spinozas' mysticism was expressed in a rationalist definitional way, but Plotinus mysticism is beyond rationalist categories, pp.140–141.

15. Armstrong : **Plotinus,** pp. 22-26, for the details of Plotinu's Hypostases—One, Nous et al, pp. 2839, and suggestions of division of Plotinus'.

16. Zeller : Outlines, pp. 314–318, Jaspers : **The Great Philosophers,** Vol. II., pp. 34-41, for details on the Hypostases.

17. Whitehead, A. N., **Adventures of Ideas,** The free Press, N. Y., 1967 for details.

18-19. Sri Aurobindo: **The Prophet Of Life Divine,** Sri Aurobindo Ashrama, Pondicherry, first edition 1951, second edition 1960, American edition 1973, page– references will be from the second edition, p p. 214–215. Haridas Chaudhuri's ultimate thesis of ever-prospective final is well brought out from advanced Western and Eastern perpectives in his later work : **Being Evolntion And Immortality,** The Theosophical Publishing House, Wheaton, U. S. A., 1974, Ch. 12.

20. While admitting the environmental influeuce of the Stoics during the Plotinian times—Zeller stresses the exalted mystic attitude of Plotinus from the transcendent One, and also of the second hypostasis Nous, its detachment from the sensuous orders in descent. Outlines, 323-325.

21. Hixon, Lex : **Coming Home :** (The Experience of Enlightenment in sacred traditions) Doubleday Anchor Books, N. Y. 1978, pp. 109-126. The speciality of Hixon in developing Plotinian mysticism lies in its comparative and critical attitude so that he could carry forward the mystic suggestions of Plotinus from the post-Aristotelian stages to the post-Buddhist and post-Vedantist processes of Krishnamurti and Ramana Maharshi of India in progressive depth processes. All such processes will be briefly indicated below : According to Hixon, the Plotinian mystic transcendent One is a power utterly simple yet rich in potentiality, generating beings in spontaneity,

simultaneously from the intellectual to the sensuous, without touching them as to be completely lost in them. Hence, the Procession of beings may be imagined as a movement outward from a center like the growth rings of a tree, to a disappearing point of pure non-being, but not to a complete nothingness, for there is always a turn inwards to the transcendent One. In a sense, Hixon, Zeller and Jaspers, in different ways, develop all apperent emenating processes from a transcendent ground, where the outflow is never loosened from the transcendent pull of the primary basic transcendent order. In the words of Jaspers : "The world is being, not self-grounded, but is an intermediate being, between Above-Being and non-being." In this ground-consequent process there is a swing or a stretch, but never a basic ground-control. The Above-Being or the transcendent One, and the non-Being the total void, are beyond the reach of conceptual process, there is in one aspect, a sphere of ultimate efficiency, and in another, an ultimate deficiency-the immanent apparent processes, are between the extremes. The second emanation or evolute from the first hypostasis-One, is Nous, but it is not restricted intellectuality, it has a ground in the plenary transcendent One, though it is a possibility, Similarly the last hypostasis, Matter, is not a total void, though bound toward non-being (void). Almost the same sort of idea is found in Aurobindo's notion of the apparent orders of experiential processes by way of descent (involution) from the Supermind which also stretches itself to Matter, which is apparently complete darkness yet not so, so that the control of the ground-process remains, as ascent or evolution to take care of the apparent spheres, But whereas to Aurobindo, the ascent process is not merely the transcendent without any change and transformation, to Plotinus, it is only a return without any change. Plotinian thought, therefore, falls in the usual notion of the early mystic traditions of the Western and Asian countries, including that of India. But the speciality of Plotinus lies in the thought of a possible, as if other than the transcendent, yet not completely other, because of the ever-present pull from the transcendent, and this pull is experiential and not categorial, conceptual or intellectual, or evén sensuous or sensual in any restricted sense.

W. T. Stace, like Jaspers and Hixon, speaks of the emanation as a series and also a simultaneous process of progressive decent or distance from the transcendent One in each of the stages from Nous to Matter: in the downward movement there is a progressive diminuation of light and value, leading one, as if to a void, akin to evil, but yet not to a total void or evil, so that the Nous is intelligence yet not it, in its restrictedness, the next emanation, Soul, is not soul,but grounded on World-soul, similarly Matter is not Matter itself but ultimately grounded on she transcendent One, or in the stretch towards non-being through the previous intermediaries, World-soul and Nous.

22. Collingwood, R. G., Essays In The **Philosophy of History,** Mcgrow Hill Book Co., N. Y./London, 1966, chiefly the **Introduction**, and Chs, I & IV (Croce's Philosophy of History & Oswald Spengler and the theory of Historical Cycles). Also Tolstoy's **War & Peace**, for the notion of history as inevitable process, over which man has no control, the so-called heroes or ideal persons by their projects to change history, have only restricted the process to their motives. Here Tolstoy is like the Taoists of China, indifferent to participate in world-process. For details vide: **Imaginative Literature** II from Cervantes to Dustoevsky by Mortimer J. Adler and Seymour Cain, Eneyclopaedia Britanica, Inc., Chicago/London/Sydney, 1962, Part 7.

23. Stace finds a closeness between Plotinus and the Upanisadic thinkers, in their interpretation of the apparent orders as grounded upon a transcendent mystic experience of the one or the Fourth (Turiya). In the interpretation of the apparent orders as God's Creation in Christain theolgy, there is only a speculation, and hence not something transcending human intellectuality.

24. Jaspers also, like Stace. feels the need of the transcendent orders of experiential process, in supra-rational ways, and therefore, he considers the Western and Eastern mystics together, and brings in Plotinus in that context.

25. Jaspers: The Great Philosophers, Vol. II, p. 50.

26. Ibid.

27. Otto: Mysticism East and West, pp. 252-3

28. For development of Phenomenological and Existentialist transcendent-apparent modes from Husserl to Merleau Ponty. vide: Thevenaz, Pierre, **What is Phenomenology** ? For the development of the different types of Pragmatist modes from Peirce

to James, Dewey and Lewis, Vide: The **American Pragmitists,** edited by Konvitz and Kennedy, Meridian Books, The World Publishing Co., Cleveland/New York. 1969, **The Pragamatic Philosophy of C.S. Peirce,** by Manley Thompson, Phoenix Books, The University of Chicago Press, 1963, **Introduction to William James,** by Reck, Indiana University Press, Bloomington/London, 1967, and **Pragmatism And Other Essays,** by William James, Washington Square Press, N. Y., 1963. For a comprehensive view of Western and Asian advanced lines of thinking in transcendental and apparent ways in Contemporay Philosophy, vide: **The Chief Currents of Contempory, Philosophy** by Dhirendra Mohan Datta, Calcutta University Press, third edition, 1970.

29. Edited by R. Baine Harris, International Society for Neo-Platonic Studies, Norfolk, Virginia, 1967, pp. 1-20.
30. Ibid., p. 19.
31. Suzuki, D. T., **The Field of Zen.** Edited with a foreward by Christmas Humphreys, Harper & Row, Publishers, N. Y./ London, 1970, Ch. 9.
32. Merton, Thomas., **Zen and The Birds of Appetie,** A New Directions Book, N. Y., 1968, D. T. Suzuki: **The Man and His Work,** pp. 59-66, Wisdom in Emptiness, pp. 29-138.
33. Buber, Martin: **Hasidism And Modern Man,** edited & translated by Maurice Friedman, Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, N. Y., 1966 and also: Buber Martin: **Hasidism (The Origin and Meaning of),** Edited & translated by M. Friedman, Harper Torchbooks, N. Y., 1966.
34. Hixon, Lex: **Coming Home,** Ch. VIII, Allah alone can know Allah pp. 161-179.
35. Ibid., Ch. V (There Is only The One: Plotinus and the Metaphysics of Spiritual Quest).
36. Ibid., pp. 118-126, also p. 110.
37. Ibid., p. 111
38. Ibid., pp. 111-113, also p. 117
39. Ibid., pp. 113-119.
40. Ibid., p. 122.
41. Barry Gross, Edited and selected by, **The Great Thinkers on Plato;** Capricorn Books, N. Y., 1969, **Introduction,** specially pp. XIX-XX, where rightly it has been pointed out

that although Plotinus owed much to Plato's thought, Plotinus embarked on several new paths. The essential point of his philosophy is the urging that one should follow a path which leads to mystic union with the one, the supreme principle of all things. The soul, which makes this journey, ascends to a kind of intellectual ladder until it reaches a point where it is able to rise beyond the intellectual to a mystical union with the One...True beings are not physical but intelligible, and the many and many in one; they are in a living identity with each other. (p. XIX).

42. For details vide this writer's **Changing Phases of Buddhist Thought** (Bharati Bhawan, Patna, second edition, 1975).

43. Sarkar, Anil K., **Whitehead's Four Principles From West-East Perspectives,** Bharati Bhawan, Patna, 1974.

44. Sri Aurobindo: **The Life Divine,** India Library Society, N.Y., Chs. XVI, XVIII, XIX, XXIII-XXVIII (Book-Part II).

45. Haridas Chaudhuri: **The Philosophy of Integralism,** Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, second edition, 1967.

46. Haridas Chaudhuri: **Intergal Yoga,** A Quest Book, Theosophical Publishing House, Wheaton, III., Second Impression, 1970.

47. Sri Aurobindo: **Savitri:** A Legend and a Symbol, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, Besides some relevent chapters, vide Sri Aurobindo's letters on "Savitri".

48. Whitehead, A. N., **Process and Reality,** First Free Press Paperback edition, The Free Press, New York, 1969, specially preface and Part V: Final Interpretation.

49. Haridas Chaudhuri: **Being, Evolution and Immortality,** p. 184.

50. Ibid., pp. 190-193.

51. Ibid., pp. 193-200.

8

The Concept of Trinity in Plotinus.

L. G. Chincholkar

This paper intents to evaluate the concept of trinity in Plotinus. To start with it will be helpful to be fairly acquainted with it.

Plotinus puts forth two types of trinities of which the one, of the higher order, may be called the divine trinity. This divine trinity consists of three principles which are demeed to be divine in nature, They are I The Absolute, II The Spirit and III The Soul.

There is also other type of trinity which may be called trinity of lower order, consisting of I The Spirit, II The Soul and III The Body. Man is an embodiment of this trinity, or rather, man is this trinity since he consists of this.[2] It has, however, to be noted that Plotinus does not regard these trinities to be either rigid or exclusive[3]

The body is a sensory organisation, it is perceived by the senses. It interpretes the world through sensation. The soul interpretes the world through discursive thought, through mind as a spatial and temporal order. It is the spiritual perception or intuitive knowledge through which alone spirit could be known. Spiritual perception alone leads us towards the Real.[4]

There is also a trinity of attributes of the Absolute. The attributes are Goodness, Beauty and Truth. Though they are attributes of the Absolute, the Absolute is not determined by them.[5]

Of the three constituents of the trinity, the Absolute appears to be of utmost importance. The Absolute has been variously named by Plotinus as the One, Being, Godhead and the Great Spirit.[6] The One is not an indication of any number. It is, in fact, a negation of it. It transcends the sprit, the spiritual worlds[7] and all existences.[8] The Absolute is not divorced from the Spirit. It is unknown to us. It is knowable only through intuition, not through reason or thought.

It is ever-complete, perfect. There is no teleology in the One, the Absolute. The nature of the intuition, spiritual intuition is beyond description.[9]

Elaborating the status of the Absolute Plotinus points out that it is basically infinite,[10] beyond causality and is independent.[11] There is, however, hierarchy in Reality,[11] a linked hierarchy from the Absolute to the matter[12]

The Absolute, the One is the first principle.[13] It is the true intellect.[14] It is simultaneously the Being and the Intellect.[16] Plotinus believes that this true intellect i.e. One and Being are one. The Being is eternal, transcends time and is different from the body. The duality between the different principles in trinity is apparent and not real.[17] There is always unity under the apparent duality.[18]

At times he also says that the Being and the One are not the same. The Being is the first derivative of the one.[19]

In fact, it appears that even the One is not the ultimate Reality in the divine hierarchy. He clearly states that the ultimate Reality is beyond the One[20] This however, does not diminish the importance of the One in his scheme. The One is self-fulfilled, it is Super God, transcending all other goods. It is true wisdom, unity. Importance is diversity.[21] Plotinus points out that intellectual knowledge of the One is not possible.[22] The One does not know even itself.[23] Whatever is, is One. It is the unity of all.[24] Men is bound by this unity.[25] Though it is the unity of all it does not mean that it exhausts all, for, as we have seen earlier, the One does not exhaust the ultimate reality.

The philosophical structure of Plotinus consists of a whole containing continuous hierarchy with adequate room for diversity.[26] To know how this One became many is beyond human intellect to know.[27] The many, however, are not the different parts of the One. But rather Its energies.[28] Human thought or speech are unable to grasp the One which is ineffable. Only negative description of it is possible. It is an "inward intellect" from which all emanate.[29]

The second constituent of the divine trinity of Plotinus is the Spirit. It is from the spirt that the individual souls and the universal soul proceed.[30] In Plotinus it is not really the soul but the spirit which is truly real.[31] The reality consists of the trinity of the spirit, spiritual preception and spiritual world.[32] To know the world as it is the prerogative of the spirit only. It alone can do it through the medium of spiritual perception or intuitive knowledge.

Plotinus also talks of the Great Spirit which is similar to the universal soul.[33] The spirit, the spiritual world and the truth are one.[34] The spirit and the being are simultaneously one and different also.[35] Actually they are one activity even though in terms of priority being comes first.[36]

For him, each idea is a spirit.[37] All the thought of the spirit are ideas, the spirit could be deemed to be a totality of ideas.[38] This world of spirit consists of three pairs of opposite categories, i. e. (I) Spirit and being, or thought or thing (II) difference and identity, and (III) stability and movement, or, permanence and change. These opposites ultimately are reconciled in the spiritual world. Plotinus has, however, not clarified the categories consistently.[39] He has also conceived the spiritual world as a Kingdom of Values.[40] The spiritual world, for him, is beyond the spatial limitations[41] though he also says that the undivided spirit is not distinguishable from the absolute.[42] Inge points out that Plotinus does not attach any specific meaning to these terms.[43] For him the spiritual world is one of the ingredients of the triad of the body, the soul and the spirit.[44] Of the three, the spirit is supremely real.[45] Trying to explain the relationship between the spirit and the spiritual world he says that it is not like the one between the subject and the object or the matter or the form.[46] The spiritual world is really real. The mundane world is partially real.

As is clear, unification of experience is necessary for any meaningful knowledge, Plotinus assigns this task to the spirit and the soul. They systematize and coherently order our experience.[47] Plotinus has also thought of Great Spirit which he equals with the One, Godhead etc.[48] There is, however, no clarification how the Great Spirit functions differently from the Universal soul and the Spirit. This Great Spirit is deemed to be the real God of Neoplatonism.[49] He also refers to the Premordial soul whose function and relationship with others remain unspecified.[50]

The Universal Soul—As has been previously noted the soul is the next ingredient of the divine trinity.[51] Plotinus further points out that the universal soul is also the constituent of the trinity.[52] Though the Universal soul is "The Soul of All" it is not an assemblage of all the souls.[53] It is beyond the world, beyond the time and the space. But the world is in it. It is the world-soul. An individual soul can know itself through the medium of universal soul.[54]

The universal soul is said to create the world in the image of the spiritual world and supervise it.[55] This does mean that the world is the replica of the spiritual world. The difference is vast and qualitative.[56] While the world expresses partial reality the spiritual world embodies spiritual reality. It is the energy of the universal soul which descends to the level of matter,[57] Which is at the bottom of the hierarchy of reality as envisaged by Plotinus. He also talks of premordial soul.[58] and the superior soul.[59], It is however, not clear whether the terms are synonymous and different functions have been allotted to them.

The energy of the universal soul pulsates through the entire nature. Plants and minerals express the same energy.[60] The harmony in nature is the harmony of the universal soul.[61] The same harmony exists between the individual soul and the universal soul.[62] Since they carry the same energy and are unitary in nature. All souls originate from the universal soul.[63] It is the soul of all the souls.

The Soul—Soul is also one of the constituents of the divine trinity. There are many souls[64] with separate individualities. The individuality of the soul is not dependent upon its being embodied.[65] The individuality of the soul is unique.[66] One who has a body has a soul. The soul, however,is separable from the body.All souls,as we have noted earlier, originate from the universal soul. They are created and then sent to the world of senses.[67] This however does not mean that they are the parts of the universal soul. They are rather the expressions of the energy of the universal soul. The soul is immortal. It is copassive with itself.[68] It is incorporeal. Body is not.

Unlike the body, the soul is imperishable. It is indivisible.[69] It occupies the place between the phenomenal world and the world of the spirit.[70] Though it originates from the universal soul it is not its function.[71] The soul retains its connection with the universal soul. Plotinus also says that both the individual soul and the universal soul originate from the spirit.[72] The soul is also different from the universal soul. It is the soul who possesses the faculty of reason.[73] It transcends the space and the time.[74]

For Plotinus the body is different from the soul. While the body is perishable the soul is not. The soul is not the body but it penetrates the body.[75] A man comprises of the body, the soul and the spirit.[76] Body perceives the world through senses. Soul interprets the world through mind as a spatial and temporal order. Spirit alone perceives the world as it is through spiritual perception or the intutive knowledge. Elaborating the relation between the body and the soul Plotinus points out that the association of the body with the soul is not permanent. The soul does not need body for its activities.[77] According to him Pneuma is the vehicle of the soul.[78] and even after the separation from the body, the soul does not leave the vehicle. Originally the soul is not evil, the evil is external.[75] Further, he points out that it is the soul which produced all the animals.[76] Reason appears to be a distinguishable mark of a human soul. It is, on account of the intellect that a soul could become divine.[77] The beauty of the soul, for Plotinus, is derived from wisdom[78] which is the true intellect. And this intellect is the first principle from the One.[79] He states that the One is simultaneously intellect and the being. This energy from the essence is what we call, a soul.[80] The soul possesses sensitive power,[84] self-knowledge and intelligence.[82] The relationship between the One and the soul is unique in that they are unitary and yet different from each other.[83] For him, the soul must be free from all the vices to achieve liberation.[84] The liberation may not be achieved in one life. The life of the soul is also not limited to one life only. While the ordinary soul ignorantly passes through the circles of lives the perfect souls govern the universe.[85] Plotinus admits rebirth.[86] A soul can be reborn either in a lower or in a higher life.[87] Soul continues to live after death.[88] The soul does not perish.[89] It is eternal, unitary and distinct individual.[90] Though they imanate from the same source each individual has distinct individuality[91]. For Plotinus, the immortality of the soul is beyond doubt. Man thinks himself immortal[92] There is no need to offer any other proof. It is self-proven.

The World—The soul whether embodied or disembodied, must have a world to live in. For them Plotinus has "created" two worlds, the phenomenal world and the spiritual world. The embodied and the ignorant rest by the phenomenal world while those free from all the vices, perfect souls ascend to the spiritual world. Though the soul originally "belongs" to the spiritual world the extraneous evil drags it down from its high pedestal and binds it to the captivating, yet deviating, lures of the world of the senses.

Plotinus states that the universal soul creates the world in the image of the spiritual world and supervises it.[93] It is populated with the souls who are created by the universal soul and then sent to the world.[94] But even their descent into the world, the world of the senses, is not voluntary. It is not by choice, but by the command of God.[95]

This soul-ridden world of the senses is not unreal.[96] The world order is rational.[97] It is certainly not an illusion, a mere appearance.[98] The reality it represents is not the highest. It may be deemed to be of a lower order.[99] It is not a non-entity. The cycle of the world goes on endlessly.[100] The external world is produced by the divine mind.[101] The world is a continuous process wherein created souls are endlessly despatched.[102] Not only the creation and the despatch of the souls are dependent upon the will of the God even the creation of the world itself is dependent upon God. The nature is produced by the superior soul.[103] and life of nature aspires towards higher activity.[104] The world, however, is said to be perpetual.[105] Thus both the world and the inhabitants of the world of senses are created by the command of God.

The spiritual world—As has been noted earlier the spirit is one of the constituents of the divine trinity.[106] The spirit, the spiritual world and the truth are one.[107] The spiritual world is a world of spirits. It is not created out of the spirit.[108]. It is more real than the world of senses, the phenomenal world.[109] It is limitlessly expansive.[110] The real place of the soul is not the phenomenal world but the spiritual world for, the soul is nothing else than the energy of the spirit.[111] The soul is really a stranger in the phenomenal world.[112] As has been noted a soul can free itself from the shackles of vices and enter into the spiritual world which is its true abode.

All the attributes[113] of the spirit are also the attributes of the spiritual world.[114] The relationship between the spirit and the spiritual world is not like the one between the subject and the object or like the one between the matter and the form.[115] There appears functional unity between them. The spiritual world, however, is not the highest reality. Higher to it is the Absolute which transcends both the spirit and the spiritual world[116] It is not possible to know about the spiritual world through reason.[117] The knowledge of the spiritual world transcends the limits of the human reason.

Reson and the Intellect—Philosophy is claimed to be a reasoned approach to grasp and systematize what is deemed to be real. Plotinus has accepted reason as being an effective medium so as to have proper understanding of philosophy as a quest for Reality. He does not, however, think that though useful, the reason can lead us to liberation.

For him, reason is the power of the soul and the spirit is beyond the reason,[118] i. e. it is not possible to know the spirit with the aid of the reason. The reasoning faculty has self-consciousness.[119] This self consciousness is a consciousness of externality.[120] Thus consciousness of externality is possible on account of the reason which is exclusive to the soul. The reason is, as we have seen, a faculty of the soul, it is not higher than the soul.[121]

The reason has also its limitations. The spiritual world transcends the reason.[122] Reason cannot be of any help to enter into the world of the spirits. Though the value of the logic is not under-estimated it is also not exalted at the cost of spiritual insight. For Plotinus, it is a prelinary, but not a perfect vehicle towards liberation.[123]

He distinguishes between the reason and the intellect. While reason is limited to a soul and unable, by itself, to fathom the depth of ultimate reality, the intellect is true wisdom.[124] It is equivalent to the One, Good, Being, the first principle.[125] Thus it is clear that there is qualitative difference between the intellect and the reason. The soul needs the help of intellect to usher into the spiritual world. The intellect itself is self-subsistent.[126] Intellect is almost highest spiritual reality in terms of hierarchy. It, however, does not mean that they are divorced from each other. The soul is not cut off from the intellect. On the contrary, it is the intellect which really induces the soul to realise its divinity.[127] The intellect exists eternally.[128] It is not a mere sensory perception. While the world of sense is limited to one place only the world of intellect is omnipresent.[129] It is self-fulfilled.[130] Plotinus says that the inward intellect is the source of all.[131] From it emanates all the rest, the various hierarchical expressions of the One.

According to Plotinus there are two types of intellectual perceptions. In one type of perception subject and object are identified. It is primarily intellective. We cannot perceive intellectually the One; the Good: for they are simple: there is no dichotomy of the subject and the object between them. The other type is one where there is such a difference. Plotinus believes that intellect is necessary for liberation.

He has also distinguished between the pure and partial intellect. He has attached more importance to pure intellect.[132] But he does not believe even the pure intellect to be the last state for him, "prior to intellect is more excellent."[133] Thus it would be clear that the intellect is deemed to be a qualitatively higher state beyond the reason which is the sole power of the soul, and, unless the intellect helps the soul out of the phenomenal infirmities, the soul cannot achieve liberation.

Liberation—The ultimate aim of life is to achieve liberation. All the rest is secondary. Liberation is freedom from ignorance. It is an ecstatic state,[134] a rare experience.[135] It is the "vision of the One" which brings about boundless peace and contentment.[136] In it soul knows its true nature, finds it ultimate solace and original home, free from the tormenting imbalances of the ephemeral world.

It is the fundamental doctrine of Neo-Platonism that we can know the unknowable only because we are, in our deepest, unknowble.[137] A soul cannot 'know' itself, for, knowledge of itself, if it were different from itself, would involve the dichotomy of the subject and the object, which unless surpassed, intuition or primarily intellective perception would not be possible, and without such a perception 'knowledge' of itself would not be possible; for, liberation is a 'knowledge' of indentity, of unity, of basic oneness. A soul must be free from all the vices in order to be qualified to achieve liberation, to reach the Godhead who "dwelleth in the light that one man approaches unto.[138]

The liberation cannot be achieved through reason. Direct spiritual insight or experience is the only way out. Thought cannot help us.[139] Plotinus is primarily amystic and not a mere theoretician. The spiritual experience, wisdom, alone can help us realise the Supreme Truth, the ultimate Reality.This realisation is liberation.It is beyond theOne,[140] an undivulged mystery.[141] It is not the reason or thought but the spiritual experience which alone could bring a soul face to face with its "Father." The Spiritual experience does not come off involuntarily or automatically. One has to pass through intense spiritual processes, free oneself from all the vices.[142] The help of the pure intellect is also necessary.[143] Attainment of liberation is the ultimate aim of all the souls. It is a vision of primal indentity,[144] "Seeing a Sun through solar light" only[145]

God—The liberation is almost Godliness. God also finds important place in the philosophy of Plotinus. God is responsible for the emanation of the many from the One. The whole, the One, the Absolute are God.[146] God creates the world and the process continues endlessly. Its continuity depends upon the will of the God.[147] The souls come to this world at the instance of the God.[148] Eternity is nothing but the God manifesting His own nature.[149] It is not possible for the intellect to know God.[150] Intellect and the soul are not prior to God, they follow Him.[151] Not only this God is prior to and above all.[152]

God creates the matter also.[153] He is beyond the law of causality.[154] Plotinus seems, at times, to distinguish between the God and the Godhead. The Godhead is said to be above God.[155] A **'Divine Dark'**.[156] His God is a state not a person.[157] To know the Godhead is beyond us.[168] He is unknowable. But he recognises the necessity of some concession being granted to accommodate human longing for worshipping Gods, and allows it.[159] Plotinus has also made a distinction between the absolute and the knowable God.[160] The knowable God can be prayed for and worshipped by a devotee, a God to help and to direct a devotee to a righteous path to fulfil his wishes. There are also Gods belonging to mundane spheres.[161] But it appears that such a knowable God is not a Supreme God. A Supreme God is the Godhead which is unknowable and transcends human limitations and the aspirations attached thereto.

Matter—God also creates matter. The world consists of not only souls but also of matter. Creation of the world implies existence of both, the souls and the matter. Just as the creation of the world is endless similarly the matter is also endless. It is a creation of God.[162] The creation of the matter is not in time.[164] It is beyond time and hence endless.

Matter is the lowest degree of creation.[164] There is no difference between the matter and the form,[165] In this respect the matter of Plotinus is different from the matter of Aristotle. It is a relative term,[166] the lowest in the hierarchy of the Real. It is a principle of the evil.[167] As such it cannot produce either the intellect or the soul[168] which are basically spiritual in nature. It is pointed out that plotinus uses the term (i. e. matter) in more than one sense.[169]

Matter is not only timeless, it is infinite also.[170] It is almost omnipresent in the world. All forms are the forms of matter. Since there is no form without matter or rather every form is matter.

It is apparent that for Plotinus, the Reality is hierarchical continuous expression of the Divinity. He conceives the ultimate reality to be a trinity constituted by the Absolute, the Spirit and the Soul. There is identity between them and yet they are different. There is unity and yet diversity.[171] But the diversity is not separation since it is only an apparent diversity. To be specific, the Divinity expresses itself in a triple way; hence there is no real diversity or difference. Thus there is, at the most, a distinction between them but not separation.

The world is also an expression of the same trinity. There is nothing real other than the divinity. Though the matter is said to be an evil principle it is also creation of the God. Both, the souls and the matter are creations. The fall of the soul from its highest abode is dependent upon God, for, the God sends the soul to this ephemeral world. The soul, however, is free to seek reentry into the world of of spirit and enjoy the spiritual bliss.

This accession of the soul into the spiritual world becomes possible when it becomes completely free from all the vices. To be free from the vices a soul has to pass through spiritual training, for, mere intellectual knowledge is inadequate for the purpose. In this respect logic, though useful, has its limitations. For Plotinus Logic is not an exercise at a formal consistency of a human thought, but a helpful aid, though limited in scope and effectiveness, towards the realisation of the spiritual bliss. For him dialectic is a study of the first principle leading to an intuitive wisdom.[172] The true knowledge is wisdom and wisdom implies spiritual wisdom. Reason cannot see the world as it is. It is not unitary.[177] It has limited perspective. To transcend the limits of reason is invitable for a soul if it chooses to realise its original status, its true abode, a unity which surpasses all the pulls of ignorance.

Critical Evaluation

Plotinus, a post-platonian thinker has attempted to build up his philosophical system coherently. As a profound thinker, he has travelled deep into the realms of the fundamentals of philosophy, secured insight into them trying to weave the interrelated element into a tangible whole, and presented to the world the results of his valuable explorations in this field with the innate conviction of a realised soul.

The system of Plotinus consists of the basic trinity of which the absolute, the spirit and the soul constitute the ingredients.They are eternal,fundamental. They are distinct but not separate. Distinction, however, is not an indication of any division between them because there is also a thread of unity amongst them all.

However, in actual presentation of the various aspects of the basic trinity Plotinus seems to have compromised their distinct eternality. He has relegated all of them to the secondary position in comparison to some other principles so that their fundamentality or eternality appear more apparent than real.

Is the divine trinity of Plotinus really basic in the sense of a constitution of the three eternally distinct though unitary principles of Reality ? His elaboration of the constituents does not bear out his claim. The absolute,the spirit and the soul do not appear to be distinct and eternal constituents of the trinity.

Neither the trinity nor the constituents there of appear to be either eternal or distinct together. They are neither fundamental principles nor are they supremely real.

The Absolute, to start with, is not the Absolute. Plotinus has named the Absolute also as the One, Being, Godhead, Great Spirit,[174] God, Whole.[175] Thus the Absolute is deemed to be the highest expression of reality. But then he also says that the Absolute, which is one, is not the ultimate reality. The ultimate reality surpasses the One, the Absolute.[176] Thus the supreme reality is not the Absolute. It ranks lower to the ultimate Reality which transcends it. A clearer view would have been helpful to ward off such glaring difficulties. It is not only the Absolute even the Spirit could not logically be deemed to be either fundamental or eternal on the basis of his elaborations. The spirit does not appear to have either any independent or simultaneous status with the Absolute or the Being; for, the Being in terms of priority comes first.[177] It appears to be derivative of the Absolute and not its simultaneous, distinct and eternal companion.

Similar difficulties occur in respect of the relation between the spirit and the Being. While at a place he says that the world of the spirit consists of the Spirit and the Being which are opposing categories, he proceeds to say that the opposing categories including the one referred above are ultimately reconciled into the spiritual world.[178] Is the world of spirits different from or lower than the spiritual world ? If it is we do not know how it is so. If, however, it is not so, how the world of spirits which consists of the opposing categories simultaneously reconciles them in itself remains unexplained.

The world of spirit is spiritual in nature. How and if it is different from the spiritual world we do not know. We also do not know if they are the same entity named differently.

Plotinus further says that the thoughts of spirit are ideas, and each idea is a spirit, that the spirit could be deemed to be a totality of ideas. If it is a totality of ideas it implies that it is not a unitary whole but only a conglomoration in which case it could not possibly unitarily supervise the souls, since it is not itself unitary in nature on account of being a mere assemblage of ideas.

Besides, how the spirit entertains a "thought" ? Is this thought different from the 'human thought' ? Or is it the 'same' thought ? If the 'thought' is the same, the spirit and the soul appear almost identical since the power of thought, of reason is the distinctive quality of the soul only. If, however, the 'thought' of the spirit is different from the human thought we do not know how is it so. If the spirit becomes synonymous with the soul the entire structure of trinity is basically altered.

Besides, we do not know the difference between the 'undivided' spirit and the 'divided' spirit. The undivided spirit is indistinguishable from the Absolute. What then is the status and the function of the divided spirit ? How are they related to the body, the spirit, etc. is not made out clearly.

There is also no clarification regarding the relation between the Spirit and the Great Spirit. Are the Spirit and the Great Spirit the same ? The term, Great Spirit is used to connote the spirit, the universal soul, and the One also. The same ambiguity is apparent in case of other terms also. God, for example expresses Godhead, the Absolute and even the Reality transcending the Absolute. The term is also used to denote the devotee's personal God. This has interfered with the clarity and consistency of his exposition.

The One is an important principle of the trinity. It is, said to transcend the spiritual world. If it is so, then the reality which consists of the trinity of the Spirit, spiritul perception and the spiritual world ranks below the One. But Plotinus also states that the One, the Absolute is not divorced from the spirit. How he justifies transcendence of the One beyond the spiritual world simultaneously accepting the identity with the spiritual world is a constituent is not clear.

It is also said that the One is one with the Being. It is equated with the Being. But the being is also said to be a derivative of the One. How the derivation simultaneously becomes identical with that from which is derived requires clarification. Plotinus, however, says that there is always unity under the apparent duality.[179] But if the principles are deemed to be structurally one prohibiting any duality, a unity in duality becomes an inapplicable description.

The One, the Absolute is also a true intellect.[180] The One is equated with the Being and the intellect.[181] At the same time intellect is also shown to be a first principle from the One, its derivative.[182] Simultaneous equation of the derived with its origin questions the derivation itself unless the derivation is shown to be at least principally distinct from its source. Plotinus also talks of inward intellect. How it is different from true intellect is not clear.

Similar is the [illegible]on of God. For Plotinus God is one, Absolute[183] and abo[illegible] Since the One is also the Intellect it implies that the God is Intellect also. But plotinus has also indicated[185] that the intellect follows God meaning thereby that God is prior to intellect, The great spirit, i. e. the Godhead[186] or the real God[187] which means the supreme Reality is ranked below by being shown to be equivalent to the universal soul[188] which is derived from the the Spirit.[189]

While the One is God[190] or the Godhead, the Godhead is also said to be above God.[191] Thus the God and the Godhead which are the same principle unequals itself. It is to be noted that they are not two different principles. They are one and the same principle named differently, and yet the one is said to transcend the other. This defies understanding.

There is also no clarification how the inward intellect which is the source of all, is different from the intellect which is the one, or from the true intellect, the wisdom. Also, we do not know how the partial intellect is different from the human reason. Is inward intellect a pure intellect, and reason a partial intellect ?

Plotinus refers to a Divine Mind as a producer of the external world. How the divine mind is different from the God who creates the world and the universal soul is not explained. Do they cannote the same reality ? They do not appear to do so, because the God excels the universal soul. The nature of the divine mind is not sufficiently clear.

From the account of the Philosophy of Plotinus it is clear that he has not specified the meanings of the terms he has used in his elaborations. The One is known differently. There are various names attributed to it. Super God, Godhead, God, Great Spirit, Undivided Spirit, Intellect, Being, Whole, First principle, Good, are all its names. The terms do not seem to have been used with one specified meaning.

The connotation of the terms like spirituality and divinity also lacks clarity. We do not know what actually is the meaning of the term divinity or spirituality. Is spirituality different from the divinity ? Are they one, or, different from each other ? Except that the terms probably refer to some experience which is believed to transcend the limits of sensory experience open to normal human being, we are not deemed qualified to known anything about it.

Even in respect of other principles the position is not much different. The distinction between the Spirit, the undivided spirit and the great spirit is not clear. The spirit, it appears creates the universal soul and the universal soul creates the world and the individuals souls. The souls then create the animals. God is also [illegible] to create the world.

Whether God creates it through the universal soul as referred above or independent of it or along with it we do not know.

The creation of the world is dependent upon the will of God. Matter is also His creation. How the created matter is endless, beyond time and infinite is a mystery. The interpretation of 'creation' of Plotinus as offered by W.R. Inge[192] is not satisfactory. To deem the creation as being subordinate to and dependent on God does not follow from the acceptance of any dateless creation unless the connotation of the term creation is totally reversed.

To conceive of an element being eternally subservient to some high principle does not necessitate or justify acceptance of its creation. It could be argued that[194] Plotinus meant emanation, rather than creation, of the hierarchical principles wherein the principles could be as timeless and simultaneous with the Supreme Reality, that it is a logical and not chronological order. Such a view, however, fails to explain their sequence, perishability and, desirability and possibility of the lower aspiring to become the higher.

Plotinus believes the world to be partially real and the spiritual world fully real. Thus the reality of the world of senses is of a lower order.[194] Since the world is of a lower order or partially real, soul aspires to ascend to that which is fully real. And the fully real is the spiritual world which constitutes the divine trinity along with the spirit and the truth. This divine trinity is however not the highest reality. The absolute reality transcends both the spirit and the spiritual world.

The highest trinity of Plotinus turns out to be not a constituent and eternal trinity at all. In fact, there are more than one trinity. The trinity of the absolute, the spirit and the soul has in common two principles i. e. the absolute and the soul with the trinity of the lower order which includes body in addition to them. Thus actually it is the body that makes the difference between the higher and lower orders of reality. Plotinus also thinks of a trinity of the spirit, the spiritual world and the truth and calls it a divine trinity as in case of the trinity of the higher order i. e. consisting of the absolute, the spirit and the soul.

Of the three constituents of the trinity i.e. the absolute, spirit and the soul, neither of them turns out to be either constituent or fundamental. The soul is already declared to be not real, it is said to be a creation of the universal soul or the God. The spirit too is derived from the One, the absolute. The absolute does not appear to be a constituent of the other two since it transcends the spirit and the soul.

Is soul an eternally distinct principle or a temporary phenomenon ? We do not find in Plotinus any consistent indication on this issue. Despite his repeated assertions about the imperish ability and immortality of the soul it is apparent that the soul cannot be so unless it is uncreated. Creation implies decay, and, timeboundness. Why has the desireless God chosen to create the souls and the matter we do not know. Plotinus avers that the spirit is real, the soul is not. The souls are neither independent nor timeless entities. Their fate is decided by God. They stand or fall at the command of God. Such parasites could not claim independence or immortality inconsistence with their creation.

Is even the Absolute, then the highest Reality ? It is not so; for Plotinus has conceived the reality which transcends even the Absolute. Thus it follows that the fundamental trinity of Plotinus is not a trinity of simultaneous, fundamental and equipoised. constituents but only a juxtaposition of gradatory, unequal expressions of reality

Even the trinity of the lower order i. e. consisting of the spirit, the soul and the body is neither imperishable nor constituent. The body is perishable. The soul being a creation has to decay in course of time. Only the spirit remains as the derivative of the Absolute. But even the Absolute as we have seen is not underived. How the spirit functions in the body ? Does it control the soul and the body ? Upon death, the soul, along with its vehicle is separated from the body. What becomes of the spirit then ? Where does it ultimately choose to proceed ? The individual souls are many. Their individualities are unique, he says. What then is the position of the spirit amongst the souls ? Is it the one spirit in all or different spirits in different souls ? If the spirit is one in all the souls its functions therein are not clear. If they are many, how the spirits along with souls function in each body is not made clear to us. How the function of the spirit differs from that of the soul requires classification. If, however, they work harmoneously, the basis of difference amongst them has to be clearly indicated. In the absence of any such basis they are prone to be viewed as being identical with the souls endangering their superior, independent and distinct status.

Plotinus talks of Pneuma as a vehicle of the soul which it retains even after the body is separated from it. What is the nature of this vehicle if it is neither a soul nor a body ? It is a hybrid combination of any other matter ? What is the function of the vehicle and relationship with the soul and the matter ? Does the vehicle faithfully follow the soul during the rebirth or at the liberation ? All this remains ambiguous.

If ultimately, in view of the above, it follows that the trinity does not consist of equal partners and there is a principle more fundamental and transcending them it implies that the trinity is not the highest reality in the philosophy of Plotinus. It does not consist of the ultimate simultaneous constituents forming part of a single whole allowing distinction amongst themselves, though not separation. The ultimate Reality transcends all and from it emanate all the rest.

It is more consistent to say that the Supreme Reality expresses itself successively through the Absolute named differently. From it emanates the world of spirits or the spiritual world. The spirit creates the universal soul which in turn creates the world of matter and individual souls. The individual souls are said to create animals thereafter, How the individual souls do it we do not know. The Philosophical scheme of Plotinus is hierarchical, rather evolutional. He, however, does not seem to think of it as evolutional.

The difficulties in the elaborations of Plotinus could be dealt with on the lines suggested above, i.e. by accepting the various elements as being evolutionary in nature and not eternal in themselves. The insistence on imperishability and timelessness of the elements have to be abandoned unless we accept all the grades in the hierarchy to be equally eternal though expressing different orders of reality; and for this, the theory of their creation may have to be done away with; for, creation implies creation in time; and that which is timeless creation is a misnomer. An acceptance of an evolutionary temporality of the hierarchy may justify the creation and ultimate unitary liberation of the soul.

Such an acceptance need not compromise underlying identity, whether actual or potential, of all the relevant, elements. On the contrary it would strengthen it. It is upon such a view that the soul and the world, even matter could be deemed to be timeless, endless if the evolution thereof is accepted as only an instance of an endless cycle of eternal hierarchical evolution. Then the entire scheme of reality turns out to be a permanently graded actualisation of divinity even embracing the evil as being a constituent phenomenon expressive of the same underling divinity. Matter then need not be singled out as being as Plotinus has done. The evil becomes an inalienable ingredient of reality, unless it is shown to be basically different from it. Since Plotinus does not admit any reality other than the one of which all the rest categories are mere expressions, his treatment of the evil follows the same monistic line of thinking wherein the evil is "somehow" accepted but not explained.

Is the hierarchy of Plotinus an eternal feature of Reality ? He appears to believe it is. But such a view tends to compromise his contention that the world, soul, matter, universal soul, even the One are creations of or emanations from the ultimate reality, that they are at the command of God. Should mercy of God choose to decide differently they could be lost in Him evaporating their distinct, eternal status. Is then the hierarchy temporal, allowing the supreme Reality to make or unmake or change it at its discretion ? To be consistent Plotinus has to accept the temporality of the hierarchy and accept it as only one of the possible cycles of divine expression or dispense with the theory of creation compromising their timeless eternality.

In this context the difficulty faced by W. R. Inge[195] is not really insurmountable. When Plotinus believes the Absolute to be transcending the limits of human thought and mind it certainly is beyond the attributes attributed to it. He is quite consistent in this respect. The attributes of personal God attributed to such an impersonal and thought-transcending principle could only be deemed to be a feeble expression of a limiting mind trying to describe the indescribable. The description does not exhaust the Absolute nor does it compromise its indescribability.

All this, however raises some fundamental questions regarding the "knowability" of the reality and the function of philosophy. Here Plotinus belongs to the category which believes the Reality to be incomprehensible to the sensory mind. We can "know" the reality though the mind cannot "know" it. Knowledge of reality transcends the human mind. For him the philosophy is not purely a thought-based attempt to unravel the unknown. It is an innate realisation of the thought-transcending spiritual reality to be achieved through spiritual practices. It is the liberation from the pulls of ignorance. The liberation is the goal of Philosophy and liberation is not an attainment through logical, thinking only. Logic, though useful, is not sufficient for the task. He has described liberation variously, as being a vision of the One or as being the state beyond the One. His Ultimate appears to be the vision of primal indentity. This confirms Plotinus as basically a monist.

An acceptance of a reality transcending the mind, surpassing logical contenations has often raised difficulties for some in the history of philosophy. Is such a reality possible or knowable ? Is it rational ? The controversies continue till today. In fairness to Plotinus it has to be said that he is very much clear in this respect. He is basically a mystic believing in the thought-transcending, realisation-based reality. Of the two questions, is such a reality possible ? It could be 'logically' argued that the possibility of such a reality cannot be called in question unless the instruments prescribed there of are primarily and honestly applied and tested. To scoff at such a reality without undergoing the discipline prescribed therefor is like a blind man refusing to accept the existence of light simultaneously insisting that sight is not necessary to 'See' it.

Besides, to insist upon philosophy as only an analysis of language could at the most be a point of view which need not ostracise, to be reasonable, other views of philosophy. To those whom it is a quest of reality have, at least, equal justification to put up their case unless justification implies only amenability to know logical principles. To believe so is to restrict, without justification, the richness, catholicity and possiblities of human experience to that expanse only to which we are normally accustomed. It is to defy reason to insist that experience must conform to reason only. Therefore, Plotinus is very much "reasonable" in advocating his structure of philosophy, which, as he says, stems from his vision of reality; from the spiritual insight into a depth of reality which transcends known human limitations.

Plotinus is not a subjectivist, though a mystic. He is a realist who believes in the dichotomy of the subject and the object and in the knowledge which is a product thereof. Knowledge is not totally mind-dependent. It is objective though in the final analysis he believes in the ultimate knowledge, realisation of the transcendent reality as being a state wherein this dischotomy itself is trancended. He is thus an objective realist. It appears that he accepts the dichotomy in relation to the world of senses but does not accept it at the level of the "communion" with the highest spiritual attainment.

The question whether such a transcendent reality is "rational" is equally important. Is mystical phiolosophy "rational" ? Many are prone to believe that such an acceptance would render it a purely subjectve phenomenon without any objective content therein. A purely subjective reality would endanger, they say, the communicability of mutual experience and we would be led to a world where everybody is a stranger to the other and any schematic understanding would be impossible as is believed to be possible under normal sensory organisation.

As it is, even those who believe in human reason to be the only dependable instrument to know the Truth do not arrive at the same or even similar tangible conclusions. Therefore it appears to be a too tall a claim to claim that human reason alone leads us to any reliable and/or unanimous, ultimate scheme of all the experiences which are amenable to human mind.

If rationality is a conformity with the commonly known structure of human logic and its applications than Plotinus is not probably rational. But to restrict, dogmalically our experience to the known logical limitations and refuse to accept any probable trans-sensory experience without submitting to the discipline it enjoins on the researchers for the purpose is irrational. There is no justifiable reason to limit rationality to one kind of experience and refuse to accept any other kind as rational. Thus seen Plotinus is as rational as any other honest thinker.

He is one of the most prominent mystic-philosophers of post-Platonic era. In him we find the depth of a thinker and the vision of a seer. His philosophy is an expression of his vision. He has attempted to translate it into a logical structure to which we are accustomed. As happens in all such cases the expression eludes the vision and the theoretical adumbrations thereof are occasionally threatened with logical impossibilities. Whether to reject as totally anti-rational or irrational such logical difficulties which are supposed to be inherent in some such cases-not on account of any basic contradiction in the vision itself but because of inability of thought to express faithfully that which is presumably transcendent to it; or accept it as rational on the basis of relevant realisation and the logical possibility thereof-depends upon whether we choose to shut the doors of human experience to what is known to the majority of human minds or whether we believe that the dimensions of logic and human experience pass beyond sensory limitations. There is no "reason" to deny such a possibility. The access of Plotinus to it could be as objective and consistent as any other theory claiming allegiance to formal logic.

The broad lines on which his elaborations could be presented in a more consistent way have been already suggested. There appears to be a marked similarity between the views of Plotinus and Sri Aurobindo the mystic-philosopher of Pondicherry who left the world only recently. Especially the concept of trinity in Plotinus and of triplicity in Sri Aurobindo deserve closer scrutiny. Such an attempt here is neither possible nor contemplated. It would pass beyond the limit and purpose of this paper. It could be a subject of a separate paper.

Plotinus influenced the thinking of the post-contemporary world. Even as a man he possessed superb moral character and deep spiritual insight; led a life of a realised person scrupulously discharging his worldly duties in tune with his highest spiritual ideals. He was a thinker with a vision and a mission, and did the task with the zeal of an enlightened reformer. His concept of trinity forms the core of his philosophical thinking which, it was the humble task of this paper to formulate and to evaluate.

Reference

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid P. 123, 124,
5. Ibid V. II P. 80, 81.
6. Ibid P. 125.
7. Ibid P. 108.
8. Ibid P. 109.
9. Ibid P. 112-114.
10. Ibid P. 116.
11. Ibid P. 121.
12. Ibid P. 118.
13. Ibid P. 120.
14. Plotinus : "Select Works of Plotinus." Translated by Thomas Taylor London G. Bell & Sons Ltd. York House, Portugal Street, 1911 P. 184.
15. Ibid.
16. "Select Works" P. 254.
17. "Select Works" P. 193.
18. Ibid P. 194-196.
19. Ibid P. 253.
20. Ibid P. 339-340.
21. Ibid. P. 312.
22. "Select Works" P. 297.
23. Ibid.

24. Ibid P. 300.
25. Ibid P. 302.
26. Ibid P. 255.
27. Ibid P. 278.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid P. 280-287.
30. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. I. P, 213.
31. Ibid V. II P. 38-39.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid P. 82.
34. Ibid P. 41.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid P. 45.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid P. 56.
39. Ibid P. 58-61.
40. Ibid V. II P. 74.
41. Ibid. V. I. P. 163.
42. Ibid V. II P. 46.
43. Ibid P. 48.
44. Ibid V. I. P. 123.
45. "We think of spirit as something supremely real but incorporeal invisible and timeless. . . . . .Spirit, Soul and Body are three parts of our nature and to put spirit at the highest place. Ibid V. II P. 38.
46. Ibid V. II P. 46.
47. Ibid P. 161, 162.
48. Ibid 125.
49. "The Great Spirit as the manifestation of the ineffable Godhead in all its attributes is the God of Neoplatonism. This fact is obscured both by the completeness with which it is divested of all anthropomorphic attributes, and by the mystical craving for union with Godhead itself which has been commonly supposed to be the starting point and the Goal of this philosophy" W. R. Inge 'The Philosophy of Plotinus' V. II P. 82, 83.
50. Select Works P. 222.
51. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. I. P. 122.
52, Ibid 205.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid P. 208.

56. Ibid P. 209.
57. "The energy of the Universal Soul descends as low as vegetable life and slumbers even in inorganic nature" Ibid.
58. "Select Works" P. 222.
59. Philosophy ot Plotinus V. I. P. 159.
60. Ibid P. 240.
61. Ibid P. 244.
62. Ibid P. 240.
63. "Select Works" P. 214-215.
64. "Select Works" P. 189.
65. The Philosophy of Plotinus by W. R. Inge V. I. P. 215.
66. Ibid V. II P. 85.
67. Ibid V. I. P. 254.
68. "Select Works" P. 214-215, Also, "The soul at the centre not at the summit, of Plotinus philosophy. It stands midway between the phenomenal world, of which it is the principle, and the world of Spirit which is its principle. But the soul is not only an intermediary between appearance and reality, It is the point where all [converging and diverging lines meet;' It binds extremes together;. . . . . . within the soul all metaphysical principles are represented" philosophy of Plotinus P. 202-203.
69. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. I. P. 213.
70. Ibid P. 202-203.
71. Ibid P. 213.
72. At one place he says that it is an energy thrown off by the Spirit. Ibid P. 204.
73. Ibid V. II P. 37.
74. Ibid V. I P. 177 "The Soul can transcend them, because true home of the soul is the eternal world" It is all pervasive. It is partible and impartible. "The nature, however, which is at once partible and impartible, which we say is soul, is not one like that which is continued, having another and another part; but is partible indeed, because it is in all the parts of that in which it subsists; and impartible because the whole of it is in all the parts, and likewise in each of the parts." "Selected Works" P. 201.
75. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. I P. 218.
76. Ibid P. 123.
77. Ibid P. 236.
78. Ibid P. 219.
79. "Select Works" P. 155.

80. Ibid P. 164.
81. Ibid P. 179.
82. Ibid. P. 184.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid P. 254.
85. Ibid P. 258.
86. Ibid P. 259.
87. Ibid P. 300.
88. Ibid P. 214.
89. Ibid P. 304.
90. Ibid P. 215. 226, 273.
91. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. II P. 32-33 also "Souls that have failed to raise themselves above (the ordinary level of) humanity, but who have nevertheless respected that characteristic in themselves are reborn into a human body; those who have only lived a life of sensation, pass into animal bodies, or even, if they have been entirely without energy, if they have lived entirely vegetative existence are condemned to live the life of a plant" Taylor. Preface to "Select Works of Plotinus P. XXVIII.
92. "Select Works" P. 318.
93. Philosophy of Plotinus V.II P. 24.
94. Ibid P. 23.
95. "For it is not possible that the same things should happen to each individual, since they are much distant from each other, in the times of their generation, the places in which they reside, and the dispositions of the soul." Plotinus in "Select Works" P. 68.
96. "Select Works" P. 155.
97. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. I P. 208.
98. Ibid P. 254.
99. Ibid P. 255.
100. Ibid P. 261.
101. "Nature is the rational and therefore unvarying expression of a perfect intelligence" quoted from "The Neoplatonists": Whittaker P. 91. "Footprints of the universal soul can be traced in Bodies." quoted by Ward, in "The Realm of Ends." P. 251 from Ibid P. 162.
102. Ibid P. 253 Also "It follows that the scientific view of the world is reality not merely appearance. Only we must not make the mistake of supposing that the phenomenal world is real apart from the soul that perceives it or that the soul registers passively a kingdom of facts external to itself. The

world of the Scientists is demonstrably spiritual not material. What is real in it is not the aggregation of ponderable matter but the laws which soul both makes and finds there" Ibid P. 162.

103. Ibid P. 194-199.
104. Ibid P. 189. Also ' The world order evolves regularly till the end of an astronomical cycle, and then the whole process is repeated, perhaps exactly. When all the seminal Logoi have produced individuals, according to the plans of the universal soul a new world order will begin. Thus the history of the universe consists of an infinite number of vast but finite schemes which have each of them, a beginning, middle and end."
105. Ibid P. 166. Possibly, as noted earlier by the universal soul.
106. Ibid P. 254.
107. Ibid P. 159.
108. Ibid P. 155.
109. Ibid P. 144.
110. Ibid V. II P. 38.
111. Ibid. P. 41.
112. Ibid P. 42.
113. Ibid V. I. P. 194-199.
114. Ibid P. 203.
115. Ibid P. 204.
116. Ibid.
117. i. e. the One, the Good and the Beautiful Ibid V.II P. 104.
118. "This reality is neither an independently existing external universe nor a subjective construction thrown off by the mind. It is constituted by the unity in duality of the spiritual faculty and the spiritual world which it "beholds' in exercising its selfconsciousness. Spirit and the spiritual world imply and involve each other, neither has its existence apart from its correlative. If we call the spiritual world the self externalisation of spirit, we must add that with equal propriety,"Spirit may be called the self consciousness of the spiritual world" Ibid P. 123-124.
119. Ibid V. II P. 46.
120. Ibid P. 108.
121. Ibid P. 107.
122. Ibid V. I. P. 234.
123. Ibid P. 236.
124. Ibid. P. 237.

125. Ibid V. II P. 37.
126. Ibid. P. 107.
127. Ibid.
128. "Select Works" P. 184.
129. Ibid.
130. Plotinus : "Soul indeed must reason about (in order to perceive) intellect, and must investigate from itself what the nature of it is but the intellect beholds itself without reasoning about itself for it is always present with itself." 'Select Works' P. 273.
131. 'Select Works' P. 184.
132. Ibid P. 160.
133 Ibid P. 195.
134. Ibid P. 273.
135. Ibid P. 283.
136. Ibid P. 305.
137. Ibid.
138. The Philosophy af Plotinus V. II. P. 153.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid P. 159.
141. Ibid P. 132.
142. Ibid P. 125.
143. "Select Works" P. 173.
144. Ibid P. 339-340.
145. Ibid P. 320.
146. Ibid P. 304.
147. Ibid.
148. "When the Soul raises itself to the realm of Sprit, 'it will not at first see itself at the All, but being unable to find a stopping place to fix it own limits and determine where it ceases to be itself. it will give up the attempt to distinguish itself from the Universal Being, and will arrive at the All without change of place, abiding there, where the All has its home'. "quoted from 'The Philosophy of Plotinus' V. P. P. 203.
149. "Select Works" P. 289.
150. Ibid P. 312. Also the Philosophy of Plotinus V. I. P. 216.
151. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. I. P. 144.
152. Ibid P. 255.
153. Ibid V. II P. 93-97.
154. "Select Works" P. 173.
155. Ibid.
156. Ibid. P. 306-307.

157. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. I. P. 156.
158. "Select Works" P. 307.
159. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. II P. 162.
160. Ibid P. 160.
161. Ibid P. 161-162.
162. Ibid P. 109.
163. Ibid P. 195.
164. Ibid P. 112.
165. "These, however, (i. e. the mundane spheres) are Gods, because they are never deserted by intellect and soul; and are suspended from the premordial soul which is as it were departing (from mundane natures). These, therefore, so far as they are what they are and so far as they are said to look to intellect (are divine) the vision of the soul itself being directed nowhere else than to intellect" Select Works P.P. 222.
166. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. I. P. 136.
167. Ibid P. 144. "Matter was created in order that the–activities of soul and spirit might become actualities. Was creation out of nothing as christianity teaches ? The question has a meaning if creation took place at a point of time; but this is not the doctrine of Plotinus. Eternal creation—creation which has no date—seems to be only another way of saying that the world is lower than God and always dependent on Him. The creation of finite things is going on perpetually; there was never a time when God was not creating" Ibid.
168. Ibid P. 139.
169. Ibid P. 142.
170. Ibid P. 131.
171. Ibid P. 135.
172. 'Select Works' P. 144.
173. W. R. Inge—The Philosophy of Plotinus V. I. P. 140.
174. Plotinus : "But Matter being indefinite, and never at rest with itself, and being borne along to every form, in every direction and easily led everywhere, becomes multitudinous by its generation and transition to all things, and after this manner it possesses the nature of bulk" . . . . "Matter therefore is necessary both to quality and Magnitude, so that it is also necessary for the bodies." 'Select Works' P. 35, 36.
175. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. II P. 204.
176. Ibid P. 107.
177. "The discursive reason has its function in separating, distri-

buting, and recombining the data of experience. For this reason its world is not wholly real. But Nous beholds all things in their true relations without the needs of this process." Ibid P. 37, 38.

178. Philosophy of Plotinus V. II P. 125.
179. 'Select Works' of Plotinus translated by Thomas Taylor P. 312.
180. Ibid P. 339, 340.
181. The Philosophy of Plotinus by W. R. Inge V. II P. 45.
182. Ibid P. 58-61.
183. 'Select Works' P. 194-196.
184. Ibid P. 184.
185. Ibid P. 254.
186. Ibid P. 184.
187. Ibid 312.
188. Ibid P. 306, 307.
189. Ibid P. 173.
190. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. II P. 125.
191. Ibid P. 82, 83.
192. Ibid P. 82.
193. Ibid V. I. P. 213.
194. 'Select Works' P. 312.
195. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. II P. 162.
196. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. I. P. 144.
197. Vide R. Baine Harris "A Short History of Neoplatonism" P. 7.
198. Cyclical destruction and regeneration of the sensible world also militates against any eternal, though ordered, structure of Reality (Vide Philip Merlan : Plotinus assumes that the sensible world is . . . . "Subject to cyclical destruction and regeneration and in each of these worlds the same indistinguishable individuals, for which one idea would suffice would exist." in "The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy" Editor-in-Chief—Paul Edwards. V. 6 P. 353. Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc. The Free Press, New Yosk : Collier Macmillan Publishers London 1967).
199. The Philosophy of Plotinus V. II P. 115-116.

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